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http://www.archive.org/details/elementsofmilitaOOIabarich 


ELEMEE"TS 


OP 


MILITARY  AET  AND  HISTORY; 


COMPRISING 


THE  HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS; 

THE  COMBINATION  OF  THE  ARMS;   AND  THE 

MINOR  OPERATIONS  OF  WAR. 


BY 

ED.  DE  LA  BARRE  DUPARCQ, 

CAPTAIN     OF     ENGINEERS    IN    THE     ARMY     OP     FRANCE, 
PROFESSOR  OP  THE  MILITARY  ART  IN  THE  IMPERIAL  SCHOOL  OP  SAINT-CYR. 


TRANSLATED   AND   EDITED   BY 

BRia.-GEN.  GEORGE  W.  CULLUM, 

CHIEF  OP  STAFF  OF  THE  GENERAL-IN-CIIIEF  OF  THE   ARMIES  OF  THE  ITNITED  STATES; 

LATE  AIDE-DE-CAMP  TO   LIEUTENAKT-GENERAL  SCOTT ;    AND 

CUIKP  OF  STAFF  AND  OF  ENGINEERS  OF  MAJOR  GENERAL  IIALLECK,  WHILE  COMMANDING 

THE  DEPARTMENTS  OF  fuE  MISSOURI  AND  MIS8ISSIPPL 


NEW  YOEK: 
VAN"  NOSTRANTD,  192  BROADWAY, 
1863. 


Enteeed,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  tlie  year  1862,  by 
D.  YAN  NOSTEAND, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York. 


•  •  •  • 


•  • 


JOHN  F.  TROW, 

Fbimter,  Stbekotvpeb,  and  Elbctbotvpbr, 

60  Greene  Street,  New  York. 


PREFACE  OF  THE  TRANSLATOR.    . 


For  some  years  I  have  been  strongly 
urged  by  many  of  my  army  friends  to  prepare 
a  work  on  Military  Art  and  History,  suited 
to  our  service^  for  which.  I  had  a  large  amount 
of  material;  but  not  feeling  the  same  confi- 
dence in  my  ability  as  those  who  solicited  me 
to  undertake  the  task,  I  shrank  from  it,  from 
time  to  time,  till  the  breaking  out  of  the 
rebellion  of  the  Southern  States,  since  which 
my  arduous  duties  have  precluded  the  possi- 
bility of  preparing  such  a  work,  though  fully 
aware  of  the  importance  of  its  being  under- 
taken by  some  one,  especially  for  the  benefit 
of  our  volunteer  officers,  most  of  whom  have 
not  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  a  military  education. 

I  now  submit  to  our  vast  army  and  the 
public  a  translation  of  the  best  book  on  Mili- 
tary Art  and  History  I  could  find  among  the 
many  excellent  productions  of  the  French  and 
Germans,  and  which  will  be  found  far  better 


4  PREFACE   OF   THE   TRANSLATOE. 

than   any  original  work   I   could   have   pro- 
duced under  existing  circumstances. 

My  time  being  almost  entirely  occupied 
with  important  professional  duties,  I  sought 
the  aid  of  a  competent  translator,  and  was 
truly  fortunate  in  securing  the  assistance  of 
that  ripe  scholar,  Professor  W.  Chauvenet, 
formerly  of  the  U.  S.  Naval  Academy  at  Anna- 
polis, and  now  of  Washington  University,  at 
St.  Louis,  Mo. 

GEOEGE  "W.  CULLUM,  Beig.-Gen., 

Chief  of  Staff  and  Engineers  of  the 

Department  of  the  Mississippi, 

Headquaetees,  Department  of  the  Mississippi, 

Camp  in  Corinth,  Miss.,  July  4:th,  1862. 


PREFACE  OF  THE  EDITOR. 


In  collecting,  under  the  title  of  '^  Elements/^ 
many  of  the  studies  of  Military  Art  and  .His- 
tory, which  my  service  as  Professor  at  the 
Imperial  Special  Military  School  put  it  within 
my  power  to  do,  and  my  particular  labors 
enabled  me  to  improve,  I  do  not  pretend  to 
offer  a  complete  treatise,  for  writing  which  I 
do  not  feel  sufficiently  prepared.  I  wish  sim- 
ply to  publish  essays,  carefully  elaborated,  it 
is  true,  though  imperfect,  and  which  time 
alone  can  improve  by  successive  retouches. 

If  eight  years  of  a  conscientious  professor- 
ship— if  more  than  ten  years  devoted  to  as- 
siduous researches,  to  grave  publications,  all 
relating  to  the  profession  of  arms,  are  guaran- 
tees— I  am  authorized  to  present  this  work  to 
my  chiefs,  to  my  comrades,  and  to  the  pupils 
of  the  school  of  Saint-Cyr.  May  the  latter 
profit  by  it.  May  the  young  officers  espe- 
cially, whose  professor  I  have  been,  welcome  it 


6  PEEFACE   OF  THE   EDITOE. 

as  an  old  friend — one  of  the  youthful^  smiling 
friends  which  they  re-find  with  pleasure  at  all 
periods  of  life.  To  me^  I  confess^  it  recalls 
happy  moments  passed  with  them  in  the  faith- 
ful study  of  an  art  eleven  centuries  old^  and 
which  even  now  exercises  so  much  influence 
over  the  destinies  of  our  glorious  country. 

ED.  DE  LA  BAKKE  DUPAKCQ. 
l5^  October,  1857. 


ELEMEInTTS 


OF 


MILITAEY  AET  AND  HISTORY. 


PKELlMllSrAEY  DEFmiTIONS. 

War  may  be  defined,  a  state  of  armed  struggle 
between  two  nations:  tlie  nation  which  attacks 
makes  offensive  "war,  and  that  which  defends  itself 
sustains  a  defensive  one. 

The  art  of  loar  is  the  art  of  concentrating  and 
employing,  at  the  opportune  moment,  a  superior 
force  of  troops  upon  the  decisive  point. 

An  army  is  a  large  collected  force,  raised  and 
paid  by  a  government. 

An  arm  is  a  union  of  combatants,  having  the  same 
mode  of  action.  Thus,  the  union  of  foot  combatants 
forms  the  infantry  arm;  the  cavalry  arm  comprises 
all  those  who  fight  on  horseback ;  the  artillery  arm 
those  having  the  management  of  ordnance ;  and  the 
engineer  arm  those  charged  with  the  construction, 
attack,  and  defence  of  fortifications.  A  single  kind 
of  combatant  in  each  arm  is  not  sufiicient  for  the  dif- 
ferent circumstances  which  arise  in  war;  experience 


8  PEELIMINAEY   DEFINITIOIfS. 

demonstrates  the  necessity  of  the  following  subdivi- 
sions in  the  several  arms:  Light  and  line  infantry; 
light,  line,  and  reserve  cavalry;  field,  siege,  coast, 
and  mountain  artillery ;  and  in  the  engineers,  sappers 
and  miners. 

In  the  first  three  arms,  the  U7iit  of  force^  or  tac- 
tical unit^  is  the  largest  fraction,  acting  separately, 
under  the  command  of  a  single  chief:  in  the  infantry  it 
is  the  battalion  ;  in  the  cavalry,  the  squadron  ;  in  the 
artillery,  the  battery ;  and  in  the  engineers,  the  com- 
pany. 

The  unit  of  force,  placed  on  the  ground,  has  a 
figure  called  the  formation  or  order.  The  part  of 
the  troop  facing  the  adversary  is  the  front,  the  op- 
posite side  the  o^ear ;  the  lateral  extremities,  the 
flanhs  of  the  formation.  We  call  ranh  the  line  of 
soldiers  parallel  to  the  front ;  and  file,  the  line  of 
men  perpendicular  to  the  same  front.  The  number 
of  ranks  of  a  troop  determine  its  de^tTi. 

Troops  are  not  formed  for  attack  as  for  defence ; 
there  are  deep,  or  ployed  formations,  and  thin,  or  de- 
ployed;  we  understand  by  manoeuvres,  the  move- 
ments for  passing  from  one  to  another  formation. 

The  column  is  a  disposition  of  troops  whose  ele- 
ments remain  placed  parallel  to  each  other,  and  on 
the  same  axis.  When  the  axes  become  different, 
they  are  said  to  be  in  echelons.  We  ordinarily  desig- 
nate the  first  and  last  subdivision  of  a  column  as  its 
head  or  foot 

The  distance  is  the  interval  between  the  foot  of 
one  corps  and  the  bead  of  that  which  follows  it ;  or 


PRELIMINAKY   DEFINITIOI^S.  9 

between  the  toes  of  one  soldier  and  the  heels  of  the 
one  preceding  him.  The  interval  is  the  space  be^ 
tween  the  adjacent  flanks  of  two  troops,  or  of  two 
men  in  the  same  line. 

Troops  placed  upon  the  same  front,  whether  in 
column  or  deployed,  constitute  a  line ;  the  line  may 
be  either /i^Z?  (like  a  wall),  or  with  intervals. 

The  checker 'f or m^  as  its  name  indicates,  is  a  forma- 
tion upon  many  lines,  with  intervals;  the  intervals 
in  each  line  equalling  the  full  spaces ;  and  the  lines 
are  arranged  so  that  the  void  spaces  of  the  one  are 
opposite  the  full  ones  of  the  other. 

An  or^er  is  more  than  a  reunion  of  lines ;  it  is 
the  general  and  combined  disposition  of  troops  of 
different  kinds,  grouped  together  for  the  same 
purpose. 

Tactics  determines  the  best  mode  of  distribut- 
ing, arranging,  and  moving  the  units  of  force.  The 
tactics  of  an  arm  make  known  the  special  properties 
of  this  arm,  and  the  most  advantageous  method  of 
using  it.  General  or  grand  tactics,  show  the  com- 
binations of  the  arms,  and  the  ensemble  of  movements, 
suited  to  obtain  the  maximum  effect. 

Strategy^  the  science  essential  to  the  general-in- 
chief,  is  the  art  of  properly  directing  masses  upon 
the  theatre  of  war,  for  the  defence  of  our  own,  or 
the  invasion  of  the  enemy's  country. 

Logistics  is  the  practical  application  of  the  art 
of  moving  armies ;  the  science  of  chiefs  of  staff. 

In  a  military  operation,  we  ought  to  attend  to 
three  principal  things :  the  line  from  whence  we  de- 


10  PRELIMINARY   DEFESriTIOlTS. 

part,  the  point  where  we  wish  to  arrive,  and  the 
line  to  be  followed  to  reach  it. 

The  line  upon  which  an  army  is  supported,  and 
from  which  it  departs  to  act  offensively,  is  called  the 
hase  of  operations.  For  example,  the  French,  desir- 
ing to  attack  Germany,  would  take  the  Ehine  for  their 
base  of  operations ;  the  Alps,  if  they  wished  to  en- 
ter Italy;  and  the  Pyrenees,  if  they  would  invade 
Spain. 

When  we  are  reduced  to  dispute  with  the  enemy 
the  possession  of  the  base,  without  going  beyond  it, 
this  base  takes  the  name  of  line  of  defence.  All 
the  points  we  desire  to  reach,  and  the  possession  of 
which  would  influence  the  success  of  the  campaign, 
are  called  objective  points^  or  simply  ohjectives. 

Since  the  political  concentration  of  the  European 
states,  their  capitals  form  excellent  objective  points, 
and,  for  that  reason,  many  of  them  have  recently  been 
fortified. 

The  road  passed  over  by  the  army  to  reach  the 
objectives,  is  called  the  line  of  operations;  and 
takes  the  name  of  line  of  retreat^  when  we  are  com- 
pelled, after  a  defeat,  to  follow  it  in  a  contrary  di- 
rection, in  order  to  gain  a  line  of  defence,  behind 
which  to  resist  the  conqueror. 


PART   FIRST. 

HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 


CHAPTER    FIRST. 

HISTORY  OF  IKFANTRY, 

The  specific  history  of  an  arm  possesses  the 
advantage  of  exhibiting,  one  by  one,  in  the  order  of 
their  discovery  or  adoption,  the  several  improve- 
ments effected  in  its  organization,  armament,  and 
mode  of  combat;  and  consequently,  of  indicating 
successively,  in  the  order  of  date,  each  of  the  proper- 
ties of  this  arm.  History  is  thus  brought  to  the 
aid  of  theory ;  and  for  this  reason,  the  present  work 
contains  summaries  of  the  history  of  each  of  the 
arms.  The  most  important,  and  to  us  the  most  in- 
teresting of  these  summaries,  is  doubtless  that 
which  relates  to  the  principal  basis  of  armies — the 
infantry.  It  will  form  the  subject  of  the  present 
chapter. 

To  unfold  it  in  due  order,  we  shall  distribute  it 


12      inSTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF   THE   SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

into  eighteen  sections,  eacb.  devoted  to  a  single 
epoch.  Thus,  Sect.  1  will  treat  of  the  infantry  of  the 
ancient  people  of  Asia  and  Africa ;  2d,  of  infantry 
among  the  Greeks ;  3d,  of  the  Eoman  infantry ;  4th, 
of  the  infantry  of  the  barbarous  nations  who  over- 
turned the  Koman  empire,  and  especially  that  of 
our  ancestors,  the  Franks.  From  the  downfall  of 
Kome,  infantry  plays  a  less  prominent  part  than  in 
ancient  times :  we  shall  examine  it  in  its  decline, 
under  four  aspects :  5th,  the  feudal  infantry ;  6th,  the 
communal  infantry ;  Tth,  the  infantry  of  the  soldiers 
of  fortune;  and  8th,  that  of  the  English  archers. 
In  the  fourteenth  century  the  Swiss  reinstated  the 
infantry,  and  proved  its  power  by  brilliant  successes^ 
as  we  shall  show  in  section  9th ;  which  will  be  fol- 
lowed, in  the  10th,  by  some  particulars  respecting  the 
Spanish  infantry,  the  best  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
In  the  three  succeeding  sections  we  shall  study  the 
French  infantry,  under  Charles  VII.,  Francis  I.,  Henry 
II.,  and  Henry  IV.  In  the  14th  we  shall  speak  of  the 
diminution  of  the  depth  of  the  infantry  by  Gustavus 
Adolphus;  the  15th  will  group  together  the  charac- 
teristic features  of  the  infantry  in  the  reigns  of  Louis 
XIV.  and  Louis  XV. ;  the  16  th  will  treat  of  the 
improvements  made  in  the  Prussian  infantry  the  first 
half  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  the  17th  will  indicate 
the  more  recent  progress;  and  the  18th  and  last 
will  contain  some  remarks  on  the  entire  history  of 
this  arm. 

Our  object  in  selecting,  for  each  epoch,  the  in- 
fantry of  some  one  nation  as  a  type,  is  to  abridge 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTEY.  13 

details,  and  to  bring  them  within  the  limits  of  a 
chapter ;  citing,  nevertheless,  in  our  historic  sketch 
such  facts  as,  for  soldiers,  are  most  curious,  most 
characteristic,  and  most  instructive.  To  have  fol- 
lowed the  history  of  each  arm,  during  each  period, 
in  all  nations,  would  have  involved  us  too  far,  and 
would  have  produced  a  narrative  which,  though 
perhaps  more  connected,  would  most  surely  have 
less  hold  upon  the  memory. 

With  this  preface,  we  enter  upon  our  subject. 

1.  Ancients. — In  the  oriental  countries,  where 
the  himian  race  and  the  art  of  war  had  birth,  caval- 
ry and  war  chariots  were  the  most  esteemed  arms. 
This  was  due,  1st,  to  the  level  character  of  the 
ground,  which  allowed  complete  and  extended 
manoeuvres  of  both  cavalry  and  chariots ;  2d,  to  the 
impression  produced  by  every  elevated  object,  in 
accordance  with  which,  in  those  primitive  times,  the 
highest  combatant  appeared  to  be  the  strongest. 

The  character  of  these  countries  also  modified 
the  formation  of  the  infantry,  which  was  in  deep 
order ;  that  is,  more  solid  than  mobile.  ^ 

The  Egyptian  infantry  was  formed  in  heavy 
square  battalions  of  100  men  to  a  side;  these  bat- 
talions were  subdivided  into  fractions  of  1,000, 
100,  10.  The  heavy-armed  foot  soldiers  carried 
each  a  large  shield,  a  long  pike,  a  hatchet,  a  hel- 
met; the  light-armed  foot  soldiers  were  archers  or 
slingers. 

The   Jews  formed  their  infantry  upon  a  single 


14      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OF  THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

line,  from  10  to  30  men  in  depth ;  tlie  archers  and 
slingers  occupied  tlie  front  ranks,  tlie  lieavy-armed 
troops  tlie  rear.  The  troop  formations  of  this  people, 
1,000  strong,  were  subdivided  into  groups  of  100 

men. 

The  Persian  infantry,  originally  armed  solely 
with  offensive  weapons,  was  composed  of  heavy 
battalions,  24  to  30  men  deep.  Cyrus  the  elder 
reduced  this  depth  to  12  ranks,  and  introduced 
the  use  of  defensive  weapons  into  his  army.  The 
Persian  troops  were  divided  into  bodies  of  10, 
100,  1,000,  10,000  men.  Thus,  among  all  the 
early  nations  we  have  mentioned,  the  decimal 
subdivision  appears  as  the  basis  of  their  infantry 
formations. 

Every  deep  formation  upon  a  single  line  was,  in 
ancient  times,  called  a  phalanx.  The  Jews  and  the 
Persians,  then,  ranged  their  infantry  in  phalanx. 
The  Greeks  adopted,  with  some  modifications,  the 
Asiatic  phalanx,  and  it  is  especially  among  them 
that  we  must  study  this  species  of  formation. 


2.  Greek  Phalanx. — ^The  Greek  phalanx  was  a 
corps  of  heavy  infantry,  formed  in  a  single  line  16 
men  deep,  and  designed  to  act  e7i  masse,  and  to  fall 
upon  the  enemy  like  a  solid  block.  Its  organiza- 
tion, instead  of  being  decimal,  like  that  of  the  Per- 
sian, was  founded  upon  the  powers  of  the  number 
two.  Thus,  taking  as  its  primitive  element  a  file  of 
sixteen  men, — 


TETRARCHIA. 
PPPP 


HISTOEY   OF   INFANTE Y.  15 

Two  files  formed one  dilochia ; 

Two  dilochias one  tetrarchia ;  ^ 

Two  tetrarchias one  taxiarchia ; 

Two  taxiarcliias one  syntagma ; 

Two  syntagmas one  pentacosiarchia ; 

Two  pentacosiarcliias   .  .  .  one  chiliarcMa ; 

Two  chiliarchias one  merarcliia ; 

Two  merarchias one  phalangarchia ; 

Two  phalangarcliias  ....  one  diphalangarcliia ; 
Two  diphalangarcLias  .  .  .  one  tetraphalangarchia. 

The  tetrarcMa,  a  body  of  64  men,  corresponded 
to  our  modern  company,  and  was  the  constituent 
element  of  the  phalanx.  The  syntagma  com- 
prised 256  men;  the  chiliarchia,  1,024;  the 
PPPP  phalangarchia,  or  small  phalanx,  4,096.  This 
PPPP  last  fraction  was  composed  of  16  syntag- 
^^^^  mas,  the  syntagma  being  16  files  of  16  men. 
PPPP  The  tetraphalangarchia,  or  complete  phalanx, 
PPPP    embraced  16,384   men.     All  these  soldiers, 

when  heavy-armed,  were  called  Tioplites, 
PPPP         It   frequently  happened  that   the   small 

^  P  P  ^    Greek  states  could  not  set  on  foot  even  one 

PPPP 

PPPP   phalangarchia,  still  less  a  tetraphalangarchia. 

PPPP   In  such  cases  the  name  o^  phalanx  was  given 

^^^^    to  any  combination  of  tetrarchias,  without 
PPPP        .  .  ... 

fixing  any  definite  number.     This  facility  of 

organizing  any  number  of  men  whatever  in  phalanx, 

had  great  advantages. 

The  hoplite  occupied  a  space,  in  open  rant  and 

file,  of  four  cubits  (6  feet)  each  way ;  in  close  rank 

and  file,  two   cubits  (3  feet)  ;   in  very  close  rank, 

one  cubit  (1\  feet).    The  phalanx  charged  in  close 


• 


16      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

ranks;  it  received  a  charge  in  very  close  ranks,  a 
formation  called  a  synapisma.  The  principal  arms 
of  the  hoplites  were  the  shield  and  the  sarissa^  a 
long  pike  of  fourteen  cubits  (21  feet)  in  length, 
which  the  first  ^lyq  ranks  held  horizontally,  whilst 
the  others  held  them  vertically. 

The  sarissa  being  seized  at  a  point  four  cubits 
from  the  but,  and  each  soldier  occupying  in  close 
rank  two  cubits,  it  is  apparent  that  in  this  close  forma- 
tion the  sarisssB  of  even  the  fifth  rank  projected  two 
cubits  (3  feet)  beyond  the  front  rank  of  the  pha- 
lanx. This  front,  bristling  with  pikes,  presented  a 
formidable  aspect. 

Besides  the  soldiers  of  the  rank  and  file,  oi* 
hoplites,  the  Greek  phalanx  also  comprised  light- 
armed  troops,  designated  psiletes.  In  fact,  the  num- 
ber of  these  psiletes  was  usually  half  that  of  the 
hoplites,  or  8,192  for  the  complete  phalanx.  They 
were  divided  into  archers,  slingers,  and  darters  or 
jaculatoi'-Sj  who  threw  arrows  with  the  hand. 
Formed  eight  men  in  depth,  they  skirmished  about 
the  phalanx,  and  were  employed  in  all  operations 
which  required  lightness  and  promptitude. 

Sometimes  the  hoplites,  imitating  the  formation 
of  the  psiletes,  reduced  their  files  to  one  half,  and 
the  phalanx  became  but  8  men  deep ;  but  this  mo- 
bile order  was  an  exception;  moreover,  the  inter- 
vals between  the  divisions  of  the  phalanx  w^ere  not 
strongly  marked,  and  it  formed  a  nearly  contin- 
uous line. 

There  was  a  class  of  Grecian  foot  soldiers  inter- 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTKY.  lY 

mediate  between  tlie  heavy  and   the  light  armed : 
they  were   called  j^eltastes^   from    the    small    round - 
shield  (jitXvri)  with  which  they  were  armed;   they 
carried  a   shorter  pike   than  the   hoplites.     Alexan- 
der the  Great  made  frequent  use  of  them. 

The  chief  end  of  the  Grecian  system  of  educa- 
tion, as  well  as  of  the  laws  and  customs,  was  to 
make  a  good  soldier  of  every  citizen.  Thus,  the 
young  were  from  their  infancy  familiarized  with  the 
idea  of  war,  and  their  first  plays  were  military  exer- 
cises;  the  system  of  rewards  was  more  honorable 
than  lucrative,  and  the  system  of  punishments  based 
rather  upon  sentiment  than  actual  infliction ;  and 
hence,  the  lack  of  courage,  or  any  censurable  act 
committed  in  war,  even  when  it  was  not  pun- 
ished, subjected  the  soldier  to  public  reprobation, 
and  disgrace  with  his  friends  and  relatives.  In 
Sparta,  mothers  rejoiced  when  they  received  the 
announcement  of  the  death  of  their  sons  upon 
the  field  of  battle,  and  their  dead  bodies  were 
brought  home  upon  their  shields,  preferring  to  see 
them  stretched  lifeless  upon  that  defensive  arm  than 
alive  without  it,  for  its  loss  was  branded  with 
infamy. 

The  Greek  foot  soldiers,  moreover,  excelled  in 
every  soldierly  quality;  robust,  skilful,  and  coura- 
geous even  to  an  extreme,  he  thought  nothing  more 
glorious  than  to  die  for  his  country.  But  it  is  to  be 
remarked,  that  the  formation  in  phalanx  in  a  meas- 
ure counterbalanced  these  qualities  in  the  hoplite ; 
for  this  formation  upon  a  single  line  nearly  con- 
2 


18       HISTORY   AND   TACTICS    OF   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

tiniious  was  not  sufficiently  pliant  to  fight  advan- 
tageously in  broken  and  mountainous  countries, 
where  the  waverings  of  the  march  produced  fatal 
gaps,  into  which  the  enemy  could  penetrate  and  at- 
tack the  body  in  flank  and  in  rear.  For  this  reason, 
the  phalanx  was  very  successful  only  in  level  coun- 
tries. To  be  just,  however,  let  us  add  that  when- 
ever it  was  commanded  by  generals  of  the  highest 
order  (and  such  always  understand  how  to  adapt  the 
aiTangement  of  their  troops  to  local  circumstances), 
the  phalanx  was  equally  victorious  upon  irregular 
oTound;  as  was  exemplified  under  Alexander  the 
Great,  and  especially  under  Xenophou. 

3.  Roman  L.egioii — -At  the  first  glance  we 
observe  a  characteristic  of  the  Eomaii  legion  w^hich 
distinguishes  it  fi^om  the  phalanx:  it  is  not  ham- 
pered by  close  order ;  its  organization  breathes 
mobility. 

It  forms  three  lines,  each  divided  into  ten  mani- 
ples or  companies,  ten  men  deep.  The  Tiastati  are 
in  the  front  line,  the  p^inciipes  in  the  second,  the 
triarii  in  the  third.  In  each  line,  the  maniples  are 
separated  by  a  distance  equal  to  their  front,  and  the 
maniples  of  each  line  behind  are  placed  opposite  to 
the  spaces  of  the  preceding  line,  which  produces  a 
checker-board  formation.  The  interval  between  the 
lines  equals  the  depth  of  a  maniple ;  the  space 
between  two  soldiers,  in  any  direction,  is  six  Koman 
feet  (5  feet  Y  inches). 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY.  19 

MAISIPLE   FORMATION   OF  THE   LEGION. 

iiASTATr,    nnnnnnnnnn 

10  ranks  and  12  files.   ' '' — '' — '' '' '' — '' '' — II— il — I 

,o.rM^.os.  nnnnnnnnnn 

:«rarrd"«me.  DDDDDDDDDD 

In  tlie  first  two  lines,  the  maniple  contains  12 
files,  which,  with  a  depth  of  10  men,  gives  the  mani- 
ple a  force  of  120  men.  In  the  triarii^  the  maniple 
contains  but  6  files,  so  that  it  numbers  but  60  men. 

The  light-armed  troops  attached  to  the  legion 
were  called  velites^  and  formed  10  maniples  of  120 
men  each,  like  those  of  the  liastati  and  princijpes. 
They  constituted  the  inferior  class  of  the  legion,  and 
fought  outside  and  around  the  lines.  It  w^as  the 
reward  for  brave  deeds  to  be  promoted  to  the  regu- 
lar ranks. 

The  Eoman  legion,  therefore,  embraced  1,200 
hastati^  1^200  principes^  600  triarii^  and  1,200  velites] 
or,  in  all,  4,200  foot  soldiers.  This  is  the  usual  num- 
ber, but  there  were  legions  of  a  smaller  as  well  as 
those  of  a  larger  effective  force. 

The  organization  of  the  legion  allowed  the  ready 
formation  of  detachments  embracing  the  same  classes 
of  soldiers,  and  in  the  same  proportions  as  in  the 
legion  itself  Thus,  one  maniple  of  hastati,  one  of 
pviiicipes^  one  of  triarii^  and  one  of  velites^  formed 
a  small  legion  of  420  men,  to  which  could  also  be 
added  a  turma  of  cavalry,  or  the  tenth  part  of  a 
cavalry  legion.  By  doubling  or  tripling  the  num- 
ber of  maniples,  detachments  were  obtained  of  840 


20      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

or  1,260  foot  soldiers,  wMch  still  retained  tlie  like- 
ness of  the  legion. 

A  lielmet,  a  shield,  a  sword,  and  seven  javelins 
constituted  the  armament  of  the  velites,  who  fought 
as  skirmishers,  either  on  the  front  or  flanks.  They 
took  advantage  of  the  spaces  left  by  the  checker- 
board formation,  to  advance  and  retire. 

The  defensive  arms  of  the  Jiastati  and  principes 
were  a  helmet,  a  brass  breastplate,  and  a  convex 
shield;  their  offensive  arms,  two  light  spears  or 
darts  (called  pild)^  two  javelins,  and  a  sword. 
This  sword  was  the  favorite  weapon  of  the  Ko- 
mans:  being  broad  and  strong,  it  served,  in  the 
hands  of  a  vigorous  man,  the  purpose  of  an  axe,  and 
inflicted  wide  and  deep  wounds,  which  terrified  the 
enemy.  The  liastati  received  or  gave  the  first 
charge ;  the  princi])€S  supported  them,  either  by 
advancing  in  front  of  them,  by  passing  through  the 
intervals  of  the  first  line,  or  by  simply  filling  up 
the  spaces,  so  as  to  form  a  full  and  more  solid  line ; 
the  legion  then  fought  as  a  veritable  phalanx,  which 
not  unfrequently  happened.  This  facility  of  trans- 
formation at  pleasure,  according  to  circumstances 
and  localities,  so  as  to  possess  either  extreme  mobil- 
ity or  great  solidity,  renders  the  Roman  legion  su- 
perior to  the  Greek  phalanx. 

The  triarii^  who  were  tried  soldiers,  were  armed 
with  the  shield,  the  pike,  and  the  sword.  During 
the  combat  of  the  first  two  lines,  they  remained  im- 
movable, their  pikes  resting  upon  the  ground. 
Their  mission  was  to   throw  themselves    into    the 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  21 

weak  places,  and  reclaim  a  victory  about  to  be  lost : 
they  constituted,  therefore,  a  reserve.  It  was  only 
when  the  battle  was  becoming  desperate,  that  they 
were  called  into  action ;  and  hence  the  Latin  prov- 
erb :  Res  ad  triarios  pervenitj  expressive  of  a  final 
struggle. 

The  soldier  of  the  Koman  legion  was  a  valiant 
combatant,  well  skilled  in  manoeuvres  and  the  exer- 
cise of  arms,  and  especially  inured  to  fatigue  of 
every  kind.  The  Greek  foot  soldier,  the  hoplite, 
ordinarily  carried  no  burden,  leaving  the  transpor- 
tation of  his  munitions  to  servants  or  slaves ;  but 
the  soldier  of  the  legion,  at  least  during  the  better 
days  of  the  republic,  carried  not  only  his  arms,  but 
his  baggage,  a  stake,  a  pioneer  tool,  and  a  leather 
pouch  containing  his  provision  of  corn  for  fifteen 
days.  Reckoning  the  weight,  piece  by  piece,  of  his 
arms  and  all  his  effects,  we  find  that  his  load 
amounted  to  about  100  pounds,  or  double  that 
which  is  usually  carried  by  our  foot  soldiers."^*  With 
these  enormous  loads  the  Roman  soldiers,  neverthe- 
less, travelled  some  20  miles  or  more  in  a  day  on 
ordinary  occasions,  and  in  forced  marches  as  much 
as  33  miles. 

The  soldier  of  the  legion  was,  moreover,  accus- 
tomed to  digging  the  ground ;  for  the  Romans  were 
in  the  constant  practice  of  surrounding  their  camps 
with  intrenchments,  even  when  they  encamped  but 

*  In  tlie  Russian  campaign  (1812)  the  soldiers  of  Marshal  Davoust 
adjusted  upon  their  knapsacks,  already  filled,  6^  lbs.  of  bread,  4|  lbs. 
of  biscuit,  and  11  lbs.  of  flour,  thus  carrying  a  total  weight  of  QQ  lbs. 


22       HISTORY  AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

for  a  single  niglit— a  prudent  habit,  to  wMcli  may 
be  ascribed  in  a  great  degree  tbeir  remarkable 
exemption  from  reverses,  and  whicli  also  liad  tlie 
advantage  of  keeping  the  soldiers  in  training,  and 
making  them  robust  and  healthy.  We  may  ob- 
serve however,  that  the  practice  of  intrenching 
camps  and  positions,  though  excellent  with  the 
projectile  arms  of  the  ancients,  all  of  which  were  de- 
structive only  at  small  distances,  presents  but  unim- 
portant advantages  with  our  modern  fire-arms. 

The  legion,  by  its  formation  in  small  bodies 
drawn  up  in  several  lines,  with  intervals,  always 
had  a  reserve,  was  possessed  of  great  mobility,  and 
could  fight  upon  all  kinds  of  ground.  It  had,  there- 
fore, that  character  of  universality  which  is  indis- 
pensable to  armies,  and  especially  to  infantry:  it 
was  a  military  machine,  eminently  fitted  to  serve 
the  Eomans  in  their  projects  of  universal  conquest, 
to  which  they  always  aspired,  and  w^hich  constituted 
their  strength,' — a  machine  precisely  adapted  to  their 
political  constitution ;  for  it  is  worthy  of  particular  re- 
mark, that  the  Eomans  differed  from  all  other  nations, 
ancient  or  modern,  in  this  :  that  whilst  other  nations 
made  war  only  to  maintain  themselves  in  a  position 
to  administer  their  government,  they  administered 
their  government  solely  with  a  view  to  making  war. 

The  lines  with  intervals  were  objectionable,  in- 
asmuch as  a  quick  and  resolute  enemy  might  pene- 
trate the  open  spaces.  Convinced  of  this,  Marius, 
the  celebrated  conqueror  of  the  Cimbri  and  Teu- 
toni,    substituted    for    the    formation    by    maniples 


HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY.  23 

the  formation  by  cohorts,  which  assimilated  th^  or- 
ganization to  that  of  the  phalanx.  In  this  new  for- 
mation there  was  now  but  one  class  of  soldiers :  the 
hastati,  the  principes,  and  the  triarii  were  mingled, 
all  armed  with  the  pihim^  and  divided  into  ten  co- 
horts of  an  equal  force.  The  number  of  ranks,  and 
the  intervals  between  the  ranks  and  files,  remained 
the  same  as  in  the  formation  by  maniples. 

Marius  formed  his  legion  upon  two  lines,  each 
consisting  of  two  cohorts,  separated  by  small  inter- 
vals. Csesar,  as  the  following  diagram  shows,  dis- 
posed the  Eoman  legion  in  three  lines,  the  first  of 
four  cohorts,  the  second  and  third  each  of  three  co- 
horts. The  third  line  formed  a  reserve,  and  it  was 
for  that  purpose  that  CaBsar  restored  it. 

COIIOKT  FORMATION  OF  THE  LEGION  UNDEll   C^SAE. 

4th  coh.  8(1  coh.  2(1  coh.  Istcoli. 


1st  line,                 p 
in  10  ranks.             L 

1  1 

1  1 

II                     1 

5th  coh. 

2(1  line, 
in  10  ranks. 

7tli  coh. 

Gth  coh. 

r         1 

1            1 

1                          1 

lOth  coh. 

9tli  coh. 

8th  coh. 

in  10  ranks. 

1            1 

1                      1 

1            1 

In  the  formation  by  cohorts,  the  lines  being  full, 
the  first  could  no  longer  retire  between  the  inter- 
vals of  the  second,  as  in  the  foimation  by  maniples. 
The  second  line  alone  could  advance  and  insert  it- 
self in  the  first,  the  fresh  files  stepping  into  the  in- 
tervals between  the  fatigued  files,  so  that  the  front 
of  the  legion  doubled  in  number,  without  increasing 
its  length.  The  possibility  of  such  a  manoeuvre  de- 
pended upon   the   opening   of  the   ranks   and  files 


24      HISTORY   AOT)   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

whicli  cliaracterized  tlie  Koman  legion,  in  whicli 
eacli  man  occupied,  as  we  have  said,  a  space  of  six 
Eoman  feet  (5  feet  7  inches) ;  the  difficulty  was  to 
preserve  this  space,  and  hence  all  their  drills  were 
conducted  so  as  to  make  the  soldier  preserve  his  in- 
tervals both  in  rank  and  file.  Under  the  new  form 
of  cohorts,  the  infantry  legion  again  rendered  most 
excellent  service,  and  gained  as  much  celebrity  as 
under  the  manipular  form.  From  that  time  the 
cohort  became  so  well  established  as  the  unit  of  the 
Koman  infantry,  that  their  historians,  and  especially 
Cgesar,  frequently  say :  "  We  had  so  many  cohorts," 
without  even  naming  the  legion. 

During  the  period  of  the  Roman  emperors,  the 
legion  deteriorated;  and  nothing  shows  this  more 
clearly  than  the  organization  of  the  legion,  described 
by  Vegetius.'^  This  legion,  of  6,100  foot  soldiers, 
divided  into  ten  cohorts,  ranged  in  the  checker 
form,  in  two  lines,  each  of  ^ve  cohorts,  embraced 
all  kinds  of  foot  combatants:  thus  there  were  in 
each  cohort,  in  the  first  rank  the  heavy-armed  troops, 
in  the  second  the  mailed  archers,  in  the  third  and 
fomiih  the  velites,  in  the  fifth  a  projectile  machine 
called  oiiageVjj-  flanked  by  slingers  and  crossbowmen, 
and  in  the  sixth  the  triarii,  forming  the  reserve. 

This  confused  formation  could  not  last.  They  re- 
turned to  the  isolated  cohorts,  of  an  efiective  force 
of  from  500  to  1,000  men,  some  composed  entfrely 
of  infantry,  others,  of  infantry  and  cavalry.     They 

*  In  the  third  century. — T}\ 

t  A  machine  which  threw  stones. — Tr. 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  25 

allowed  substitutes  in  tlie  military  service,  a  decided 
mark  of  degeneration;  they  abandoned  defensive- 
arms ;  tliey  exclianged  tlie  use  of  that  broad  and 
trenchant  sword,  which  had  gained  so  many  battles, 
for  projectile  arms,  whose  light  weight  agreed  better 
with  the  effeminacy  of  the  times ;  they  went  further, 
and  threw  javelins  from  engines .  called  carrohalistce^ 
the  number  of  which  became  considerable.  Disci- 
pline declined ;  the  troops  were  no  longer  drilled ; 
they  forgot  the  maxims  which  had  given  them  vic- 
tory. The  decline  was  rapid,  and  the  Roman  colos- 
sus soon  succumbed  under  the  repeated  blows  of 
enemies,  who  poured  down  in  such  numbers  that 
their  native  countries  were  designated  in  the  Latin 
idiom  as  the  officina  gentium  (the  factory  of  nations). 
Let  us  now  pursue  the  study  of  infantry  among 
their  enemies :  those  new  people  to  whom  custom 
has  given  the  traditional  name  of  BaTharians, 

4.  Barbarous  Nations. — ^With  the  exception 
of  the  Sarmatians  and  the  Vandals,  the  barbarians 
who  overwhelmed  the  Roman  empire  fought  almost 
exclusively  on  foot,  and  we  may  apply  to  them  the 
expression  of  Tacitus,  when  speaking  of  the  Ger- 
mans :  "  Omne  robur  in  peditey 

The  German  infantiy  had  a  decimal  organiza- 
tion :  it  attacked  in  wedge  fonu,  sometimes  in  pha- 
lanx, always  with  loud  cries. 

Let  us  especially  consider  the  infantry  of  the  Franks. 

Here  is  the  portrait  which  historians  have  left 
us  of  the  Frank  foot  soldier :  He  tied  his  flaxen  hair 


26       HISTORY  AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE   ARx\IS. 


on  the  top  of  his  head  in  a  tuft,  which  fell  back  and 
flowed  behind  li^e  a  horse's  tail.  He  shaved  his 
face,  leaving  only  two  long  and  pendent  mustaches. 
His  linen  clothes  fitted  closely  to  his  body ;  a  large 
belt  sustained  his  sword.  His  favorite  weapon  was 
the  francisque,  a  battle-axe  with  one  or  two  edges 
and  a  very  short  handle.  His  left  arm  bore  a  long 
and  narrow  shield,  the  only  defensive  armor  with 
which  he  was  furnished.  He  also  had  a  spear,  or 
pike,  of  moderate  length,  designated  in  the  Frank 
tongue  by  the  name  hang.  This  pike  could  be  used 
both  at  small  and  at  great  distances ;  its  shaft  was 
covered  with  plates  of  iron,  which  protected  it 
against  the  sword  cuts  of  the  enemy,  and  its  point 
was  curved  in  the  form  of  a  double  claw. 

In  the  fight,  the  Frank  foot  soldier  threw  this 


HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY.  27 

weapon  at  liis  adversary :  if  it  caught  in  the  flesh, 
it  was  difficult  to  disengage  it,  on  account  of  the. 
small  iron  hooks  at  its  point,  and  thus  it  produced 
serious  wounds.  When  the  enemy  parried  the 
blow,  the  hang  struck  the  shield,  and  fastening  in  it, 
drew  it  down ;  while,  its  but  end  dragging  upon  the 
ground,  it  hung  to  the  shield  like  a  very  troublesome 
weight ;  which,  from  its  construction,  could  neither 
be  torn  out  nor  cut  by  the  sword.  Then  the  Frank 
sprang  forward,  placed  one  foot  upon  the  shaft, 
pressed  upon  it  with  his  whole  weight,  and  thus 
forcing  his  adversary  to  lower  his  shield,  could 
easily  strike  the  exposed  breast  or  head.  In  this 
advantageous  position  the  arm  which  held  the  bat- 
tle-axe usually  aimed  at  the  face  or  the  neck. 

The  Franks  preserved  this  warlike  aspect  down 
to  the  end  of  the  sixth  century. 

The  Frank  infantry,  like  that  of  the  Germans, 
fought  in  phalanx  and  in  wedge  form,  the  latter 
formation  being  often  little  more  than  a  deep  and 
close  column ;  it  attacked  with  terrible  shouts,  and 
with  a  velocity  almost  equal  to  that  of  cavalry.  In 
consequence  of  its  sojourn  in  Gaul,  it  adopted  by  de- 
grees some  of  the  military  usages  of  the  Romans. 

At  the  battle  of  Tours  (732),  in  which  Charles 
Martel  conquered  the  Saracens,  the  masses  of  the 
Frank  infantry  were  drawn  up  in  great  depth, 
whence  the  celebrated  expression :  "  God  was  ^vitli 
his  lieavy  hattalionsr  Having  to  do  with  mounted 
enemies,  who  fought  skirmishing,  the  Frank  war- 
rior opposed  to  them  heavy  columns  drawn  up  to 


28      HISTORY  AND    TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

act  with  ensemble.  There  is  every  reason  to  "believe 
that  he  was  acquainted  with  and  employed  the  agmen 
quadratum  (square  formation). 

This  massing,  the  source  of  power  in  infantr}^, 
disappears  from  the  organization  of  this  arm,  from 
the  time  of  Charles  Martel. 

5.  Feudal  Infantry. — In  the  wars  of  invasion 
of  Charlemagne,  the  grandson  and  second  successor 
of  Charles  Martel,  cavalry  increased,  and  at  the 
death  of  that  powerful  monarch  constituted  the 
half  of  the  French  armies.  The  feudal  system, 
which  arose  soon  after,  and  which  was  created  with 
the  view  of  maintaining  in  subjection  the  recently 
conquered  people,  instituted  nobles,  who  desired  no 
other  occupation  than  the  honorable  profession  of 
arms.  They  monopolized  this  vocation  to  their 
own  profit,  and  being  wealthy,  covered  them- 
selves with  heavy  armor  and  rode  upon  chargers 
bai'bed  Avith  iron.  All  the  chiefs  adopted  this 
fashion ;  the  taste  for  mounted  combat  became 
general.  From  that  time  the  infantry  was  ineffi- 
cient, for  no  one  attended  to  giving  it  a  good  or- 
ganization, without  which  it  can  never  accomplish 
anything;  and  it  remained  especially  powerless 
against  the  gensdarmes^  whose  armor  rendered  them 
invulnerable. 

The  feudal  infantry  was  composed  of  the  ser- 
vants of  the  gensdarmes,  and  peasants  taken  from  the 
plough.  Their  principal  and  most  common  office 
was  to  pick  up  their  masters  when  they  fell  to  the 


HISTOEY   OF   INFANTRY.  29 

ground,  and  remount  tliem,  as  also  to  despatch  the 
disarmed  cavaliers  of  the  enemy.  Sometimes  they 
skirmished  at  the  beginning  of  the  action.  Their 
offensive  arms  were  the  sword,  the  crossbow,  the 
mace,  and  the  sling ;  they  earned  no  defensive  arms, 
and  nevertheless  were  often  made  to  face  great  dan- 
gers, as  the  history  of  the  battles  of  that  period 
proves.  The  victors  always  made  horrible  carnage 
of  this  defenceless  infantry. 

Two  historic  facts  will  show  the  state  of  deg- 
radation to  which  the  feudal  infantry  fell : 

At  the  battle  of  Bou vines  (1214),  the  Count  de 
Boulogne  formed  his  infantry  into  a  hollow  square, 
within  which  he,  with  six  other  cavaliers,  after  a 
certain  period  of  combat,  retired  to  recover  breath ; 
they  came  out  in  due  time,  refreshed,  and  ready  to 
renew  the  strife.  This  was  using  their  infantry  as  a 
kind  of  rampart. 

At  the  battle  of  Crecy  (1346),  the  Genoese  bow- 
men, who  formed  a  part  of  the  French  army,  being 
thrown  into  confusion  by  the  well-directed  shafts 
of  the  English  archers,  and  unable  to  advance,  the 
king,  Philip  of  Valois,  enraged  at  seeing  them  re- 
tire, called  out  to  the  cavaliers :  "  Or  tot  tiiez  toute 
cette  ribaiidaille  qui  nous  emptclie  la  vote  sans  rai- 
sony  The  French  gensdarmes  fell  upon  the  unfortu- 
nate Genoese  infantry ;  but  while  they  were  thus 
engaged,  the  enemy  gained  the  upper  hand,  and 
they  suffered  a  complete  defeat, — a  defeat  which,  to- 
gether with  the  sad  and  fatal  names  of  Poictiers 
and  Agincourt,  will  ever  be  for  us  and  our  descend- 


30      HISTORY   AND    TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPAEATE  ARMS. 

ants  a  striking  proof  of  the  errors  committed  by  our 
ancestors,  wliicli  brought  France  to  tlie  very  brink 
of  ruin,  and  had  wellnigh  caused  us  to  be  to  this 
day  a  colony  of  England,  instead  of  boasting  the 
proud  title  of  Frenchmen. 

The  coiidottieri^  those  warriors  by  contract  who 
afflicted  the  Italian  peninsula  in  the  middle  ages, 
also  diminished  the  usefulness  of  infantry  in  the 
interest  of  their  trade;  for  the  petty  princes  who 
employed  them  could  afford  neither  to  support  a 
large  body  of  foot,  nor  to  pay  their  wages;  they 
succeeded,  indeed,  in  reducing  the  number  of  effec- 
tive foot  to  the  tenth  part  of  their  mail-clad 
horse;*  a  proportion  which  shows  how  completely 
the  principles  which  should  govern  the  mutual  rela- 
tion of  these  two  arms  were  at  that  time  reversed. 

Let  us  see  how  the  infantry  rose  from  this  use- 
less condition. 

6.  Communal  Infantry. — In  the  twelfth  century, 
several  European  nations,  as  the  English,  the 
Flemish,  the  Swiss,  and  the  Lombards,  still  looked 
upon  infantry  with  favor.  In  France,  they  were 
brought  back  to  similar  views  by  the  crusades.  In 
those  distant  expeditions  the  foot  soldier  could  not 
be  replaced  as  upon  the  soil  of  the  mother  country ; 
he  became  of  more  value,  was  armed  with  more 
care,  and  drilled;  and  henceforth  could  render  ser- 
vices which  Avere  appreciated.  The  introduction 
of  fire-arms   soon  also  favored  the  regeneration  of 

*  The  Prince^  by  Macliiavelli,  chap.  xii. 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  31 

infantry.  At  the  same  time  the  excessive  tension 
of  the  feudal  system  brought  together  the  two 
powers  of  the  political  hierarchy  before  most  widely 
separated,  namely,  the  sovereign  and  the  burghers 
of  the  towns.  These  powers,  both  incommoded  by 
the  system,  came  to  an  understanding:  the  towns 
were  erected  into  communes  enjoying  political 
rights,  on  condition  of  paying  a  tax  and  raising 
militia,  which  should  march  at  the  call  of  the  king. 
Such  is  the  orio^in  of  the  communal  militia.  The 
creation  of  these  citizen  troops  rendered  the  feudal 
troops  ever  after  less  important,  and  thus  broke 
down  the  exclusive  use  of  cavalry. 

The  communal  force,  raised  by  the  authority  of 
the  commune,  sometimes  embraced  mounted  men, 
but  was  generally  composed  of  infantry  alone ;  the 
number  of  soldiers,  or  rather,  to  use  the  expression 
of  the  time,  sergeants  (servientes^^  rarely  exceeded 
500.  Two  thirds  of  the  communal  infantry  carried 
bows  or  crossbows ;  the  rest  used  maces,  sticks 
loaded  with  lead,  and  halberds.  Moreover,  imple- 
ments of  agriculture,  or  the  tools  of  the  improvised 
soldier,  frequently  served  him  as  arms,  and  he  even 
wore  in  the  ranks  one  of  his  ordinary  garments, 
the  blouse  of  the  iield-laborer.  The  infantry  of  the 
communes  marched  to  the  army  under  the  parochial 
banner ;  an  advowee  of  the  bishop,  or  a  municipal 
chief,  or  a  representative  of  the  king,  commanded. 
It  was  not  compelled  to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
commune  more  than  a  certain  distance,  reckoned  in 
days'  marches  (at  most  forty  days)  ;  beyond  this  dis- 


32      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

tance,  its  maintenance  devolved  upon  the  king  or 
the  nobleman  wlio  employed  it;  and  in  default  of 
the  necessary  funds  for  this  purpose,  the  communal 
troops  frequently  dispersed.  In  the  order  of  battle, 
the  communal  infantry  was  placed  between  the 
squadrons  of  horse :  this  intermixture  is  all  that  is 
known  of  its  tactics. 

This  infantry  proved,  in  its  struggles  against  the 
nobles  who  surrounded  a  city,  that  men  on  foot 
could  contend  advantageously  with  knights  com- 
ipletely  mailed,  whose  prestige  thus  began  to  disap- 
pear. Nevertheless,  this  infantry  was  not  Avorth 
much,  although  superior  to  the  feudal  infantry  in 
organization,  armament,  discipline,  and  courage. 

Still,  the  institution  of  communes  did  not  re- 
lieve the  dukes  and  counts  from  obeying  the  call 
of  the  king  and  taking  part  in  war.  In  the  rear  of 
their  gensdarmes,  there  always  followed  a  body  of 
infantry,  composed  of  servants  and  peasants — these 
continuing  to  be  badly  organized,  and  more  ready 
to  pillage  than  to  fight.  To  put  an  end  to  the  con- 
fusion which  reigned  among  these  foot  soldiers, 
Louis  IX.,  in  1226,  gave  them  a  commandant  under 
the  name  of  Grand  Master  of  the  Bowmen^  and  this 
office  was  preserved  down  to  the  reign  of  Francis  I., 
but  contributed  very  little  to  the  improvement  of 
the  condition  of  the  infantry:  at  least,  not  until 
Charles  VII. 

T.  Soldiers  of  Fortune — Besides  the  feudal  and 
communal   infantry,   there   arose  in   France,  at   the 


HISTOEY    OF   INFANTEY.  33 

close  of  tLe  twelfth  century,  bands  of  soldiers  of 
fortune,  all  on  foot,  known  under  various  names, 
such  as  CotereauXj  Boudoyers^  Tard-venus^  Malmh 
drins^  Rouiiers^  Brabangons,  Chaperons^  JEscor- 
clieurSj  PastoureauXj  Hihauds^  Tondeurs^  Mille- 
diahles.  These  mercenaries,  gathered  from  all  na- 
tions, formed  undisciplined,  vagabond  troops,  who, 
when  not  engaged  in  war,  spent  their  time  in  pil- 
laging— always  taking  the  part  of  the  sovereign  who 
paid  the  highest  wages.  The  French  king,  Louis 
VII.,  had  as  many  as  twenty  thousand  in  his  pay. 
Their  depredations  becoming  intolerable,  Philip 
Augustus,  in  1183,  sent  an  army  which  overcame 
them  near  Bourges.  They  recruited  their  force,  and 
continued  to  fight  and  steal  until  the  reign  of 
Charles  V.  This  monarch,  taking  pity  on  the 
French  provinces  which  they  were  laying  waste, 
ordered  Du  Guescliii  to  take  command  of  theii^ 
grandes  compagnies  and  to  lead  them  out  of  the 
kingdom ;  which  difficult  mission  the  Breton  hero 
successfully  accomplished  (1366). 

At  this  period,  the  French  infantry,  principally 
composed  of  crossbowmen,  was  drawn  up  in  three 
or  four  ranks.  In  the  order  of  battle,  it  was  placed 
in  the  first  line,  in  front  of,  or  at  the  side  of  the 
first  line  of  gensdarmes:  in  attacks  it  always  occu- 
pied the  front. 

§.  Englisli  Arcbers. — ^The  English  archers  who 
did  the  French  so  much  harm  in  the  days  of  Crecy 
(1346)  and  Poictiers  (1356),  constituted  one  of  the 

3 


34      HISTOEY   AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

best  bodies  of  infantry  of  tlie  fourteentli  century. 
Their  defensive  arms  were  a  mailed  jacket,  a  bas- 
sinet (or  liglit  helmet),  and  a  round  shield.  Vig- 
orous, and  exercised  in  shooting  from  their  infancy, 
they  carried  the  long  and  stout  bow,  the  string  of 
which  could  be  removed  when  it  rained,  an  advan- 
tao-e  not  possessed  by  the  crossbow.  To  arrest  the 
impetuosity  of  the  French  gendarmery,  they  took 
their  positions  in  front  of  their  cavaliers,  in  a  long 
line  of  little  depth,  each  planting  before  him  a  stake 
11  feet  in  length,  like  a  cheval-de-frise ;  thence  they 
discharged  as  many  as  ten  arrows  a  minute,  aimed 
at  the  horses,  and  dismounted  our  gensdarmes  in  a 
very  short  time,  who,  when  once  on  foot,  were  very 
much  embarrassed  by  their  armor.  We  thus  per- 
ceive that  the  English  began  to  reason  upon  the  art 
of  war. 

The  Hussite  infantry,  such  as  was  employed  by 
the  famous  Bohemian  Zisca  about  1418,  was  also 
one  of  the  first  which  succeeded  in  withstanding 
the  gendarmery  in  open  country,  fighting  behind  a 
barricade  of  wagons,  called  a  tabor, 

9.  Swiss  Infantry. — From  the  beginning  of  the 
fourteenth  century,  the  Swiss  were  compelled  by  ne- 
cessity to  resuscitate  the  ancient  infantry,  both  be- 
cause they  were  too  poor  to  maintain  cavalry,  and 
because  the  country  was  ill  adapted  to  its  evolutions. 
They  adopted  a  compact  formation,  and  made  use  of 
a  pike  18  feet  in  length,  which  they  held  by  the  mid- 
dle with  both  hands,  as  our  soldiers  now  hold  the 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  35 

musket  wlien  crossing  Ibayonets.  The  Swiss  battalion 
was  compared  to  a  forest  of  ilioims ;  it  was  often 
called  tlie  hedgehog.  From  tlie  year  1386,  the  Swiss 
made  use  of  culverins  (a  kind  of  long  18-pounder). 
In  14T6,  at  the  battles  of  Granson  and  Morat,  in 
which  they  were  victorious,  they  fought  in  full 
squares,  having  halberdiers,  pikemen,  and  culverin 
artillerists  in  various  proportions.  The  halberds 
were  used  in  the  melee;  the  pikes  rested  on  the 
ground  to  resist  the  onset  of  the  cavalry ;  the  cul- 
verins were  employed  chiefly  on  the  flanks,  occasion- 
ally on  the  front.  Their  order  of  battle  consisted  of 
three  masses  arranged  in  echelons^  the  distance  be- 
tween the  echelons  being  the  range  of  a  culverin : 
thus  the  cavalry  could  not  break  through  them.  In 
receiving  an  artillery  attack,  they  awaited  the  first 
discharge,*  then,  taking  advantage  of  the  slow  firing 
of  that  day,  rushed  upon  the  cannon  and  captured 
them. 

The  Swiss  always  fought  with  great  courage; 
but  this  courage,  stimulated  at  that  time  by  the 
desire  of  independence,  was  not  all  that  sustained 
them  against  the  impetuous  horsemen  of  the  Duke 
of  Burgundy.  The  true  secret  of  the  success  of  their 
infantry  was  their  discipline,  and  the  ensemble  of 
action  which  is  the  result  of  discipline.  This  disci- 
pline was  severe ;  it  prescribed  the  most  absolute 
silence,  and  prohibited  leaving  the  ranks  under  pain 
of  death.     Thenceforth,  the  popular  element  of  com- 

*  At  Cerisoles  (1544)  they  threw  themselves  on  the  ground,  so  that 
the  balls  might  pass  over  them. 


36      HISTOEY  AlH)   TACTICS  OF   THE   SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

Unation  is  found  arrayed  against  tlie  feudal  element 
of  isolation;  but  with  tMs  exception,  tlie  Swiss  have 
not  contributed  to  tlie  improvement  of  tlie  military 
art.  Nevertheless,  we  shall  find  them,  subsequently, 
looked  upon  as  models,  and  European  nations  in  the 
following  century  imitating  their  formation  and  tak- 
ing bodies  of  Swiss  infantry  into  their  pay. 

It  is  therefore  to  the  Swiss  that  we  must  ascribe 
the  more  extensive  introduction  of  infantry  in  the 
composition  of  armies  after  the  fifteenth  century. 

10.  Spanisb  Infantry — ^The  Spanish  infantry 
was  the  next  most  celebrated  after  the  Swiss,  which 
it  subsequently  surpassed.  Brave,  disciplined,  tem- 
perate, indefatigable ; — such  were  the  foot  soldiers  of 
Spain  who  fought  in  Italy  or  in  the  Netherlands 
under  Charles  V.  and  Philip  II.  Their  contact  with 
the  S"\viss  taught  them  the  art  of  forming  close  bat- 
talions ;  their  conipact  order,  bristling  with  pikes,  be- 
came as  difficult  to  break  as  the  phalanx.  Besides 
the  pike,  they  carried  as  offensive  weapons  the  sword, 
the  poignard  or  dagger,  and  the  arquebus :  as  defen- 
sive, a  coat  of  mail.  When  the  Swiss,  or  the  large 
foot  soldiers  of  Germany  broke  them,  instead  of  fly- 
ing they  returned  individually  to  the  charge,  rushing 
between  the  ranks  of  the  victors  and  attacking  with 
the  poignard.  In  these  duels  and  hand-to-hand  fights, 
the  Spanish  soldier  often  fell,  and  always  had  every 
chance  against  him ;  but  his  bravery  is  nowhere  more 
conspicuously  proved. 

The  arquebus,  with  which  the   Spaniards  were 


mSTOEY   OF   INFANTEY.  37 

armed,  took  the  place  of  the  Swiss  culverin ;  it  was 
provided  with  a  forked  prop,  which  relieved  its 
weight  while  being  discharged ;  whereas,  before  this 
time,  it  was  discharged  only  when  resting  upon  a 
tripod.  This  improved  arquebus  subsequently  re- 
ceived in  France  the  name  of  mousquet. 

The  Spanish  infantry,  being  constantly  required 
to  fight,  could  not  be  disbanded  at  the  end  of  each 
campaign ;  it  therefore  became  a  permanent  body, 
and  this  circumstance,  together  with  its  courage, 
rendered  it  so  thoroughly  disciplined  and  warlike, 
that  its  proud  battalions  remained  for  more  than  a 
century  the  terror  of  the  soldiers  fighting  in  Italy 
and  Flanders.  The  Spaniards  often  mingled  their 
arquebusiers  with  the  cavalry ;  a  mixture  which  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus  imitated,  but  which  is  at  the  present 
day  proscribed. 

The  Spanish  infantry  was  distinguished  for  its 
good  discipline  and  esprit;  a  simple  sergeant  was 
obeyed  like  an  officer.  When  a  new  recruit  ar- 
rived, the  older  ones  helped  him  with  their  advice 
and  their  purse,  to  put  him  at  once  in  a  condition 
to  do  honor  to  his  country.  "Their  barracks," 
wrote  La  Noue,  "  were  like  schools,  where  the  ordi- 
nary topics  were  the  duties  of  the  soldier  and  of  the 
officer,  honor,  and  whatever  related  to  arms." 

Charles  V.  had  solidly  organized  the  tercios 
(regiments)  of  his  infantry,  which  out  of  Spain 
usually  numbered  3,000  men,  divided  into  fifteen 
companies  of  200  men  each ;  the  tercio  was  com- 
manded by  a  colonel  of  horse,  or  the  senior  captain. 


38      inSTOEY  AND  TACTICS    OF   THE  SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

The  celebrated  emperor  had  also  instituted  bounties 
as  rewards  for  acts  of  courage,  the  least  of  which 
was  two  crowns;  and  the  Spanish  soldier  consid- 
ered it  an  honor  to  obtain  them. 

Similar  organization  and  usages,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, are  wanting  in  the  sixteenth  century,  among 
the  infantry  of  other  nations. 

Let  us  return  to  the  French  infantry. 

11.  Frank  Archers. — The  Spaniards  were  not 
the  only  people  who  maintained  a  standing  infantry. 
In  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  two  attempts 
to  establish  it  in  a  permanent  form  were  made  by  the 
French  kings ;  the  first  by  Charles  VII. 

This  monarch,  having  recovered  his  kingdom 
from  the  English,  desired  to  consolidate  his  throne 
by  surrounding  it  with  regular  troops.  For  this 
purpose  he  instituted  the  "  free  companies  "  of  cav- 
slrjj  and  formed  the  infantry  of  the  Frank  archers. 
By  an  edict  of  1448,  he  ordered  each  parish  to  raise 
and  maintain  one  archer,  well  formed,  and  skilful 
in  the  use  of  the  bow,  whose  duty  it  was  to  prac- 
tise on  Sundays  and  holidays,  and  to  take  the  field 
at  the  royal  command.  In  consideration  of  the 
military  service  to  which  he  was  bound,  which  was 
more  extensive  than  that  of  the  communal  militia, 
and  attached  him  exclusively  to  the  king,  the  Frank 
archer  was  exempted  from  taxes.  This  exemption 
was,  indeed,  an  indirect  method  of  paying  him ; 
but  in  active  service  he  received,  in  addition,  the 
sum  of  56  francs  per  month,  which,  together  with 


niSTOKY   OF    mFANTRY.  39 

his   equipment  and  armament,  was  cliargecl  to  the 

,  parish.     He   wore   over  his   ordinary  dress   a  kini 

of  doublet,  which  came  at  least  to  the  knees,  formed 
of  thirty  thicknesses  of  linen  cloth,  enclosed  be- 
tween buckskins.  They  had  great  confidence  in  this 
defensive  article,  which,  however,  was  sometimes 
covered  by  a  steel  corselet.  On  his  head  he  wore  a 
helmet  without  a  crest  or  a  visor.  He  was  armed 
with  the  long  bow  and  quiver,  and  a  sword  of  mode- 
rate len2:th. 

Louis  XL,  in  1469,  increased  the  number  of 
Frank  archers  to  16,000.  This  force  was  distrib- 
uted in  four  corps  of  4,000  men,  each  commanded 
by  a  captain-general,  over  whom  there  was  a  chief 
of  all  the  archers.  France  was  divided  into  four 
military  departments;  within  the  limits  of  each  a 
captain-general  had  to  recruit  his  soldiers.  Each 
corps  of  4,000  was  divided  into  eight  bodies  of  500. 
The  first  of  these  remained  under  the  immediate  or- 
der of  the  captain-general ;  a  captain  took  command 
of  each  of  the  remaining  seven.  This  reorganization 
by  Louis  XL  carried  out  the  views  of  Charles  VIL 

This  instituting  of  archers  just  at  the  time  when 
portable  fire-arms  were  beginning  to  spread,  is  sin- 
gular enough;  but  they  proved  their  inefficiency, 
and  finally  disappeared,  not  so  much  on  account  of 
their  armament,  which  reduced  them  to  light 
troops,  as  for  other  reasons.  Scattered  through  the 
parishes,  and  drilling  separately,  the  Frank  archers 
could  not  but  remain  under  the  influence  of  the  parish 
church,  losing  the  habits  of  the  soldier  and  taking 


40      HISTOKY  AND  TACTICS   OF   THE  SEPAEATE   AKMS. 

those  of  tlie  laborer  and  tlie  artisan.  In  fact,  this 
came  to  pass :  after  having  behaved  valiantly  in  some 
engagements,  they  could  not,  when  peace  came,  yield 
to  discipline,  and  sustain  the  esprit  dii  corps:  in 
short,  they  could  not  be  soldiers.  It  became  difficult 
to  reassemble  them;  officers  disliked  to  command 
them,  and,  sarcasm  lending  its  aid,  the  institution 
was  undermined.  Toward  the  end  of  his  reign, 
Louis  XI.  substituted  for  them  6,000  Swiss,  10,000 
French  soldiers  of  fortune,  and  a  corps  of  German 
foot  soldiers  known  under  the  name  of  lansquemts 
(Lands-knecht). 

These  lansquenets  consisted  of  soldiers  of  for- 
tune recruited  in  the  German  districts,  near  the 
Ehine.  Being  strong  and  tall,  they  at  first  formed 
bodies  of  pikemen ;  but,  unlike  the  Swiss,  they  held 
the  pike  by  the  end  of  the  shaft,  and  nevertheless 
managed  it  with  skill.  They  were  better  than  the 
French  infantry,  and  on  that  account,  for  want  of 
Swiss  troops,  they  were  intrusted  with  the  guard 
of  the  cannon. 

The  infantry  having  rendered  valuable  service 
to  Charles  VIIL,  upon  his  return  from  the  conquest 
of  Naples,  the  greater  part  of  the  crowned  heads 
comprehended  the  importance  of  this  arm,  and 
formed  bodies  of  pikemen,  in  imitation  of  the 
Swiss.  The  French  kings  did  not  follow  this  exam- 
ple, but,  trusting  to  the  Swiss  and  the  German 
soldiers  of  fortune  enlisted  in  their  pay,  dispensed 
with  the  formation  of  regular  national  infantry. 

Louis  XII.,  however,  endeavored  to  discipline  his 


I 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY.  41 

infantry,  and  to  give  it  more  importance.  He  was 
the  first  to  succeed  in  dismounting  the  gentry.  At 
his  solicitation,  several  of  the  most  distinguished  cava- 
liers, among  others  Bayard,  accepted  the  command 
of  bodies  of  foot.  From  that  time  the  prejudices  of 
the  nobles  against  infantry  were  overcome,  and  num- 
bers of  young  gentlemen,  of  whom  Blaise  de  Montluc 
was  one,  exchanged  the  lance  for  the  pike.  This 
happy  reform  dates  from  1507.  By  relieving  the 
French  infantry  from  the  contempt  under  which  it 
had  suffered,  it  increased  its  valor  tenfold,  and  con- 
tributed to  the  success  of  Louis  XII.  in  Italy. 

12.  Liegions  of  Francis  I, — Francis  I.  did  even 
more  than  Louis  XII.  for  the  improvement  of  the 
French  infantry.  At  the  battle  of  Marignan  (1515) 
he  commanded  it  in  person  on  foot,  and,  armed  with 
a  pike,  rushed  to  the  charge,  exclaiming,  ^^Qui 
TfHaime  me  suive^  Stimulated  by  his  example,  our 
infantry  that  day  proved  their  superiority  to  the 
Swiss,  and  conquered  them. 

It  was  at  this  very  time  that  Machiavelli  laid 
it  down  as  a  maxim  that  "well  organized  infantry 
could  hardly  be  beaten,  except  by  infantry;"  thus 
proclaiming  the  superiority  of  the  foot  soldiers. 
The  idea  was  a  profound  and  bold  one,  especially 
for  one  who  had  never  worn  a  sword. 

Francis  I.,  entertaining,  doubtless,  the  same  view 
as  the  gi^eat  writer,  and  unwilling  to  remain  longer 
at  the  mercy  of  the  capricious  and  exacting  for- 
eigners, resolved  to  create  a  national  infantry.     For 


42      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

some  time  lie  liesitated  as  to  the  organization  to  be 
adopted;  but  finally,  influenced  by  the  revival  of 
learning,  wLicli  turned  the  minds  of  men  back  to 
tbe  ideas  of  the  ancients,  he  decided  to  imitate  the 
Koman  formation;  but  he  copied  it  in  little  else 
than  in  name. 

In  1534  he  formed  seven  legions,  each  bearing 
the  name  of  the  province  in  which  it  was  raised.* 
Each  legion  consisted  of  six  bands,  the  band  having 
the  following  effective  force  : 

{Captain, 1  1 
Lieutenants,      ....     2  I  5 

Ensigns, 2  J 


Non-commissioned 
Officers. 


Centurions, 10 

Corporals, 40 

Quartermaster  sergeants,    4 
^  Sergeants, 6  ^ 


60 


4  Deijmmers  and  2  Fifeks, 
Soldiers. 


Arquebusiers, 
4  Pikemen,  .  . 
I  Crossbowmen, 


200 
600 
200 


1,000 


Total,  1,071 


The  entire  legion  was  commanded  by  one  of  the 
six  captains  of  the  band.  Its  force,  according  to 
the  above  schedule,  amounted  to  6,426  men,  and 
that  of  the  seven  legions  together  to  44,982  men, 
including  officers.     The  officers  and  non-commissioned 


*  The  legion  of  Normandy,  tlie  legion  of  Brittany,  the  legion  of 
Picardy,  the  legion  of  Languedoc,  the  legion  of  Guyenne,  the  legion 
of  Champagne  (raised  also  in  Burgundy  and  Nivernais),  the  legion 
of  the  Dauphine  (raised  also  in  Provence,  Lyonnais,  and  Auvergne). 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY.  43 

officers  were  required  to  be  of  tlie  province  in  whicli 
the  legion  was  raised. 

The  arquebusiers  formed  but  the  fifth  part  of 
the  soldiers  of  a  band,  but,  being  frequently  de- 
tached to  fight  as  eiifants  perdus  (forlorn  hope), 
there  were  assigned  to  them  exclusively  one  of  the 
lieutenants  and  his  ensign. 

Among  his  privileges,  the  soldier  of  the  legion 
enjoyed  exemption  from  taxes  to  the  amount  of  20 
sols  ;  obtained  a  decoration,  consisting  of  a  gold  ring, 
if  he  distinguished  himself  by  a  brilliant  action, 
and  attained  to  nobility  by  the  simple  fact  of  pro- 
motion to  the  grade  of  lieutenant.  Those  who  were 
invalided  by  wounds  served  in  the  garrisons  under 
pay,  exempt  for  life  from  all  tax  or  subsidy. 

This  project  was  never  fully  carried  into  ejffect, 
for  it  was  at  that  time  impossible  in  France  to 
maintain  nearly  45,000  foot  soldiers,  in  addition  to 
the  old  bands.  At  the  death  of  Francis  I.,  the  le- 
gionary formation  fell  at  once  into  disuse,  and  was 
followed  by  a  return  to  isolated  bands. 

13.  French  Bands. — From  this  period,  the  band 
(hande)  became  the  only  foot  corps  in  France  possess- 
ing a  regular  and  peiTQanent  organization.  It  was 
the  real  unit  of  formation  of  the  infantry,  and  as  it 
mostly  numbered  as  many  as  500  or  600  men,  it  cor- 
responded very  nearly  to  our  modern  battalion. 

A  captain  commanded  the  band,  seconded  by  a 
lieutenant,  an  ensign,  quartermaster  sergeants,  ser- 
geants, and  corporals.      The  band  marched  to  the 


44      HISTORY  AKD  TACTICS   OF   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

drum  and  fife.  Among  the  soldiers  there  were  those 
distino-uished  as  a  first  class,  called  anspessades,  a 
name  at  first  written  lanspessades^  derived  from  the 
Italian  lance  spezzate,  broken  lance,  and  originally  ap- 
plied to  dismounted  gensdarmes  accepting  service  in 
the  infantry. 

The  officers  and  pikemen  were  armed  alike;  a 
long  pike,  a  sword,  a  helmet  covering  the  ears, 
corselets  or  cuirasses,  armlets,  gauntlets,  and  cuisses. 
The  arquebusiers  had  little  helmets,  mailed  frocks  and 
sleeves,  and  a  sword  or  dirk.  The  former,  therefore, 
belonged  to  the  heavy-armed  troops,  or,  as  we  should 
now  say,  to  the  infantry  of  the  line ;  whilst  the  lat- 
ter were  of  the  light-armed  kind. 

The  band  was  formed  in  full  square,  the  pike- 
men  in  the  centre,  the  arquebusiers  outside.  The 
captain  took  his  place  in  front;  the  lieutenant 
stood  as  file  closer ;  the  ensign  occupied  the  centre 
of  the  front  rank  of  pikemen.  In  combat,  the  pike- 
men  stood  fast,  while  the  arquebusiers  scattered, 
under  the  direction  of  the  lieutenant,  and  skir- 
mished. If  the  battle  became  serious,  the  arquebusiers 
took  refuge  behind  the  pikemen,  who  received  a 
charge  with  crossed  pikes,  or  charged  the  enemy  in 
close  order.  In  this  charge,  they  went  almost  shoul- 
der to  shoulder,  and  turned  themselves  obliquely  to 
break  through  the  enemy — a  practice  which  seems  to 
be  a  vestige  of  the  ancient  influence  of  the  shield, 
which  gave  the  infantry  a  tendency  to  extend  itself 
to  the  right,  because  each  soldier  endeavored  to 
cover  himself  with  the  shield  of  his  neighbor. 


mSTOEY   OF   INFANTRY.  45 

On  tlie  battle  field,  the  imposing  masses  of  in- 
fantry were  drawn  up  in  large  hattailles^  square  or 
rectangular,  varying  from  3,000  to  10,000  men. 
Manuscripts  of  the  time  represent  these  battailles  as 
42,  or  even  68  men  in  depth.  The  number  of  men 
covered  with  corselets  was  gradually  diminished, 
and  the  pikemen  were  stripped  of  defensive  arms. 

It  was  on  account  of  this  formation  in  full  square, 
that  military  works  of  the  sixteenth  century  contained 
tables  of  square  roots  for  any  given  number  of  sol- 
diers, which  tables  formed  the  tactical  manual  of  the 
epoch. 

In  these  formations,  the  ranks,  as  well  as  the 
files,  were  separated  by  one  step.  Occasionally,  in 
presence  of  the  enemy,  this  distance  was  closed,  and 
they  formed  in  compact  order,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
foot  soldiers  under  Montluc  at  Cerisoles  (1544). 

During  the  religious  wars  which  troubled  France 
under  the  last  Valois,  fire-arms  were  multiplied  in  the 
ranks  of  the  French  infantry,  being  better  suited  to 
the  character  of  wars  consisting  of  skirmishes,  cap- 
tures and  recaptures  of  posts ;  but  as  these  arms  were 
then  used  only  for  firing,  the  infantry,  deprived  of 
pikes,  were  incapable  of  either  charging  or  receiving 
a  charge.  Hence  this  maxim  of  a  contemporary  war- 
rior :  "  The  arquebusiers  without  pikes  are  arms  and 
legs  without  bodies."  The  pikemen  were,  in  fact, 
retained  down  to  the  time  when,  by  the  invention  of 


*  They  already  began  to  use  the  word  lattalions ;  subsequently,  the 
name  of  the  whole  became  the  name  of  a  part. 


46      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OP   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

the  "bayonet,  tlie  fire-arm  became  at  once  an  offensive 
and  a  defensive  weapon. 

The  French  "bands  were  known  under  two  grand 
divisions,  according  to  their  origin;  the  bands  of 
Piedmont,  which,  for  more  than  a  century  fought  for 
the  so  much  desired  conquest  of  the  Milanese  and 
of  Italy,  and  the  bands  of  Picardy,  which,  on  the 
northern  frontier,  contended  against  the  Flemish 
and  the  English.  After  Francis  I.,  there  were  far- 
ther distinguished,  the  bands  of  Champagne,  op- 
posed to  the  Germans,  and  the  bands  of  Guyenne 
and  Navarre,  charged  with  the  defence  of  the  king- 
dom, on  the  side  of  the  Pyrenees,  against  the  Span- 
iards. Piedmont,  Picardy,  Champagne,  Navarre ! 
glorious  names,  which  the  oldest  corps  of  our  infantry 
bore  even  to  the  time  of  the  Eevolution. 

The  system  of  isolated  bands  was  suited  to  the 
French  character,  inasmuch  as  it  allowed  the  cap- 
tains to  distinguish  themselves  individually,  and 
did  not  subject  them  to  any  superior  authority.  It 
was  soon  discovered,  however,  that  it  was  necessary 
to  combine  several  of  these  bands  under  the  command 
of  a  single  chief,  in  order  to  give  greater  impetus  to 
the  combatants,  as  well  as  to  facilitate  the  direction 
and  administration  of  the  whole.  Henry  II.,  con- 
vinced  of  this  necessity,  tried  to  renew  the  legionary 
organization  of  Francis  I. ;  but  the  peace  of  Cateau- 
Cambresis  deferred  the  realization  of  his  projects  by 
rendering  them,  for  the  time,  useless.  It  was  in  the 
minority  of  Charles  IX.,  in  the  early  months  of  1561, 
that  the  first  regiments  were  formed,  consisting  of 


I 


HISTOEY    OF   IITFAISTTRY.  47 

several  bands — the  chief  officers  receiving  the  title  of 
colonel.  The  regimental  organization  of  the  old  bands 
was  completed  in  1569. 

The  political  troubles  very  much  increased  the 
number  of  regiments  from  the  first,  since  each  influ- 
ential partisan  received  a  commission  to  raise  one ;  but 
these  corps  usually  lasted  no  longer  than  the  credit 
of  theii^  chiefs,  and  were  disbanded  in  time  of  peace. 
Indeed,  until  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII.,  there  were  not 
many  permanent  regiments  of  infantry.  The  only 
regiments  which,  having  their  origin  before  this  agi- 
tated period,  survived  it  unbroken,  were  those  re- 
sulting from  the  fusion  of  the  old  bands  already 
known  by  the  distinctive  title  of  the  vieux  corps^ 
which  they  retained  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century — the  moyens  vieux  and  the  petits  vieux  fol- 
lowing them  in  respect  of  seniority. 

The  order  of  battle  of  a  regiment  was  at  first  a 
line  of  small  squares,  either  full  or  hollow,  each 
company  forming  a  square.  In  serious  actions  the 
line  was  made  full.  For  resisting  cavalry  they  had 
already  conceived  of  the  formation  in  squares  ar- 
ranged in  echelons  so  as  to  flank  each  other. 

The  introduction  of  the  musket  was  almost 
simultaneous  with  the  institution  of  the  first  regi- 
ments of  French  infantry.  The  musketeers  fought 
only  as  skirmishers.  Besides  the  musket,  their  whole 
armament  and  equipment  consisted  of  a  morion  (small 
helmet),  a  buff  leather  vest  without  sleeves,  a  dirk,  a 
knapsack,  and  a  powder  flask.  To  act  with  greater 
rapidity,  some  were  mounted  upon  small  horses,  thus 


48      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

forming  in  tlie  infantry  regiments  an  accidental  por- 
tion of  cavalry.  The  heavy  arquebus  was  gradually 
superseded  by  the  musket. 

The  depth  of  the  infantry  formation  was  dimin- 
ished, as  defensive  armor  and  the  pike  were  aban- 
doned. Even  with  the  disposition  of  the  regiment 
in  a  line  of  squares  by  companies,  the  depth  of  the 
lines  could  not  exceed  10  or  12  men;  for  this  cor- 
responds to  an  effective  force  of  100  or  144  men  in 
a  company.  This  depth,  habitually  preserved,  al- 
though the  intervals  were  lessened,  became  the 
standard  depth.  Indeed,  the  depth  of  ten  ranks 
may  be  regarded  as  that  of  the  reign  of  Henry  IV., 
as  the  following  diagram,  extracted  from  a  contem- 
porary author,  shows.^*  It  relates  to  the  order  of 
battle  of  a  battalion  of  500  men,  the  jp  standing  for 
pikemen,  and  the  m  for  musketeers. 

FEENCH   BATTALIOIT   ABOUT  1610. 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mminmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

mmmmmmmmmm    pppppppppppppppppppppppppppppp  mmmmmmmmmm 

In  this  formation,  the  musketeers  are  placed  in 
a  position  favorable  to  their  action  as  light  troops  in 
skirmishing,  and  the  pikemen  stHl  form,  as  in  the  old 
band,  a  solid  centre,  capable  of  sustaining  a  charge. 

*  Principes  de  Vart  militaire,  par  J.  de  Billon,  1622,  in  4to.,  p.  156. 


HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY.  49 

The   fire-arms   in   this   battalion   constitute    two 
iffclis  of  the  whole  force.     The  proportion  went  on 
increasing,  and  became  two  thirds  in  the  reign  of 
Louis  XIIL* 

14.  Swedish  Infantry. — The  French  infantry,  un- 
der Henry  IV.,  derived  both  its  formation  and  tac- 
tics, in  part,  from  the  Dutch  infantry,  trained  by  the 
celebrated  captain,  Maurice  of  Nassau.  So,  also,  the 
infantry  under  Louis  XIV.  borrowed  some  of  its  im- 
provements from  the  Swedish  infantry,  formed  in  the 
school  of  the  great  war  under  Gustavus  Adolphus. 
Let  us,  therefore,  before  proceeding  to  speak  of  its 
progress  under  the  greatest  of  the  Bourbons,  first 
consider  the  improvements  made  by  the  conqueror  of 
Leipsic. 

Having  to  deal  with  the  heavy  Austrians,  who 
were  w^edded  to  the  use  of  large  battalions,  Gustavus 
Adolphus  turned  his  attention  to  mobility.  He  ren- 
dered his  infantry  more  manageable  by  dividing  it 
into  small  independent  corps,  under  separate  com- 
manders, and  reducing  its  depth  to  six  ranks.  Some- 
times, in  battle,  he  made  his  files  deploy  to  extend  his 
front,  so  that  the  line  was  reduced  to  a  depth  of 
three  ranks.  He  usually  drew  up  his  infantry  in  two 
lines,  the  full  spaces  of  the  first  corresponding  to  the 
vacant  ones  of  the  second.  This  formation  is  exhibited 
in  the  following  diagram,  in  which  P  denotes  the 
pikemen,  and  M  the  musketeers. 

*  At  this  epoch  the  proportion  of  fire-arms  was  about  the  same  in  the 
Spanish  infantry  ;  for  in  1637  the  regiment  of  Jaen  numbered  190  men,  to 
wit :  60  pikemen,  90  arquebusiers,  and  40  musketeers. 
4 


50      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS    OF  THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

FOBMATION   OF  THE   SWEDISH    IXFANTRY,    UNDER   GUSTAVUS   ADOLPHUS. 

f-pi        m\::e2\m2le2\m        l^ 

[mIIIpDEJCIIIImI  [mILZJCSLZHIM] 

By  diminisMng  the  depth  of  his  infantry,  the 
Swedish  king  extended  his  front,  and  thereby  in- 
creased the  effect  of  the  fire-arms;  and  this  effect 
was  the  more  increased  in  consequence  of  the  greater 
number  of  musketeers  in  his  troops  than  in  preceding 
formations ;  for  they  numbered  72  in  a  company  to 
54  pikemen,  which  gives  nearly  three  fifths  as  the 
proportion  of  portable  fire-arms. 

With  the  duninished  depth  he  could  also  shorten 
the  pike  to  12  feet  (English).  He  abolished  the 
cuirasse  of  the  pikemen,  leaving  as  their  sole  de- 
fensive armor  the  helmet,  called  a  salade.  He  light- 
ened the  musket,  so  that  it  could  be  fired  without  a 
rest,  and  carried  upon  the  shoulder  without  a  cushion ; 
he  adopted  the  cartridge  carried  in  a  pouch,  instead 
of  charges  hung  upon  cords,  which  frequently  became 
entangled  with  the  soldiers'  belts;  and  introduced 
firing  in  three  ranks,  very  much  like  that  of  the 
present  day. 

All  these  innovations,  increasing  the  mobility 
of  the  infantry,  rendered  it  easy  to  pass  from  line 
into  column;  and  thenceforth,  in  marches  and  in 
battles,  the  advantage  was  with  Gustavus  Adol- 
phus,  whose  adversaries  adhered  to  the  formation 
10  ranks  deep,  and  used  muskets  of  such  clumsy 
construction  that  they  could  be  loaded  only  by  94 
commands. 


I 


HISTOEY   OF   mFANTRY.  51 

f  Sweden  also  put  companies  of  mus- 
:eteers  between  Ms  squadrons  of  horse,  a  mixture 
whicli  at  that   time,  when  the   cavalry  movements 
were  slow,  was  both  feasible  and  profitable. 


15.  Infantry  of  Lionis  XIT.  and  I^ouis  XT. — ^The 
fire-arms  used  by  the  Swedish  infantry  were  muskets 
with  the  match  or  wheel-lock,  which  had  to  be  borne 
on  the  shoulder  horizontally  :  consequently,  the  ranks 
could  not  be  closed. 

Two  inventions  appeared  which  changed  this 
state  of  things.  One  was  the  flint-lock  musket, 
which  was  introduced  into  the  French  army  in  1652. 
The  bayonet  had  already  been  in  existence  some 
years.  It  was  then  constructed  with  a  wooden  stock, 
so  that,  when  placed  upon  the  end  of  the  musket, 
it  prevented  firing ;  but  it  was,  nevertheless,  an  im- 
portant improvement,  inasmuch  as  it  furnished  the 
soldier  with  a  weapon  which  was  at  once  both  offen- 
sive and  defensive. 

These  inventions,  which  date  from  the  time  of  the 
Fronde^  were  especially  opportune,  since  Turenne 
had,  in  1640,  adopted  for  the  French  infantry  the 
Swedish  depth  of  six  ranks.  Lighter  arms  and  a 
lighter  formation,  therefore,  in  combination,  worked 
rapid  progress. 

With  this  depth  of  six  ranks,  the  French  bat- 
talion was  drawn  up  as  in  the  times  of  Henry  IV. ; 
pikemen  in  the  centre,  musketeers  on  the  flanks. 
This  formation  is    exhibited  in   the   following  dia- 


52     HISTORY   AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE    ARMS. 

gram,  taken  from  a  contemporaneous  work.^      Tke 
battalion  liere  forms  a  regiment. 


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In  forming  a  square,  tke  pikemen  occupied  tlie 
centre  and  tke  musketeers  surrounded  tkem  on  the 

*  rart  de  la  guerre,  par  Gaya,  1689,  p.  158. 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  5H 

four  sides,  as  in  the  following  diagram^*  of  a  company 
of  100  men,  36  pikemen  and  64  musketeers. 


COMPANl 

'  SQUARE  (1673). 

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m 

m 

m 

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m  m 

m  ni 

m 

ni 

m 

in 

m 

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m  m 

m  m 

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P 

P 

P 

m  ra 

m  m 

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P 

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111  m 

m  m 

P 

P 

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m  m 

m  m 

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I 


The  new  musket  (the  fusil)  easily  supplanted  the 
old  one  (the  mousqitetj  firelock),  which  completely 
disappeared  from  the  French  ranks  in  the  last  year 
of  the  seventeenth  century.  The  bayonet  took  the 
place  of  the  pike,  but  not  without  a  struggle ;  for  it 
was  not  until  1703  that  Louis  XIV.,  following  the 
advice  of  Vauban  against  that  of  Montesquiou,  finally 
abolished  the  latter.  As  the  musket  was  now  the 
only  arm  of  the  foot  soldier,  and  its  length  was  much 
less  than  that  of  the  pike,  it  became  necessary  to  re- 
duce the  depth  of  the  line,  which  was  now  drawn  up 
in  four  ranks.  The  diagram  on  the  next  page,  taken 
from  Puysegur,f  shows  this  reduced  formation.  The 
c*ommandant  of  the  battalion  stands  in  front  of  the  cen- 
tre, having  behind  him  the  three  colors,  which  are  in 

*  From  a  work  entitled  Les  Devoirs  militaires  d^  qfficiers  (Vlnfanterie 
et  de  camlerie,  par  De  La  Fontaine,  1673,  p.  404. 

t  Art  de  la  guerre  par  principes  et  par  regies^  par  le  marechal  de 
Puys^gnr,  edition  in  4to.,  t.  i.,  p.  120. 


64    HISTORY   AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 


o 
o 
o 
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O 
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i 


tlie  middle  of  tlie  line  formed 
by  tlie  captains  of  compa- 
nies and  some  other  officers ; 
a  number  of  sergeants  are 
placed  in  a  line  of  file-closers 
behind  tlie  fonrtli  rank.  Tlie 
distance  of  tlie  ranks  is  about 
12  feet ;  upon  engaging  with 
the  enemy  the  ranks  close  to 
about  3  feet,  and  the  officers 
in  front  fall  back  into  the 
front  rank  of  soldiers.  The 
drummers  are  on  the  flanks. 

Louis  XIV.  also  originat- 
ed the  grenadiers,  a  wholly 
French  creation,  since  copied 
by  other  nations.  The  first 
grenadiers  were  designed  to 
throw  grenades  in  sieges.  In 
1670  they  became  selected 
soldiers,  and  each  regiment 
contained  one  company  of 
them. 

At  the  beginning  of  the 
reign  of  Louis  XV.,*  therefore, 

*  Light  infantry  dates  from  the  reign 
of  Louis  XY.  At  the  close  of  1742,  a 
simple  servant,  named  Fischer,  collected, 
near  Prague,  some  of  his  comrades,  and 
repulsed  the  attacks  of  the  Austrian 
pandours.    With  his  handful  of  men  he 


HISTOKY    OF   INFANTRY.  55 

the  Frencli  infantry  was  drawn  up  in  four  ranks,  but 
these  were  still  open  ranks.  A  vast  improvement  in 
tactics  soon  followed,  "by  the  introduction  of  the  ca- 
denced  and  lock  step,  recommended  by  Marshal  Saxe, 
which  permitted  marching  and  manoeuvring  in  close 
ranks,  each  man  then  occupying  the  minimum  space, 
both  in  rank  and  file.  This  is,  consequently,  the 
period  from  which  we  must  date  the  light  but  com- 
pact infantry  formation  which  covers  the  least  possible 
ground  ;  as  may  be  seen  by  this  figure,  extracted  from 
a  work  of  that  time."^ 

COMPANY  OF  FRENCH  GEEXADIERS  IN  OEDEE  OF  BATTLE  (175T). 

1st  lieutenant.  »fYTTnnnOnnnO®  Captain. 


2d  lieutenant. 


16.  Prussian  Infantry. — At  the  death  of  Marshal 
Saxe,  the  Prussian  infantry  was  the  best  in  Europe. 
Trained  by  the  Prince  of  Anhalt  under  Frederic- Wil- 
liam I.,  and  brought  to  perfection  by  Frederic  the 
Great  after  his  conquest  of  Silesia,  it  was  familiar 
with  marching  in  order  of  battle,  forming  and  deploy- 
ing close  columns,  and  executing  rapid  firing.  The 
Prussian  gun  had  a  cylindrical  iron  rammer,  and  a 

displayed  so  much  bravery  and  comprehension  of  military  matters,  that 
this  small  corps  obtained,  Nov.  1,  1743,  through  the  influence  of  Count 
Saxe,  rank  in  the  army,  under  the  name  of  Chasseurs  de  Fischer.  At  the 
end  of  the  war,  Fischer  had  under  his  command  400  foot  and  200  mounted 
chasseurs.  He  was  distinguished  in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  With  him 
originated  the  foot  and  horse  chasseurs. —  Tr. 

*  Amusements  Militaires,  par  Dupain,  1757,  p.  226. 


56     HISTORY   Al^D    TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

conical  or  funnel-shaped  vent,  wliich  allowed  powder 
to  pass  from  the  barrel  into  the  pan,  two  features 
which  saved  two  commands  in  loading,  namely  prim- 
ing and  reversing  the  rammer.  The  soldier  being, 
moreover,  trained  in  the  most  minute  drill,  under 
severe  discipline,  could  fire  six  times  in  a  minute ;  a 
degree  of  rapidity  of  execution  which  gave  him  the 
same  advantage  as  if  he  were  nearer,  and  fired  more 
accurately ;  and  hence  firing  was  the  chief  mode  of 
action  of  the  Prussian  infantry,  although,  in  several 
battles,  it  attacked  with  the  bayonet. 

Modern  infantry  tactics  •  came  forth  completely 
formed  from  the  Prussian  camps  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  basis  and  the  principles  of  the  manoeu- 
vres of  this  arm,  as  now  practised  by  the  several  na- 
tions, are  the  immediate  results  of  the  manoeuvres 
either  perfected  or  introduced  by  Frederic  the  Great, 
who  was  the  first  to  combine  precision  of  movement 
with  celerity. 

The  Prussian  battalion,  drawn  up  in  three  ranks, 
was  divided  into  eight  equal  companies,  usually  com- 
posed only  of  soldiers  from  the  ^ve  companies  of  fusi- 
leers,  the  grenadiers  fighting  separately.  The  conse- 
quence was  that  men  of  different  companies  were 
united  into  one,  and  that  the  soldiers  were  not 
always  under  the  same  officers  in  the  camp  and  in 
the  field.  To  this  twofold  inconvenience  there  was 
added  the  anomaly  of  having  in  each  battalion  one 
company  of  fusileers  commanded  by  a  lieutenant, 
whilst  each  of  the  others  was  under  the  orders  of  a 
first  or  second  captain. 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTEY.  5? 

In  order  of  battle  the  officers  in  the  front  rank 
occupied  the  interval  between  the  companies  ;  behind 
them  stood  a  non-commissioned  officer.  In  a  single 
rank,  four  paces  in  the  rear,  stood  all  the  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  who  were  not  between  the 

PEUSSIAN  BATTALION   (1752). 

<K®A    


101         !oi  u         10    g  iQi  Id         lor 


@C0©©00©©00©©00©         @oo®©oo@©oo@©oo© 

companies.  The  colors  were  in  the  centre,  dividing 
the  battalion  into  two  equal  parts,  called  wings,  each 
wing  formed  of  two  divisions,  and  each  division  of 
tw^o  companies.  On  each  side  of  the  colors,  three  of 
the  files  always  reserved  their  fire.  The  commandant 
of  the  battalion  stood  in  front  of  the  colors.  The  pre- 
ceding diagram  represents  this  formation :  •  designates 
an  officer ;  O  a  non-commissioned  officer. 

The  Prussian  company,  when  drawn  up  se})arately, 
was  divided  into  four  sections^  the  supernumeraries 
forming  a  separate  detachment,  in  three  ranks,  in  rear 
of  the  left  flank,  as  is  shown  in  the  following  figure. 


PEUSSIAN  COMPANY. 

1st  lieut. 

© 

2(1  lieut. 

Ensign. 

® 

Captain. 

® 
O    O   O  Drummers. 

1                               lot 

|o| 

|oI 

lo 

o          o 

O 

o 

_              _    Non-commissioned    offi 
O              O                    eers. 

1       J  Supernumeraries. 

It  was  one  of  the  features  of  the  Prussian  infantry 
to  execute  firing  while  marching  to  the  charge,  a  prac- 


58      HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS   OF    THE   SEPARATE   AEMS. 

tice  since  abandoned,  as  producing  more  disorder  than 
effect.  They  were  also  distinguished  for  their  close- 
fitting  dress  and  very  precise  carriage.  Under  the 
fire  of  the  enemy,  without  losing  in  any  degree  theii* 
quickness  of  movement,  they  preserved  the  most  im- 
movable solidity,  which,  more  than  once,  contributed 
to  save  Frederic  the  Great  from  impending  defeat. 

17,  Progress  to  the  present  time.^ — From  the  time 
of  the  great  Frederic,  the  history  of  infantry  may  be 
summed  up  in  a  few  words.  The  formation  in  three 
ranks  was  definitely  adopted  in  France  with  the  in- 
troduction of  the  Prussian  drill  among  the  troops, 
with  a  view  to  giving  them  uniform  instruction. 

The  principal  minister  of  war  of  the  reign  of  Louis 
XVI.,  Count  de  Saint-Germain,  instituted  (1775)  in 
each  regiment  of  infantry,  a  company  of  chasseurs, 
a  second  company  of  elite,  to  which  good  soldiers 
could  be  promoted,  as  a  reward  for  distinguished 
services,  without  regard  to  their  stature.  In  1804 
this  company,  which  had  disappeared  during  the  Rev- 
olution, reappeared,  under  the  name  of  voUigeurs ; 
but  there  was  now  one  company  to  each  battalion,  in- 
stead of  one  to  a  regiment,  as  formerly.  As  each  bat- 
talion contained  also  a  company  of  grenadiers,  its  two 
flanks,  in  the  order  of  battle,  were  each  supported  by 
a  company  of  picked  men,  which  rendered  unnecessary 
the  select  detachment  formerly  placed  in  reserve  on  the 
left  flank,  when  the  depth  of  the  line  had  been  reduced. 

In  the  subsequent  campaigns,  the  French  select 
soldiers,  like  the  grenadiers  of  Frederic,  fought  apart 


HISTORY    OF   mFANTRY.  59 

iTom  their  regiment,  no  longer  forming  merely  select 
battalions,  but  distinct  army-corps,  used  as  a  reserve. 

From  this  epoch,  the  infantry  organization  has  re- 
mained very  nearly  the  same,  with  the  exception  of 
the  number  of  centre  companies  of  a  battalion,  and 
the  number  of  battalions  to  a  regiment,  which  have 
varied  from  time  to  time. 

As  to  the  tactics  of  the  infantry  during  this  period, 
it  may  be  said  to  consist  no  longer  in  solidity  and 
firing ;  the  Prussian  method  is  disappearing,  and  the 
secret  of  success  is  possessed  by  those  who  best  un- 
derstand marching  and  attacking.  All  the  wars  of 
the  first  republic  and  of  the  reign  of  Napoleon  I.,  ^es- 
pecially the  campaigns  of  1796,  in  Italy,  and  of  1805, 
in  Germany,  clearly  set  forth  this  characteristic  fea- 
ture in  the  progress  of  modern  military  art."^ 

We  have  yet  to  point  out  two  essential  modi- 
fications : 

The  first  is  the  formation  in  two  ranks,  adopted  in 
1810  by  the  English ;  a  formation  which  is  particu- 
larly suited  to  their  solid  and  phlegmatic  troops.  The 
Swiss  infantry  has  also  followed  the  example  of  the 
English,  and  now  forms  in  only  two  ranks.  The  Eus- 
sian  infantry,  in  great  manoeuvres,  has  begun  to  form 
in  two  ranks ;  but  as  yet  has  never  appeared  upon 
the  battle-field  in  less  than  three.  In  France,  we  have 
adhered  to  the  habitual  depth  of  three  ranks,  as  offer- 

*  The  secret  of  Napoleon's  success  was  as  mucli  in  the  legs  as  arms — 
in  marching  more  than  fighting.  Massing  his  forces,  and  profiting  by  any 
fault  of  the  enemy,  he  fell  upon  his  exposed  points  like  a  thunderbolt, 
crushing  him  at  a  blow. — Tr. 


60      HISTORY  AKD  TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

ing  better  resistance  to  cavalry;  but  higli  military 
authorities  have  pronounced  in  favor  of  two  ranks, 
which  we  have,  indeed,  occasionally  employed  * 

The  second  modification  relates  to  the  armament. 
The  flint  lock  becomes  sluggish  in  damp  weather,  and 
a  continued  rain  may  silence  it  completely.  Frederic 
the  Great,  in  order  to  remedy  this  evil,  which  was  the 
more  fatal  because  his  infantry  operated  principally 
by  firing,  had  provided  each  soldier  with  a  piece  of 
leather  as  a  cover  for  the  lock,  to  protect  it  from 
moisture ;  but  this  was  but  a  palliative,  for  the  leather 
covering,  attached  to  the  cartridge-box  during  a  march, 
soon  became  unfit  for  its  purpose.  The  modern  in- 
vention of  percussion  arms  has  more  satisfactorily  re- 
solved the  problem.  These  arms,  adopted  in  France 
in  1840,  are  now  in  the  hands  of  all  European  sol- 
diers. In  all  probability,  it  will  not  be  long  before 
the  fire-arm  of  the  infantry  will  be  constructed 
throughout  the  civilized  world  with  the  rifled  bore, 
and  the  foot  soldier  will  thenceforth  project  the  im- 
proved elongated  ball  with  such  precision  of  aim,  and 
at  such  distances,  as  greatly  to  increase  his  importance 
as  a  combatant. 

18.  Remarks — The  rapid  history  which  we  have 
just  sketched,  shows  that  the  depth  of  infantry  regu- 
larly diminished  with  the  progress  of  the  military  art. 
Thus  we  see  that  the  formation  of  this  arm  has  passed 
successively,  from  the  earliest  times  to  the  present, 
from  the  Egyptian  square  battalions  of  100  men  on  a 

*  See  the  following  chapter,  Sect. 


HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY.  61 

side,  to  tlie  compact  formation  of  the  Greek  phalanx, 
16  men  in  depth,  and  to  the  subdivided  formation  of 
the  Koman  legion,  six  men  deep  ;  and  from  the  square 
formation  of  the  French  bands,  to  the  thinner  ones  of 
six  ranks,  under  Gustavus  Adolphus  and  Turenne ;  of 
four  ranks  under  Maurice  de  Saxe ;  and  of  three  ranks 
under  Frederic- William  I. ;  while,  at  the  present  day, 
it  consists  of  three  ranks  among  the  French,  and  of 
but  two  among  the  English.  There  is  little  probability 
that  this  depth  will  be  further  diminished  until  the  for- 
mation is  reduced  to  a  single  rank ;  *  nevertheless,  the 
recent  improvements  in  portable  fire-arms,  and  the 
employment  of  Congreve  rockets  against  troops,  would 
seem  to  make  such  a  result  not  absolutely  impossible. 

We  will  remark,  in  conclusion,  that  victorious  na- 
tions, from  the  beginning  of  the  world,  have  owed 
their  success  to  good  infantry. 

Alexander  the  Great  overturned  Darius  and  his 
empire  with  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  thoroughly  or- 
ganized by  his  father  Philip,  and  the  excellent  Greek 
soldiers  who  accompanied  him. 

The  Komans  were  correct  in  their  estimate  of  the 
Greek  phalanx,  and  conquered  almost  the  whole  known 
world  with  the  legion;  for  their  armies  never  con- 
tained any  considerable  proportion  of  cavalry. 

Charles  V.  and  Philip  II.,  of  Spain,  owed  their 
victories  to  their  brave  infantry. 

Frederic  the  Great  obtained  his  first  successes  with 
the  Prussian  infantry,  formed  and  disciplined  under 
the  reign  of  his  predecessor. 

*  This  would  almost  amount  to  converting  the  whole  formation  into 
that  of  skirmishers. 


62      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS    OF   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

Napoleon  I.  conquered  at  Austerlitz,  Jena,  Fried- 
land,  and  Wagram,  witli  tlie  infantry  inured  by  tlio 
wars  of  tlie  Kevolution,  and  trained  in  the  camp  of 
Boulogne. 

Finally,  without  their  infantry,  the  English  would 
not  have  met  with  the  success  that  attended  their 
arms  in  the  war  in  Spain  from  1809  to  1814. 


I 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 

INFANTRY   FORMATION   AND    TACTICS. 

1.  Oeneral  Principles. — Infantry  is  capable  of 
fighting  upon  all  kinds  of  ground,  and  under  all  cir- 
cumstances ;  it  is  readily  recruited,  easily  instructed, 
and  maintained  at  small  expense.  Whether  receiv- 
ing the  enemy's  attack,  or  marching  to  the  charge, 
it  can,  in  case  of  need^  dispense  with  the  other  arms. 
It  constitutes,  therefore,  par  excellence^  the  corps  which 
should  be  the  chief  basis  of  an  army. 

The  foot  soldier  is  required  to  be, — 1st,  skilful^ 
because  his  arm  is  effective  only  when  managed  with 
dexterity ;  2d,  agile ^  that  he  may  be  able  to  overcome 
all  the  obstacles  of  the  ground ;  3d,  robust^  that  he 
may  readily  support  privation  and  fatigue;  4th, 
intelligent^  that  he  may  not  be  a  mere  machine,  but  a 
thinking  being,  whose  moral  nature  may  be  appealed 
to.  He  must  be  able  to  fight  at  all  hours,  and  in  all 
countries,  whatever  may  be  the  season  or  climate ;  in 
short,  he  must  possess  the  character  of  universality  in 
the  highest  possible  degree. 


64      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OF  THE   SEPARATE   ARMS. 

His  clothing  should  be  simple,  convenient,  and 
warm ;  contrived  solely  with  a  view  to  his  health, 
subject  neither  to  caprice  nor  to  fashion;  his  shoes 
should  be  strong,  and  well-fitting ;  his  head-gear  light, 
but  yet  such  as  to  resist  the  sabre  of  cavalry. 

The  percussion  gun,  with  the  bayonet,  is  a  port- 
able implement,  as  perfect  (nearly*)  as  the  present 
state  of  the  mechanic  arts  permits ;  the  certainty  of  its 
fire  makes  it  an  excellent  arm  for  the  infantry,  and 
the  bayonet  is  the  only  arm  which  is  suitable  for  the 
foot  soldier  in  personal  encounters.  The  sabre  worn 
by  the  non-commissioned  ofiicers  and  privates  of  select 
foi'mations  is  of  very  little  use  except  at  the  bivouac, 
where  it  serves,  to  some  extent,  as  a  bill-hook  and 
an  axe. 

The  physical  force  of  the  infantry  soldier  is  to  be 
increased  by  drills,,  such  as  those  of  the  manual, 
marches  in  line  and  by  flank,  various  manoeuvres,  etc. ; 
as  also  by  gymnastics,  which  impart  suppleness  to  his 
limbs.  His  moral  force  is  to  be  increased  by  means 
of  discipline,  which,  properly  observed,  gives  uniform 
and  increased  power  of  action,  and  also  by  the  in- 
culcation of  the  most  elevated  ideas  of  his  strength, 
his  importance,  and  his  superiority  over  those  with 
whom  he  has  to  contend.  It  is,  especially,  to  be 
proved  to  him  that  with  his  bayonet  he  should  never 
fear  cavalry,  notwithstanding  the  apparently  com- 
manding position  of  the  mounted  soldier.  He  is  to 
be  rendered  habitually  calm  in  the  most  critical  mo- 
ments, amid  showers  of  grape-shot,  and  in  despite  of 

*  We  put  in  this  qualification  in  view  of  the  rifled  gun. 


I 


I 


INFANTRY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


hunger  and  tliirst.  His  moral  education,  however, 
can  be  properly  completed  only  by  war. 

An  infantry  soldier,  with  a  load  of  55  pounds,* 
should  be  able  to  march  during  ten  hours  of  the  day : 
any  troop  of  foot,  at  this  rate,  will  outdo  the  best  cav- 
alry, and  can  even  overtake  it  in  pursuit  in  a  short 
time,  the  horse  having  more  need  of  repose  than  man. 
Thus,  in  1805,  when  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  upon 
his  leaving  Ulm,  was  pursued  by  the  French,  the 
grenadiers  of  Oudinot  marched  as  much  as  fourteen 
leagues  (over  35  miles)  a  day,  never  permitting  the 
cavalry  of  the  enemy  to  rest,  and  finally  causing  a  part 
of  them  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  French  cavalry. 

The  battalion  is  the  unit  of  the  infantry  force,  and 
in  the  instruction  of  the  soldier,  his  ultimate  destina- 
tion as  a  constituent  of  the  battalion  must  be  kept  in 
view.  This  is  to  be  effected  synthetically,  by  proceed- 
ing from  the  simple  to  the  compound,  from  the  indi- 
vidual to  the  mass.  We  should  begin  with  a  single 
man,  then  two  men,  three  men,  four  men,  etc.,  in  a 
single  rank.  When  they  have  become  sufficiently 
skilful  in  one  rank,  they  are  to  be  combined  in  two 
and  three  ranks. 

We  have  observed  in  the  preceding  chapter  that 
we  owe  to  Marshal  Saxe  the  introduction  of  the  lock- 

*  "  There  are  five  tilings  from  wliicli  the  soldier  must  never  be  sepa- 
rated :  his  gun,  his  cartridges,  his  knapsack,  his  provisions  for  at  least 
four  days,  and  his  pioneer  tool.  Let  the  knapsack  be  reduced  to  the 
smallest  size,  let  him  carry  in  it  a  shirt,  a  pair  of  shoes,  a  stock,  a 
handkerchief,  a  tinder-box ;  but  let  him  have  it  always  with  him ;  for 
once  separated  from  him,  it  never  returns." — Memoires  de  Napoleon  /'', 
seconde  note  sur  les  considerations  sur  Vart  de  la  guerre. 


(56      HISTOEY   AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

step,  wliicli  enables  troops  to  marcli  and  manoeuvre  in 
cbsed  ranks;  tMs  step  is  fundamental  in  all  good 
evolutions.  Tlie  infantry  step  is  two  Frencli  feet 
(28  inches  in  our  service)  in  lengtli.  There  are  two 
kinds  of  step  : — the  direct  and  oUiqiie  ;  the  latter  is 
equivalent  to  a  wheel  of  one  fourth  and  a  direct  step. 
With  the  direct  step,  the  foot  soldier  goes,  in  one 
minute,  50  metres  at  the  ordinary  pace,  60  metres  at 
the  marching  pace,  66  metres  at  the  quick  pace,  81 
metres  at  charging  pace,  and  100  metres  (109  yards 
English)  upon  a  run.  He  occupies  a  space,  in  the 
rank,  of  one  half  a  metre  (20  inches)  ;  and  in  the  tile, 
with  his  knapsack,  the  same  space ;  there  is  an  inter- 
val of  0°'.32  (14  inches)  between  the  ranks.  But  we 
need  not  dwell  any  longer  upon  these  special  details. 
The  formation  in  three  ranks  gives  more  firmness 
than  that  in  two,  chiefly  for  resisting  cavalry,  and  for 
attack  in  line,  and  on  this  account  it  has  been  pre- 
served in  France  down  to  the  present  time,  excepting 
for  the  chasseurs  a  pied.  .  The  English  draw  up  their 
infantry  in  two  ranks,  and  a  number  of  authorities 
have  advocated  it ;  ^'  but  the  French  formation  com- 

*  Napoleon  I.  in  his  Menioires,  and  in  a  letter  to  Marmont,  Oct.  13, 
1813 ;  Marshal  Marmont  {de  VEsprit  des  institutions  militaires,  p.  40) ; 
Marshal  Gouvion  Saint-Cjr  (Meinoires,  toI.  i.,  p.  16) ;  Generals  Jomini, 
Chambray,  and  Decker. 

General  Dufour,  who  has  been  at  the  head  of  the  federal  army  of 
Switzerland,  expresses  a  preference  for  three  ranks,  for  the  infantry  of 
his  country,  as  stronger  and  more  defensive,  although  the  official  depth 
is  there  but  two  (see  his  Cours  de  Tactiqve,  1851,  p.  59).  Marshal  Bu- 
geaud  (Aperffus  sur  la  guerre)  thinks  that  infantry  should  have  both 
formations,  so  that  either  may  be  employed  according  to  circumstances 
and  the  views  of  the  general.    Marshal  Saint- Arnaud,  at  the  commence- 


I 


INFANTRY    FORMATION    AND    TACTICS.  G7 

bines  the  advantages  of  both,  since  it  is  easy  to  pass 
from  the  formation  in  three  ranks  to  that  in  two.  As 
for  the  reason  why  the  three-rank  has  prevailed  over 
the  six-rank  formation  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  and 
over  the  still  deeper  ones  of  antiquity,  it  may  be  given 
in  a  few  words :  it  is,  that  our  predecessors  had  but 
a  single  mode  of  formation,  whereas  we  have  several, 
and  can  pass  from  one  to  the  other,  by  means  of 
manoeuvres. 

But  although  the  infantry  is,  as  we  have  above  re- 
marked, that  arm  which  is,  par  excellence^  the  basis  of 
an  army — the  only  one  which,  in  case  of  need^  can  rely 
upon  itself  alone — it  must,  nevertheless,  not  be  sup- 
posed that  it  can  by  itself  produce,  in  all  cases,  the 
maximwn  of  effect  '^  for,  in  pursuit,  the  enemy  will 
often  escape  from  it ;  '''*  and,  when  overcome,  it  will  be 
easily  picked  up  by  the  cavalry.f  Without  cavalry, 
the  infantry  will  be  perpetually  harassed  by  the  ene- 
my, fatigued  by  the  advance  guard-duty  which  its 
own  safety  requires,  and  very  much  exposed,  in  case 
of  defeat,  in  an  entirely  open  country.  It  is  apparent, 
therefore,  a  priori^  that  infantry  and  cavalry  are 
necessary  to  each  other,  and  should  be  considered  as 
indispensable  parts  of  the  same  whole,  whether  of  an 
army-corps  or  an  aiTay. 

inent  of  the  war  in  the  East,  adopted  the  formation  in  two  ranks  for  his 
troops,  and  proclaimed  it  in  the  orders  of  the  day.  The  Imperial  Guard 
usually  manoeuvres  in  two  ranks. 

*  At  Bautzen  (1813),  for  want  of  cavalry,  the  result  of  our  victory 
was  not  as  complete  as  at  Austerlitz. 

t  At  Rivoli  (1796)  we  picked  up  the  Austrian  battalions  which  had 
become  separated  from  their  cavalry  and  artillery. 


68      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OP   THE  8EPAEATE   AEMS. 

2.  nodes  of  Action  of  Infantry. — ^The  infantry 
has  two  modes  of  action,  or,  if  tlie  expression  be  pref- 
erable, two  methods  of  operating.     It  operates : 

1st.     By  firing,  distant  or  near.* 

2d.     Witli  sabre  or  bayonet. 

Tlie  present  sabre  of  tlie  infantry,  however,  is  a 
very  poor  arm,  and  is,  besides,  given  only  to  the  non- 
commissioned officers  and  the  soldiers  of  the  select 
companies.  We  may,  therefore,  consider  the  attack  or 
defence  with  the  bayonet,  as  the  only  mode  of  action 
of  the  infantry  in  close  fight. 

The  bayonet  should  be  sparingly  employed  ;  it  is, 
after  all,  but  an  extremely  inferior  weapon;  and  it 
can  hardly  be  required  of  soldiers  to  expose  themselves 
to  a  hand-to-hand  fight  whilst  the  means  of  defence 
are  so  imperfect. 

The  French  have,  indeed,  gained  a  well-deserved 
reputation  abroad  by  the  energy  of  their  charge  with 
the  bayonet ;  for  this  mode  of  attack  agrees  admirably 
with  their  character,  and  is  perfectly  suited  to  the 
furia  Francesa :  thus  with  some  reason  the  bay- 
onet has  been  distinguished  as  the  "weapon  of  the 
French." 

The  bayonet  attack  is  only  good  when  it  is  re- 
quired to  make  a  sudden  demonstration.  We  may  even 
say  that,  in  general,  it  is  but  a  demonstration,  inas- 
much as  very  few  cases  are  cited  in  which  it  was  really 
a  charge, — ^that  is  to  say,  in  which  there  really  was  a 
collision.     The  only  authentic  case,  indeed,  is  that  in 

*  Near,  that  is,  at  a  very  short  distance,  as  for  example,  in  the 
defence  of  a  military  crest.    See,  hereafter,  Part  III.,  Chap,  viii.,  sec.  2. 


I 


IKFANTRY   FORMATION   AND    TACTICS.  69 

wliicli  the  grenadiers  of  Oudinot,  at  Amstetten,  in 
1805,  met  tlie  Russian  rear  guard  of  Bagration. 

This  demonstration  generally  forces  the  enemy  to 
fall  back,  by  the  moral  effect  produced  by  such  a 
charge ;  *  and  it  is  in  this  sense  alone,  compelling  the 
enemij  to  fall  hack^  that  we  use  the  phrase  bayonet 
charge^  in  cases  where  this  attack  occurs  between  con- 
siderable bodies  of  troops.  Nevertheless,  there  are 
cases  in  which  the  bayonet  charge  has  not  only  been 
followed  by  collision,  but  has  degenerated  into  a 
melee ;  as,  for  example,  in  1800,  during  the  siege  of 
Genoa,  on  the  part  of  the  troops  of  Soult,  the  day  of 
the  10th  Floreal  (April  30th).f 

If,  then,  the  bayonet  is  only  to  be  used  in  mod- 
eration, the  distant  mode  of  action  remains  the 
principal  mode  of  action  ot  infantry.  Frederic  II. 
placed  victory  in  well  executed  firing,  as  Marshal  Saxe 
placed  it  in  the  legs  (marching  and  manoeuvring)  ; 
and  these  two  celebrated  warriors  were  both  right : 
for  while  the  legs  prepare  the  victory,  firing  secures  it. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  firing, — simultaneous,  by 
battalions,  companies,  &c.,  and  firing  at  will.  The  for- 
mer, when  executed  by  the  three  ranks,  produces  the 
maximum  effect^  but  on  account  of  the  attention  it  re- 
quires on  the  part  of  both  officers  and  troops,  is  with 
difficulty  practised  in  the  field.     Firing  by  command 

*  General  Duliesme,  at  the  battle  of  Caldiero  (1805),  finding  himself 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  an  Austrian  corps,  superior  in  numbers,  made  a 
demonstration  with  the  bayonet ;  the  Austrians  fell  back,  aWiough  an 
'impassable  ravine  separated  the  two  armies. 

t  In  this  contest  "  they  fought  hand-to-hand ;  they  even  seized  each 
other  by  the  hair."  Thiebault,  Blocus  de  Oenes^  3d  ed.,  1847,  vol. !.,  p.  231. 


70     HISTORY  AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

is  divided  into  firing  by  battalions,  by  half  battalions, 
and  by  companies,  succeeding  each  other  in  alterna- 
tion, in  such  a  manner  as  always  to  keep  a  portion  of 
the  pieces  loaded. 

Firing  by  battalions,  or  even  by  half-battalions,  is 
used  either  in  an  offensive  movement,  or  in  retreat. 
The  force  halts,  delivers  one  or  more  rounds,  then  re- 
news the  march.  This  kind  of  firing  may  also  be  used 
with  advantage  before  coming  out  of  an  ambuscade. 
Firing  in  a  charge  must  be  the  most  destructive  pos- 
sible, and  consequently  should  consist  of  the  simulta- 
neous firing  of  three  ranks. 

Firing  by  di\^sions,  or  by  companies,  is  especially 
suitable  for  infantry  in  position,  when  repelling  feeble 
attacks. 

Firing  by  command  by  ranks,  w^hich  was  tried  in 
the  early  part  of  this  century  against  cavalry,  has  been 
abandoned  as  ineffective. 

But  all  firing  by  command  can  continue  but  a 
short  time  in  battle,  and  becomes  impracticable  in  any 
brisk  action  ;  for  the  orders  of  the  different  officers  are 
confounded  together,  and  the  noise  of  the  artillery  and 
even  of  the  musketry,  the  excitement  of  the  combat, 
increased  by  the  cries  of  the  wounded,  make  it  im- 
possible for  the  soldiers  to  give  the  attention  necessary 
•for  loading  and  firing  together.  Moreover,  all  firing 
by  command,  ends  in  firing  by  two  ranks ;  and  even 
the  latter  cannot  be  long  maintained  in  the  mode  pre- 
scribed by  the  French  regulations— for  the  man  in  the 
third  rank  is  loth  to  part  with  his  habitual  arm, 
and,  becoming  impatient  at  not  taking  part  in  the 


INrAlNTRY   FORMATION    AND    TACTICS.  Yl 

combat,  at  last  takes  to  firing  on  liis  own  account, 
instead  of  loading  for  the  man  in  tlie  second  rank. 
Again,  if  the  man  in  tke  third  rank  remains  in  his 
place  and  fires  horizontally,  he  runs  the  risk  of  wound- 
ing the  men  of  the  first  and  second  ranks ;  if  he  re- 
mains in  his  place  and  fires  high,  his  fire  does  not 
reach  the  enemy,  and  becomes  useless ;  finally,  if  he 
pushes  into  the  second  rank,  he  crowds  it,  and  im- 
pedes its  action,  whence  result  disorder  and  accidents. 
The  advocates  of  the  formation  in  two  ranks  argue 
from  these  facts  in  favor  of  their  views.  It  follows 
that  the  fire  hy  file  is  the  most  destructive,  gives  the 
soldier  the  best  chance  of  loading  and  aiming,  and  is 
suited  to  all  cases ;  being,  in  fact,  that  into  w^hich  any 
other  kind  of  firing  degenerates ;  in  shoi-t,  it  is  the 
veritable /^z^  de  combat. 

Firing,  as  the  reader  is  aware,  may  be  either 
direct  or  oblique;  but  one  should  never  fire  on  the 
march,  which  only  produces  disorder,  and  but  little 
effect.  Besides,  when  a  movement  is  made  on  the  battle 
field,  it  is  with  a  view  to  reach  a  certain  position,  and 
then  it  should  be  reached  with  the  least  possible  delay. 

We  will  terminate  these  details  respecting  firing 
by  two  maxims,  extracted  from  the  Aperqiis  sur 
quelques  details  de  la  guerre  of  Marshal  Bugeaud  : 

1st.  Firing  at  too  great  a  distance  is  the  mark  of 
bad  infantry  ;  good  soldiers  are  sparing  of  their  fire. 

2d.  The  waste  of  ammunition  is  the  greatest 
fault  with  which  infantry  can  be  reproached.*"* 

*  Marshal  Bugeaud  also  recommends  loading  with  two  balls,  and 
advises  that  every  infantry  officer  should,  in  the  field,  carry  a  double- 
"barrelled  piece,  as  practised  in  the  Austrian  army. 


72       HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

Marshal  Saxe  long  ago  condemned  excessive  firing 
Uirerie)'^  an  opinion  the  more  remarkable,  that,  in 
his  day,  the  successes  of  the  Prussians  were  ascribed  to 
their  firing.  He  says,  sjaeaking  of  the  abuse  of  firing: 
"  En  tirant^  on  fait  plus  de  hruit  que  de  mal  et  on  est 
toujour s  hattu.^ 


11 'A- 


3,  The  Battalion. — ^The  battalion  is  the  tactical 
unit  of  infantry.  In  France  it  is  composed  of  8  pla- 
toons,f  which,  grouped  two-and-two,  form  4  divisions. 

"  The  battalion  is  the  true  military  element,  the 
unit  in  the  battle ;  we  move  and  manoeuvre  by  battal- 
ions ;  we  fight  by  battalions." 

"  Two  conditions  are  to  be  observed  in  the  numer- 
ical constitution  of  the  battalion :  1st,  it  must  not  be 
unwieldy;  and  2d,  it  should  be  of  such  size  that, 
when  deployed,  the  voice  of  the  commander  may  be 
heard  at  both  extremities." J 

According  to  this  principle,  the  front  of  the  bat- 
talion should  not  exceed  170  yards,  which  embraces  a 
force  of  about  1,000  men,§  if  formed  in  three  ranks ; 
which  is  the  maximum  limit  calculated  with  reference 
to  the  unavoidable  losses  which  a  body  of  troops  suf- 
fer in  passing  from  the  inactivity  of  the  garrison  to 
the  laborious  life  of  the  camp. 

It  is  one  of  the  advantages  of  our  modern  bat- 

*  Reveries^  chap,  i.,  art.  6. 

t  The  French  platoon  corresponds  to  our  company. — Tr. 

\  Marrnont,  Esprit  des  institutions  militaires,  pp.  38,  89. 

§  A  front  of  170  yards,  or  155  metres,  at  the  rate  of  two  men  in  the 
rank  for  each  metre,  gives  310  men  in  a  rank,  930  in  three  ranks,  and 
1,000  men  for  the  total  force,  if  we  count  70  file-closers,  that  is,  about- 
one  file-closer  for  each  two  metres  of  front. 


!• 


INFANTEY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  73 

tallon,  tliat  its  subdivisions,  for  administrative  dis^ 
cipline  and  for  evolutions,  are  identical ;  so  that  the 
soldiers  are  always  under  the  orders  of  the  same  offi- 
cers :  thus  the  regime  of  the  camp  and  the  regime  of 
the  field  are  in  entire  accordance.  It  was  not  so  in 
France  under  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.,  nor  in  Prussia 
during  the  wars  of  the  great  Frederic. 

Moreover,  all  the  subdivisions  of  the  battalion  are 
symmetrical  and  equal,  which  is  a  great  convenience 
in  evolutions. 

4.  mraiioeuvres — By  a  manoeiivve  we  understand 
any  movement,  the  object  of  which  is  to  change  a 
body  from  one  condition  or  position  to  another.  Tac- 
tics consist  of  manoeuvres. 

In  order  to  secure  their  successful  performance, 
especially  in  war,  they  should  combine  simplicity, 
clearness,  promptness,  and  facility  of  execution.  The 
manoeuvres  prescribed  by  the  French  regulations  ful- 
fil these  conditions. 

The  training  of  troops  to  manoeuvres,  and  familiar- 
izing them  with  the  most  rapid  and  complicated  move- 
ments, are  among  the  most  important  duties  of  the 
officers,  in  which  they  can  succeed  only  by  continual 
and  often  wearisome  repetitions ;  but  so  many  unfore- 
seen causes  of  disorder  occur  on  the  field  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy,  that  we  cannot  be  too  careful  to 
provide  in  advance  against  their  ill  effects,  by  regular- 
ity, ensemble,  solidity  and  steadiness  in  manoeuvres — 
qualities  acquired  only  by  numerous  drills  practised 
in  times  of  peace. 


74       HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

Every  body  of  troops  during  a  maiiceuvre  is  in  a 
condition  of  danger ;  for,  while  manoeuvring,  they  can- 
not defend  themselves.  This  axiom  is  especially  ap- 
plicable to  infantry.  Manoeuvring  must  therefore  be 
effected  in  the  shortest  possible  time  ;  all  manoeuvres 
should,  when  practicable,  be  covered,  and  executed,  in 
preference,  in  rear  of  the  line  of  battle. 

To  prevent  innovations  and  secure  uniformity,  the 
instructions  to  be  given  to  the  men  are  invariably  fixed 
by  the  regulations  for  each  arm  of  the  service. 

5.  Order  of  Battle. — To  resist  the  enemy,  a  num- 
l)er  of  battalions  of  infantry  are  drawn  up  in  two 
lines ;  the  first  line  deployed  with  but  small  intervals 
of  about  50  feet  between  the  flanks  of  the  battalions; 
the  second  line  of  battalions  is  ployed  in  double  col- 
umn, in  order  to  be  the  more  able  to  come  to  the  aid 
of  the  first,  which  is  its  proper  duty.  When  the  first 
line  yields,  the  second  advances  and  takes  its  place  ; 
or  else,  if  the  first  line  breaks,  it  can  disperse  through 
the  intervals  of  the  second,  and  the  latter,  once  un- 
masked, deploys  and  receives  the  charge  of  the  adver- 
sary. In  order  to  do  this  effectively,  the  second  line 
must  have  been  kept  fresh  during  the  engagement  of 
the  first,  and  hence  it  is  posted  about  300  yards  in  its 
rear,^*  at  which  distance  the  enemy's  fire  will  hardly 
reach  it.  If  the  broken  character  of  the  ground  cov- 
ers the  second  line,  it  can  be  brought  within  100  yards 
of  the  first,  but  seldom  nearer.     To  take  it  beyond 

*  The  distancG  of  the  two  lines  is  thus  about  double  the  front  of  a 
battalion. 


INFANTRY   FORMATION   AND    TACTICS.  7o 

300  yards  would  deprive  the  first  of  its  support ;  this 
distance,  therefore,  should  not  be  exceeded ;  but  if  the 
second  line,  even  300  yards  in  rear,  suffers  too  much 
from  the  artillery  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be  deployed. 
It  is  usual  to  extend  the  second  line  beyond  the  first, 
in  order  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  latter. 

OKDER  OF  BATTLE  OF  THE  INFANTRY. 
'      «  '      '  I      I  I   ^   I  I      I  I      i       I 


The  regulations  of  1831  respecting  the  manoeu- 
vring of  the  infantry,  treat  first  of  the  evolutions  in  a 
single  line,  and  then  of  those  performed  in  two  lines. 
But  the  second  line  is  dependent  upon  the  first,  inas- 
much as  it  should  perform  the  same  movements  to 
keep  itself  in  the  same  relative  position.  The  two 
lines,  however,  execute  their  movements  separately, 
and  in  practice  it  can  hardly  be  otherwise,  since  the 
difference  of  the  ground  which  they  severally  occupy 
may  occasion  modifications  in  the  details  of  execution. 

6.    Msurciiiiig  formations. — The  infantry  has  four 
marching  formations : 
1st.   Marching  in  line ; 
2d.    Marching  by  flank ; 
3d.    Marching  in  column ; 
4th.  Marching  in  square. 
A  battalion  (and  a  fortiori  a  larger  body  of  troops). 


76      HISTOEY   AKD   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

in  consequence  of  its  extended  front  and  slight  depth, 
cannot  long  march  in  line  without  suffering  injurious 
breaks,  produced  either  by  the  march  itself,  or  by  en- 
countering various  obstacles :  besides,  there  are  very 
few  localities  sufficiently  wide  and  clear  to  permit  the 
execution  of  such  a  march  without  inconvenience.  A 
battalion  will  therefore  never  march  in  line  except  to 
charge  with  the  bayonet,  or  when,  having  engaged 
the  infantry  of  the  enemy,  it  may  be  necessary 
to  advance  or  retire  progressively  a  few  hundred 
paces. 

Marching  hy  the  flanh  allows  the  battalion  to  pass 
through  the  narrowest  roads;  but  in  this  kind  of 
march,  as  soon  as  the  step  is  broken,  which  quickly 
happens,  the  distances  are  lost  and  the  column  is 
lengthened,  so  that  if  it  were  required  suddenly  to 
face  to  the  front,  the  line  which  it  would  form  would 
be  irregular.  Besides,  in  the  march  by  flank  of  a  bat- 
talion, the  front  and  the  rear  are  too  far  apart  for  mu- 
tual support  in  case  of  attack.  Hence,  a  battalion 
should  never  march  by  the  flank  in  presence  of  the 
enemy,  unless  it  be  to  lean  to  the  right  or  to  the  left 
a  few  steps  only,  and  not  even  for  that  purpose,  if  it 
is  seriously  engaged. 

Marching  hy  column  is  not  subject  to  the  same 
inconveniences  as  marching  in  line  or  by  flank ;  it  is 
consequently  the  most  appropriate  for  movements  or 
manoeuvres.  The  column  by  sections  or  by  platoons, 
at  full  distance,  is  the  best  marching  column.  The 
march  of  a  column  is  quite  simple  ;  takmg  care  only 
to  preserve  the  distances.     The  men  may  march  at 


INFANTEY   FORMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


11 


MARCH  IN  COLUMN  OF  THE  INFANTET 
Adjutant-major   ...        ^      wmimm 


ease  and  cany  their  guns  at  will.  Changes  of  direc- 
tion are  made  either 
by  turning  or  wheel- 
ing^  according  as  the 
new  direction  is  or  is 
not  on  the  side  of  the 
guide. 

It  is  a  general  prin- 
ciple    respecting     col- 


umns, and  an  essential 


Adjutant 


one    for    columns    on    a       Chief  of  battalion   . 

march,  that  they  never 
occupy  a  greater  space 
from  the  front  to  the 
rear,  than  they  would 
occupy  in  line,  so  that  it 
may  always  he  easy  to 
pass  from  one  order  of 
formation  to  the  other. 

Marching  in  square  is  employed  to  reach  a  shel- 
ter not  far  distant,  during  a  respite  from  attacking 
cavalry.  It  is  often  more  prudent,  in  open  country,  to 
march  in  square  than  to  re-form  the  column.  To 
march  in  square,  the  two  lateral  lines  relatively  to  the 
direction  of  the  march,  form  hy  the  flank,  and  the 
fourth  faces  to  the  front.  The  march  in  square  is  al- 
ways undulating  and  uncertain :  it  should  be  regarded 
as  purely  accidental.  In  the  wars  .of  the  Revolution 
and  Empire,  squares  were  marched  with  success ;  we 
need  only  recall  in  this  connection  the  battles  of  Heli- 
opolis  (April,  1800),  Auerstadt  (October  14,  1806), 


78      HISTORY  AND   TACTICS   OF  THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

Lutzen  (May  2,  1813).  In  Egypt  they  marched  in 
squares,  even  for  days;  but  this  was  for  the  purpose 
of  assuring  the  soldiers  against  a  new  enemy,  and  to 
cover  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  the  artillery ;  and 
with  this  object  the  squares  were  at  first  formed  with 
six  ranks,  a  superfluous  depth,  which  was  afterward 
reduced  to  three,  and  even  to  two  ranks. 

7.  Formations  of  Attack. — We  shall  consider  five 
kinds  of  formations  of  attack  for  the  infantry  : 

1st.  Attack  in  line; 

2d.  Attack  in  column ; 

3d.  Attack  as  skirmishers ; 

4th.  Attack  in  echelon ; 

5th.  Attack  in  squares. 

Attack  in  line. — ^This  attack  permits  the  troops  to 
make  use  of  their  whole  fire,  to  come  upon  the  enemy 
upon  a  greater  front,  and  thus  to  menace  him  with 
danger  at  all  points ;  to  render  his  defeat  more  com- 
plete and  more  certain ;  finally,  it  offers  less  exposure 
to  the  enemy's  artillery. 

These  are  real  advantages,  and  the  attack  in  line, 
executed  by  solid  and  ivell  trained  troops,  ought  to  be 
preferred  in  a  variety  of  circumstances. 

To  these  considerations  we  may  add  this  formal 
opinion  of  Marshal  Bugeaud :  "  The  deployed  order  is 
the  veritable  order  of  combat." 

The  attack  in  line  will  generally  be  employed 
against  infantry  :  nevertheless,  it  has  occasionally  suc- 
ceeded against  cavalry  badly  managed,  but  it  then  re- 
(piires  very  solid  infantry. 


INFANTEY   FORMATION    AND   TACTICS.  79 

But  tliis  order  is  not  suited  to  all  kinds  of  ground. 
The  greater  part  of  tlie  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  are  in  the  position  of  iile-closers ;  the  others  are 
inserted  in  the  ranks:  the  soldier  is  thus  deprived 
of  the  stimulus  of  their  example.  Artillery  and  mus- 
ketry may  produce  voids  in  the  ranks,  which  can  be 
filled  only  at  the  expense  of  the  rapidity  of  march ;  it 
may,  perhaps,  become  necessary  to  halt,  and  thence- 
forth there  is  no  longer  any  impetus ;  and,  the  natural 
instinct  of  the  soldier  prompting  him  to  use  his  arms 
at  the  sight  of  danger,  firing  begins  in  spite  of  the  offi- 
cers, and  the  charge  fails.  In  such  a  case,  a  battalion 
may  be  defeated,  and  cause  a  general  rout,  by  uncov- 
ering the  flanks  of  the  neighboring  battalions. 

Attack  in  column, — The  inconveniences  of  the  at- 
tack in  line  which  we  have  just  stated,  frequently  lead 
to  a  preference  for  the  attack  in  column. 

The  best  offensive  column  is  the  double-central^  as 
prescribed  by  the  regulations  ;  which  is  very  quickly 
formed  and  deployed,  and  in  which  the  grenadiers  and 
voltigeurs  constitute  a  reserve  in  the  rear,  which  can 
be  formed  and  deployed  in  face  of  the  enemy,  while 
kept  at  a  distance  by  the  fire  of  the  fourth  and  fifth 

DOUBLE-CENTEAL  COLUMN. 
Q  7  c;  S  <t  3  2 1 


,v    C  3     I 


7 2 


platoons  on  the  line  of  battle.     This  last  advantage 
is  important,  for  generally,  after  the  charge,  it  is  ne- 


80      HISTOEY   AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

cessary  to  deploy  tlie  column  of  attack,  to  preserve 
tlie  point  wliicli  has  been  gained. 

There  are  also  employed,  occasionally,  columns  by 
platoons  or  by  sections,  at  half  distance,  which  can 
fight  mth  advantage  on  narrow  ground.  When  sev- 
eral of  such  columns  are  made  to  act  upon  broken 
ground,  it  is  prudent  to  throw  one  or  more  com- 
panies of  skirmishers  on  the  front  and  flanks  of  each 
column,  to  unite  it  with  the  neighboring  columns, 
and  protect  its  march  against  the  skirmishers  of  the 
enemy. 

According  to  Guibert,  the  depth  of  an  offensive 
column  should  not  exceed  eight  subdivisions.  Since 
this  writer,  the  experience  of  the  nineteenth  century 
has  caused  this  depth  to  be  reduced  to  four  subdivi- 
sions only,  as  shown  by  the  figure  of  the  double-cen- 
tral column. 

In  the  column,  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers,  being  all  placed  between  the  platoons  or  divi- 
sions, or  on  their  flanks,  exercise  a  very  powerful 
physical  and  moral  influence  upon  the  soldiers. 

Once  in  motion,  the  column  of  attack  should 
neither  stop  to  fire  nor  to  deploy ;  on  the  contrary, 
taking  advantage  of  its  first  ardor  and  the  impetus 
given  by  its  depth,  it  should  be  precipitated  in  com- 
pact form  upon  the  enemy,  sweeping  away  all  opposi- 
tion. To  stop  within  reach  of  the  enemy  to  deploy 
would  be  a  dangerous  operation,  which  might  lead  to 
defeat  in  case  the  enemy  knew  how  to  profit  by  it. 

The  formation  in  column  offers  three  principal  ad- 
vantages :  1st,  the  men  being  grouped  en  mas-se^  are 


INFANTE Y  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  81 

more  easily  electrified  witli  entliusiasm  than  in  the  thin 
and  extended  formation  in  line  ;  2d,  the  leading  divi- 
sion of  the  column  has  more  boldness,  because  it  feels 
itself  followed  and  supported,  and  is  conscious  that  it 
cannot  stop  without  being  overthrown ;  3d,  the  other 
divisions,  seeing  themselves  covered  by  the  first,  march 
resolutely.  As  to  the  loss  of  fire  in  this  formation,  it 
is  compensated  by  throwing  out  skirmishers  on  the 
flanks. 

The  column  acts  by  a  succession  of  efforts  depend- 
ing upon  its  depth ;  nevertheless,  the  first  subdivision 
has  no  greater  velocity  than  those  which  follow  it ; 
for  if  it  had,  the  velocity  of  a  column  would  in- 
crease with  its  depth,  whereas  just  the  contrary  takes 
place. 

The  order  in  column  allows  marching  without 
wavering ;  is  adaj^ted  to  all  kinds  of  ground,  and  may 
take  advantage  of  the  irregularities  of  the  surface,  to 
shelter  itself  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  Columns, 
moreover,  can  resist  cavalry,  and  the  destruction  of 
one  column  does  not,  necessarily,  involve  that  of  the 
others.  All  these  are  advantages  which  the  order  in 
column  offers  over  the  order  in  line,  as  an  offensive 
formation. 

Troops  who  are  but  partially  trained  may  be  made 
to  fight  in  column ;  for  it  is  not  essential  in  the  attack 
in  column  that  the  soldier  should  know  how  to  march 
well ;  it  is  sufficient  that  the  guides  and  officers  are 
intelligent,  firm,  and  have  sufficient  authority  to  re- 
strain the  soldier. 

The  French  have  obtained  their  most  notable  suc- 
6 


82       HISTORY   AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

cesses  by  tlie  attack  in  columns,  wMcli  is  perfectly 
congenial  to  their  national  character. 

Infantry  attacks  intrencliments  in  numerous  col- 
umns, of  little  depth  and  narrow  front ;  it  exposes 
thus  fewer  to  the  enemy's  fire  lining  the  parapets,  and 
reserves  to  itself  the  power  of  reenforcing  the  attack 
upon  the  weakest  point. 

The  great  objection  to  columns  of  attack  is  their 
liability  to  suffering  from  the  fire  of  artillery,  especially 
in  a  flat  country ;  and  this  often  becomes  so  serious 
as  to  compel  them  to  deploy  without  delay. 

We  have  sometimes  employed,  in  dangerous  ope- 
rations, an  order  of  attack  compounded  of  the  attack 
in  line  and  the  attack  in  column,  which  we  have  just 
analyzed.  It  consists  in  marching  one  battalion  in 
line,  while  two  others,  in  column,  occupy  each  of  the 
flanks  of  the  deployed  battalion ;  thus,  in  each  group 
of  three  battalions,  the  advantages  of  the  two  methods 
are  combined,  and  their  disadvantages  lessened.     It 

MIXED    FOEMATION. 

3d.      2d  bat.      1st. 


was  in  this  order  that  the  French  army,  in  1797,  ford- 
ed the  broad  bed  of  the  Tagliamento  in  presence 
of  the  Austrians ;  and  that  a  part  of  the  Eussians 
fought  at  Eylau  (1807). 

In  several  modem  battles,  particularly  at  Wagram 
(1809),  offensive  columns  composed  of  a  large  number 
of  battalions  have  been  employed ;  but  they  should 
be  regarded  as  exceptionable  formations,  for  under  the 


INFANTRY   FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  83 

sweeping  fire  of  the  adversary's  artillery  they  are  al- 
ways cruelly  decimated,  even  in  case  of  success. 

Attach  as  skirmishers, — In  mountainous  and 
woody  countries  there  are  positions  which  can  be  at- 
tacked neither  in  line  nor  in  column,  the  ground  being 
too  much  covered  or  cut  up  by  ravines  and  escarp- 
ments to  allow  any  order  of  march  to  be  observed. 
They  are  then  attacked  by  skirmishers ;  but  these 
must  be  in  large  numbers ;  thus  battalions,  sometimes 
even  regiments,  or  a  whole  brigade,  are  detached  for 
this  purpose,  and  in  this  case  they  are  designated  as 
skirmishers  en  grande  lande?' 

Much  greater  skill  and  valor  are  required  of  the 
soldier  for  fighting  and  advancing  in  this  manner, 
than  in  combats  in  close  ranks,  where  the  touch  of  the 
elbow  and  the  unity  of  the  command  sustains  him. 

The  influence  of  the  ofiicers  being  purely  moral, 
they  can  do  no  more  than  set  the  example  of  bravery. 
The  soldier  has  here  every  facility  for  lagging  behind, 
wandering  away,  and  hiding  from  the  surveillance  of 
his  superiors. 

The  men  feel  themselves  less  supported  and  more 
exposed  to  the  chances  of  hand-to-hand  combats  than 
when  they  form  parts  of  a  mass,  where  the  danger 
threatens  no  individual  specially. 

In  this  sort  of  combat,  if  the  soldiers  are  not  brave 
and  enthusiastic,  they  will  fire  a  whole  day  without 
advancing,  and  will  squat  behind  trees,  hedges,  and 
walls,  doing  very  little  mischief,  and  scarcely  receiv- 

*  We  shall  again  speak  of  these  skirmishers  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter,  Sect.  10,  when  treating  of  the  different  kinds  of  skirmishers. 


84      HISTOEY  AND   TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPARATE  AEMS. 

ing  any.  Sucli  attacks  are  without  vigor,  and  must 
often  fail. 

The  bayonet,  which  is  of  no  advantage  to  the  sol- 
dier, in  the  rank,  against  cavalry,  may  become  the 
principal  arm  in  the  hands  of  skirmishers  against 
detached  horsemen,  for  these  skirmishers  have  the 
greatest  freedom  of  movement. 

Attach  in  echelon, — ^The  order  in  echelons  is  favor- 
able for  attack,  because  it  readily  conforms  to  the  nature 
of  the  ground,  and  does  not  necessitate  engaging  more 
than  a  part  of  the  forces ;  it  is  adopted  for  the  pur- 
pose of  attacking  a  particular  point  of  the  enemy's 
line.  In  this  order,  the  battalions  may  be  either  de- 
ployed or  in  column.  The  echelons  should  mutually 
flank  each  other,  even  with  musketry,  and  hence  their 
distance  should  not  exceed  some  200  yards ;  it  would 
not  do  to  reduce  the  distance  below  100  yards,  for 
then  two  echelons  would  be  engaged  at  the  same  time. 


OEDEE  IN  ECHELONS. 


1st.  "Rat. 


3d.  Bat. 


ysy*; 


2fl.  Bat. 


y^ 


The  intervals  between  the  echelons  should  be  at 
least  18  yards. 

A  line  may  be  broken  up  into  direct  echelons  or 
oblique  echelons.    In  any  case,  the  possibility  of  an  at- 


I 


INFAITTEY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  85 

tack  by  cavalry  forbids  the  formation  of  ecbelons  of 
more  tban  six  battalions,  or  a  brigade.  For,  in  or- 
der to  resist  tbe  cavalry,  they  will  have  to  form 
squares ;  but,  supposing  the  echelons  to  consist  of  a 
brigade,  and  each  to  form  one  square,  they  will  be  too 
far  apart  to  flank  each  other  properly ;  if  formed  into 
two  squares,  of  a  regiment,  they  will  imperfectly  flank 
each  other;  and  it  will  be  impossible  to  place  six 
squares,  each  of  a  battalion,  upon  200  yards.  Thus, 
six  battalions  may  be  well  considered  as  the  maximum 
of  force  which  should  compose  each  echelon.* 

Attack  in  squares, — Whenever  a  square  can 
march,  it  may  also  act  on  the  offensive.  In  the  cam- 
paign in  Egypt  (1799-1800),  the  French  army  not 
only  marched  in  squares,  but  also  attacked  in  squares. 
The  attack  in  squares  may,f  then,  be  ranked  among 
the  forms  of  attack  for  infantry ;  its  special  employ- 
ment is  against  cavalry. 

According  to  Jomini,;];  the  square  by  battalion  is 
the  best  for  the  offensive. 

A  long  square  of  a  front  of  three  companies,  closed 
on  one  side  by  the  grenadiers,  and  on  the  other  by 
the  voltigeurs,  gives  a  good  formation  for  a  battalion 
to  attack  in  square. 

*  This  is  based  upon  the  supposition  that  the  front  of  the  battalion 
measures  a  little  over  150  yards. 

t  In  this  kind  of  attack  the  protecting  artillery  will  eave  its  ammu- 
nition for  the  critical  moment  which  may  arrive  unexpectedly,  but  during 
which  it  will  be  necessary  to  act  with  all  the  energy  possible.  The 
French  artillery  observed  this  rule  in  the  battle  of  Heliopolis  (April, 
1800),  gained  by  Kleber  over  the  army  of  the  Grand  Vizier.  {Tactique 
des  trois  armes,  par  le  colonel  Favi^  p.  208.) 

X  Precis  de  Vart  de  la  guerre^  t.  ii.,  p.  229. 


86      IIISTOEY  AND  TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE   AKMS. 

8.  Formations  of  Defence. — We  shall  consider  five 
kinds  of  formations  of  defence,  for  infantry  • 

1st.  Defence  in  line ; 

2d.    Defence  in  column  ; 

3d.    Defence  in  square  ; 

4th.  Defence  in  echelon  ; 

5th.  Defence  in  checker-form. 

Defence  in  line, — ^The  infantry  assumes  the  thin 
order  for  combat,  whenever  its  business  is  to  occupy 
and  defend  an  advantageous  position;  it  then  cuts 
off  the  approaches  by  covering  them  with  its  fire, 
which  is  directed  upon  the  attacking  columns. 

Infantry  adopt  the  deployed  line  for  defence, 
especially  against  troops  of  the  same  kind ;  they  then 
cover  the  ground  which  the  enemy  must  traverse  to 
reach  them,  with  skirmishers ;  and  when  the  adver- 
sary has  been  worried  by  a  stubborn  resistance,  the 
infantry  move  and  march  to  the  attack  at  charging  step. 

Circumstances  may  also  sometimes  require  that  a 
body  of-  deployed  infantry,  though  acting  upon  the 
defensive,  should  follow  up  their  fire  by  a  bayonet 
charge.  This  case  occurs  when  they  are  stationed 
near  and  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill,  awaiting  a  column 
which  is  ascending  the  slope.  We  shall  return  to  this 
point  when  speaking  of  the  defence  of  heights.* 

Again,  infantry  employ  the  thin  order  when 
firing  to  defend  intrenchments,  natural  or  artificial,  by 
lining  the  parapets  with  one  or  two  ranks  of  mus- 
kets ;  but  this  passive  means  of  defence  is  not  suffi- 
cient, except  when  combined  with  the  active  and  judi- 

*  Part  III.,  Chap.  viii. 


INFANTHY   FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


8-7 


EEGULATION  SQUAllE. 

^  4 


I 


eious  employment  of  reserves  outside  the  intrencliment, 
as  was  done  by  Massena  in  Ms  energetic  defence  of 
Genoa  in  tlie  year  1800. 

Defence  in  column, — Infantry  in  column  can  with- 
stand neither  artillery  nor  deployed  infantry,  the  for- 
mer raking  its  great  depth  with  its  horizontal  fire,  and 
the  latter  riddling  it  with  its  musketry.  The  column 
is,  therefore,  useful  in  defence  only  against  cavalry. 

A  defensive  column  will  often  change  to  the  square. 

Defence  in  square?' — ^The  square  is  the  true  for- 
mation of  the  infantry  against 
cavalry,  because  it  is  closed,  and 
resists  on  all  sides.  The  double 
column  at  half  distance  forms,  in 
the  presence  of  cavalry,  a  liol- 
low  square.  The  mode  of  form- 
ing it,  according  to  official  regu- 
lations, is  shown  in  the  annexed 
figure. 

This  square  may  also  be  ob- 
tained directly  from  the  line  in     '"  '"""" ' 

order  of  hattle^  without  the  intervention  of  the  column, 
as  is  shown  in  the  following  figure,  extracted  from 
General  Schramm's  Album  de  manoeuvres  dHnfanterie^ 
Paris,  1850,  p.  15. 


■^ 


*  The  Kussians,  and  the  English  in  Spain,  occasionally  substituted 
the  following  manoeuvre  for  the  square  against  cavalry.  The  infantry 
(even  in  two  ranks)  awaited  the  cavalry  in  line ;  the  first  rank  fired 
upon  the  charging  horsemen ;  the  second  rank  threw  themselves  upon 
the  ground  until  the  cavalry,  riding  at  full  speed,  had  passed  them,  then 
rising  discharged  their    fire   at  the    backs  of   the    horsemen.      This 


88       HISTOEY  AND   TACTICS   OF   THE   SEPARATE  AEMS. 

SCHRAMM'S  SQUARE. 


S-              ry             M 

^ 

a 

r       .r        .r 

V  V\  v\ 

6 

7 

s 

1 

3 
2 

__ 

^^ 

The  square  half  full  is  notMng  more  than  the 
regulation  column  against  cavalry?'  This  formation 
is  assumed  by  a  column  closed  en  masse,  so  suddenly 
threatened  by  cavalry  as  not  to  have  time  to  resume 
the  regular  distances  required  in  forming  a  square  in 
the  usual  manner.  It  then  forms  a  provisional  square, 
by  breaking  as  many  files  from  the  right  and  left  of 
each  company  as  may  be  necessary  to  close  the  in- 
tervals. 

General  Jomini  considers  the  square  by  a  regiment 
the  best  for  the  defensive,  whilst,  as  we  have  said,  the 
square  by  a  battalion  is  the  best  for  the  offensive. 

"A  large  square,"  says  Marshal  Bugeaud,  "has 
not  an  increased  fire  in  proportion  to  its  size,  and  is 
no  stronger  than  a  small  one.  The  only  portion  of 
the  charging  cavalry  really  to  be  feared  is  that  which 
can  strike  the  face  of  a  square ;  the  portions  extend- 
ing beyond  are  mill.  By  extending  the  face  of  a 
square,  though  we  do  indeed  increase  its  fire,  we  in- 
crease in  the  same  proportion  the  number  of  its  ene- 

manoeuvre  may  answer,  but  requires  for  its  execution  soldiers  of  great 
coolness  and  experience. 

*  Evolutions  de  la  ligne.    No.  925. 


INFANTRY  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  89 

mies.-  A  large  square  broken,  is  as  mucli  lost  as  a 
small  one,  and  everything  is  tlius  risked  at  once. 
For  these  reasons,  I  think,  we  should  form  none  but 
deep  squares  of  a  single  battalion."  The  annexed 
fig^ure   illustrates    the    square 

°  BUGEAUD'S  SQUAEE. 

proposed  by  the  conqueror  of     Grenadiers        ,  -. 


1st  company, ^ 


I 


Isly.  ,_        _ 

The    weak    points    of    a    3^    „         ^^^  ^^ 

square    are    not    the    angles,     uh    -         j=  = 

which   are   protected  by   the     sth    •         {^  " 

oblique  fire  of  two  faces,"^  but     vouigeurs ■  — ■ 

rather  the  middle  of  the  faces,  which  present  but  a 
front  fire,  and  have  more  void  space  behind  them.f 

The  infantry  of  a  square  should  find  its  defence 
rather  in  its  fire  than  in  the  bayonet.  During  the 
war  in  the  East,  instead  of  the  regulation  fire  of  two 
ranks,  the  preference  was  given  to  a  fire  (P ensemhle^ 
aimed  at  the  horses'  noses  at  forty  paces,  after  which 
they  were  received  upon  the  bayonet. 

When  several  squares  are  to  act  together,  they 
should  be  echeloned^  so  as  to  flank  each  other. 

Artillery  is  the  most  formidable  oj^ponent  of  the 
square.  Nevertheless,  in  favorable  circumstances, 
brought  about  by  skilful  manoeuvres,  cavalry  alone 
may  break  a  square  mthout  the  assistance  of  artil- 
lery ;  as  happened,  for  example,  at  the  battle  of  Dres- 
den (1813). 

*  In  a  tactical  square,  there  are  no  sectors  totally  deprived  of  fire, 
since  we  can  admit  oblique  firing,  whicli  is  not  done  in  fortification. 

t  Upon  the  heights  of  Elbodon  (Spain,  1811)  the  cavalry  of  Montbrun 
charged  an  English  square  upon  three  of  its  faces. 


90      HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS    OF   THE  SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

The  formation  in  square  is  often  designated  by  tlie 
i^mm  formation  of  resistance. 

In  conclusion,  we  will  remark  that  a  square,  not- 
withstanding its  mobility,  acts,  in  fact,  as  a  redoubt, 
and  has  the  same  disadvantages ;  its  faces,  for  exam- 
ple, stand  in  need  of  flanking.  In  order  to  flank  them, 
Desaix,  when  in  Egypt,  placed  on  the  prolongations 
of  the  diagonals  of  the  great  square  four  small  squares, 
each  composed  of  200  men,  to  which  were  added,  in 
case  of  attack,  the  companies  of  skirmishers. 


WURTEMBEKG  SQUARE. 


DESAIX'    SQUAKE. 


M 


^m 


1 1 1 

III 

o  o 

oo 

o  o 

o  o 

1 1  1 

1 1 1 

o  o 

oo 

o  o 

oo 

o  o 

o  o 

o  o 

oo 

o  o 

oo 

o  o 

oo 

1 1 1 

111 

o  o 
o  o 

oo 
oo 

111 

III 

We  may  also  here  notice  a  good  formation  of  the 
square,  adopted  by  the  army  of  Wurtemberg.  The  2d 
division  closes  in  mass  upon  the  1st,  the  4th  upon  the 
3d,  the  3d  being  at  double  distance  from  the  2d.  The 
3d  and  4th  front  to  the  rear,  the  files  of  the  extrem- 
ities front  to  the  right  and  left,  and  the  flanks  are 
filled  out  by  the  file-closers  and  picked  sharpshooters. 
This  square  is  strong,  and  marches  with  more  ease 
than  the  ordinary  square. 

Defence  in  echelon. — The  order  in  echelons,  which 
we  have  spoken  of  in  connection  with  attacks,  an- 
swers also  for  defence.     It  is  especially  employed  in 


INFANTRY   FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS,  91 

retreating  slowly  and  gradually,  after  receiving  a 
clieck. 

Wliat  we  have  said  above  respecting  the  relative 
disposition  of  the  echelons  and  the  distances  between 
them,  is  also  applicable  here. 

Defence  in  cliecker-form, — ^The  column,  square, 
and  echelons  are  all  suited  both  to  offensive  and  de- 
fensive operations.  The  order  in  checker-form,  on  the 
contrary,  is  purely  defensive.  The  regulations  with 
regard  to  manoeuvres  prescribe  its  employment  in  re- 
treats ;  but,  as  it  requires  level  ground,  its  application 
is  often  limited. 

CHECKER-FOEMATION. 

8d.  Bat.  1st.  Bat. 

I  \  I  I 


4th.  Bat.  2d.  Bat. 

I  I  I  I 

The  advantage  of  this  formation  consists  in  allow- 
ing the  force  to  retreat  in  successive  portions,  oblig- 
ing the  enemy,  meanwhile,  to  remain  in  a  position 
parallel  to  the  line  of  battle  ;  its  disadvantage  is,  that 
it  offers  feeble  resistance  to  cavalry,  which  can  easily 
enter  between  its  several  parts. 

In  this  order  the  odd  battalions  (1st,  3d,  etc.)  oc- 
cupy the  first  line,  nearest  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
even  ones  (2d,  4th,  etc.),  the  second  line. 

9.  liigbt  Infantry. — All  light  troops,  at  the  pres- 
ent day,  are  regularly  organized,  and  have  a  system 
of  tactics  ;  even  Austria  has  decided  to  methodize  her 
Croatian  and  Tyrolean  Chasseurs. 


92      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE   SEPARATE  ARMS. 

la  France,  tlie  light  infantry  is  composed  of  tlie 
chasseurs  a  lyied^  who  are  accustomed  to  performing 
their  manceuvres  at  the  double-quick  pace  (^jpas  gym- 
nastique),  and  running ;  they  are  drilled  in  all  kinds 
of  leaping;  are  formed  in  two  ranks,  and  always 
fire  at  will.  They  are  all  armed  with  the  rifled 
carbine,^  whose  extreme  range,  upon  masses,  is  as 
great  as  1,300  metres  (over  1,400  yards),  and  they 
are  trained  to  great  accuracy  of  aim.  The  battalions 
of  chasseurs  a  pied  are  created  for  outpost  service,  and 
that  of  skirmishers.  In  their  evolutions  they  follow  a 
special  system,  established  by  the  ordinance  of  July 
22,  1845.  Their  organization  is,  in  one  respect,  pecu- 
liar :  in  each  company,  placed  in  two  ranks,  an  odd 
file  and  its  adjacent  even  file  together  form  a  group 
of  four  men,  who  are  designated  by  the  name  com- 
rades of  battle  {camarades  de  combat)  ;  the  company 
deploys  as  skirmishers,  and  rallies  hy  fours.  Upon  en- 
countering foraging  cavalry,  the  rally  by  fours  takes 
the  place  of  the  rally  upon  the  reserve ;  each  group 
of  four  men  assumes  a  radiated  formation,  in  which, 
placing  their  right  feet  together,  the  four  men  mutu- 
ally support   each  other; 

DEPLOYED  GEOUP.  EALLIED  GEOUP.      J  rr  i 

1  and  each,  taking  the  posi- 

i  1  i  i  -^  J^->.        "ti^^   ^^   charge   bayonets, 


fires  from  the  place  he  oc- 
cupies, without  moving  his 
foot.     We  give  a  view  of  the  rallied  group  seen  in 
perspective,  in  order  to  illustrate  more  clearly  the  re- 
spective position  of  the  four  comrades. 

*  By  a  recent  decision  the  Zouaves  are  also  furnished  with  tliis  arm. 


I 


INFANTRY  FOKMATION   AND    TACTICS.  93 

In  com'bats  of  skir-  «^^^^^°  «^«^^'  ^^  perspective. 
mishers,  besides  tlie  sig- 
nals given  by  tlie  bugle, 
wliicli  may  often  fail  to 
be  heard  in  consequence 
of  the  firing,  or  a  con- 
trary wind,  the  officers 
and  non  -  commissioned 
officers  are  authorized  to 
use  a  whistle,  to  communicate  with  their  men. 

The  selection  of  suitable  men  to  form  the  best 
light  infantry,  is  a  matter  of  some  importance.  The 
recruits  should  be  quick  of  hearing,  keen-sighted,  light- 
footed,  and  clear-headed.  In  France,  we  find  these 
several  qualities  best  combined  in  the  inhabitants  of 
the  mountainous  and  forest-covered  departments. 

The  light  infantry  soldier  requires  more  time  for 
his  instruction  than  the  soldier  of  the  line ;  for  both 
his  physical  and  intellectual  faculties  must  be  de- 
veloped with  the  greatest  care.  He  must  be  taught 
to  climb,  to  run,  to  leap  a  barrier,  or  a  brook,  and  to 
scale  a  wall  or  an  escarpment.  He  will  be  instructed 
in  the  method  of  reconnoitring  a  piece  of  ground,  ex- 
ploring a  copse,  and  examining  a  house,  a  farm,  or  a  vil- 
lage. He  will  learn  what  kind  of  obstacles  may  serve 
as  covers,  how  they  are  to  be  occupied ;  and,  in  short, 
how  to  see  without  being  seen.  One  of  the  Russian 
writers  even  requires  that  he  should  be  taught  some- 
thing of  topography.  Moreover,  his  quickness  of  sight 
is  to  be  cultivated,  and  accuracy  of  aim  imparted,  by 
frequent  target  practice.     It  is  only  by  this  detailed 


94      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

instraction  of  eacli  soldier,  that  light  infantry  can  be 
formed  fully  able  to  discharge  the  service  required  of  it 
in  war— a  service  which  embraces  watching  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy,  reconnoitring,  beginning  and  fin- 
ishing combats,  covering  retreats,  escorting  convoys, 
giving  secure  repose  to  the  troops  by  performing  pa- 
trol duty  in  advance  of  and  about  them,  acting  as 
flankers,  advance  guards,  etc. 

10.  Skirmisiiers. — Before  closing  this  chapter,  we 
must  say  a  few  words  more,  especially  in  relation  to 
the  branch  of  infantry  designated  as  skirmishers. 

All  soldiers  fighting  dispersed  or  scattered,  are 
called  skirmishers,  whatever  may  be  the  object  they 
have  in  view.  A  body,  detached  as  skirmishers,  al- 
ways leaves  a  reserve  of  one  third  of  its  force  in  the 
rear  of  the  point  upon  which  it  spreads,  as  a  centre 
upon  which  to  rally. 

Those  soldiers  make  the  best  skirmishers  who  de- 
velop the  instinct  of  the  chasseur  and  the  partisan,  in 
taking  advantage  of  peculiarities  of  the  ground,  and 
employing  judicious  ruses. 

The  skirmisher,  unless  covered  by  the  broken 
character  of  the  ground,  should  not  stand  still  while 
loading  his  piece ;  and,  when  necessary,  he  should  lie 
flat  upon  the  ground,  to  avoid  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 
The  battalions  of  chasseurs  a])ied^  who  take  the  place 
of  our  former  light  infantry,  will  furnish  the  best  skir- 
mishers ;  nevertheless,  we  should  add  that  in  France 
even  the  soldier  of  the  line  may  be  used  for  this  ser- 
vice, for  which  he  is  well  fitted  by  his  vivacity  of 
spirit,  his  activity,  and  his  skill. 


I 


INF^VOT^EY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  95 

There  are  three  classes  of  skirmishers  :  skirmishers 
of  march,  skinnishers  of  battle,  skirmishers  en  grande 
bande, 

Shirmisliers  of  march, — These  skirmishers  perform 
the  duty  of  reconnoitring  on  the  flanks  and  on  the 
front  and  rear  of  columns  in  march ;  of  giving  warning 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy ;  of  masking  the  move- 
ments and  formations  of  the  troops ;  of  skirmishing 
against  the  enemy,  in  order  to  gain  time  for  making 
defensive  dispositions.  When  the  two  parties  are 
marching  at  a  short  distance  from  each  other,  as,  for 
example,  in  a  pursuit,  both  throw  out  skirmishers, 
and  the  result  is  a  petty  warfare.  These  skirmishers 
necessarily  travel  two  or  three  times  as  far  as  the  col- 
umns, and  that  over  the  most  broken  parts  of  the 
ground,  thus  rendering  their  duty  extremely  arduous. 
They  must,  therefore,  be  frequently  relieved,  and,  con- 
sequently, must  not  be  detached  in  too  great  numbers. 

Sldrmisliers  of  hattle. — ^When  two  bodies  or  two 
annies  are  drawn  up  in  line  face  to  face,  each  detaches 
upon  its  front  a  line  of  skirmishers,  designed  to  drive 
back  the  advanced  posts  of  the  adversary,  and  to  try 
the  strength  of  his  position.  If  allowed  to  approach, 
these  skirmishers  should  harass  the  enemy  by  well 
arranged  attacks,  which  can  be  met  only  by  the  skir- 
mishers on  the  other  side.  However,  it  is  rare  that 
anything  decisive  results  from  the  action  of  skirmishers 
on  either  side,  since  they  generally  neutralize  each 
other ;  and  this  is  a  reason  why,  in  this  case  alone, 
they  should  not  be  detailed  in  greater  numbers  than 
are  actually  necessary  to  repel  those  of  the  enemy. 


96      HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS    OF   THE   SEPAEATE   AEMS. 

SUrmishers  en  grande  hande. — The  chief  business 
of  the  fii'st  class  of  skirmishers  is  to  see^  and  to  give 
warning ;  that  of  the  second  class,  to  initiate  the  com- 
bat ;  that  of  the  third,  to  cany  a  position,  that  is,  to 
perform  the  real  business  of  war.  The  distinction  be- 
tween them  is  thus  distinctly  marked.  The  employ- 
ment of  skirmishers  en  grande  hande  occurs  as  far  back 
as  the  sixteenth  century ;  they  w^ere  used  by  Coligny, 
Montluc,  and  Henry  IV.  Disused  during  the  seven- 
teenth century,  they  were  again  revived  by  the  wars 
of  the  Kevolution  ;  and  this  is  not  surprising,  as  their 
action  is  especially  appropriate  in  the  case  of  intrepid 
though  imperfectly  drilled  troops. 

If  a  formidable  position  is  to  be  captured,  instead 
of  approaching  it  by  the  front,  at  the  risk  of  great 
loss,  skirmishers  will  be  thrown  upon  the  flanks — 
either  a  battalion,  a  regiment,  or  even  a  whole  brigade 
— whilst  a  body  of  troops,  drawn  up  in  column  be- 
yond the  reach  of  the  artillery,  menaces  the  front  of 
the  position.  These  skirmishers  eri  grande  hande, 
climb  the  slopes,  surmount  obstacles,  assail  the  posi- 
tion in  flank  or  rear,  and,  having  arrived  within  mus- 
ket range,  rush  with  the  bayonet  upon  the  defenders, 
who,  held  in  check  on  the  front,  are  obliged  to  retire. 

As  examples  of  the  employment  of  skirmishers  en 
grande  hande,  we  may  cite  the  battle  of  Jemmapes 
(November  6,  1T92),  when  they  were  used  with  suc- 
cess by  Dumouriez ;  and  the  battle  of  Hanau  (Octo- 
ber 30,  1813),  in  which  there  were  at  one  time  more 
than  5,000  French  skirmishers  engaged  in  the  great 
forest,  two  leagues  from  the  town. 


CHAPTEE   THIED. 

HISTOEY   OF   CAVALEY. 

We  shall  liei:e  be  more  brief  than  in  the  history 
of  infantry;  and  shall  treat  the  subject  under  three 
heads  only :  antiquity,  middle  ages,  and  modern  times. 

1.  Antiquity. — As  the  military  art  had  its  origin 
in  Asia,  a  country  abounding  in  arid  plains,  where 
manceuvres  even  of  chariots  were  easy,  mounted  com- 
batants at  first  prevailed.  "War  chariots  appeared  first, 
because  the  art  of  guiding  horses  in  harness  presents 
fewer  difficulties  than  equitation ;  cavalry  proper  is 
of  later  origin. 

Mounted  upon  the  platform  of  a  car,  the  warrior 
overlooks  the  field  of  battle,  has  the  free  use  of  his 
arms  (the  horses  being  managed  by  a  driver),  and  can 
strike  his  adversary  as  he  comes  suddenly  upon  him. 
This  method  of  combat  was  well  suited  to  warriors 
who  were  of  a  select  order — warriors  d'elite.  The 
Egyptians  and  Persians  made  great  use  of  chariots  for 
thus  conveying  the  combatants ;  but  there  were  also 
two  other  kinds  of  war  chariots :  those  armed  with 
scythes,  which  mowed  their  bloody  swath  through 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy ;  and  those  carrying  warlike 
machines,  which  may  be  said  to  have  composed  the 
7 


98       HISTORY   AND  TACTICS    OF   THE  SEPARATE   ARMS. 

portable  artillery  of  those  times.  The  Greeks  and  Ro- 
mans made  but  little  use  of  war  chariots  ;  they  opened 
their  lines  to  let  those  of  the  enemy  pass.  They  also 
employed  against  these  chariots  rows  of  stakes,  placed 
along  their  front,  and  caltrops. 

Mounted  horse  existed  in  China  more  than  twenty 
centuries  before  our  era.  The  elder  Cyrus  was  the  first 
who  (560  B.  C.)  introduced  a  cavalry  corps  into  Persia. 

The  Greeks  began  to  make  use  of  cavalry  in  the 
earliest  period  of  their  history ;  but  until  the  battle 
of  Leuctra  (371  B.  C),  although  they  had  made  great 
advances  in  the  art  of  war,  this  people  were  yet  igno- 
rant of  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  numerous 
and  well  instructed  cavalry,  and  their  armies  were  com- 
posed almost  entirely  of  foot  soldiers. 

The  Theban  general  Epaminondas  was  the  first 
who  had  a  just  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  cav- 
alry in  charging  and  in  pursuing.  He,  with  great 
perseverance,  trained  a  body  of  5,000  regular ,  horse- 
men, and  habituated  them  to  fighting  en  masse.  His 
efforts  were  crowned  with  success;  for,  thanks  to  his 
cavalry,  he  was  victorious  at  Leuctra,  and  Mantinea, 
and  undermined  the  old  reputation  of  the  Spartans. 

These  two  victories  opened  the  eyes  of  the  other 
Grecian  states,  and  they  increased  the  number  of  their 
mounted  troops.  Froni  that  time,  improved  cavalry  sus- 
tained a  more  important  part  in  the  wars  of  Greece. 

Two  nations  of  Greece  distinguished  themselves 
by  the  excellence  of  their  cavaliers :  the  Thessalians, 
whose  numerous  cavalry  contributed  to  the  success  of 
Philip  of  Macedon  and  Alexander  the  Great ;  and  the 


I 
I 


HISTORY    OF    CAVALRY.  99 

EtoHans,  whose  renowned  squadrons  rendered  so  mncli 
service  to  tlie  Eomans  in  their  struggle  against  Mace- 
donia, at  the  beginning  of  the  second  century  B.  C.  The 
Thessalian  horsemen  were  invincible  when  they  fought 
in  line,  massed,  but  were  worthless  when  once  broken ; 
the  contrary  was  the  case  with  the  Etolian  cavaliers. 

According  to  the  Greek  theorists,  the  cavalry 
should  be  one  sixth  of  the  infantry ;  and  this  propor- 
tion was  adopted  by  Alexander  at  the  time  of  his  en- 
trance into  Asia ;  for,  of  the  35,000  men  which  com- 
posed his  expedition,  5,000  were  horsemen  ;  but,  more 
frequently,  the  proportion  observed  in  the  Greek  ar- 
mies was  one  eleventh. 

The  fii^t  Eoman  cavalry  was  but  mediocre,  and 
served  either  on  foot  or  on  horseback,  according  to 
circumstances.  Subsequently,  when  they  fought  alto- 
gether on  horseback,  they  were  interspersed  with  foot 
soldiers.  These  vicious  methods  of  employing  caval- 
ry were  not  attended  by  any  bad  consequences  in  the 
wars  of  Eome  against  the  people  of  the  Italian  penin- 
sula, but  they  well-nigh  proved  disastrous  in  their  efforts 
to  repel  the  attacks  of  the  Gauls  and  of  Pyrrhus. 

We  may  well  be  astonished  at  this  mediocrity 
of  the  Roman  cavalry ;  for,  in  Rome,  to  be  a  horse- 
man, or  rather  hniglit^  required  the  possession  of  a 
certain  income.  In  the  social  hierarchy,  the  order  of 
knights  came  next  after  that  of  senators,  and  each 
knight  wore  a  gold  ring,  as  a  distinctive  badge. 

It  was  not  until  the  wars  with  Carthage  that  the 
Romans  began  to  understand  how  much  could  be  done 
with  good  and  numerous  cavalry.     They  enticed  into 


100    HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

their  service  the  foreign  cavalry,  wMch  constituted  the 
force  of  the  Carthaginians ;  and  from  that  time  the 
face  of  things  was  changed.  Hannibal  had  maintained 
himself  in  Italy  victoriously  for  thirteen  years,  by  the 
aid  of  his  excellent  Numidian,  Spanish,  and  Gallic 
cavalry;  but  when  these  useful  auxiliaries  passed 
over  to  the  Eomans,  fortune  deserted  his  standard. 

From  this  time  Eome  maintained  two  kinds  of  cav- 
alry :  one  composed  of  Roman  citizens  or  knights,  the 
other  furnished  by  their  allies.  The  former,  which 
was  attached  to  the  legions,  was  always  mediocre ;  the 
latter  became  skilful,  and  distinguished  itself  under 
the  designation  of  auxiliary  cavaliy. 

The  proportion  of  cavalry  which  formed  a  part  of 
the  legion  varied  from  a  tenth  to  a  twentieth ;  but  at 
each  epoch  the  number  of  cavalry  attached  to  each  le- 
gion was  almost  always  invariable  and  independent 
of  circumstances  and  localities :  a  practice  to  be  con- 
demned, for  the  cavalry  of  an  army  should  be  more 
numerous  in  level  than  in  mountainous  countries,  and 
it  was  not  always  possible  for  the  Roman  consuls  to  find 
at  hand  all  the  auxiliary  cavalry  which  they  needed. 

The  cavalry  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans  was  di- 
vided into  heavy  and  light  cavalry:  both  used  the 
shield.  Tbe  heavy  cavalry  also  wore  either  a  helmet 
and  cuirass,  or  complete  armor ;  in  the  latter  case,  the 
horse  was  protected  by  iron  plates.  The  light  cavalry 
wore  the  helmet,  as  well  as  a  small  cuirass  of  metal  or 
leather.  As  to  their  offensive  weapons,  the  heav}'- 
armed  cavaliers  had  the  sword,  the  javelin,  and  the 
double-lance,  with  iron  on  both  ends ;  this  lance  was 


I 


HISTORY    OF    CAVALRY.  101 


held  at  a  point  about  one  third  of  its  lengtli  from  one 
end,  so  that,  if  the  longer  part  broke,  the  other  part 
might  still  be  used.  The  light  cavaliy  used  the  sword, 
the  javelin,  the  bow,  and  even  the  sling. 

The  ancients  paid  little  attention  to  swiftness  in 
the  action  of  cavalry,  and  this  explains  why,  in  the 
formation  of  this  arm,  they  multiplied  the  number  of 
ranks.  The  Greeks  extended  their  preference  for  the 
deep  order  to  their  mounted  troops,  to  which,  how- 
ever, it  is  even  less  appropriate  than  to  infantry. 

The  Greek  cavalry  was  drawn  up  in  4,  5,  or  8 
ranks ;  the  Thessalians  adopted  this  last  depth.  As 
to  the  formation  of  this  cavalry,  it  was  sometimes  a 
square  or  a  rectangle ;  sometimes,  also,  a  triangle, 
which  was  the  favorite  form  with  Philip  of  Macedon 
and  his  son  Alexander.  The  triangle,  the  point  of 
which  was  directed  toward  the  enemy,  in  order  to 
break  them  with  more  certainty, 
is  supposed  to  have  originated  in 
the  imitation  of  the  figure  formed 
by  a  flock  of  birds  flying  through  c  c  c  c  c 

the  air.     The  habitual  form  of  ccccccccc 


HESSALIAN  LOZENGE. 

O 
C  C  C 


the  Greek  squadrons  appears  to        ccccccccccc 
have    been  the    lozenge,   which     ccccccccccccc 

^'     .    occccccccccccco 

offers  the  advantage  of  frontmg     ccccccccccccc 
on  all  sides.     This  form  is  repre-       ccccccccccc 

ccccccccc 

sented  in  the  annexed  diagram,  in  c  c  c  c  c  c  c 

which  the  chiefs  are  denoted  by  c  c  c  c  c 

the  letter  a  '"" 

o 

The  Romans  divided  the  cav- 
alry of  a  legion  into  ten  turmce,  or  squadrons ;  each 


102      HISTORY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

turma  was  composed  of  30  soldiers  and  5  cliiefs ;  tlie 
wliole  drawn  up  in  tliree  ranks, 

EOMAX   TUEMA.  . 

^  as  siiown  m  tlie  annexed  figure 

occcccccccco       (tlie  letter  o  denoting  a  chief). 

cccccccccc  Sometimes  . tlie    turma   con- 

c  c  c  c  c  c  c  c  0  c  tained  32  men,  and  was  formed 

in  a  similar  manner,  in  four 
ranks.  In  combat  tlie  turmse  were  placed  on  the  front 
or  the  flanks  of  the  legion.  The  auxiliary  cavalry 
adopted  in  its  formations  either  the  square,  the  loz- 
enge, or  the  triangle ;  but  in  every  case  its  depth 
was  less  than  amons:  the  Greeks. 

The  best  among  all  the  cavalry  which  figures  in 
the  Koman  armies  is  unquestionably  that  of  the  Nu- 
midians  and  the  Gauls.  The  latter  rendered  important 
services  to  Csesar,  and  maintained  its  preeminence  dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  Roman  emperors,  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  at  the  commencement  of  our  era  all  the 
terms  of  manege  most  in  use  were  Gallic. 

In  the  latter  days  of  the  empire,  cavalry  increased 
beyond  measure  in  the  Eoman  armies. 

The  barbarian  nations  who  overwhelmed  the  Eo- 
man empire  had  but  little  cavalry ;  adhering  to  their 
practice  of  fighting  on  foot,  they  displayed  great  skill 
in  that  kind  of  combat.  But  the  establishment  of  the 
feudal  system,  which  happened  soon  after,  produced  a 
marked  preponderance  among  them  of  cavalry,  which 
is  said  to  have  composed  one  half  of  the  armies  in  the 
reign  of  Charlemagne. 

The  ancients  were  not  acquainted  with  the  saddle ; 
they  used,  instead  of  it,  skins  or  housings,  placed  so 


k 


HISTOEY    OF   CAVALRY.  103 

as  to  afford  the  rider  a  firm  seat  without  hurting  the 
horse.  The  saddle  was  invented  under  the  reign  of 
Constantine ;  and  this  led,  naturally,  to  the  use  of 
stirrups,  which  could  be  more  firmly  sustained  by  the 
saddle  than  by  housings.  The  invention  of  stirrups  is 
attributed  to  the  Franks,^'  and  their  use  caused  the  her- 
nias and  the  numerous  diseases  of  the  legs,  with  which 
horsemen  were  afflicted,  to  disappear.  Besides  lessen- 
ing fatigue,  the  use  of  stirrups  enabled  the  horseman  to 
remain  a  longer  time  in  the  saddle,  and  also,  by  giving 
him  a  point  of  support,  permitted  him  to  give  more 
certain  blows  to  the  enemy.  The  absence  of  stirrups 
is,  indeed,  a  distinctive  feature  of  the  ancient  cavalry ; 
without  them,  the  heavy  feudal  cavaliers  had  perhaps 
never  existed. 


2.  middle  Age§. — During  the  middle  ages,  the 
history  of  cavalry  is  interwoven  with  that  of  the  feu- 
dal system  and  chivalry.  We  are  not  here  required 
to  treat  of  chivalry  under  its  political  asj)ect ;  but 
will  merely  remark  that  this  institution,  during  a  pe- 
riod of  trouble  and  general  anarchy,  powerfully  con- 
tributed to  the  suppression  of  violence  and  the  purifi- 
cation of  morals ;  and  that  the  knights-errant  them- 
selves^ notwithstanding  the  absurdities  of  some  of 
their  number,  so  well  satirized  by  Cervantes,  were 
useful  to  society,  for  their  generous  protection  of  the 
weak,  wherever  they  went,  was  really  the  only  police 

*  Before  this  invention  the  cavalier  mounted  his  horse  by  the  aid  of 
one  of  the  milestones  disposed  along  the  Eoman  roads,  or  else  by  means 
of  a  projection,  provided  for  the  purpose,  near  the  but  of  his  lance. 


104     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPARATE  AKMS. 

whicli  could  be  exercised  in  tlie  rural  districts  and  on 
tlie  liigli  roads. 

It  was  not  in  the  nature  of  the  feudal  system  to 
employ  methods  of  warfare  based  upon  observation 
and  reflection :  the  distribution  of  power,  as  then  con- 
stituted, is  alone  sufficient  to  explain  this  remark. 
Besides,  tactics  and  chivalry  could  not  exist  simul- 
taneously ;  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  former 
being  ensemble^  the  emplopuent  of  masses ;  that  of 
the  latter,  individual  courage,  the  isolated  feat  of 
arms — prowess. 

The  nobles  who  held  fiefs  owed  their  military  ser- 
vice to  the  king,  for  a  period  of  sixty  days,  at  their 
own  expense  ;  beyond  that  period,  it  was  at  the  royal 
charge.  At  the  call  of  the  monarch,  they  rej)aired 
to  the  army,  accompanied  by  mounted  combatants 
taken  from  the  nobility  of  their  fiefs,  and  bearing  the 
name  of  cavaliers,  or  knights.  Each  knight  had  a  reti- 
nue armed  with  the  long  bow  or  the  crossbow,  con- 
stituting the  light  cavalry,  whilst  he  himself,  wholly 
cased  in  iron  mail,  pursuant  to  the  privilege  of  his 
rank,  fought  in  line,  face  to  face  with  the  enemy. 

To  aspire  to  the  dignity  of  knighthood,  it  was  ne- 
cessary to  be  a  gentleman,  to  have  given  proofs  of 
courage,  and  to  have  reached  the  age  of  majority. 
The  induction  of  a  knight  into  his  office  was  accom- 
panied with  pomp  and  ceremony;  but,  most  singu- 
larly, this  induction  took  place  on  the  eve  of  battle,  a 
practice  plainly  unjust,  and  destructive  of  emulation. 
This  custom  was  infringed  by  Francis  I.  when  he 
caused  himself  to  be  knighted  by  Bayard  the  evening 


HISTORY    OF   CAVALRY.  105 

after  tlie  battle  of  Marignan  (1515)  ;  Montluc  was 
also  kniglited  by  tbe  Duke  of  EngMen  after  tlie  battle 
of  Cerisoles  (1544).  Any  kniglit  could  confer  tlie  or- 
der of  knighthood  upon  a  compatriot.* 

The  knights  were  divided  into  hannerets^  those 
sufficiently  powerful  to  raise  a  banner,  and  lachelors^ 
or  lower  knights,  gentlemen  less  powerful  than  the 
preceding,  who  carried  only  an  ensign,  called  a  pen- 
non, attached  to  their  lance.  The  force  of  an  army 
was  estimated  by  the  number  of  its  banners  and  its 
pennons  ;  the  infantry  not  being  thought  worth  count- 
ing. To  rise  to  the  dignity  of  a  banneret,  the  knight 
had  to  be  able  to  embrace  under  his  command  5  or  6 
lances,  in  all  30  or  36  horses. 

A  lance  was  the  term  applied  to  a  small  band 
formed  by  a  man-at-arms  and  his  attendants,  the  latter 
consisting  of  a  coutillier  (so  named  from  the  long, 
broad  dirk  in  his  belt),  one  page  or  varlet,  and  three 
archers.  The  coutillier  frequently  marched  on  foot 
and  conducted  the  baggage  horse ;  the  page,  or  varlet, 
brought  the  war-horse  to  the  knight  when  he  was 
going  to  battle,  carried  his  lance  and  shield,  and 
guarded  his  prisoners ;  the  archers  were  young  gen- 
tlemen entering  upon  the  military  career,  and  aspir- 
ing to  become  men-at-arms. 

The  man-at-arms  was  covered  with  iron,  when  his 
fortune  allowed  it,  and  wore,  as  much  as  possible. 

*  A  case  is  cited  in  which  an  English  chief,  the  Count  of  Suffolk,  at 
the  combat  of  Jargeau  (1429),  knighted  the  French  gentleman,  Guillaume 
Renaud,  before  surrendering  to  him.  But,  in  my  opinion,  we  should  not 
draw  any  general  conclusion  from  this  instance. 


106     HISTOEY  AND   TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

only  armor  from  Milan.  Tlie  details  of  this  armor 
are  as  follows :  Over  a  vestment  of  leather,  called  a 
gamheson,  lie  buckled  on  a  shirt  of  mail  called  a  liau- 
be7%  and  over  this  a  cuirass.    In  addition  to  the  cui- 


KNIGHT  IN  AEMOE. 


1.  Helmet 

2.  Gorget. 

3.  Cuirass. 

4.  Epaulicres. 

5.  Brassarts. 

6.  Gauntlet. 

7.  Tasses. 

8.  Cuishes. 

9.  Genouill^res. 
10.  Greaves. 


rass,  the  complete  armor  embraced  the  gorget,  which  de- 
fended the  neck ;  brassarts,  which  protected  the  arms  ; 
epauUeres,  covering  the  shoulders;  tasses,  protecting 
the  lower  part  of  the  body ;  cuisJies,  for  the  thighs ;  and 
greaves,  for  the  legs.  Over  the  whole  was  sometimes 
thrown  the   sagum  (saye),  a  kind   of  embroidered 


HISTORY    OF    CAVALRY.  107 

doublet,  made  of  woollen  cloth  {serge  or  say),  A 
helmet  and  a  shield,  either  round,  oval,  or  demi-oval, 
completed  the  defensive  armor.  As  offensive  arms  the 
knight  carried  the  sword,  the  mace,  the  battle  axe, 
and  the  lance,  the  latter  being  about  15  feet  in  length. 
The  lance  with  which  the  gendarme  unhorsed  his 
enemy  was  regarded  as  a  noble  arm,  and  was  for- 
bidden to  villains^  or  serfs.  Upon  a  march,  the 
knight  did  not  wear  his  armor,  which  would  unne- 
cessarily fatigue  him  in  advance ;  but  it  was  carried 
after  him  upon  a  horse  or  in  a  wagon.  For  a  like 
reason,  he  then  rode  upon  a  small  horse,  called  a 
courtaud;  but  on  the  day  of  action  he  armed  himself 
cap-a-pie  and  mounted  his  war-horse,  an  animal  of 
lofty  stature  and  great  strength. 

The  French  cavalry  charged  in  a  single  line — a 
formation  which  resulted  in  part  from  the  tendency 
of  the  feudal  lords  to  consider  themselves  as  equals, 
possessing  equal  rights.  This  claim  of  equality  was 
satisfied  by  the  formation  in  a  single  rank,  which  gave 
each  knight  a  free  field  for  attacking  the  enemy  and 
displaying  his  own  prowess.  The  pages,  or  varlets, 
ready  to  support  their  chiefs,  formed  a  second  rank 
behind  that  of  the  gensdarmes ;  but  the  latter  attacked 
alone,  which  necessarily  occasioned  successive  charges 
of  a  small  number  of  horses. 

The  cavalry  ignored  the  laws  of  tactics,  and  sub- 
mitted but  little  to  discipline ;  still,  such  was  the  de- 
fective organization  of  the  infantry,  that  the  former 
bore  all  the  burden  of  war,  and  not  only  fought  bat- 
tles, but  also  laid  sieges. 


108     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  ARMS. 

Toward  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
and  the  beginning  of  the  fifteentli,  the  expert  English 
archers  and  the  excellent  Swiss  pikemen,  all  foot  sol- 
diers, frequently  forced  the  chivalry  to  convert  itself 
into  infantry ;  and  this  lasted  so  long  as  armies  did 
not  contain  a  body  of  infantry,  properly  so  called, 
sufficiently  compact  to  sustain  a  charge.  This  was 
illustrated  at  the  battles  of  Poictiers,  Cocherel,  Mon- 
teil,  Agincourt,  and  Formigny.  When  the  knights 
dismounted,  they  often  shortened  their  lances  to  five 
feet,  to  render  them  easier  to  manage,  and  of  stouter 
resistance ;  they  took  off  their  spurs,  to  use  them  as 
caltrops,  planting  them  in  the  ground,  row^els  up. 
Moreover,  the  men-at-arms,  with  their  heavy  mail, 
made  but  clumsy  foot  soldiers;  they  could  march 
against  their  adversaries  only  by  resting  several  times 
on  the  way.  They  were  obliged  to  fix  in  advance  the 
number  of  poses,  or  rests,  of  which  an  attack  should 
consist.  It  would  have  been  impossible  for  them  to 
perform  a  long  march;  and  when  dismounted,  they 
were  compelled  to  divest  themselves  of  their  armor. 

After  the  crusades,  chivalry  fell  into  decline,  the 
principal  causes  of  which  were  the  destruction  of  the 
feudal  system,  the  establishment  of  the  communal 
militia,  the  invention  of  fire-arms,  and  the  ignorance 
and  vices  of  the  knights.  This  decline  ended  in  com- 
plete  extinction  about  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, when  the  modern  epoch  begins. 

3.  Modern  Times — Dissatisfied  with  an  intract- 
able  nobility  frequently   absenting  itself  from  the 


I 


HISTOEY    OF    CAVALRY.  109 

rankSj  the  kings  soon  began  to  supplant  the  feudal 
armies  by  permanent  troops  more  obedient  to  their 
wishes.  In  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  more 
correct  ideas  of  organization,  and  the  employment  of 
armies,  effected  a  revolution  in  war,  which  again  be- 
came an  art. 

In  France,  Charles  VII.  was  the  iirst  to  institute 
permanent  troops  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  He  suc- 
ceeded better  with  the  latter  than  the  former,  for  the 
corps  of  cavaliers  which  he  created  lasted  as  long  as 
the  old  monarchy. 

In  1445  he  organized  fifteen  companies  of  cavalry, 
called  compagnies  (T ordonnance^  each  containing  100 
lances.  Counting  six  men  in  a  lance,  this  gives  600 
combatants  per  company,  and  9,000  for  the  whole 
body  estalished,  not  including  the  supernumeraries  or 
candidates  who  followed  voluntarily,  in  the  hope  of 
one  day  becoming  full  gensdarmes. 

Besides  the  captain,  there  were  in  each  company  a 
lieutenant,  an  ensign,  and  a  guidon,  all  chosen  from 
the  gentlemen  most  reputed  for  valor.  There  was  also 
a  quartermaster. 

Every  gendarme  had  four  horses  :  one  for  his  ser- 
vant, one'  for  his  baggage,  a  war-horse,  and  a  cour- 
taud.  Each  archer  had  two  horses.  The  gensdarmes 
w^ere  paid  after  a  review,  or  muster,  held  by  a  spe- 
cial commissioner;  and  the  means  for  that  purpose 
were  raised  by  a  tax  called  the  gendarme  tax,  levied 
upon  the  people  of  the  towns  and  the  rural  districts. 

After  the  institution  of  these  companies,  the  feu- 
dal lords  no  longer  brought  their  vassals  into  service. 


110     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

Except  in  the  rare  cases  wlien  the  king  summoned 
the  arriere-ban^^  the  use  of  banners  and  pennons 
ceased,  gentlemen  of  high  rank  preferring  the  position 
of  captain  of  an  independent  company  (which  con- 
ferred a  real  command)  to  that  of  cavaliers. 

The  companies  thns  created  by  Charles  VII.  were 
imitated  by  the  neighboring  nations ;  but,  with  the 
exception  of  those  of  the  duchy  of  Burgundy,  the  for- 
eign companies  never  reached  the  excellence  of  ours. 

Upon  the  accession  of  Francis  I.,  the  French  gen- 
darmery  still  formed  in  a  single  rank ;  a  formation 
too  thin,  especially  for  resisting  German  squadrons, 
which  were  sometimes  drav/n  up  in  squares,  but  al- 
ways in  deep  order.  The  depth  of  these  squadrons 
was  usually  seventeen  ranks.  Charles  V.  reduced  it 
to  ten,  and  finally  to  eight  ranks. 

This  deep  formation  of  the  German  squadrons  re- 
sulted from  their  being  composed  entirely  of  the  com- 
mon people,  to  whom  the  reasons  which  led  the 
French  gendarmery  to  form  in  a  single  rank,  and 
which  we  have  above  explained,  were  no  longer  ap- 
plicable. 

.  Fire-arms  began  to  be  introduced  in  the  cavalry. 
In  Germany,  about  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, they  reckoned  one  arquebusier  for  every  four 
lances.  They  also  began  to  employ  special  corps  of 
light  cavalry  for  skinnishing,  who,  when  necessary, 
dismounted.  They  were  called  chevau-legers  when 
they   carried    the    lance,   and   stradiots  when   they 

*  Body  of  arriere- vassals,  or  inferior  feudatories  of  the  sovereign. — 
TraiMlator. 


HISTOEY    OF   CAVALKY.  Ill 

served  as  scouts.  There  existed  also  cranequiniers^ 
or  mounted  crossbowmen,  wlio  used  a  hook  called  a 
cranequin  to  draw  the  cord  of  their  crossbow ;  malan- 
drinSj  mounted  soldiers  of  fortune,  armed  with  a  bo^v ; 
argoulets,  horsemen  carrying  the  escojpette  (wall-piece 
with  wheel-lock  and  rifled  barrel)  ;  carahins^  when  the 
escopette  was  changed  to  the  carbine ;  and,  finally,  re- 
itres^  OY  pistoliers^  when  armed  with  the  pistol. 

The  origin  of  dragoons  dates  also  from  this  epoch, 
since  history  informs  us  that,  in  1543,  in  the  environs 
of  Landrecy,  Peter  Strozzi  placed  500  arquebusiers  on 
horseback,  in  order  that  they  might  not  he  fatigued. 
This  fact  explains  how  dragoons  were  at  first  but 
mounted  infantry ;  and  this  character  they  preserved 
for  a  long  period,  sometimes  serving  as  horsemen,  and 
sometimes  as  foot  soldiers. 

The  deep  formation  of  the  German  squadrons  was 
attended  with  little  inconvenience  in  the  sixteenth 
century,  on  account  of  the  feebleness  of  artillery ;  and 
these  masses  of  cavalry  did,  in  fact,  contribute  to  the 
success  of  several  battles.  Defeated  by  these  squad- 
rons on  the  days  of  Pavia  (1525)  and  Saint-Quentin 
(1577),  the  French  gendarmery  were  compelled  to 
abandon  its  single-line  formation,  although  the  deep 
order  wounded  to  the  quick  the  self-love  and  sus- 
ceptibility of  the  cavalier.  From  that  time  a  remark- 
able change  is  observable  in  the  organization  of  the 
cavalry.     All  the  European  states,  France  included,* 

*  In  France  this  adoption  toot  place  as  early  as  1556 ;  but  this 
power  returned  occasionally  to  the  single-line  formation,  especially  at  the 
battle  of  Saint-Denis,  in  1567. 


112     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

adopted  tlie  German  formation  of  eiglit  ranks  deep ; 
tlie  cavaliy  immediately  lost  a  part  of  tlie  mobility  it 
had  possessed  in  tlie  times  of  chivalry,  when  the  knights 
charged  at  the  fastest  gait,  and  now  manoeuvred  at  a 
walk  or  trot,  and  made  more  use  of  fire-arms  than 
of  other  weapons.* 

The  first  deep  squadrons  were  very  strong  in  num- 
ber. They  rose  to  1,500  and  even  2,000  men-at-arms, 
all  equal,  all  cavaliers  without  a  retinue.  Reflection 
soon  showed  how  little  effect  was  produced  by  these 
heavy,  almost  immovable  masses.  This,  together  with 
the  ravages  produced  in  these  elevated  living  rectan- 
gles by  the  projectiles  of  improved  artillery,  led  to 
the  reduction  of  the  depth  to  six  ranks.  Henry  IV. 
further  reduced  it  to  ^ve  ranks,  and  formed  no  squad- 
rons of  more  than  600  horses. 

Louis  XIII.,  in  1635,  organized  the  companies  of 
light  cavalry  into  regiments,  each  commanded  by  a 
colonel.  The  compagnies  (P ordonnance  continued  to 
form  the  body  of  the  gendarmery. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  made  several  improvements 
in  the  cavalry,  dividing  it  into  small  squadrons,  form- 
ing it  in  four  or  three  ranks,  ordering  it  to  fire  only 
when  very  near,  and  to  charge  with  the  sabre.  This 
new  system  of  tactics  struck  the  Imperials  with 
astonishment,  who  with  difficulty  accustomed  them- 
selves to  it;  and  yet  the  Swedish  cavaliers  still 
charged  only  at  a  trot.  The  king  of  Sweden,  to  resist 
the  heavy  cavalry  of  the  Austrians,  placed  companies 

*  Nevertheless,  according  to  La  ISToue,  if  the  reitres  charged  at  a  trot, 
the  French  cavalrj  of  that  period  sometimes  "  galloped." 


HISTOEY   OF   CAVALKY. 


113 


COMPANY  OP  FRENCH  CAVALRY  IN 
OEDEB  OF  BATTLE,  (1750). 


of  musketeers  between  Ms  squadrons  of  horse ;  but 
this  mixture  of  the  two  arms  has  since  been  aban- 
doned as  incompatible  with  the  diversity  in  the  nature 
and  tactics  of  these  two  arms. 

The  cavalry  retained  for  a  long  time  its  depth  of 
three  ranks,  which  it  still  pos- 
sessed at  the  close  of  the  reign 
of  Louis  XIV.,  and  during  a 
part  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV. 
The  annexed  cut  shows  the  or- 
der of  battle  of  a  company  of 
French  cavalry  about  1750. 

In  the  time  of  Louis  XV., 
the  armament  of  the  cavalry 
was  very  different  from  that  of 
the  fourteenth  century.  Down  to  Henry  IV.,  the 
gensdarmes  were  still  armed  cap-a-pie,  and  their 
horses  were  barbed ;  whilst  the  light-horsemen  wore 
either  simple  cuirasses  or  coats  of  mail.  From  the 
reign  of  this  monarch,  the  armor  was  gradually 
simplified,  and  the  defensive  pieces  with  which  the 
cavaliers  were  covered,  one  by  one,  shared  the  faf e  of 
the  deep  squadrons.  Under  Louis  XIII.  the  lance 
was  no  longer  used ;  under  Louis  XIV.  only  the  cui- 
rass and  the  helmet  were  retained ;  under  Louis  XV. 
the  buff-leather  vest  took  the  place  of  the  cuirass,  and 
the  sabre-proof  cap  supplanted  the  helmet ;  helmet 
and  cuirass  reappeared  only  during  the  Consulate, 
and  were  worn  very  nearly  as  at  the  present  day. 

Marshal  Saxe  paid  great  attention  to  the  improve- 
ment of  cavalry,  insisting  especially  that  they  should 


114     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

not  charge  as  foragers,  as  was  in  his  time  tlie  practice 
of  the  French  cavalry ;  but  he  had  not  sufficient 
authority  to  produce  any  important  amelioration,  and 
the  reform  came  finally  from  Prussia. 

Before  Frederic  II.,  the  Prussian  cavalry  was  neg- 
lected, except  for  parade.  They  charged  only  at  a  trot, 
firing  with  the  pistol  or  musketoon.  This  monarch, 
himself  a  good  horseman,  proscribed  this  routine 
method  of  fighting,  and  gave  orders  that,  without 
paying  any  attention  to  the  firing  of  the  Austrian 
squadrons,  his  cavalry  should  rush  forward  at  a  gallop 
and  fearlessly  attack  them,  sword  in  hand.  The  su- 
periority which  this  mode  of  action  gave  him  on  most 
occasions,  confirmed  what  his  genius  had  foreseen,  and 
which  others  stubbornly  refused  to  appreciate ;  namely, 
that  the  real  qualities  of  cavalry  lie  in  the  charge^  and 
not  in  firing, 

Frederic  always  retained  in  his  army  some  squad- 
rons formed  in  three  ranks ;  nevertheless,  by  the  ad- 
vice of  Seydlitz,  he  adopted  the  formation  in  two 
ranks  for  the  greater  part  of  his  regiments.  Seydlitz 
deserves  to  be  considered  as  the  first  general  of  caval- 
ry of  modern  times  ;  he  brought  equitation  again  into 
repute,  and  perfected  fencing  upon  horseback ;  then, 
starting  from  this  basis,  he  imparted  to  evolutions  the 
regularity,  ensemble,  rapidity,  and  certainty  which 
permitted  them  to  be  executed  in  the  face  of  the  ene- 
my with  the  same  precision  as  on  the  drill-ground ; 
moreover,  in  spite  of  the  opinion  of  Frederic  the 
Great,  he  placed  the  guide  upon  the  flanks  instead  of 
the  centre,  an  arrangement  ever  since  preserved. 


HISTORY   OF    CAVALRY.  115 

The  adoption  of  the  formation  in  two  ranks  goes 
back  to  the  year  1766,  and  took  place  simultaneously, 
after  several  attempts,  in  France,  Hanover,  and  Prus- 
sia. It  was  brought  about  by  the  fact  that,  with 
the  rapid  gait  recently  adopted,  the  second  rank 
could  not  keep  a  sufficient  distance,  unless  the  third 
rank  remained  in  the  rear,  or  even  halted;  in  which 
case  it  became  useless.  The  result  of  trials  was  that 
in  two  ranks  the  movements  of  cavalry  were  both 
more  rapid  and  more  precise. 

The  formation  in  two  ranks  did  not  become 
general  in  Europe  until  1790.  The  Austrians*  and 
the  Russians  were  the  last  to  adopt  it.  Since  that 
time,  cavalry  has  advanced  in  the  science  of  manoeu- 
vres and  the  tactics  of  battle,  and  its  progress  has 
rendered  it  formidable.  The  campaigns  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  of  the  Empire  have  definitively  established 
its  formation  in  two  ranks. 

There  is,  besides,  an  essential  difference  between 
the  cavalry  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  that  which 
existed  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  the 
uniform  of  the  horsemen  at  the  present  day  is  loose, 
and  the  burden  canied  by  the  horse  is  equally  dis- 
tributed before  and  behind. 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  the  details  of  the 
present  formation  and  tactics  of  cavalry. 

*  It  even  appears  that  the  official  adoption  in  Austna  only  took  place 
in  1806,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Archduke  Charles. 


CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

CAVALRY  FOEMATION  AND  TACTICS. 

1.  Use  of  Cavalry. — In  mounting  on  horseback, 
tlie  soldier  sacrifices  several  advantages  to  gain  speed : 
thus  lie  can  no  longer  make  an  efficacious  use  of 
his  fire-arms,  and  all  are  an  obstacle  to  him.  It 
is  in  rapidity,  then,  that  his  strength  chiefly  consists  : 
we  do  not  say  wholly  consists,  for  boldness  is  a  qual- 
ity equally  indispensable  to  him. 

The  ordinary  use  of  cavahy  is  to  complete  a  suc- 
cess prepared  or  obtained  by  infantry,  assisted  by  ar- 
tillery ;  it  is,  consequently,  an  accessoi^y  arm.  To  ac- 
complish this  end,  it  must  rout  the  already  broken 
masses  of  the  enemy,  and  then  pursue  them.  To  pro- 
duce a  rout,  cavalry  must  take  the  initiative,  and  at- 
tack at  the  propitious  moment.*  Indeed,  the  offensive 
is  its  only  practicable  mode  of  combat;  for,  if  it 
awaits  the  enemy,  it  will  be  infallibly  overthrown 
by  the  velocity  of  its  adversary,  if  cavaliy,f  and  by 

*  At  Marengo,  the  prodigious  effects  of  the  vigorous  and  timely  charge 
of  General  Kellermann  with  his  400  horse  would  have  been  lost  if  he  had 
charged  but  three  minutes  later. 

t  At  Guada-Hortuna  (Spain),  July  25,  1823,  1,200  Spanish  horse, 


CAVALKY   FOEMATIOIS-   AND   TACTICS.  117 

amount  of  its  fire,  if  infantry.  For  this  reason 
Frederic*  and  Napoleon  wished  their  cavalry  to  at- 
tack continually ;  but  in  attacking,  the  great  matter 
is  to  seize  the  opportune  moment,  whence  the  designa- 
tion applied  to  cavalry  of  arme  du  moment. 

From  the  twofold  use  of  cavalry,  routing  and  pur- 
suing, results  the  division  of  this  arm  into  at  least  two 
kinds  :  the  one,  adapted  for  the  charge,  composed  of 
men  and  horses  of  great  stature,  provided  with  defen- 
sive armor — ^this  is  the  heavy  cavalry ;  the  other,  for 
the  pursuit,  composed  of  smaller  men  and  horses, 
wearing  no  armor — this  is  the  ligTit  cavalry.  Between 
these  extremes  there  is  an  intermediate  species — 
mixed  cavalry — employing  men  and  horses  of  a  medium 
height  which  takes  the  place,  in  case  of  need,  either 
of  the  heavy  or  of  the  light  cavalry ;  and  when  it  ac- 
companies these  in  war,  serves  to  save  the  former  from 
unnecessary  fatigue,  and  supports  the  latter  by  giving 
it  greater  solidity. 

The  heavy  cavalry  embraces  the  carahiniers  and 
the  cuirassiers.  Its  business  is  to  appear  upon  the 
day  of  hattle  and  mahe  decisive  charges^  as  was  done 
at  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  by  a  corps  of  4,000  French 
cuirassiers.  It  may,  in  case  of  need,  be  employed  to 
sustain  light  cavalry ;  but  this  must  be  done  in  mode- 
ration.    Heavy  cavalry  should  be  saved  from  unne- 

having  awaited  a  charge,  were  overthrown  by  450  French  horse,  com- 
manded by  General  Bonnemains. 

*  This  monarch  said,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years'  "War :  "  C'est 
le  diable  que  mes  officiers  n'agissent  que  defensivement,  mais  j'y  mettrai 
bon  ordre,  u  quoi  il  a  bien  r6ussi."  ("Warnery,  Commentaires  sur  Ttcrpin 
et  MontecuculU.) 


118     IIISTOEY  AISTD  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

cessary  fatigue,  even  on  a  marcli ;  but  on  tlie  field  of 
battle,  it  will  be  charged  with  the  most  perilous 
duties. 

The  dragoons,  theoretically  speaking,  now  compose 
all  the  mixed  cavalry;  for  they  only  wear  a  sin- 
gle piece  of  defensive  armor,  the  helmet.  For  a 
long  time  the  dragoons  were  intended  to  fight  both 
on  foot  and  on  horseback.  A  consequence  of  this 
ambiguity  of  character  was  a  total  loss  of  confidence 
in  themselves,  which  made  them  indiiferent  troops.* 
At  the  present  day  they  are  exclusively  horsemen. 
Being  better  mounted  than  the  light  cavalry,  they 
support  the  chasseurs  and  hussars  against  the  numer- 
ous cavalry  of  the  enemy,  fight  the  dragoons  with 
equal  arms,  and  can  even  measure  themselves,  with 
some  chance  of  success,  against  cuirassiers,  whom  they 
surpass  in  lightness.  Since  dragoons  have  become 
altogether  horsemen,  all  the  cavalry  seems  to  have 
abandoned  forever  the  idea  of  dismounting  and  fight- 
ing on  foot.  This  rule  should  not,  however,  be  exclu- 
sively followed ;  for  there  are  circumstances  in  which 
a  real  advantage  may  be  gained  by  some  platoons  of 
cavalry  temporarily  dismounting ;  as,  for  example,  in 
the  attack  or  defence  of  a  bridge,  a  wood,  or  a  de- 
file. "I  have  seen  one  occasion,"  says  Warnery, 
"  where  a  regiment  of  hussars  were  surprised  and  beaten 
in  their  camp,  because  they  had  been  refused  30  foot 

*  "When  engaged  as  foot  soldiers,  it  was  difficult  for  them  to  regain 
their  horses  in  case  of  defeat ;  as  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  14 
squadrons  of  French  dragoons  sent  to  retake  the  village  of  Franquenies 
at  the  commencement  of  the  battle  of  Eamillies  (May  23,  1706). 


I 


CAVALRY    F0RMATI0:N^    AIS^D   TACTICS.  119 

soldiers  to  defend  a  deiile."  In  a  reconnoissance 
amono"  the  mountains  around  Hostalrich,  in  1808, 
Gouvion  Saint-Cyr,  having  fallen  into  an  ambuscade 
of  guerillas,  would  have  been  destroyed,  had  not  his 
dragoons  dismounted,  and  rapidly  scaling  the  heights, 
in  spite  of  their  heavy  boots,  put  the  Spaniards  to 
flight. 

The  light  cavalry  embraces  the  chasseurs,  the  has- 
sarSj  and  the  lancers.  The  chasseurs  and  the  hussars 
have,  however,  the  same  kind  of  horses,  the  same 
weapons,  the  same  n^thods  of  combat ;  they  are, 
therefore,  but  varieties  of  the  same  arm.  They  are 
employed  to  give  security  to  the  army,  by  forming 
advance-guards,  flanking  marches,  protecting  evolu- 
tions, masking  reconnoissances,  and  covering  retreats. 
These  various  duties,  at  all  times  necessary,  are  those 
for  which  their  light  and  agile  horses  especially  fit 
them.  The  lancers,  besides  rendering  similar  services, 
are  especially  useful  against  confused  masses,  and  in 
pursuits.  At  the  present  day  there  is  no  longer  any 
irregular  cavalry  either  in  France  or  in  other  nations. 
Austria  has  consolidated  her  Hungarians  and  Croats, 
who  now  fight  in  regular  formations  and  in  line :  even 
Kussia  has  begun  to  systematize  the  Cossacks.* 

*  We  may  here  quote  a  singular  remark  of  Count  Heraclius  de  Polig- 
nac,  who  had  been  a  colonel  in  the  Russian  service.  This  officer  has 
said:  "The  Cossacks  have  great  military  knowledge,  ride  excellent 
horses,  and  understand  the  art  of  defending  themselves ;  bnt  they  have 
not  that  elan,  that  ardor  of  attack,  which  is  almost  always  crowned  with 
success.  The  Cossacks  charge  boldly  only  upon  fugitives,  or  when  they 
are  sure  of  being  at  least  ten  to  one."  (See  the  preface  to  his  translation 
of  General  Davidoff's  Essay  on  Partisan  War/are,  1841.) 


120     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

2.  Armament — ^Tlie  use  to  whicli  cavalry  is  ap- 
plied  necessitates  special  kinds  of  dress  and  arma- 
ment. The  jacket,  wide  trowsers,  and  tlie  long  sabre 
are  proper  for  all  kinds  of  cavalry.  The  kelmet  is  in- 
dispensable to  tlie  heavy  cavalry  and  dragoons ;  and 
the  cuirass  (of  the  model  of  1826,  which  is  proof 
against  musket  balls  at  the  distance  of  40  yards)  is 
also  necessary  to  the  heavy  cavalry.  The  lance  is  an 
excellent  arm,  and  both  the  light  and  the  mixed  cav- 
alry of  several  foreign  nations  are  now  wholly  armed 
with  it ;  its  use  is  indeed  spreading,  and  may  occasion 
modifications  in  the  armament  of  infantry.  Fire-arms 
are  useful  to  cavalry  only  when  serving  on  detach- 
ments and  as  skirmishers. 

3.  Numerical  Data. — The  numerical  relation  of 
the  cavalry  to  the  infantry  has  been  very  variable. 
It  depends  upon  the  character  of  a  people,  and  the 
facilities  for  the  supply  of  horses  which  the  country 
affords.  As  a  general  rule,  however,  we  may  say  that 
when  the  army  is  to  operate  in  a  level  country,  the 
number  of  its  cavalry  should  be  one  fifth  tl^at  of  its 
infantry;  but  only  one  tenth  when  in  mountainous 
regions.  The  weight  carried  by  cavalry  horses  in 
France  is  as  follows : 

Chasseurs 
Cuirassiers.  and  Hussars. 

Horseman,  about, 176  pounds.  143  pounds. 

Horseman's  arms, 32      "  18      " 

Horseman's  equipment, 24      "  24       " 

Horse  equipment, 51       «     ^  49       " 

Spare  shoes, 4      «  4      « 

Utensils,  2  days'  provisions,  2  rations  oats,      22      "  22       " 

Total, 309      "  251       " 


CAVALRY   FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  121 

The  horse  of  a  carabinier  carries  about  ^j\  lbs. 
more  than  that  of  a  cuirassier,  and  the  horse  of  a  dra- 
goon 22  lbs.  more  than  that  of  a  chasseur  or  a  hussar. 
All  these  numbers  will  be  increased  some  6  or  8  lbs. 
in  wet  weather,  on  account  of  the  increase  in  weight 
of  the  horseman's  cloak ;  and  the  same  increase  is  to 
be  allowed  when  the  cavalry  is  obliged  to  carry  hay 
or  straw  in  addition  to  the  oats  included  in  the  pre- 
ceding table. 

A  horse  travels,  in  a  minute : 

At  a  walk,  about 110  to  120  yards 

At  a  trot,       " 220  "  240      " 

Atagallop,    "    330  "  380      " 

If  we  take  the  first  of  these  numbers  for  each  gait, 
we  see  that  the  trot  is  about  twice,  and  the  gallop 
about  three  times  as  fast  as  a  walk. 

When  the  horses  are  in  a  body,  they  have  less 
freedom  of  movement,  and  accidents  of  the  ground 
impede  them  more ;  consequently,  a  column  of  cavalry 
will  not  march  as  rapidly  as  a  single  horse.  With 
the  weight  above  given,  a  column  can  make  as  much 
as  3 1  miles  per  hour  at  a  walk,  and  7i  miles  per  hour 
at  a  long  trot. 

4.  Tactical  Unit. — ^The  tactical  unit  of  cavalry 
is  the  squadron,  which,  being'  composed  of  a  much 
smaller  force  than  the  battalion,  seldom  fights  sepa- 
rately, as  the  latter  does.  The  French  squadron  is 
usually  composed  of  4  platoons,  forming  together  48 
files.     The  following  is  its  figure  in  order  of  battle ; 


122     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

SQUADRON  OF  CAVALKY  IN  OEDEE  OF  BATTLE. 
2(1  L.  Cd  8.  L.         C.  C.       1st  S.  L.  1st  L. 

a        a    fl    a         a 

mtmmmmmmmmmmmm 
i        i      5       i        ^ 

2dC. 

The  shaded  spaces  represent  the  non-commissioned 
officers.  "We  see  by  this  figure  that  the  captain  com- 
manding the  squadron  is  in  the  centre,  the  crupper  of 
his  horse  one  yard  in  front  of  the  heads  of  the  horses 
of  the  first  rank.  The  second  captain  is  three  yards 
in  the  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  squadron;  he  is 
charged  with  the  alignment  of  the  second  rank,  and 
of  the  file-closers.  The  1st  lieutenant' commands  the 
1st  platoon ;  the  2d  lieutenant  the  4th  platoon ;  the 
1st  sub-lieutenant,  the  2d  platoon;  the  2d  sub-lieu- 
tenant, the  3d  platoon.  Each  of  these  officers  is  placed 
in  front  of  the  centre  of  his  platoon,  the  crupper  of  his 
horse  at  a  distance  of  one  yard  in  front  of  the  heads 
of  the  horses  of  the  first  rank. 

Each  horse  occupies  1  metre  (39  inches)  in  breadth, 
and  3  metres  (nearly  10  feet)  in  depth.  The  front  of 
the  squadron,  therefore,  occupies  a  space  of  52  yards, 
and  that  of  a  platoon  13  yards.  The  two  ranks  are 
at  a  distance  of  one  yard,  measured  from  the  heads 
of  the  horses  of  the  second  rank  to  the  cruppers  of  the 
horses  of  the  first. 

The  oldest  troops  in  each  platoon  are  placed  in  the 
front  rank,  and  from  right  to  left  in  each  rank. 


I 


CAVALRY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  123 

The  minimum  effective  force  of  a  squadron  is  48 
files ;  tlie  maximum  is  64  files — a  number  wliicli  ad- 
mits of  easy  subdivision.  Within  the  limits  of  48  and 
64  files,  the  squadron  combines  all  the  conditions  re- 
quisite for  manoeuvring  and  fighting  with  order  and 
facility.  Whatever  may  be  its  effective  force,  the 
squadron  is  always  divided  into  four  platoons.  When 
several  squadrons  are  drawn  up  in  line,  the  intervals 
between  them  are  each  equal  to  one  fourth  of  the 
front  of  one  of  them. 

The  squadron  is  now  formed  in  two  ranks.  .Only 
the  front  rank  can  strike  the  enemy ;  nevertheless  the 
rear  rank  has  its  use,  and  should  be  preserved :  1st, 
because  it  supports  the  front  rank,  and  increases  its 
moral  force ;  2d,  because  it  fills  the  voids  occasioned  in 
the  front  rank ;  3d,  because  it  fights  as  well  as  the 
front  rank  in  case  of  a  melee — a  rare  case,  in  which  it 
is  wxll  to  have  as  large  a  number  of  horsemen  as 
possible  gathered  upon  the  same  point;  4th,  and 
finally,  because  it  compels  the  front  rank  to  march 
more  correctly.  It  is  only  in  exceptional  cases,  there- 
fore, that  cavalry  may  be  drawn  Tip  in  a  single  line, 
and  then  there  should  be  some  fall  files  on  the  flanks 
of  the  squadrons ;  it  may  be  done  as  a  ruse,  to  deceive 
the  enemy  as  to  its  real  force ;  but  even  then,  to  do  it 
safely,  there  should  be  no  danger  to  be  apprehended 
from  the  attack  of  vigorous  cavalry.  The  formation 
in  three  ranks  has  been  abandoned,  because  it  did  not 
allow  the  middle  rank  sufficient  freedom  and  quick- 
ness of  movement,  and  disorder  was  not  so  easily 
remedied. 


124    HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

5.  Manoeuvres.— As  tlie  length  occupied  by  the 
horse  is  three  times  his  breadth,  the  horseman  cannot 
make  apwot-tuTn  in  his  place  in  the  rank,  as  the  foot 
soldier  can,  for  he  is  wedged  in  the  rank ;  and  we 
shall  presently  see  why  it  should  be  so.  In  order  to 
bring  a  troop  of  cavalry  promptly  by  the  flank,  and 
with  a  depth  of  column  equal  to  the  front  in  line, 
it  was  necessary  to  devise  the  movement  called 
the  movement  hy  fours,  which  is  executed  either  to 
the  right  or  the  left,  and  gives  a  front  of  8  horsemen. 
In  this  movement,  the  object  of  which  is  to  gain 
ground  to  the  right  (or  left),  at  the  command  "  To  tlie 
right  (or  left)  hy  fours^''  each  group  of  4  men,  in  each 
rank,  wheels  by  itself  upon  a  fixed  pivot.    The  move- 


MOVEMENT  BY  EOUES. 


K 

\^ 

\ 

> 
> 
> 
> 

\  ■  > 
\  > 
\  > 

ment  being  completed,  the  four  horses  of  the  rear  rank 
in  each  group  of  four  files  are  found  at  the  right  of 
those  of  the  front  rank. 

Cavalry  also  breaks  by  fours  in  making  an  ad- 
vance diagonally.  These  oblique  marches,  and  the 
movements  by  fours,  were  much  in  vogue  in  the  last 
century,  and  Marshal  Saxe  set  a  high  value  upon 
them ;  but  they  are  no  longer  employed,  except  in  the 
elementary  instruction  of  the  platoon  and  the  squad- 
ron ;  in  actual  manoeuvres,  movements  by  platoons 
take  their  place.    The  platoons  are,  then,  frequently 


CAVALRY   FORMATION   AND   TACTICS.  125 

required  to  wteel ;  tlie  consequence  of  wliicli  is,  that 
tlie  horses  on  tlie  flanks,  always  going  at  a  quicker 
gait,  are  more  fatigued  tkan  in  the  movements  by- 
fours  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  movements  by 
fours  there  are,  in  a  squadron  of  48  files,  24  pivots 
and  24  flanks,  which  very  much  increases  the  liability 
to  disorder,  and  also  requires  better  trained  horsemen. 

Cavalry,  not  making  use  of  their  fire-arms,  cannot 
have  any  lateral  action,  like  that  of  infantry.  In  order 
to  defend  themselves,  they  must  be  able  to  post  them- 
selves facing  the  enemy,  and  at  a  sufficient  distance  to 
give  full  scope  to  the  horse  in  charging ;  and  this  is 
the  reason  why  changing  the  front  is  for  them  a  fre- 
quent and  indispensable  evolution.  These  changes 
of  front  are,  like  the  other  manoeuvres  of  cavalry, 
effected  by  means  of  the  movement  by  platoons ;  but 
as  the  obstacles  of  the  ground  or  an  unforeseen  attack 
may  often  paralyze  the  manoeuvre,  it  is  prudent  to 
cover  the  flanks  of  cavalry. 

The  ordinary  gait  in  manoeuvres  is  the  trot ;  but 
the  horsemen  should  also  be  able  to  execute  them  all 
at  a  gallop. 

• 

6.  Mode  of  Action. — ^The  horseman  incurs  less 
danger  in  war  than  the  foot  soldier.  He  therefore 
gains  but  little  training  in  the  field  except  in  the  way 
of  confidence  in  himself;  consequently,  he  must  be 
very  carefully  instructed  in  time  of  peace.  This  in- 
struction is  always  indispensable,  and  is  to  be  con- 
tinued whenever'  practicable  ;  for  the  great  object  of 
cavalry  is  to  act  with  ensemhle  and  precision.    Besides, 


126     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

the  horses  are  to  be  trained  to  the  sound  of  war ;  for, 
notwithstanding  the  assertion  of  poets  of  all  ages,  they 
are  easily  frightened  and  not  fond  of  combats  * 

The  mode  of  action  of  cavalry  fighting  in  a  body 
consists  in  actual  collision,  the  efi*ect  of  which  is  pre- 
pared by  a  charge.  The  combination  of  horse  and 
rider  does  not  form  a  perfectly  dense  body ;  but  we 
may  nevertheless  consider  the  intensity  of  the  col- 
lision of  a  line  of  cavalry  as  proportional  to  its  mass 
and  its  velocity.  Hence,  to  increase  its  force,  the  ve- 
locity must  be  accelerated  as  much  as  possible,  and 
its  mass  increased  by  forming  the  troop  into  a  united 
and  compact  whole,  by  the  adhesion  and  alignment 
of  the  horsemen. 

The  whole  secret  of  the  instruction  of  cavalry  will 
therefore  be  to  teach  them  to  gallop  in  close  order  and 
well  aligned^  even  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

7.  Charge. — The  decisive  action  of  cavalry,  the 
charge,  is  employed  either  at  the  commencement  or  at 
the  end  of  a  battle,  and  as  much  as  possible  on  the 
flanks  of  the  infantry,  chiefly  when  the  latter  has  be- 
come engaged.  At  the  favorable  moment,  and  at  300 
yards  from  the  opposing  line,  the  commandant  orders 
sabres  to  be  drawn,  and  puts  his  troop  in  motion  at  a 
trot,  to  bring  the  horses  by  degrees  to  their  work,  and 
to  enable  the  horsemen  to  adjust  their  alignment ;  at 
150  yards,  he  orders  the  ordinary  gallop,  and  at  60 
yards  the  full  charging  gallop.    The  horsemen  should 

'  *  This  is  the  observation  of  Mottin  de  la  Balme.    See  his  Tactique 
pour  la  cavalerie,  p.  180  to  184. 


CAVALRY  rOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  127 

remain  united  and  masters  of  their  movements,  not- 
withstanding their  rapid  motion.  Thus  the  progres- 
sive acceleration  of  gait  is  an  important  feature  in  the 
charge,  and  necessary  to  be  observed,  if  Ave  would  not 
quickly  ruin  the  cavalry ;  nevertheless,  in  case  of  sur- 
prise, when  an  enemy  unexpectedly  debouches  from 
an  ambuscade,  the  charge  may  be  begun  at  a  gallop, 
in  order  to  regain  a  part  of  the  advantage  lost  by  the 
omission  of  the  first  movement. 

In  order  to  make  the  soldier  charge  vigorously,  he 
must  be  convinced  that  his  officers  mean  to  persevere  in 
the  charge  to  the  last,  and  that,  if  it  fails  at  first,  they 
will  lead  him  again  and  again  to  the  combat,  until  it 
succeeds ;  otherwise  there  will  be  indecision  and  weak- 
ness of  action.  In  this  resj)ect,  the  French  cavalry  is 
preeminent ;  for,  according  to  reliable  testimony,  "  it 
is  the  best  in  the  world  for  combat,  and  always 
charges  a  fondP  ^'  To  this.  Marshal  Marmont,  in  his 
Memoires^^  adds :  "  Les  Allemands  nous  sont  supe- 
rieurs  pour  Tordre  et  I'esprit  de  conservation;  mais 
pour  I'emploi  ils  sont  loin  de  nous  :  la  cavalerie  fran- 
gaise,  h.  egalite  de  force,  a  toujours  battu  la  cavalerie 
etrangere." 

During  the  charge,  the  horseman  should  not  fire, 
for  firing  makes  the  horses  restive,  and  produces  but 
little  effect  upon  the  adversary.  As  for  his  arms  de 
main^  the  lance  may  serve  for  the  moment  of  ren- 
contre, and  the  sabre  will  be  useful  after  the  collision, 
during  the  very  short  period  of  the  melee.    The  van- 

*  Marmont,  Esprit  dea  institutions  militaires^  p.  48. 
t  Tome  i.,  p.  221. 


128     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS, 

quished  party,  however,  quickly  betake  tkemselves  to 
flight,  and  there  are  usually  very  few  men  killed  or 
wounded  in  a  charge. 

Velocity  of  movement  and  close  adhesion  of  the 
horsemen  stirrup  to  stirrup,  are  the  two  essential  ele- 
ments of  a  good  charge,  to  which  the  officers  should 
especially  direct  their  attention — ^the  more,  since  the 
men,  to  avoid  being  pressed  in  the  rank,  are  apt  to 
spread  themselves.  After  all  the  watchfulness  of  the 
officers,  and  their  own  example,  a  charge  not  unfre- 
quently  fails  from  a  very  slight  cause,  as  a  panic  may 
be  produced  in  a  body  of  troops  going  at  full  speed, 
by  the  most  trifling  circumstance :  for  example,  the 
noise  of  a  ball  striking  the  cuirass  of  a  horseman  and 
throwing  him  off,  may  suffice  to  produce  a  failure  in  a 
charge.  On  this  account,  cavalry  should  be  drawn 
up  in  two  lines,  at  from  300  to  400  yards  apart. 
As  far  as  possible,  the  flanks  of  the  second  line  should 
extend  beyond  those  of  the  first.  With  this  arrange- 
ment, if  the  first  line  fails  in  its  charge,  it  will  rally 
behind  the  second,  and  the  latter  will  charge  in  turn ; 
observing,  however,  that,  to  avoid  all  disorder  occa- 
sioned by  the  scattering  and  retreat  of  the  first  line, 
the  second  line  is  to  be  formed  in  columns  by  pla- 
toons, so  as  to  present  intervals  sufficiently  great  for 
the  escape  of  the  fugitives ;  which  produces  the  fol- 
lowing figure :  * 

*  This  figure  represents  the  charge  in  parallel  order.  The  charge  in 
oUique  order  is  executed  according  to  the  same  principles,  and  is  to  he 
preferred  when  the  line  of  the  enemy  is  extended,  in  order  to  compen- 
sate this  advantage  hy  the  refusal  of  one  wing. 


CAVALEY  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


129 


For  want  of  a  second  line  of  cavalry,  the  troop 
whicli  fails  in  a  charge,  will  rally  behind  a  line  of  in- 
fantry, which  will  be  suddenly  unmasked,  to  arrest 


FOEMATION  FOE  THE  CHARGE. 

J:: 


C^^  U^ 


^ 

^ 

^ 

^ 

^ 

la 

0 

Zl 

0 

0 

IZl 

a 

0 

0 

0 

IZI 

0 

a 

a 

0 

the  enemy  by  its  fire,  or  behind  an  obstacle ;  but  al- 
ways beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy,  for  the  neglect 
of  this  precaution  might  expose  it  to  certain  de- 
struction. 

If  the  charge  succeeds,  the  success  must  be  com- 
pleted by  a  pursuit.  In  this  pursuit,  the  victors 
constantly  endeavor  to  gain  one  of  the  flanks  of  the 
vanquished  party,  in  order  to  take  them  on  their  weak 
point ;  or  if  some  obstacle  prevents  this,  they  try  to 
get  between  the  columns  of  the  enemy,  and  to  fight 
them  in  detail :  but  care  must  be  taken  to  guard 
against  retaliative  operations,  coming  from  ambus- 
cades, the  troops  of  the  second  line,  and  the  reserves 
of  the  enemy. 

In  the  charge,  the  officers  retain  their  respective 
places  in  line,  except  the  commanding  officer,  who 
9 


130     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

goes  to  any  point  at  whicli  lie  judges  liis  presence  to 
be  most  necessary  to  insure  success. 

Against  artillery,  cavalry  charges  as  foragers.  By 
this  term  we  designate  a  dispersive  charge,  by  means 
of  which  the  scattered  horsemen  reach  their  point  of 
destination  more  quickly,  and  suffer  less  from  the  pro- 
jectiles of  the  artillery.  Whilst  the  platoons  which 
arrive  first  repel  and  keep  in  check  the  troops  which 
protect  the  artillery,  some  of  the  horsemen  throw 
themselves  upon  the  pieces,  carry  them  off,  or  spike 
them,  and  break  or  carry  away  the  implements,  es- 
pecially the  rammers. 

We  will  add  that,  against  the  Arabs,  the  charge  as 
foragers  should  always  be  used.*" 

8.  Formations. — Cavalry  employs  four  forma- 
tions— order  in  line^  order  in  column^  order  in  ecJidons^ 
order  in  square. 

Its  orders  of  attack  are — in  line,  in  column,  and  in 
echelons.  It  attacks  cavalry  in  line  :  it  attacks  infan- 
tryf  in  echelons  or  in  column :  in  echelons,  when  the  in- 
fantry is  deployed,  and  cannot  be  turned  ;  in  column, 
when  the  infantry  is  formed  in  column  or  in  square ;  % 
the  column  of  cavalry  is  in  that  case  a  column  by 
squadrons  aif  double  distance.     The  attack  in  echelons 

*  In  the  French  army  of  Algiers,  the  Bpahis  form  the  light  cavalry, 
and  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  the  cavalry  of  the  line. 

t  Cavalry  has  heaten  infantry  in  several  hattles,  particularly  at  Ceri- 
soles  (1544),  at  Rocroy  (1G43),  at  Fehrbellin  (1675). 

X  In  the  rain,  cavalry  has  the  advantage  of  infantry,  as  the  fire  of  the 
latter  is  impaired :  example,  the  battle  of  Dresden  (1818).  The  use  of 
percussion  arms  at  the  present  day  lessens  this  advantage. 


CAVALEY  FORMATION   AND    TACTICS.  131 

is  well  suited  to  cavalry  in  this,  that  it  allows  the 
charge  to  be  renewed  on  several  points,  and  facilitates 
the  outflanking  of  the  enemy.  Moreover,  the  mutual 
protection  of  the  echelons  is  the  more  efficacious,  be- 
cause cavalry  protects  the  ground  on  its  front,  within 
charging  distance,  better  than  the  ground  it  occupies ; 
and  the  successive  charges  of  the  echelons  succeed 
pretty  well  against  infantry  by  harassing  them,  and 
causing  them  to  throw  away  their  fire  precipitately. 
The  attack  in  columns  against  a  square  of  infantry  is 
directed  against  one  side  of  the  square,  if  a  small  one, 
or  against  two  angles  adjacent  to  the  same  side,  if  the 
square  is  of  considerable  size.  In  all  cases,  with  one 
or  two  columns,  four  or  five  horsemen  thrown  forward 
are  sufficient  to  make  a  breach  by  means  of  their  dead 
horses ;  and  having  once  gained  entrance  by  this 
breach  into  the  interior  of  the  square,  the  horsemen 
who  follow  sweep  down  the  thii'd  rank,  and,  aiming 
at  the  eyes  of  the  foot  soldiers,  compel  them  to  raise 
their  guns,  thus  rendering  their  fire  harmless. 

It  would  seem  that  cavalry  should  have  no  forma- 
tion for  defence,  since  we  have  seen  that  it  should 
never  allow  itself  to  be  attacked.  Nevertheless,  in  an 
exceptional  case,  it  may  be  drawn  up  for  defence,  and 
should  then  be  formed  in  squares.  Heavy  and  even 
mixed  cavalry,  thus  formed,  may,  in  case  of  need,  re- 
ceive the  attack  of  light  cavalry.  Thus,  in  1813,  at 
Juterbogk,  the  division  of  dragoons  of  General  De- 
france  formed  a  square  against  the  Cossacks.  The 
emperor  Napoleon  I.  without  doubt  approved  of  this 
method  of  combat,  for  he  seldom  had  a  regiment  of 


132     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

cavalry  manoeuvred  in  his  presence  without  ordering 
tlie  formation  in  square. 

The  marching  formation  of  cavalry  is  the  column 
by  platoons.  A  detachment  on  a  march  should  gen- 
erally keep  the  left  side  of  the  road,  because,  in  case  of 
attack,  each  horseman  then  presents  his  strong  side — 
the  right — to  the  enemy. 

The  checker-formation,  formerly  much  used  in  re- 
treat, has  been  abandoned  by  cavalry,  on  account  of 
the  extreme  difficulty,  if  not  impossibility,  in  a  retro- 
grade movement,  of  keeping  the  squadrons  of  the  sec- 
ond line  opposite  to  the  intervals  of  the  first. 

0.  Sciaircurs. — By  this  name  are  designated  the 
horsemen  scattered  in  front,  in  rear,  and  on  the  flanks 
of  a  troop,  to  cover  its  movements  or  its  position. 
They  are  the  skirmishers  of  the  cavalry. 

They  should  be  selected  from  the  troops  who  are 
armed  with  guns  or  carbines.  Their  principal  duties 
are  to  scour  the  country,  reconnoitre  the  enemy,  cover 
the  preparations  for  a  charge,  escort  convoys,  support 
the  infantry  skirmishers,  etc.  A  body  of  cavalry,  in 
retreat,  may  also  throw  out  a  screen  of  skirmishers, 
behind  which  the  broken  squadrons  may  rally.  Good 
results  will  be  obtained  by  combining  the  action  of 
these  edaireurs  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  infantry, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

The  French  regulations  with  regard  to  the  evolu- 
tions of  the  cavalry,  fixes  the  number  of  eclaireurs  at 
one  fourth  the  number  of  the  troop  from  which  they 
are  detailed. 


CHAPTER    FIFTH 


HISTOET   OF   AETIXUEEY. 


I 


The  history  of  artillery  presents  tliis  particular  in- 
terest :  that  it  is  connected  with  the  highest  efforts 
and  most  notable  progress  of  human  genius. 

The  motive  force  of  the  projectile-machines  of  anti- 
quity, of  which  the  halista,  the  onager^  and  the  catapulta 
are  Lest  known,  were  either  weights,  or  springs  made  of 
cords  of  hide  or  sinew,  raised  or  stretched  by  a  wind- 
lass or  levers,  and  suddenly  abandoned  to  the  effect 
of  gravity  or  elasticity. 


CATAPULT. 


These  machines,   constructed    almost   wholly   of 
wood,  carried  upwards  of  1,000  yards,  and  the  strong- 


134     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

est  threw  projectiles  weighing  from  600  to  YOO  pounds. 
Besides  stones,  tliey  threw  arrows,  beams,  red-hot 
balls,  and  fire-pots. 

As  they  were  transported  with  armies,  they  corre- 
sponded to  our  field  pieces.  The  Greeks,  excepting 
Alexander  the  Great  and  his  successors,  made  but  lit- 
tle use  of  them.  The  Komans,  in  the  time  of  the  Ee- 
public,  employed  them  only  for  the  defence  of  their 
camps ;  under  the  Empire,  they  ventured  to  take  them 
with  their  armies.  These  machines  multiplied  as  the 
courage  and  military  skill  of  the  Komans  declined, 
and  in  the  legions  of  the  Lower  Empire  there  were 
even  as  many  as  11  machines  to  1,000  men.  Thus, 
also,  Frederic  II.  and  Napoleon  I.,  at  the  close  of  their 
reigns,  increased  the  number  of  their  pieces  of  artillery 
in  the  armies  which  were  composed  of  young  soldiers. 
This  coincidence  proves,  that,  from  the  introduction  of 
projectile  machines,  the  number  of  them^  required  has 
always  been  the  greater  the  poorer  the  troops. 

The  ancient  machines  were  put  liors  du  comhat  by 
setting  them  on  fire,  or  else  by  cutting  the  cords  and 
springs — a  manoeuvre  corresponding  to  our  spiking 
of  guns. 

The  first  kings  of  France  took  into  their  service 
the  projectile  machines  captured  from  the  enemies' 
legions,  but  their  people  were  ignorant  of  the  art  of 
using  them,  and  considered  their  employment  as  dis- 
honorable, for  which  double  reason  balistics  were  of 
little  service  to  them,  and  began  to  decline  under  their 
successors.  This  decline  stopped  under  the  reign  of 
Charlemagne;  but  after  this  great  emperor,  it  con- 


HISTOEY   OF   ARTILLERY.  135 

tinued,  and  the  balistic  art  soon  perislied,  with  all  the 
arts,  in  the  midst  of  the  feudal  system.  During  the 
Crusades,  both  parties  made  use  of  projectile  machines 
of  the  ancient  kind.  Philip  Augustus  brought  them 
back  to  France  (1191).  They  were  perfected  in  the 
thirteenth  century,  and  the  onager  and  catapult  re- 
appeared, under  the  names  of  ^erriere  and  man- 
gonneau. 

Several  of  these  machines  were  of  enormous  di- 
mensions, and  required  a  great  quantity  of  wood  in 
their  construction ;  moreover,  if  they  threw  very  large 
masses  they  could  not  give  them  great  velocity  ;  but 
notwithstanding  these  inconveniences,  they  were  pre- 
served for  a  long  time  after  the  invention  and  use  of 
the  first  cannon,  with  which  they  competed  during 
nearly  two  centuries. 

Many  persons  still  attribute  the  invention  of  gun- 
powder to  that  celebrated  English  monk  Koger  Bacon, 
who  astonished  the  world  by  his  great  scientific  discov- 
eries in  the  thirteenth  century ;  nevertheless,  powder — 
that  is,  the  mixture  of  saltpetre,  sulphur,  and  charcoal — 
was  known,  several  centuries  before  our  era,  to  the 
Chinese,  who  employed  it  in  the  manufacture  of  various 
fire-works,  which  they  put  into  tubes,  and  thus  formed 
what  we  should  now  call  fuses.  The  knowledge  of 
powder  was  gradually  transmitted  to  the  people  of 
Asia,  through  India  and  Persia,  and  at  last  to  the 
Arabs,  who  communicated  it  to  the  Greeks  of  the 
Lower  Empii^e ;  and  a  recent  opinion  is,  tliat  the  fa- 
mous Greek-fire  of  the  last-mentioned  people,  was 
nothing  more  than  an  incendiary  composition  made  of 


136     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS   OF  TIIE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

gunpowder.  Tlie  invasions  of  the  Arabs,  and  espe- 
cially tlie  Crusades,  introduced  a  knowledge  of  gun- 
powder to  the  people  of  western  Europe ;  and  tlie 
great  number  of  European  claimants  to  the  invention 
of  this  agent  of  war  (the  English  Roger  Bacon^  the 
German  ATbertus  Magnus^  Bertliold  Schwartz^  Con- 
stantin  Anklitzen^  etc.),  evidently  indicates  that  the 
epoch  was  ripe  for  the  invention :  that  is,  this  inven- 
tion was  but  the  reproduction  of  a  thing  already  in 
existence,  but  of  which  only  confused  and  vague  ideas 
were  entertained,  diffused  throughout  Europe  by  the 
crusaders  returning  to  their  homes. 

But  if  Europe  can  no  longer  lay  claim  to  the  in- 
vention of  gunpowder,  she  is  still  justly  entitled  to 
that  of  fire-arms,  with  which  neither  the  Chinese,  nor 
the  Indians,  nor  the  Persians,  nor  the  Arabs  were  ac- 
quainted before  ourselves ;  these  ancient  people  being 
indeed  acquainted  with  powder,  but  ignorant  of  the 
fact  that  it  could  be  used  to  project  heavy  masses  to 
a  distance.  This  point  seems  now  to  be  established 
in  favor  of  our  science. 

The  obscurity  of  the  chronicles  of  the  middle  ages, 
and  the  confusion  of  names,  make  it  difficult  to  ^x 
the  precise  epoch  when  the  projectile  property  of 
powder  was  discovered,  and  when  the  first  cannon 
were  introduced.  It  appears,  however,  that  their  em- 
ployment in  war  does  not  go  back  beyond  the  four- 
teenth century.  In  fact,  the  earliest  mention  of  can- 
non appears  to  be  that  of  instruments  in  the  form  of 
funnels,  or  vases,  used  by  the  Genoese  in  1319. 

The  first  field  artillery  differed  little  from  the  port- 


HISTORY   OF  ARTILLERY. 


ISY 


BOMBAKD. 


k 


able  fire-arms,  and  was  frequently  mounted  upon  sta- 
tionary frames,  for  wliicli  wheels  were  afterward  sub- 
stituted.    . 

The  cannon  called  vases  were,  from  their  form, 
capable  of  throwing  large  stones ; 
they  soon  received  the  name  of 
homlards.  The  annexed  figure 
shows  the  nature  of  their  con- 
struction. 

Bombards  soon  increased 
their  proportions,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  fourteenth  century  must 
have  obtained  remarkable  length 
and  weight ;  for  we  find  mention 
of  one  50  feet  long,  and  of  another  weighing  2,000 
pounds. 

The  ancient  machines  could  not  contend  against 
bombards ;  the  smallest  ball  caused  their  fragile  frames 
to  fly  to  pieces.  They  were  supplanted  by  pieces 
of  ordnance,  which,  from  the  year  1376,  were  em- 
ployed to  open  breaches,  and  thenceforth  were  exclu- 
sively used  (with  some  rare  exceptions)  in  sieges  and 
on  fields  of  battle. 

The  term  artillery  existed  before  the  invention  of 
fire-arms.  It  designated  all  the  arms  fabricated  by  the 
artilUer  (original  form  of  the  word  artUleur)^  namely, 
balistic  engines,  bows,  arrows,  lances,  darts,  shields, 


1 


*  The  old  French  verb  artiller  signifies  to  fasMon  ly  art^  and  had 
nearly  its  equivalent  in  the  old  English  verb  to  artilize,  while  artilUer 
was  nearly  equivalent  to  artisan;  but  its  modern  form,  artilleur^  is  re- 
stricted to  the  signification  of  artillerist. — Tr, 


138     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

etc.  Masters  of  artillery  commanded  the  artilUers, 
These  masters  of  artillery  were  cliarged  with  the  fa- 
brication as  well  as  the  distribution  to  the  army,  of 
A  the  new  and  the  old  artillery ;  they  consequently  also 
\  made  fire-arms,  pieces  of  ordnance,  powder,  balls,  bul- 
lets, and  had  under  their  orders  soldiers  called  cannon" 
iers^  instituted  about  1411,  for  manoeuvring  and  servin^, 
cannon. 

The  first  masters  of  artillery  were  subordinate  to  the 
grand  master  of  the  crossbowmen,  to  whom  they  ren- 
dered direct  account  of  the  matters  intrusted  to  their 
charge.  But  under  Charles  VII.  the  master-general 
of  the  artillery,  who  was  chief  of  this  branch  of  ser- 
vice, succeeded  in  making  his  office  independent ;  and 
from  that  time  its  prerogatives  went  on  increasing 
daily. 

The  first  field  artillery,  considered,  so  to  speak,  as 
an  obstacle^  was  scattered  about  the  army,  and  inter- 
spersed among  the  wagons;  it  was  soon  separated 
from  the  baggage  and  placed  on  the  front  or  flanks. 
Cannon,  in  those  days,  produced  an  especial  effect 
upon  the  spirit  of  the  troops  by  the  noise  of  their  dis- 
j^  charges ;  they  increased  the  importance  of  defensive 
positions,  and  were  employed  in  secondary  operations ; 
but,  being  difficult  to  manoeuvre  and  slow  to  load,  they 
could  be  used  but  imperfectly  in  an  open  country. 

Louis  XL,  about  1475,  distributed  among  three 
the  duties  of  master-general  of  artillery ;  and  profiting 
by  the  experience  of  his  father,  whose  artillery  had 
rendered  him  important  aid  in  the  reconquest  of  his 
kingdom  from  the  English,  he  maintained   a  large 


HISTORY   OF   ARTILLERY.  139 

amount  of  artillery.  During  liis  reign,  twelve  pieces  of 
tlie  caliber  45  were  cast,  wMcli  were  celebrated  under 
tlie  name  of  tlie  tivelve  peers  of  France.^'  One  of  these 
pieces  was  taken  at  the  battle  of  Montlheri  (1465). 

Charles  VIII.,  in  1493,  reestablished  a  single  mas- 
ter-general of  the  artillery.  His  expedition  into  Italy 
exhibits  the  first  important  employment  of  artillery  in 
a  campaign.  All  the  powers,  following  the  French  ex- 
ample, set  about  improving  their  artillery.  The  definite 
foundation  of  the  French  artillery  dates  from  this  epoch. 
Charles  VIII.  left  France  with  about  100  cannon  of 
mean  caliber ;  at  Sarzanne  his  park  of  artillery  was 
augmented  by  about  40  large  pieces.  It  was  already 
understood  how  to  place  these  pieces  so  as  to  take  the 
enemy's  troops  obliquely ;  nevertheless,  in  this  expe- 
dition, artillery  played  a  more  important  part  against 
fortresses  than  in  the  open  country ;  it  was  fired  with 
precision. 

Under  Louis  XII.,  artillery  of  lighter  construction 
was  introduced,  in  order  to  be  a  less  hinderance  to 
the  march  of  an  army.  The  small  calibers  became 
sufficiently  portable  to  take  advantageous  positions 
during  the  combat,  to  compel  the  enemy  to  keep  at 
a  distance,  and  thus  to  complicate  his  movements. 
This  monarch  established  two  masters-general  of  artil- 
lery, one  in  France  and  one  in  Italy. 

At  this  epoch  the  infantry  was  often  made  to 
lie  down  on  the  ground,  to  be  less  exposed  to  the 
balls.     The  Swiss,  in  one  battle,  endeavored  to  seize 

*  This  name  recalls  the  twelve  apostles,  which  Charles  V.  had  cast  at 
Malaga  for  his  expedition  against  Tunis. 


140     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

upon  tlie  artillery  of  their  adversaries,  by  advancing 
as  sMrmisliers  against  the  batteries.  Under  Francis 
I.  the  French  artillery  was  increased  and' systematized; 
and  in  its  outfit  the  use  of  stout  horses  was  made  im- 
perative. At  Marignan  (1515),  our  cannon  gave  us 
the  victory.  At  Pavia  (1525),  Francis  I.,  after  the 
success  of  his  right,  thinking  to  surprise  the  army  of 
the  enemy,  advanced  at  the  head  of  his  gensdarmery, 
thus  masMng  the  fire  of  his  pieces.  This  false  manoeu- 
vre caused  his  defeat.  At  Cerisole  (1544),  French  pieces, 
by  having  better  horses,  amved  at  their  place  on  the 
field  of  battle  as  soon  as  the  cavalry.  Finally,  let  us 
observe  that  in  the  sixteenth  century,  it  was  artillery 
that  arrested  the  progress  of  the  Turks,  and  thus  pro- 
tected European  civilization.  From  a  military  point 
of  ^'iew,  we  may  say  that  the  increase  of  fire-arms 
complicated  the  art  of  war  only  for  mediocre  minds, 
while  making  it  more  simple  for  great  captains. 

In  1543,  Francis  I.  gave  to  the  master-general  of 
his  artillery  the  title  of  grand  master  and  captain- 
I  general  of  the  artillery.  The  ofiice  of  grand  master 
continued  without  change  during  the  subsequent 
reigns.  In  1599,  Henry  IV.  conferred  it  upon  Sully, 
in  whose  hands  it  acquired  increased  importance; 
and  two  years  later,  in  behalf  of  this  celebrated 
minister,  he  erected  it  into  an  ofiice  of  the  crown. 
This  office  lasted  until  1755,  when  it  disappeared.  It 
l^has  since  been  temporarily  reestablished,  at  several 
jepochs,  but  with  diminished  prerogatives,  under  the 
jname  of  first  inspector-general  of  artillery. 
s      The  first  cannon  were  only  combinations  of  large 


HISTOEY   OF   ARTILLERY.  141 

bars  and  iron  hoops.  From  the  fifteentli  and  the  six- 
teenth centuries  they  were  cast  of  iron,  of  copper,  and 
of  bronze.  The  balls  employed  were  also  successively 
of  stone,  lead,  ii^on,  and  bronze.  As  to  the  guard  of 
the  pieces, — as  much  importance  was  attached  to  their 
preservation,  they  were  entrusted  to  detachments  of 
the  best  infantry,  that  is,  to  the  Swiss,  and  for  want 
of  them,  to  the  lansquenets  (German  foot  soldiers). 

Henry  II.  adopted  five  calibers  for  his  ordnance, 
varying  from  1  to  33  pounds ;  Henry  IV.  added  a 
sixth  caliber  of  f  of  a  pound,  and  collected  at  the  ar- 
senal of  Paris  as  many  as  100  pieces  of  ordnance — a 
large  number  for  that  epoch,  which  is  indicative  of 
the  projects  of  conquest  entertained  by  him  at  the 
time  of  his  assassination.  The  artillery  of  Henry  IV., 
like  that  of  Henry  II.,  had  no  limbers ;  but  the  can- 
non of  33  pounds  caliber  had  a  four-wheeled  carriage, 
and  spare  carriages  for  all  the  large  pieces  accompanied 
the  train.  In  1609,  Henry  IV.,  reviving  the  edicts  of 
Charles  IX.,  forbade  the  casting  of  any  piece  approach- 
ing to  the  six  calibers  which  he  had  just  adopted. 

In  the  battles  of  this  monarch,  the  artillery,  placed 
at  the  extremities  of  a  crescent,  endeavored  to  take 
the  enemy  obliquely,  and  to  flank  the  whole  line  of 
battle,  keeping  itself  upon  the  defensive. 

About  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  we  find 
the  artillery  of  Protestant  Germany  possessing  great 
lightness,  and  firing  with  extraordinary  rapidity.  That 
of  Prussia  also  possessed  a  good  and  powerful  organi- 
zation, and  later  served  as  a  model  to  Gribeauval. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  reduced  the  weight  of  aiiiillery, 


14:2     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

accelerated  and  improved  its  fire,  and  adopted  the 
calibers  3,  4,  6,  12,  16,  and  30.  His  ordnance  was 
of  bronze,  of  cast  iron,  and  of  sheet  iron  bound  with 
leather  thongs.  This  sovereign  employed  it  especially 
in  attacking,  w^hereas  it  had  been  before  used  chiefly 
for  defence.  He  divided  the  artillery  on  marches,  and 
oTouped  it  in  large  batteries  on  the  field  of  battle, 
placing  these  batteries  on  the  flanks  and  in  the  centre 
of  his  lines.  He  always  carried  with  him  a  large 
number  of  pieces  :  at  the  crossing  of  the  Lech  (1631), 
he  had  12  of  large  caliber. 

In  1634,  Louis  XHL  added  two  new  calibers  to 
those  existing  in  France  under  Henry  IV.,  the  24  and 
the  12.  In  the  same  year  bombs  were  brought  into 
use  by  the  French,  who  threw  the  first  missiles  of  this 
kind  at  the  siege  of  Lamothe,  in  Lorraine.  From  that 
time,  in  order  to  make  artillery  lighter,  the  larger  cali- 
bers began  to  be  left  in  the  rear,  and  only  field  pieces, 
drawn  by  four  or  six  horses,  were  carried  with  the 
army. 

Under  Louis  XIV.,  Vauban  invented  ricochet  firing 
(1688),  and  specially  employed  cannon  instead  of  the 
mine  to  make  breaches.  The  invention  of  carcasses^ 
an  incendiary  projectile  of  ellipsoidal  form,  belongs 
also  to  this  period ;  the  French  used  them  for  the  first 
time  in  1672.  In  the  preceding  year,  the  king  had 
taken  from  the  Swiss  the  guarding  of  the  artillery, 
and  replaced  them  by  the  regiment  oi  fusiliers  of  the 
Mng^  created  for  that  service.  The  matchlock  was 
still  the  ordinary  arm  of  the  infantry,  and  the  new 
name  of  this  regiment  was  derived  from  the  fact  that 


h 


HISTORY    OF  ARTILLEEY.  143 

the  soldiers  who  composed  it  were  tlie  first  who  were 
armed  with  the  new  muskets  (fuslh)  with  bayonets. 
Upon  its  reorganization,  in  1693,  the  regiment  of  fusi- 
liers of  the  king  took  the  name  of  Royal  Artillery  ; 
and  this  is  the  proper  date  of  the  organization  of  the 
artillery  corps.  But  though  the  great  monarch  insti- 
tuted, as  we  have  said,  the  first  permanent  corps  of 
artillery,  and  gave  great  extension  to  the  materiel  of 
this  arm,  no  great  improvement  was  made  under  his 
reign :  in  fact,  they  persisted  in  employing  the  same 
kind  of  artillery  in  sieges  and  on  the  battle  field, 
without  considering  that  the  purpose  of  this  arm  is 
quite  different  in  these  two  cases.  Under  Louis  XIV., 
the  ordnance  generally  used  consisted  of  long  pieces 
of  the  calibers  36,  24,  16,  12,  8  and  4. 

During  the  reign  of  this  monarch,  the  number  of 
pieces  of  ordnance  in  the  army  was  increased,  as  well 
as  the  effective  force  of  the  troops.  The  French  had  at 
Fleurus  (1690)  100  pieces ;  at  Malplaquet,  200.  In 
this  last  battle  (1709)  a  battery  of  50  cannon,  placed 
on  the  French  right  and  loaded  with  grape  shot,  put 
2,000  of  the  enemy  Iwrs  du  combat  in  a  single  discharge. 
By  his  large  masses  of  artillery,  Louis  XIV.  silenced 
Spain  and  Holland,  and  made  himself  master  of  Up- 
per Burgundy  and  Alsace.  In  the  middle  period  of 
his  wars,  his  artillery  rendered  him  good  service  in 
battles  as  well  as  sieges.  At  the  end  of  his  reign,  the 
artillery,  as  well  as  the  other  corps  of  his  armies,  was 
exhausted.  Turenne  still  placed  his  artillery  in  ad- 
vance of  his  lines :  after  him,  care  was  taken  to  dis- 
tribute it  anion  Of  the  several  divisions. 


144    HISTOKY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

In  1732,  Louis  XV.  adopted  the  artillery  system 
of  Lieutenant-general  Valliere,  and  decreed  that  the 
calibers  24,  16,  12,  8  and  4,  should  be  exclusi\^ely 
employed  in  the  French  armies ;  the  24  and  the  16 
principally  for  sieges :  the  others  indifferently,  either 
for  sieges  or  for  battles. 

We  owe  to  Frederic  IL  the  introduction  of  horse 
artillery  (so  useful  for  accompanying  the  movements 
of  cavalry),  and  also  the  use  of  howitzers  in  the  field. 
This  monarch  improved  the  tactics  of  artillery,  and 
instead  of  distributing  it  on  the  whole  front  of  his 
line  of  battle,  as  was  formerly  done,  he  combined  it  in 
large  masses.  He  was  indebted  to  this  system  for 
several  of  his  successes.  We  see  him  fighting  at  Czas- 
law  (1742)  with  106  cannon  and  3  howitzers ;  at  Zorn- 
dorf  (1758)  with  117  pieces  of  ordnance;  at  Torgan 
(1760)  with  244  pieces.  These  are  large  numbers, 
considering  the  effective  force  of  his  armies. 

Vaquette  de  Gribeauval,  a  celebrated  French  gene- 
ral, who  fought  for  Maria  Theresa  against  Frederic 
IL,  and  distinguished  himself  at  the  defence  of 
Schweidnitz  in  1762,  was  inspector-general  of  artil- 
lery, and  carried  the  science  of  this  arm  to  a  high  de- 
gree of  perfection.  His  system  of  field  artillery  was 
adopted  in  France  in  1765,  and  soon  after  by  all 
Europe;  and,  with  some  modifications,  is  still  fol- 
lowed. 

In  this  system,  the  pieces,  reduced  in  length  and 
only  of  about  one  half  the  weight  of  the  old  ones,  are 
mounted  on  carriages  which  are  at  once  solid  and 
light.     The  different  calibers  are  the  12,  the  8,  and 


HISTOEY   OF   AKTILLERY.  145 

blie  4  ;  and  tlie  1  was  promptly  suppressed.  To  these 
must  be  added  a  howitzer  of  6  inches  for  field  service. 

It  is  to  Gribeauval  that  we  owe  the  use  of  the 
TmuS'Sej  by  which  cannon  can  be  pointed  both  promptly 
and  with  precision.  This  illustrious  man  changed 
scarcely  anything  in  siege  pieces,  but  he  improved 
their  accessories ;  he  invented  the  garrison  carriage, 
the  use  of  which  renders  embrasures  unnecessary,  and 
the  coast  carriage,  by  means  of  which  the  movement 
of  ships  can  be  followed  while  pointing.  He  fixed 
the  calibers  of  mortars  at  12,  10  and  8  inches ;  that 
of  stone  mortars  at  15  inches ;  and  for  these  different 
pieces  he  introduced  cast-iron  carriages. 

He  divided  the  personnel  of  the  arm  in  a  happy 
manner,  by  establishing  as  the  unit  of  artillery  force, 
the  battery  of  8  pieces  served  by  one  company  of 
cannoniers. 

In  the  year  1801,  the  First  Consul  created  bat- 
talions of  the  train,  to  convey  the  materiel  of  the  ar- 
tillery— a  service  formerly  performed  by  contractors, 
to  the  great  inconvenience  of  the  army. 

Under  the  Empire,  the  personnel  of  the  artillery 
was  raised  to  60,000  men.  Napoleon  employed  tliis 
arm  in  large  masses :  thus,  at  the  battle  of  Wagram, 
100  pieces  were  rapidly  moved  to  occupy  moment- 
arily a  portion  of  the  line  of  battle.  This  partic- 
ular circumstance  taught  us  the  necessity  of  training 
a  mass  of  pieces  to  manoeuvre  with  ensemble  and 
promptness ;  and  consequently,  during  the  ensuing 
peace,  attention  was  paid  to  drawing  up  manoeuvres 
of  one  or  several  batteries.  The  methods  which 
10 


146     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  AEMS. 

were  developed  had  a  happy  influence  upon  the  last 
battles  of  the  imperial  period.  It  is  hardly  necessary 
to  say  that  Napoleon  I.  placed  his  artillery  in  order 
of  battle  as  we  place  it  at  the  present  day. 

Finally,  in  1829,  the  "  Committee  of  Artillery,'^ 
taking  the  English  models,  adopted  a  new  materiel  of 
artillery,  called  the  neio  system.  At  the  present  time, 
the  siege  and  other  calibers  are  24,  16,  12  and  8  ;  the 
last  two,  the  12  and  the  8,  are  those  of  which  field 
batteries  are  exclusively  composed ;  for  the  new  car- 
riages, having  great  mobility,  enable  us  to  carry  can- 
non of  powerful  effect  to  the  field  of  battle.  The  new 
howitzers  have  the  length  of  cannon;  those  of  the 
field  are  of  the  caliber  24  and  of  6  inches ;  those  for 
siege,  8  inches.  Mountain  ai-tillery  consists  only  of 
howitzers  of  the  caliber  12.  The  mortars  have  a  coni- 
cal chamber,  and  their  calibers  are  12,  10,  and  8 
inches ;  the  stone  mortars  have  a  caliber  of  15  inches. 

The  battery  is  now  reduced  to  six  pieces,  with 
their  accessories ;  of  these  six  pieces,  four  are  cannon 
and  two  howitzers. 

Several  arrangements  observed  in  the  construction 
of  the  carriages  and  limbers,  give  the  new  system  great 
mobility.  It  also  possesses  remarkable  simplicity ;  for 
it  contains  but  two  kinds  of  carriages,  one  for  the  can- 
non of  12  and  the  howitzer  of  6  inches,  the  other  for 
the  cannon  of  8  and  the  howitzer  of  24 ;  moreover,  the 
limber  of  the  caisson  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  piece, 
so  that  the  can-iage  can  be  refurnished  by  a  simple 
exchange  of  limber.  The  wheels  are  also  of  the  same 
size,  and  can  be  interchanged. 


HISTORY    OF   ARTILLERY.  147 

Another  advantage  of  tlie  new  system  is  that  the 
cannoniers  can  sit  upon  the  ammunition-chests,  and  thus 
be  carried  with  the  piece.  In  consequence  of  this  im- 
provement, the  foot  batteries  manoeuvre,  in  case  of 
need,  with  the  same  rapidity  as  the  horse  batteries, 
and  the  artillery  can  conform  itself  to  all  the  move- 
ments of  the  infantry  and  of  the  cavalry. 

The  present  French  system  is  sometimes  called  the 
" Systeme  Valee,^  after  the  general  officer,  since  a  mar- 
shal of  France,  who  is  its  author,  and  had  already 
proved  its  merits  at  the  camp  of  Saint-Omer  (Sept., 
182T). 

This  system  is  now  modified,  in  its  materiel j  by 
the  adoption  of  the  12-pounder  cannon-howitzer  (Na- 
poleon-gun) ;  and  in  \t^  personnel^  by  the  organization 
of  1854,  in  which  existing  defects  are  corrected,  and 
two  important  principles  established : 

1st.  The  division  of  the  artillery  arm  into  three 
distinct  branches :  light  artillery,  the  cannoniers  riding 
on  horseback ;  line  artillery,  they  being  mounted  on 
the  ammunition-chests ;  and  reserve  artillery,  where 
they  are  on  foot.  Each  is  thus  enabled  to  perform  its 
appropriate  functions,  the  first  having  to  manoeuvre 
with  the  cavalry,  the  second  with  the  divisions  of  in- 
fantry, and  the  last  to  serve  in  the  attack  and  defence 
of  fortified  places.  In  preceding  organizations,  the  ar- 
tillery-men were  frequently  diverted  from  their  special 
instruction  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  horsemanship. 

2d.  The  artillery  train-corps  was  entirely  suppressed 
and  absorbed  in  the  foot  regiments,  forming  park-bat- 
teries. 


CHAPTER    SIXTH. 

AETILLEEY  FOEMATION  AND  TACTICS. 

1.  Purpose  of  Artillery. — ^The  purpose  of  artillery 
IS  to  destroy^  either  the  troops  of  the  enemy,  opposing 
artillery,  or  obstacles ;  and  by  sucli  destruction  to  fa- 
cilitate the  attack  of  infantry  or  cavalry.  To  accom- 
plisli  this  purpose  in  a  decisive  manner,  artillery 
should  act  in  large  masses ;  for  if  it  operate  against  a 
line  of  foot  soldiers,  it  will  by  this  means  alone  be 
able  to  make  large  breaches,  which  will  divide  the 
line  into  several  detached  groups,  which  it  will  after- 
ward be  easy  to  assail  and  to  beat  in  detail.  There 
are,  however,  cases  where  isolated  discharges  produce 
a  useful  moral  effect  upon  the  enemy ;  as,  for  example, 
when  a  ball  carries  off  some  officer,  or  simply  a  bearer 
of  orders. 

To  accomplish  its  mission,  the  artillery  must 
have  recourse  to  different  means,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  object  to  be  destroyed;  hence  there 
are  two  kinds  of  ordnance — afield  pieces  and  siege 
guns.  But  in  a  broken  and  hilly  country,  even  the 
first,  which  are  the  lightest,  are  yet  too  heavy  to 
be  transported ;  and  hence  there  is  a  third  kind  of  ar- 


I 


ARTILLEEY  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  149 

tillery — mountain  artillery^  carried  on  the  backs  of 
mules ;  whereas  the  field  and  siege  guns  are  placed  on 
carriages  drawn  by  horses. 

We  have  just  spoken  of  the  transportation  of  artil- 
lery :  this  is  indispensable,  not  only  on  the  march,  but 
upon  the  battle  field ;  for,  at  the  present  time,  this 
arm  acts  not  only  by  its  fire,  but  also  by  its  move- 
ments ;  while,  in  foimer  days,  it  was  thought  that 
the  purpose  of  artillery  was  only  to  fire  from  a  fixed 
point. 

It  is  evident  that  the  different  portions  of  the  army 
cannot  all  use  the  same  calibers,  since  mobility  de- 
pends upon  the  weight  of  the  balls.  Hence  the  divi- 
sion of  field  artillery  attached  to  an  army,  into  divi- 
sion-hatteries  and  reserve-latteries — the  former  com- 
posed of  light  artillery,  attached  to  divisions,  and  al- 
ways in  action ;  the  latter  composed  of  heavy  artil- 
lery, forming  part  of  the  reserve,  and,  like  it,  acting 
only  at  the  decisive  moment,  or  at  the  last  extremity. 

Besides  the  general  service  of  guns,  and  the  con- 
struction of  all  batteries,  the  corps  of  French  artillery 
is  also  charged  in  the  field  with :  1st,  the  furnishing 
of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  the  army ;  2d,  the 
repair  of  arms,  which  repairs  are  entrusted  to  the 
companies  of  armorers ;  3d,  the  construction  and 
placing  of  movable  bridges,  and  crossing  streams  by 
boats. 

The  artillery,  however,  is  not  a  self-sustaining 
arm ;  it  needs  immediate  protection  to  accomplish  its 
various  objects,  and  especially  when  it  is  engaged  in 
firing,  or  in  the  construction  either  of  a  battery  or 


150     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

a  bridge.  In  fact,  if  tlie  artillery  were  not  supported  by 
troops  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  the  artillerists  would  be 
obliged,  in  case  of  attack,  to  abandon  their  special 
functions  and  convert  themselves  temporarily  into 
foot  soldiers,  or  into  cavalry  (according  as  they  were 
on  foot  or  mounted),  to  repel  the  enemy;  which 
would  often  be  injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  whole, 
.by  interfering  with  their  special  duty  at  the  most 
critical  moment.  But  if  the  artillery  cannot  act  with 
security  except  under  the  aegis  of  the  other  arms,  it 
renders  them,  in  return,  the  most  important  service ; 
and  we  may  confidently  assert  that  it  now  constitutes 
an  indispensable  accessory  in  the  composition  of  armies. 

2.  Numerical  Data. — ^The  number  of  pieces  of 
ordnance  of  an  army  depends  upon  the  quantity  and 
quality  of  the  troops  which  compose  it.  It  is  usually 
fixed  by  stating  the  number  for  every  1,000  men. 
The  experience  of  our  later  wars  has  demonstrated 
that  we  could  adopt  two  pieces  of  ordnance  to  1,000 
infantry ;  but  this  number  must  be  regarded  as  a  min- 
imuTYi^  adapted  to  the  best  troops — for,  the  more  ex- 
perienced and  inured  the  soldiers,  the  less  their  need 
of  support.  In  the  generality  of  cases,  three  pieces  to 
1,000  men  is  a  more  suitable  proportion.  Foreign  na- 
tions have  often  gone  beyond  this  number ;  the  Prus- 
sians, for  example,  have  employed  four  pieces  of  ord- 

*  A  minimum,  that  is,  for  the  continent  of  Europe  :  for,  against  fee- 
ble troops,  we  come  down  to  a  lower  figure  ;  thus,  in  1830,  in  the  expe- 
dition which  conquered  Algiers,  there  was  scarcely  one  piece  of  ordnance 
to  1,000  men. 


AETILLEEY  FOKMATION   AND   TACTICS.  151 

nance,  and  tlie  Russians  even  as  many  as  seven,  to 
every  1,000  men. 

As  to  tlie  cavalry,  it  is  usual  to  support  it  by 
twice  as  many  pieces  as  would  be  used  for  tbe  same 
number  of  infantry. 

Artillery  being  always  an  impediment  to  long  ex- 
peditions, it  is  proper,  in  fixing  its  amount,  to  take 
into  account  its  weight  in  reference  to  tbe  nature  of 
the  ground  on  wbicb  it  may  iave  to  act ;  especially 
as  it  will  be  preferable  to  take  a  smaller  number  of 
pieces  than  to  be  reduced  to  the  dire  necessity  of 
abandoning  some  of  them  to  facilitate  the  march. 

The  supply  of  ammunition  carried  by  the  artillery, 
is  200  rounds  for  each  piece  of  ordnance,  and  50  car- 
tridges for  each  infantry  soldier. 

Each  piece,  or  caisson,  drawn  by  six  horses,  as  in 
France,  occupies  13  metres  (14  yards)  of  depth  in  file. 
The  limber,  with  six  horses,  occupies  but  10  metres. 
The  depth  of  the  piece  in  battery,  including  the  hand- 
spike, is  5  metres ;  the  front  of  each  piece  and  carriage 
is  2  metres. 

3.  Tactical  Unit. — A  lattery  is  the  tactical  unit 
of  artillery.  In  France  a  field  battery  consists  of  six 
pieces  *  which,  with  the  accessories  and  the  cannoniers 
necessary  to  manoeuvre  it,  produces  an  eftective  of  30 
carriages  and  wagons,  200  men,  and  200  horses,  suffi- 

*  The  field  battery,  composed  of  four  cannon  and  t-wo  howitzers,  forms 
now  the  exception ;  there  are  no  longer  any  such,  except  in  the  reserve 
(where  they  are  of  four  cannon  of  the  12  caliber,  and  two  howitzers  of 
16  centimetres),  and  not  even  all  the  batteries  of  the  reserve  have  this 
composition. 


152     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

cient  to  form  a  single  command.  Tlie  personnel  of 
this  battery  is  now  composed  of  homogeneous  elements, 
inasmucli  as  tlie  artillerists  who  serve  the  guns  and 
the  drivers  who  conduct  them  have  the  same  rank. 

Some  foreign  powers  compose  their  batteries  of 
eight  pieces,  six  cannon  and  two  howitzers;  others, 
again,  attach  to  their  armies  special  batteries  of  howit- 
zers. In  France  they  have  just  adopted,  for  field  ar- 
tillery, as  the  principal  kind  of  ordnance,  howitzer- 
cannon  of  the  calibre  12  (light  12 -pounder),  which 
throw  either  balls  or  shells, — thus  affording  the  advan- 
tage, that  the  six  pieces  composing  a  battery  may  all 
fire  at  the  same  time  either  balls  or  shells,  as  required. 
These  howitzer-guns  were  proposed  by  the  Emperor 
in  1849.* 

The  French  field-battery  is  divided  into  three  sec- 
tions of  two  pieces  each ;  f  the  1st  lieutenant  com- 
mands the  right  section,  the  2d  lieutenant  the  left  sec- 
tion, and  the  adjutant  the  centre  section. 

The  mountain-battery  is  composed  of  six  howitzers 
of  the  calibre  12,  divided  into  three  sections ;  but  more 
frequently  mountain  artillery  is  organized  simply  in  sec- 
tions of  two  howitzers,  each  section  requiring  22  mules 
for  its  transportation :  this  mode  is  followed  in  Algiers. 

4.  Formations. — ^The  field  artillery  has  no  defen- 
swe  formations.     In  manoeuvring  and  combating,  it 

*  The  new  system  of  field  artillery  whicli  they  constitute  has  been  ex- 
plained and  defended  by  Colonel  Fave,  in  two  pamphlets,  published  in 
1850  and  1851. 

t  In  the  battery  of  4  cannon  and  2  howitzers,  the  2  howitzers  form  a 
section. 


AETILLERY  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


153 


FOEMATION  IN  COLUMN. 


^ 


ad^ 


144 -^^ 


11 


has  three  different  formations :  in  columji,  in  line,  and 
in  battery.  We  will  point  out  the  distinctive  features 
of  these  formations  for  a  French  foot  battery. 

1st.  Formation  in  Column. — This  formation  is  that 
in  which  the  battery,  formed 
in  sections,  has  its  carriages 
drawn  up  in  two  files,  each 
piece  being  followed  or  pre- 
ceded by  its  caisson.  For  a 
foot  battery  the  interval  be- 
tween the  files  is  as  much  as 
12  metres;  the  distance  be- 
tween two  carriages  of  a  file 
is  1  metre.  The  annexed  fig- 
ure shows  the  position  of  each 
carriage  and  each  officer,  non- 
commissioned officer,  and  of 
the  cannoniers  in  this  forma- 
tion. The  letter  c  designates 
the  captain  commanding ;  the 
letter  I  the  lieutenant,  com- 
manding a  flank  section ;  the 
letters  ad  the  adjutant,  com- 
manding the  centre  section; 
mc  the  chief  quartermaster, 

commanding  the  line  of  caissons ;  m  assistant-quarter- 
masters, chiefs  of  pieces ;  a  artificers,  chiefs  of  caissons ; 
t  the  trumpeter.  A  foot  battery  in  column  by  sec- 
tions occupies  16  metres  of  front  and  83  metres  in 
depth.     The  artillery,  like  the  other  arms,  employs 


/a 


\-6-A-6-y, 


% — a ^ 


154     HISTORY  AITD  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

the  formation  in  column  for  manoeuvre,  especially  when 
prolonged.     It  is  used  equally  for  attack  and  march. 

In  the  march  in  column,  each  carriage  should  care- 
fully preserve  its  interval  and  distance.  The  column 
of  attack  is  formed  upon  the  centre  section  taken  as 
the  head  of  the  column,  the  two  other  sections  being 
each  in  column  hy  piece^  behind  one  of  the  pieces  of 
the  centre  section ;  a  formation  which  facilitates  the 
deployment  of  this  column  by  a  forward  into  line. 
It  is  evident  that,  for  the  purjDose  of  passing  over  a 
narrow  road,  the  whole  battery  may  be  formed  in 
column  of  pieces. 

2d.  Formation  in  Line, — In  this  formation  the 
carriages  are  arranged  upon  two  parallel  lines,  the 


m  mi 


FORMATION  IN  LINE. 
cl 


ad^  Ttii 


pieces,  limbered  up,  forming  one  line ;  and  the  caissons, 
each  following  or  in  front  of  its  own  piece,  forming  the 
second  line.  The  horses  of  all  the  carriages  face  in  the 
same  direction.  For  a  foot  battery,  the  interval  be- 
tween the  carriages  is  12  metres ;  the  distance  between 
the  lines  is  1  metre,  as  in  the  above  figure,  in  which 
the  reference  letters  have  the  same  signification  as  in 


AETILLERY  FORMATION   AND   TACTICS. 


155 


k 


the  figure  on  page  153.  This  formation  is  especially  an 
order  of  review  ;  *  yet  it  may  be  used  for  advancing 
a  few  hundred  paces,  when  the  ground  is  sufficiently 
clear  to  permit  the  passage  of  a  body,  which,  though 
but  a  single  battery,  presents  a  front  of  72  metres  and 
a  depth  of  27  metres. 

3d.  Formation  in  Battery. — ^This  formation  is  that 
in  which  the  pieces  in  line  are  prepared  to  fire  ;  the 
pieces,  their  limbers,  and  the  caissons  remain  turned 
toward  the  enemy,  and  are  formed  on  three  parallel 
lines.  For  a  foot  battery,  the  interval  between  the 
pieces  is  12  metres ;  the  distance  between  the  line  of 
pieces  and  the  line  of  limbers  is  6  metres,  and  the  dis- 
tance between  the  latter  and  the  line  of  caissons  is  10 
metres.   The  following  figure  illustrates  this  formation, 


FOEMATION  IN  BATTERY. 


iT"i  ■*j[^  i"*!*".  \Tt  iTi  OTk     il 


<— -/2— > 


*  On  reviews  and  parades,  the  order  is  modified  by  throwing  back  the 
caissons  to  the  distance  of  15  metres  from  the  pieces,  and  grouping  the 
cannoniers  in  a  small  detachment  at  a  distance  of  6  metres  in  rear  of 
the  muzzle  of  the  pieces. 


156     HISTOET  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  AEMS. 

wliicli  occupies  72  metres  of  front,  and  44  in  depth. 
The  letters  have  the  same  signification  as  before. 
This  is  the  true  formation  of  the  artillery  for  combat. 
After  the  firing  has  commenced,  the  battery  can  be 
carried,  in  parts  and  successively,  to  more  advanced 
positions — a  movement  usually  executed  by  half-bat- 
teries, the  right  half-battery  firing  while  the  other 
half  marches,  and  reciprocally.  In  the  particular 
case  where  a  battery,  fully  formed  in  the  order  in 
battery,  retires  while  firing,  the  limbers  and  caissons, 
after  the  first  retrograde  movement,  should  remain 
with  their  backs  to  the  enemy,  in  order  to  continue 
the  movement  more  readily. 

5.  HantBuvres. — ^To  pass  from  one  to  the  other 
of  the  preceding  formations,  the  artillery  necessarily 
makes  use  of  manmuvres :  moreover,  it  is  proper  for 
it  to  be  able  to  manoeuvre,  in  order  to  participate  in 
the  transformations  to  which  the  contingencies  of 
battle  may  give  rise  in  the  tactical  disposition  of  the 
troops  which  it  supports  ;  and  this,  both  for  foot  and 
horse  batteries. 

What  shall  be  the  character  of  the  manoeuvres  of 
artillery  ?  This  arm  is  complex ;  it  embraces  men, 
horses,  carriages :  consequently  great  precision  of 
movement  cannot  be  exacted  of  it.  All  that  can  be  re- 
quired is,  that  it  shall  manoeuvre  promptly ;  and,  when 
the  manoeuvre  is  completed,  that  it  fire  quickly  upon 
the  enemy.  It  will  therefore  manoeuvre  rather  like 
cavalry  than  like  infantry ;  and,  even  thus,  the  presence 
of  carriages  must  render  the  movements  somewhat 


AETILLERY  FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  157 

disjointed.  This  slight  inconvenience  will  be  made 
to  disappear  rather  by  skill  in  manoeuvring  than  by 
quickness  of  motion ;  for  artillery  does  not  admit  of  a 
faster  gait  than  a  trot  in  its  movements.  It  is  evident, 
indeed,  that  if  it  were  manoeuvred  at  a  gallop,  the 
horses,  harnessed  to  such  heavy  carriages,  would  soon 
be  ruined ;  nevertheless,  in  a  critical  moment,  a  bat- 
tery may,  by  way  of  exception  and  for  a  short  time 
only,  effect  a  movement  at  the  gallop. 

As  we  have  just  remarked,  artillery  manoeuvres 
somewhat  after  the  manner  of  cavalry  ;  consequently 
it  employs  for  the  most  part  oblique  movements  and 
wheeling,  which  are  adapted  to  combatants  who  can- 
not follow  the  compact  and  right-angled  movements  of 
infantry.   This  will  be  readily  seen  from  some  examples. 

1st.  The  battery  being  in  column,  either  at  a  halt 
or  marching,  to  form  it  in  line  upon  the  head  of  the 
column  while  gaining  ground  to  the  left,  the  command 
is  to  be  given  to  the  two  rear  sections — left  oblique 
— which  oblique  movement  they  continue  until,  by 
resuming  a  direct  march,  they  will  be  severally  at 
their  proper  interval  from  the  next  section  on  the  side 
toward  the  guide ;  and  then  they  continue  their  march 
on  a  line  parallel  to  the  axis  of  the  column  until  they 
reach  the  front  of  the  section  at  the  head  of  the 
column.  If  they  wish  to  gain  ground  to  the  right, 
the  formation  in  line  is  effected  in  an  analogous 
manner   by   a  right  obliqued      The   choice   of  the 

*  The  "  TigM  oblique  {or  left)  "  is  performed  by  artillery  at  an  an- 
gle of  45  degrees ;  it  is,  therefore,  in  reality,  a  half  turn  to  the  right 
(or  left). 


158     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  AEMS.      ' 

side  on  which  it  will  be  most  advantageous  to  form  is 
to  be  determined  by  the  ground  alone  ;  for,  as  artil- 
lery now  makes  no  account  of  inversions  in  its  ma- 
noeuvres, it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  the 
two  rear  sections  are  carried  to  the  right  or  to  the 
left  of  the  leading  section  of  a  column. 

2d.  To  form  the  column  of  attack  upon  the  centre, 
the  battery  being  in  line  at  a  halt,  the  centre  section  ad- 
vances ;  when  it  has  left  sufficient  space  the  right  sec- 
tion oUiques  to  ilie  leftj  and  comes  up  in  column  by 
piece  in  rear  of  the  right  file  of  the  centre  section ; 
while  the  left  section  ohliques  to  the  rigJit^  forms  in 
column  by  pieces,  and  takes  up  its  position  behind  the 
left  file  of  the  centre  section.  The  formation  of  the 
column  of  attack  is  formed  in  an  analogous  manner, 
if  the  battery,  instead  of  being  at  a  halt,  is  marching 
in  line. 

3d.  The  column  being  in  march,  the  formation  in 
line  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  is  effected  by  a  wheel 
to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  performed  simultaneously 
by  all  the  sections.  To  form  line  on  the  left  or  right 
the  movement  is  analogous,  except  that  it  is  performed 
first  by  the  leading  section,  which  halts  when  it  has 
fully  completed  its  wheel,  the  other  sections  wheeling 
successively  when  opposite  their  proper  places  in  the 
line  to  be  formed,  upon  which  they  halt  and  dress 
upon  the  leading  section  already  on  the  line. 

4th.  The  battery  being  in  line  at  a  halt,  or  march- 
ing in  line,  may  effect  a  change  of  front  to  a  line 
making  a  greater  or  less  angle  with  the  former  front, 
by  means  of  a  wheel  in  line,  which  is  executed  by  the 


AETILLEEY   FOEMATION   AND   TACTICS.  159 

pivot-carriage  moving  at  a  walk  while  tlie  others  pro- 
ceed at  a  trot.  It  is  likewise  by  wheels  in  line,  fol- 
lowed by  marcli  in  line,  executed  by  each  battery 
separately  and  in  parallels,  that  in  evolutions  of  sev- 
eral batteries  combined,  changes  of  front  upon  one 
flank  are  effected,  the  other  flank  being  thrown  for- 
ward or  to  the  rear. 

The  evolutions  of  several  batteries,  of  which  we 
have  just  spoken,  present  some  analogy  to  the  evolu- 
tions of  the  line  of  several  battalions,  taking  into  ac- 
count the  essential  differences  of  constitution  which 
distinguish  the  artillery  from  the  infantry. 

In  the  manoeuvres  of  artillery  there  are  neither 
general  nor  particular  guides;  the  direction  of  the 
column  or  of  the  line,  in  march,  or  while  being  formed, 
is  intrusted  to  the  chief  of  the  piece  upon  which  the 
formation  is  made.  Since  the  adoption  of  the  new 
materiel^  but  one  mode  of  wheeling  is  admitted  in 
the  movements  of  artillery,  which  is  that  of  infantry 
on  the  side  of  the  guide,  and  is  always  executed  upon 
a  moving  pivot^  the  pivot-piece  describing  an  arc 
of  a  circle,  to  clear  the  ground  where  the  movement 
begins.  We  must  also  remark  that  countermarches 
and  ahouts  of  carriages  are  always  made  to  the  left, 
because  the  drivers  ride  on  the  near  horses. 

6.  Positions. — ^The  term  hattery  is  used  not  only 
to  designate  the  unit  of  force  of  artillery,  but  also  any 
collection  of  several  pieces  upon  any  determined  point 
of  the  field  of  battle.  The  choice  of  positions  to  be 
given  to   the   batteries    is   not   indifferent,   for  the 


160     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

skill  of  tte  gunner  would  be  paralyzed  by  a  bad 
location. 

An  open  ground,  witli  tlie  flanks  supported,  and 
slightly  overlooking  the  position  occupied  by  the  ene- 
my, offers  an  eligible  site  for  a  battery.  The  soil 
should  be  solid,  but  not  stony ;  for  the  smallest  pro- 
jectiles of  the  enemy  striking  the  stones  would  pro- 
duce flying  fragments  quite  injurious  to  those  serving 
the  pieces.  The  position  should  also  afford  commo- 
dious and  safe  exits,  not  only  for  the  offensive,  but  also 
for  retreat — for  which  prudence  requires  that  we  should 
always  be  prepared.  As  much  as  possible,  the  artil- 
lery should  be  posted  so  as  to  see  without  heing  seen^ 
by  concealing  it  behind  some  obstacle,  provided  al- 
ways that  this  obstacle  does  not  interfere  with  the 
certainty  and  facility  of  its  firing,  or  with  the  con- 
venience of  exit. 

The  position  having  been  determined  upon,  the 
direction  of  the  line  of  fire  of  the  pieces  is  to  be  fixed 
more  or  less  obliquely  with  respect  to  the  front  of  the 
enemy,  so  as  to  produce  the  greatest  damage  possible 
in  his  ranks  by  the  angle  under  which  the  balls  will 
reach  them.  Hence  the  different  names  given  to  bat- 
teries. Thus  a  direct  iattery  is  one  which  strikes  the 
front  of  the  enemy  perpendicularly,  which  is  de- 
structive in  proportion  to  the  deptli  of  the  opposing 
force ;  an  oblique  lattery  is  that  whose  line  of  fire  is 
oblique  to  the  front  of  the  enemy ;  a  reverse  lattery 
is  that  which  plays  upon  the  rear  of  a  body  of  troops 
already  exposed  to  direct  fire — a  difficult  position  to 
take,  but  one  which  is  exceedingly  harassing  to  the 


ARTILLERY   FORMATION   AND    TACTICS.  161 

torce  thus  menaced ;  an  enfilading  lattery^  tliat  which 
fires  on  the  flank  in  the  direction  of  the  prolongation 
of  the  enemy's  line — a  battery  which  light  artillery 
can  easily  establish  w^hen  the  enemy  offer  their  flank 
and  thus  expose  themselves  to  this  most  murderous 
fire,  which  not  unfrequently  occurs  in  manoeuvring; 
a  cross  lattery^  one  whose  pieces  firing  obliquely,  cross 
their  fire ;  or,  by  extension,  one  which  crosses  its  fire 
with  another — a  very  destructive  kind  of  battery,  as  it 
concentrates  a  large  number  of  projectiles  upon  the 
same  point. 

When  speaking  of  the  purpose  for  which  artillery 
is  destined,  we  subdivided  field  artillery  into  division- 
batteries  and  reserve-batteries.  The  former,  also  called 
artillery  of  the  line,  because  it  is  permanently  attached 
to  the  line,  are  active  from  the  first  to  the  last  mo- 
ment of  the  combat;  the  latter,  destined  to  sustain 
the  feebler  portions  of  the  line,  act  but  temporarily. 
Hence  they  have  two  very  different  kinds  of  position 
in  battle.  The  division-batteries  are  placed  (say  150 
or  200  yards)  in  advance  of  the  first  line  of  troops, 
or  behind  the  extreme  flanks  of  the  lines.  The  re- 
serve-batteries, in  the  mean  time,  keep  out  of  reach  of 
the  enemy's  fire,  ready  to  throw  themselves  quickly 
upon  any  points  that  may  be  menaced,  or  to  accom- 
pany an  attacking  force.  In  battle,  moreover,  care 
must  be  taken  to  post  the  caissons  in  a  strong  and 
well-sheltered  place,  as  they  are  constantly  needed, 
and  their  preservation  is  of  the  first  importance. 

11 


CHAPTEE   SEVENTH. 

HISTOKY   OF  ENGESTEEES. 

The  history  of  the  engineer  arm,  as  constituted  at 
the  present  day  with  a  staff  and  troops,  may  be  com- 
prised in  a  small  compass,  for  it  is  not  of  ancient 
origin. 

In  the  sixteenth  century,  after  the  invention  of 
bastioned  fortifications,  the  Italian  engineers,  reputed 
the  most  skilful,  were  spread  over  all  Europe  ;  Cath- 
erine de  Medicis  employed  several  in  the  French  ser- 
vice. At  the  close  of  the  civil  war  which  marked 
the  end  of  the  dynasty  of  the  Valois,  Sully,  having 
been  made  superintendent  of  fortifications,  undertook 
to  repair  the  French  fortified  places  then  in  ruins,  and 
to  consolidate  the  engineers  charged  with  these  works, 
calling  them  ingenieurs  ordinaires  du  roi  (this  about 
1602). 

Until  1690,  these  engineers  held  their  rank  in  the 
arms  or  staflfe  of  which  they  were  a  part.  After  that 
date,  being  charged  with  the  coast  defences  as  well 
as  those  of  the  interior  of  the  kingdom,  and  placed 
under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  Minister  of  "War, 


HISTORY   OF   ENGINEERS  163 

tliey  formed-  a  wholly  military  corps,  and  served  at 
the  fortifications,  or  with  armies  in  the  field,  according 
to  circumstances.  Under  Louis  XIV.,  a  prince  who 
delighted  in  the  war  of  sieges,  their  corps  was  in- 
creased ;  and  from  55  officers  in  1688,  it  grew  to  600 
in  1697 — a  number  which  it  has  never  since  attained.* 
Under  Louis  XV.,  from  1755  to  1758,  the  corps 
of  engineers  was,  for  the  time,  united  to  the  staff  of 
the  artillery.  In  the  year  1758,  when  the  two  corps 
were  again  separated,  the  military  engineers  adopted 
a  uniform,  consisting  of  a  blue  coat  faced  with  black 
velvet ;  and  from  that  time,  the  black  velvet  has  re- 
mained the  characteristic  feature  of  the  French  engi- 
neer dress.  In  1762,  the  number  of  engineers  was 
fixed  at  400,  and  has  since  varied  but  little,  being 
sometimes  greater  and  sometimes  less.     In  1776  this 

*  Under  the  direction  of  Yaubau,  the  corps  of  French  engineers  ren- 
dered eminent  services  in  the  long  wars  of  this  period,  and  won  in 
Europe  such  a  preeminence,  that  everywhere  its  usages,  its  regulations, 
its  traces  or  forms  of  fortifications,  and  its  methods  of  attack,  were  fol- 
lowed and  imitated.  It  was  to  reward  the  whole  corps,  in  the  person  of 
its  real  chief,  both  by  rank  and  merit,  that  the  great  king  gave  the  baton 
of  marshal  toYauban. 

The  science  of  the  Attack  and  Defence  of  Places  made  prodigious  ad- 
vances under  this  distinguished  engineer,  who  invented  parallels,  tremcli- 
cataliers^  and  ricochet-firing.  The  art  of  fortifying  places  felt  the  power 
of  his  skilful  hand ;  the  demi-lune  was  enlarged,  the  bastion  perfected, 
the  redoubt  of  the  demi-lune  invented,  the  tenaille  given  a  more  advan- 
tageous form,  water  made  useful  in  defence,  and  fortifications  were  ad- 
mirably conformed  or  adapted  to  the  ground.  • 

The  great  increase  of  armies  made  a  resort  to  field  fortifications  indis- 
pensable ;  immense  lines  were  constructed,  supported  by  rivers  or  the 
sea,  to  protect  entire  countries  ;  but  the  great  extent  of  these  lines  ren- 
dered them  weak,  for  it  was  impossible  to  guard  them  everywhere  ;  hence 
they  were  almost  always  forced,  and  consequently  fell  into  discredit. — Tr. 


164     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

corps  received  the  official  designation  of  Corj^s  Royal 
du  Genie.  Soon  after  tlie  employes  charged  with  the 
care  of  buildings,  fortifications,  magazines,  dams,  etc., 
received  the  name  of  gardes  du  genie?' 

*  Few  changes  took  place  in  the  French  engineers  until  the  Revolu- 
tion, when,  in  common  with  the  other  branches  of  the  service,  they  lost 
many  valuable  officers  by  emigration,  among  them  Bousmard,  the  author 
of  an  able  work  on  fortifications. 

The  number  of  officers  was  kept  up  to  310  in  1791,  450  in  1795,  and 
371  in  1802,  by  introduction  of  engineers  from  other  corps — the  ;ponU  et 
chaussees,  etc. 

During  the  reign  of  the  great  IiTapoleon,  the  officers  of  engineers,  who 
had,  in  Germany,  more  the  duty  of  staff  officers  than  continually  making 
a  war  of  sieges,  found  in  Spain  the  opportunity  of  devoting  themselves 
an'ew  to  the  art  of  attacking  places. 

The  engineer  arm  had  a  staff  of  nearly  the  same  strength  as  in  1802, 
having  at  its  head  a  first  inspector-general  of  the  arm,  who  was  a  grand 
officer  of  the  Empire. 

In  1813,  when  France  was  constrained,  after  twenty  years  of  a  glo- 
rious offensive  war,  to  defend  the  ancient  frontiers  of  the  monarchy,  the 
staff  of  engineers,  distributed  in  a  great  number  of  fortified  places,  which 
she  still  occupied  in  Europe,  was  found  too  small  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  the 
service.  She  was  consequently  obliged  (without  incorporating  them  in  the 
corps  du  genie)  to  employ  a  large  number  of  engineers  of  ponts  et  chaus- 
sees,  and  even  surveyors. 

In  the  engineers,  as  in  the  artillery,  the  general  officers  present  at 
Paris  formed,  under  the  orders  of  the  first  inspector-general,  a  consulting 
committee,  called  to  give  its  advice  upon  the  different  branches  of  the 
service  of  the  engineer  arm :  the  influence  of  these  committees  was  then 
less  than  it  has  been  since. 

From  1840  to  1846,  Louis  Philippe,  at  an  expense  of  140,000,000 
francs,  caused  to  be  constructed  the  fortifications  of  Paris,  consisting  of  a 
continuous  bastioned  enceinte,  or  line,  and  a  chain  of  detached  forts,  the 
perimiter  of  the  whole  of  these  stupendous  works  being  nearly  forty 
miles.  They  were  designed  to  defend  the  capital,  and  modify  the  plan 
of  attack  against  France.  The  entire  works  were  skilfully  constructed  by 
the  corps  du  genie,  under  the  direction  of  Marshal  Dode  de  la  Brunerie. 

From  the  first  to  the  second  Empire,  the  number  of  engineers  of  the 


HISTOEY    OF   ENGINEERS.  165 

As  to  the  troops  of  engineers  in  France,  the  crea- 
tion of  sa])])ers^  called  for  by  Vauban,  dates  from 
1671 ;  tlie  first  company  of  miners  was  raised  two 
years  later.  In  1695  there  existed  one  company  of 
sappers  and  tliree  companies  of  miners. 

Vauban  commanded  the  company  of  sappers.  Mes- 
grigny,  who  died  after  seventy-two  years  of  service ; 
Goulon,  subsequently  chief  of  the  corps  of  military  en- 
gineers of  the  Empire ;  and  Esprit,  a  brave  officer,  who 
fell  at  the  siege  of  Barcelona  in  1697,  commanded  the 
three  companies  of  miners,  which  remained  at  first  in- 
dependent, and  were  not  all  finally  attached  to  the  ar- 
tillery until  1705.*  The  sappers  and  miners,  from  their 
creation  until  the  Revolution,  constituted  at  one  time  a 
part  of  the  artillery,  at  another  a  part  of  the  engineers. 
Thus,  from  1759  to  1761,  when  there  existed  six  com- 
panies of  miners,  each  consisting  of  6  officers  and  60 
men,  these  companies  were  under  the  orders  of  the  en- 
gineers. It  was  the  Convention  that  really  established 
the  troops  of  engineers ;  for,  in  1793,  it  took  the  sap- 
pers and  miners  from  the  artillery,  to  assign  them  to 
the  engineers.  In  the  following  year,  the  officers  of  en- 
gineers had  under  their  orders  twelve  battalions  of  sap- 
pers, six  companies  of  miners,  and  two  companies  of  ae- 
ronauts {aer ostlers).  The  troops  of  engineers  remained 
throughout  the  reign  of  ISTapoleon  I,  organized  in  bat- 
talions.f     At  the  restoration  they  formed  three  regi- 

staff  has  steadily  increased,  until  Napoleon  III.,  in  1855,  fixed  them  at  460, 
of  which  IGO  were  superior  ofiicers,  and  800  captains  or  lieutenants. — Tr. 

*  Allent,  Histoire  du  corps  imperial  du  genie.,  1st  part,  1805,  p.  368. 

t  Of  engineer  troops  in  the  French  army  there  were,  in  1812 :  two  bat- 


166     HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

ments.  At  present  these  troops  also  include  two  com- 
panies of  workmen,  and  three  companies  of  sapper- 
drivers;  one  of  the  latter  companies  is  attached  to 
each  regiment."^ 

talions  of  miners ;  five  battalions  of  sappers;  one  battalion  of  Walcheren 
sappers,  created  in  1811 ;  two  battalions  of  Spanish  sappers,  created  in 
1811 ;  two  battalions  of  the  engineer  train ;  and  two  companies  of  ar- 
tificers. 

The  battalions  of  French  sappers  and  miners  had  each  nine  companies, 
the  other  battalions  four  companies,  and  the  battalions  of  the  train  seven 
companies,  of  which  one  remained  in  depot.  The  battalions  of  Spanish 
sappers  were  formed  by  Napoleon,  w^ho  utilized  everything,  of  mechan- 
ics selected  from  the  Spanish  prisoners.  These  battalions  wore  a  white 
uniform,  the  others  sky-blue,  to  distinguish  them  from  the  national  sap- 
perg,  and  served  till  1814  with  fidelity  and  bravery.  The  two  companies 
of  artificers  were  attached,  one  to  the  arsenal  of  engineers  of  Metz,  and 
the  other  to  the  arsenal  of  engineers  at  Allessandria. — Tr. 

*  In  striking  contrast  with  the  ample  numbers  of  officers  and  troops 
of  engineers  in  the  French  service,  is  the  meagre  Corps  of  Engineers  of 
the  United  States,  now  engaged  in  the  most  gigantic  revolution  on  the 
page  of  history.  It  numbers  but  three  companies  of  sappers,  miners  and 
pontoniers,  and  fifty  officers,  of  which  latter  more  than  one  half  are 
unavailable  as  engineers  in  the  field,  being  engaged  in  the  construc- 
tion of  one  vast  line  of  Atlantic,  Pacific  and  Lake  coast-defences,  on  duty 
at  the  Military  Academy  and  Engineer  Bureau,  or  serving  with  volun- 
teers as  generals  and  colonels.  Recently,  as  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
Department  of  the  Mississippi,  in  which  150,000  men  were  in  active 
campaign,  I  had  not  one  regular  engineer  soldier,  and  but  a  single  oflScer 
of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  to  assist  in  directing  the  varied  operations  of 
that  service,  extending  over  the  States  of  Missouri,  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee, and  parts  of  Arkansas,  Mississippi  and  Alabama. —  Tr, 


CHAPTER  EIGHTH. 


rUHCTIONS    OF    THE    ENGINEEES. 


I 


The  engineers,  on  account  of  the  important  ser- 
vices they  rendered  in  the  great  continental  wars  of 
the  French  Kepublic  and  Empire,  and  by  the  exten- 
sion given  to  their  personnel,  may  be  considered  as  a 
fourth  arm.  The  general  functions  of  this  accessory 
arm  are  now  exclusively  military,  and  are  fixed  by 
the  regulations  of  the  French  army  as  follows  : 

1st.  All  the  works  of  permanent  fortification ;  that 
is,  the  construction  and  repairs  of  fortified  places  and 
military  posts. 

2d.  The  construction  and  repairs  of  all  military 
edifices,  such  as  infantry  barracks,  quarters  for  caval- 
ry, guard  houses,  cisterns,  hospitals,  workshops,  bake- 
houses, magazines  and  stables.  The  artillery  is  still 
charged  with  the  buildings  destined  for  its  special  ser- 
vice :  nevertheless,  the  engineers  construct  the  powder 
magazines  situated  in  the  interior  of  works  of  fortifi 
cation,  and  when  finished,  turn  them  over  to  the 
artillery. 

3d.  The  construction  of  field  fortifications,  which 


> 


168     HISTORY  AND  TACTICS  OF  THE  SEPARATE  ARMS. 

the  generals  in  chief  or  generals  of  division  think 
proper  to  put  up  in  the  field,  such  as  breastworks, 
trenches,  redoubts,  small  forts,  block-houses,  lunettes, 
fleches,  tetes-de-pont,  intrenched  lines  and  camps,  and 
dykes.  The  engineers  also  construct  ovens  for  baking 
bread  in  campaign. 

4th.  The  construction,  reestablishment  and  destruc- 
tion of  roads,  in  campaign;  the  opening  of  certain 
thoroughfares :  in  a  word,  the  various  works  which  in 
war  may  facilitate  the  march  of  columns. 

5th.  The  construction,  in  campaign,  of  raft-bridges, 
and  bridges  with  fixed  supports  which  can  be  impro- 
vised with  the  materials  drawn  from  the  country ; 
such  as  trestle-bridges,  pile-bridges,  bridges  of  trees, 
draw-bridges ;  in  short,  the  construction  of  bridges  for 
which  it  is  necessary  to  saw,  hew,  and  frame  wood. 

6th.  The  various  works  required  in  the  defence  or 
attack  of  places,  and  the  reconnoissances  connected 
with  these  works. 

These  functions  appertain  to  them  in  times  of 
peace  as  well  as  war.  In  peace,  the  engineers  have 
their  works  executed  by  contract  by  workmen  drawn 
from  various  localities  :  for  their  execution  in  time  of 
war,  they  have  under  their  orders  military  workmen,* 
organized  and  trained  in  advance — namely,  the  sap- 
pers and  miners;  and  are  also  frequently  aided  by 
auxiliary  laborers  taken  from  the  other  arms,  prin- 
cipally from  the  infantry. 

*  The  engineer  soldiers  are  chiefly  recruited  from  artificers  of  wood 
and  iron,  such  as  carpenters,  joiners,  wheelwrights,  and  blacksmiths; 
from  masons  and  builders ;  and  from  miners  and  quarry-men. 


FUNCTIOISrS   OF   THE   ENGINEERS. 


169 


In  campaign,  tliere  is  attaclied  to  each  division 
of  infantry,  one  company  of  sappers,  which,  upon  the 
war-footing,  numbers  from  120  to  150  men.  In  the 
engineer  arm,  then,  the  unit  of  force  is  a  company,  at- 
tended by  a  four-horse  wagon  and  its  drivers.  This 
wagon  carries  spare  tools,  to  replace  those  carried  by 
the  men,  when  these  are  worn  out  or  damaged.  Each 
sapper,  besides  his  sword,  which  may  be  of  some  ser- 
vice to  him  in  cutting  and  trimming  light  wood,  is 
also  kept  supplied  with  one  tool,  as  a  paii;  of  his 
equipment — either  a  shovel,  a  pick,  or  an  axe  with  a 
very 


short  handle,  which  is 


KNAPSACK   OF  A   SAPPER. 


placed  in  a  sheath  passing 
through  the  knapsack,  as 
shown  in  the  annexed  cut. 
In  a  company  of  120  sap- 
pers, there  should  be  40 
picks,  40  shovels,  30  axes, 
and  10  bill-hooks. 

The  companies  of  mi- 
ners carry  special  tools, 
useful  in  working  mines. 
They  usually  march  with 
the  engineer  tram  accom- 
panying the  army,  which,  with  its  heavy  auxiliary  ma- 
terials, travels  in  the  rear,  carrying  sappers'  and  mi- 
ners' tools,  cuirasses,  helmets,  sap-hooks  and  sap-forks, 
utensils  for  bridges,  a  pile-driver  and  its  appurte- 
nances, t^YO  or  three  travelling  forges,  and  various  ar- 
ticles of  equipment  and  re-supply. 

The  sappers  and  miners  are  drilled  as  foot  soldiers 


170    HISTOEY  AND  TACTICS   OF  THE  SEPAEATE  AEMS. 

in  all  tlie  manoeuvres  of  infantry  *  and  in  gymnastic 
practice.  They  form,  in  case  of  need,  excellent  infan- 
try for  disputing  a  post  and  figMing  in  the  midst  of 
obstacles ;  but,  not  to  divert  them  from  their  special- 
ty, they  are  rarely  employed  as  foot  soldiers,  and  they 
usually  brave  death  with  their  implements  in  hand, 
if  the  enemy  falls  upon  them  while  they  are  engaged 
in  opening  a  road,  constructing  a  bridge,  or  erecting 
a  field-work. 

We  will  close  this  chapter  with  a  single  observa- 
tion. In  France  the  engineer  corps  is  charged  with 
the  construction  of  those  bridges  only  which  require 
the  use  of  tools  for  working  wood ;  other  bridges, 
chiefly  those  which  are  constructed  with  suppo]*ts 
prepared  in  advance  and  transported  with  the  army, 
such  as  bridges  of  boats  or  pontons,  are  intrusted 
to  the  artillery,  which  is  the  arm  best  supplied 
with  conveyances.  The  case  is  different  with  the 
other  great  powers ;  in  Prussia,  in  Spain,  and  in  the 
United  States,  the  pontonniers  are  a  part  of  the  en- 
gineer corps ;  in  Austria  and  Eussia  they  form  a  sep- 
arate and  distinct  corps.  Several  French  authors  have 
expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  advantageous 
in  France  to  annex  the  pontonniers  to  the  engineer 
arm. 

*  The  engineer  troops  have  retained  the  old  equipment,  and  are  armed 
with  the  musket  of  the  voltigeurs.  The  total  weight  of  the  armament 
and  equipment  carried  by  a  man  amounts  to  about  45  pounds. 


PART    SECOND. 

COMBINATION    OF    THE    ARMS, 


CHAPTER  FIRST. 

OEGANIZATION   OF   ACTIVE   ARMIES. 

Tiius  far  we  have  considered  the  several  arms 
separately,  as  they  are  constituted  and  instinicted 
in  time  of  peace;  but  in  war  it  is  manifest  that, 
in  order  to  afford  each  other  mutual  support,  they 
must  be  comhined^  and  must  operate  under  the  orders 
of  one  and  the  same  chief,  who  will  direct  their  com- 
mon action  in  the  way  which  promises  the  most 
certain  victory.  Let  us,  then,  see  how  they  are  to  be 
united  under  one  head,  or  in  what  manner  they  are  to 
be  grouped  to  constitute  an  army. 

1.  Principles  of  Organization. — ^The  unit  of  force 
of  each  of  the  three  arms  which  fight  in  line — the  bat- 
talion, the  squadron,  and  the  battery — may  enter  di- 
rectly into  the  composition  of  a  brigade,  and  then  there 
is  no  intermediate  commander  between  the  general  of 
the  brigade  and  the  commandant  of  the  battalion,  the 


172  COMBmATION   OF   THE  AEMS. 

squadron  or  tlie  battery.  Witli  reference  exclusively 
to  its  application  in  war,  tMs  is  evidently  a  practicable 
organization,  and,  in  fact,  it  is  tliat  Avhich  exists  in  the 
federal  army  of  Switzerland.  But  in  most  countries, 
and  especially  in  France,  we  have  combined  together, 
in  order  to  centralize  the  administration  and  instruc- 
tion, and  also  to  keep  alive  discipline,  many  units  of 
force  into  regiments.  In  the  same  manner,  in  the  or- 
ganization of  active  armies,  brigades  are  composed  of 
a  certain  number  of  regiments — two  at  least. 

Above  the  brigade  comes  the  fraction  of  the  army 
called  a  division^  which  includes  troops  of  the  various 
arms,  in  the  proportion  required  by  circumstances; 
and  usually  consists  of  either  two  or  three  brigades, 
either  of  infantry  or  of  cavalry. 

The  division  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  essential 
component  fraction  of  an  active  army;  and  accord- 
ingly, the  French  regulations  respecting  .campaign 
service  declare  that,  "  The  division  is  the  funda- 
mental element  in  the  constitution  of  every  armyr 
A  division,  in  fact,  is  a  sufficiently  large  body  to  form 
a  first  separate  command  in  which  the  generalship  of 
the  officer  may  be  tested  and  his  qualifications  for  a 
chief  command  may  be  proved ;  it  does  not  require  an 
expensive  staff ;  and  is,  in  short,  the  force  best  adapt- 
ed to  the  scale  of  promotion  which  it  is  desirable  to 
preserve  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  general  officers.  Fre- 
quently, the  combination  of  several  divisions  forms  an 
army,  commanded  by  a  general-in-chief,  without  hav- 
ing larger  permanent  fractions ;  and,  in  this  case,  the 
chief  of  the  army  transmits  his  orders  directly  to  the 


ORGANIZATION   OF   ACTIVE   ARMIES.  1Y3 

generals  of  division.  We  ^ecj  permanent  fractions,  for 
there  may  exist  temporary  ones,  under  tlie  names  wing^ 
centre^  reserve;  thus,  supposing  an  army  to  be  composed 
of  eight  divisions,  it  may  be  drawn  up  upon  a  line  con- 
taining six  divisions  (two  in  the  centre,  and  two  on 
each  wing),  with  a  reserve  of  two  divisions ;  and  then 
each  of  the  wings,  as  also  the  centre  or  the  reserve, 
will  form  a  fraction  larger  than  a  division.  These 
temporary  fractions  depend  upon  the  general-in-chief, 
who  can  vary  their  amount  according  to  the  number 
of  troops  at  his  disposition  ;  and  for  this  reason  their 
command,  equally  temporary  and  variable,  is  assigned 
at  his  discretion. 

The  case  is  different  with  corps  (Tarmee,  These  are 
permanent  fractions,  established  in  the  organization 
of  an  army,  commanded  by  generals  appointed  by 
the  sovereign  at  the  same  time  with  the  general-in- 
chief.  As  a  general  rule,  it  is  more  advantageous  to 
compose  the  army  solely  of  divisions ;  but,  in  certain 
cases,  we  should  resort  to  the  organization  in  corps 
d'armee  ;  for  example,  1  st,  when  the  force  of  the  army 
is  so  great  that,  in  marching  in  a  single  column,  there 
would  be  an  interval  of  several  miles  between  the 
front  and  rear ;  2d,  when  the  resources  of  the  country, 
which  is  the  scene  of  warfare,  are  not  sufficient  to 
maintain  the  army  in  a  single  body ;  3d,  when  cir- 
cumstances render  it  necessary  to  make  a  diversion,  to 
succor  an  ally,  or  to  operate  eccentrically ;  in  a  word, 
to  act  separately,  although  in  the  same  theatre  of 
operations. 

Thus  we  perceive  that  an  army  may  contain  the 


174  COMBINATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

following  fractions,  taken  in  tlie  order  of  their  import- 
ance :  tlie  corps  d'armee^  tlie  wings,  the  centre,  tlie  re- 
serve, the  divisions  and  the  brigades.  There  are,  also 
the  parks  and  accessories.  Let  us  stop  for  a  moment 
to  consider  each  of  these  fractions. 

A  corps  Warmee  is  required  to  act  independently  ; 
it  must  therefore  be  selfsustaining,  at  least  for  a 
certain  time.  It  is  to  be  constituted  in  a  manner  to 
give  it  a  maximum  of  force ;  that  is,  in  its  formation 
it  should  embrace  all  the  arms,  each  proportioned  to 
the  nature  of  the  theatre  of  war,  and  the  kind  of 
enemy  to  be  met.  Corps  d'armee  composed  of  a  single 
arm  are  an  exception.  Nevertheless,  under  the  Em- 
pire, corps  d'armee  existed  composed  entirely  of  cav- 
alry. These  did  not  conform  to  the  condition  of  maxi- 
mum of  force,  but  they  were  able  to  retire  or  to  iight 
according  to  circumstances :  and  when  they  fought,  they 
possessed  the  advantage  of  a  large  mass,  well  suited 
to  overwhelm  the  enemy  at  the  close  of  an  action ; 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  Napoleon  often  employed 
them :  but  he  finally  discovered  that  beyond  twenty- 
four  squadrons,  a  body  of  cavalry  loses  the  qualities 
which  constitute  the  chief  excellence  of  that  arm, 
namely,  the  power  of  command,  opportuneness  of 
movement,  celerity,  and  precision  in  execution.*  Let 
us  return  to  the  ordinary  corps  d'armee^  which  are 
principally  composed  of  infantry,  with  some  cavalry 
and  a  little  artillery.  The  force  of  each  corps  should 
be  at  least  two  divisions;  but  two  divisions  are  ill 

*  Pr^veil,  Commentaires  du  projet  cVordonnance  sur  le  service  en  cam- 
pagne,  p.  14. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   ACTIVE   ARMIES.  175 

adapted  to  tactical  formations,  and  tliree  divisions  give 
an  order  of  battle  upon  a  single  line ;  hence  four  divi- 
sions will  be  tlie  most  suitable  number.  For,  witli 
this  number,  a  corps  may  be  drawn  up  in  order  of 
battle  witli  a  centre,  two  wings,  and  a  reserve,  eacli 
of  these  fractions  being  determinate  and  complete, 
under  the  orders  of  a  chief,  with  whom  it  is  already 
acquainted ;  and,  thus  formed,  the  corps  d^armee  will 
maintain  a  stout  resistance,  in  conformity  with  the  rules 
of  tactics.  Moreover,  four  divisions  are  well  suited  to 
the  formation  in  checker-form.    Beyond  four  divisions 

OKDER  OF   BATTLE  OF   A   CORPS  D'ARM^E. 
3d  div.  2d  div.  1st  div. 

I  I  I  I  I  I 

Left  wing  Centre  Eight  wing 

4th  div. 

I  I 

Eeserve. 

the  command  becomes  too  unwieldy,  and  many  details 
escape  the  notice  of  the  chief.  Under  the  Empire  the 
C(y)ps  (Parmee  were  rarely  formed  of  a  greater  number. 
As  to  the  division,  if  it  be  composed  of  three  bri- 
gades, it  will  have  an  independent  reserve  not  taken 


OEDEE   OF  BATTLE  OF  A  DIVISION. 

2d  brigade  1st  brigade 


1    I  I 


3d  brigade. 
I 


Eeserve. 


out  of  its  line  of  battle,  and  its  tactical  formation  will 
remain   complete ;    and    this   composition,   therefore, 


176  COMBINATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

should  be  adopted  whenever  it  is  called  upon  to  act 
separately,  or  when  the  army  does  not  contain  any 
corps  d)armee.  Some  authors  have  proposed  to  con- 
stitute the  divisions  unequally,  in  order  to  deceive  the 
enemy  as  to  the  force  of  the  army,  making  it  necessary 
for  them  to  observe  each  division  individually,  in  or- 
der to  judge  of  the  force  ;  but  this  trifling  ruse  goes  a 
very  little  way,  and  it  is,  moreover,  wiser  to  realize  it 
by  withdrawing  some  troops  out  of  line  and  success- 
ively annexing  them  to  one  or  another  of  the  divisions. 
If  the  army  is  divided  into  corps  dJarmee^  a  centre 
or  a  wing  will  contain  one  or  more  of  these  corps ; 
and  one  or  more  divisions,  if  the  army  is  subdivided 
only  into  divisions.  The  reserve  will  also  embrace 
one  or  more  corps  d'armee^  or  one  or  more  divisions, 
according  to  circumstances.  In  order  that  it  may  not 
be  a  delusive  support,  by  being  too  feeble,  nor  ex- 
haust the  army  by  being  too  numerous,  it  is  now  uni- 
versally agreed  to  form  it  at  least  of  one  fifth  or  at 
most  of  one  third  of  the  whole  army.  The  reserve 
plays  a  most  important  part :  placed  out  of  reach  of 
the  enemy's  artillery,  it  remains  fresh  until  the  mo- 
ment, when  the  general-in-chief  thinks  proper  to  bring 
it  into  action  to  strike  a  decisive  blow ;  and  history 
proves  that  victory  usually  declares  for  those  who 
succeed  in  being  the  last  to  bring  their  reserve  into 
play.  Nevertheless,  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  it 
is  best  to  keep  them  indefinitely  intact ;  for,  if  the 
opportune  moment  for  their  employment  is  allowed  to 
pass,*  they  often  prove  useless.     Besides  the  offensive 

*  Marshal  Marmont  observes  that  Napoleon  brought  up  his  reserve 


OKGANIZATION   OF   ACTIVE   ARMIES.  177 

part  they  may  take  in  deciding  a  victory,  tlie  reserves 
also  have  a  defensive  part  to  perform,  in  protecting 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  army,  and  serving  as  a  ral- 
lying point,  behind  which  the  beaten  troops  may  re- 
form, either  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  second  at- 
tack, or  of  retiring  in  good  order.  The  reserves  will 
embrace  the  heavy  cavalry  and  the  pieces  of  large 
caliber.  If  composed  of  infantry,  they  should  be  the 
most  veteran  troops ;  for  the  effect  of  a  last  argument 
cannot  be  too  certain.  Napoleon  usually  employed  a 
corps  d^armee  as  a  reserve ;  he  also  had  for  this  pur- 
pose the  Imperial  Guard  and  the  Oudinot  grenadiers. 
The  practice  of  taking  away  the  companies  of  grena- 
diers and  voltigeurs  from  the  regiments  of  infantry,  to 
form  them  into  battalions  of  select  soldiers,  is  objec- 
tionable, as  it  enervates  these  regiments,  by  taking 
away  their  best  soldiers ;  and  on  this  point  the  ordi- 
nance upon  campaign  service  directs  that :  "  The 
select  companies  be  not  drawn  away  from  their  regi- 
ments, except  during  the  time  when  the  latter  are 
not  in  line,  and  then  only  for  operations  of  brief 
duration."  Notwithstanding  this  prohibition,  it  is 
probable  that,  in  the  case  of  a  continental  war,  France 
would  be  obliged  to  return  to  the  use  of  battalions 
of  grenadiers,  though  the  Imperial  Guard  has  again 
been  reestablished  in  her  army ;  because  solid  re- 
serves are  imperatively  necessary  in  the  field. 

too  late  at  Moscow  and  at  Waterloo,  thus  violating  his  own  favorite 
maxim  :  "  Those  who  keep  their  troops  fresh  for  the  day  after  a  battle, 
are  almost  always  beaten."    {Esprit  des  institutions  militaires^  p.  29,  et 
Memoires^  t.  viii.  p.  143.) 
12 


178  COMBmATION   OP   THE   ARMS. 

According  to  tlie  regulations,  brigades  are  formed 
of  at  least  two  regiments  ;  there  appears  to  be  no  rea- 
son for  forming  tliem  of  more  tlian  three  regiments. 
Besides  brigades  composed  of  a  single  arm,  either  in- 
fantry or  cavalry,  the  regulations  permit  the  formation 
of  mixed  brigades,  of  infantry  and  light  cavalry,  more 
specially  destined  for  the  service  of  advanced-guards. 

There  are  various  appendages  belonging  to  and 
following  armies ;  such  as  the  parks  of  artillery,  bridge 
trains,  engineer-parks,  ambulances,  and  wagons  for  the 
transportation  of  hospital  stores,  provisions,  clothing, 
&c.,  the  latter  belonging  to  the  service  or  drawn  from 
the  country  by  requisition.  An  army  is  also  accom- 
panied by  a  special  reserve  of  heavy  cavalry ;  but  a 
Gorj^'S  d'armee  does  not  have  this  great  accessory.  For 
its  supply,  the  army  also  possesses  large  and  small 
depots.  The  former  are  established  at  places  so  far 
from  the  scene  of  active  operations  as  not  to  be  subject 
to  frequent  removal ;  the  latter  exist  with  the  army 
itself,  and  embrace,  as  far  as  possible,  the  establishments 
for  convalescents  and  the  hospitals,  and  occupy  posi- 
tions where  they  may  serve  as  halting  places  and 
points  of  reunion  for  the  detachments  rejoining  the 
army  ;  so  that  any  disposable  men  may  be  added  to 
these  detachments,  and  those  may  be  taken  out  of 
them  who  have  become  disabled  for  continued  service. 

2.  Commands. — The  command  of  an  army  or  of 
a  Gooys  Warmee  in  the  French  service,  devolves  either 
upon  a  marshal  or  a  general  of  division,  who  re- 
ceives from  the  Emperor  a  temporary  commission  as 


OEGANIZATION   OF   ACTIVE   AEMIES.  179 

commandant-in-cJiief  in  the  first  case,  or  commandant 
of  (a  particular)  coiys  d'^armee  in  the  latter.  The  chief 
of  the  army  designates  the  commandant  of  each  wing, 
of  the  centre,  and  of  the  reserve,  whose  functions, 
being  temporary,  and  conferring  but  transitoiy  hon- 
ors, should  be  confined  to  the  direction  of  the  troops 
in  their  movements  and  upon  the  field  of  battle.  This 
temporary  command  is  given  to  a  general  of  division, 
the  principal  tactical  fraction*  being,  however,  re- 
served to  the  commandant-in-chief  Every  division  is 
commanded  by  a  general  of  division ;  every  brigade 
by  a  general  of  brigade.  Usually,  the  distribution  of 
the  general  officers  is  made  by  the  Minister  of  War  at 
the  time  of  the  composition  of  the  army.  In  the  field, 
where  many  commands  become  vacant,  it  would  often 
produce  too  great  delay  to  wait  for  the  orders  of  the 
Minister  to  provide  for  them ;  and  it  would  be  impru- 
dent to  fill  them  by  appointments  according  to  senior- 
ity, as  was  still  done  in  the  time  of  Louis  XIV.,  until 
the  ordinance  of  February  1,  l'r03,f  notwithstanding 
the  example  of  Turenne  and  Catinat,  who,  as  generals- 
in-chief,  understood  the  necessity  of  breaking  through 
the  custom.    Hence  the  fifth  article  of  the  ordinance  of 


*  "We  may  distinguish  the  fractions  of  an  army  as  tactical  fractions 
and.  fractions  of  organization.  Each  wing,  as  well  as  the  centre,  is  a  tac- 
tical fraction ;  each  corps  cVarmee,  each  division,  each  hrigade,  is  a  frac- 
tion of  organization ;  the  reserve  is  at  once  a  tactical  fraction  and  a  frac- 
tion of  organization. 

t  By  this  ordinance,  Louis  XIV.  "  wills  and  requires  that  the  general 
of  each  army  shall  choose  from  among  the  lieutenant-generals  therein 
serving,  those  whom  he  may  judge  ft  for  the  command  of  the  two  wings 
of  cavalry,  and  those  who  should  command  the  corps  of  infantry." 


180  COMBINATION   OF   THE   ARMS. 

May  3,  1832,  in  relation  to  service  in  the  field,  author- 
izes the  commandant-in-chief  of  the  army  to  effect, 
during  the  course  of  the  campaign^  the  changes  which 
losses  or  the  good  of  the  service  render  necessary. 

The  functions  of  the  commandant-in-chief  are  facil- 
itated by  the  existence  of  the  various  fractions  of  the 
army,  since  he  communicates  only  with  the  generals 
who  command  those  fractions ;  and  consequently  has 
more  time  and  greater  latitude  for  combining  his 
plan  of  operations.  Nevertheless,  he  would  not  be 
equal  to  the  multiplied  exigencies  and  responsibilities 
of  his  command  (at  the  present  day  esj)ecially,  when 
a  general-in-chief  is  overburdened  with  written  papers 
by  the  somewhat  excessive  complications  of  admin- 
istrative practices),  unless  he  were  assisted  by  a 
chief  of  staff,  an  intendant,  a  general  commanding  the 
artillery,  and  a  general  commanding  the  engineers. 

The  chief  of  staff  "^^  of  an  army  is  either  a  general 
of  division  or  a  general  of  brigade.  He  is  assisted  by 
a  general  of  brigade  or  a  colonel  of  the  staff,  called 
sub-chief  of  staff.  In  a  corps  Warmee^  unless  its  im- 
portance requires  it,  there  will  be  no  sub-chief  of  staff. 
Officers  of  the  staff  corps,  of  various  grades,  serve  as 
aids  to  the  chief  of  staff,  whose  functions,  in  the  French 
army,  are  defined  by  the  eighth  article  of  the  ordi- 
nance of  May  3,  1832,  to  be  as  follows : 

"  1st.  To  transmit  the  orders  of  the  general,  and 
to  execute  those  he  receives  himself  for  detached 
duties,  such  as  the  establishment  of  camps,  recon- 

*  If  several  armies  be  combined  to  form  one  grand  armj,  the  chief 
of  staff  temporarily  takes  the  title  of  major  general  in  France. 


OKGAJ^IZATION   OF   ACTIVE   AKMIES.  181 

noissances,  inspections  of  posts  and  all  other  parts 
of  tlie  service. 

"  2d.  To  correspond  with  tlie  commandants  of  ar- 
tillery and  engineers,  and  with  the  intendants  *  in 
order  to  keep  the  general  correctly  informed  of  the 
condition  of  the  various  branches  of  the  service. 

"  3d.  To  maintain  constant  correspondence  with 
the  different  corps,  and  to  have  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  their  condition  in  detail. 

"  4th.  To  furnish  to  the  commandant-in-chief  and 
to  the  Minister  of  War  tabular  statements  of  the 
strength  and  position  of  corps  and  posts,  reports  of 
marches  and  other  operations;  in  a  word,  all  neces- 
sary information." 

There  is  attached  to  each  army  and  to  each  corps 
cVarrnee  a  military  intendant,  who  has  under  his  orders 
sub-intendants  or  deputies,  employes  of  the  various 
administrative  services,  and  troops  belonging  to  the 
administrative  corps.  The  military  intendant  makes 
reports  to  the  commandant-in-chief  or  to  his  chief  of 
staff;  he  centralizes  all  the  details  of  administration 
and  accounts  of  the  army,  and  also  those  of  the  corps 
and  detachments  composing  it,  except  in  what  relates 
to  the  materiel  of  the  artillery  and  engineers. 

In  each  army,  and  in  each  corps  cVarmeej  a  general 
officer  commands  the  artillery,  and  another  general  offi- 
cer commands  the  engineers.  Each  has  under  his  or- 
ders a  certain  number  of  officers  of  his  arm,  among 
others  a  colonel  or  lieutenant-colonel,  chief  of  staff  of 

*  Tlie  military  intendance  of  the  French  army  embraces  the  quarter- 
master's, subsistence,  medical,  clothing,  and  pay  departments. — Tr. 


182  COMBINATION    OF   THE   ARMS. 

the  arm,  and  a  superior  officer  as  director  of  the  park, 
together  with  the  number  of  guards  and  employes, 
indicated  by  the  wants  of  the  service.  He  centralizes 
all  the  details  relating  to  the  personnel  and  the  mate- 
riel of  his  arm. 

The  system  which  exists  in  each  army  and  in  each 
corps  d'armeej  is  reproduced,  for  the  same  reason,  in 
each  division.  To  assist  him  in  his  command,  and  to 
leave  him  more  libei'ty  with  respect  to  military  opera- 
tions, the  general  of  division  has  near  his  person  a 
colonel  of  etat-majo7\  who  is  chief  of  staff  of  the  divi- 
sion, an  officer  of  artillery,  an  officer  of  engineers,  and 
a  military  sub-intendant.  The  officers  of  artillery  and 
eno-ineers  attached  to  a  division  receive  the  orders  of 
the  general  with  whom  they  are  employed,  either  di- 
rectly or  through  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  division. 
They  should  communicate  to  that  general  the  orders 
they  may  receive  respecting  their  specialty  from  the 
general  or  superior  officers  of  their  particular  arm. 

We  will  add  that"  all  the  general  officers  attached 
to  an  active  army,  or  to  a  corps  d'armee  of  any 
kind,  have,  in  addition,  a  certain  number  of  aides- 
de-camp  and  orderly  officers,  proportioned  to  their 
grade. 

Among  the  officers  attached  to  the  general  head- 
quarters— that  is  to  say,  the  quarters  occupied  by  the 
commandant-in-chief — -we  should  mention  three  in 
particular  :  1st.  The  Commandant  of  the  general  head- 
quarters. This  is  a  superior  officer  of  the  staff,  charged 
with  establishing  the  quarters,  placing  the  posts  and 
guards,  and,  in   conjunction   with   the   gendarmery, 


I 


ORGANIZATIONS'   OF   ACTIVE   AEMIES.  183 

preserving  order  at  headquarters.  2d.  The  Pro- 
vost-marshalrgeneral.  This  title  is  given  to  the  com- 
mandant of  the  brigades  of  gensdarmes  attached  to 
the  army.  His  province  is  to  protect  the  inhabitants 
of  the  country  from  pillage  and  violence ;  to  maintain 
good  police;  to  institute  proceedings  against  those 
suspected  of  crimes  or  misdemeanors  committed  with- 
in the  precincts  of  the  army,  or  of  C07j:)s  d'armee ; 
to  pursue  and  arrest  the  offenders ;  to  watch  all 
the  non-military  persons  or  camp  followers ;  *  to 
follow  the  columns  on  a  march  and  bring  up  the 
stragglers.  He  reports  daily  to  the  commandant-in- 
chief  and  receives  his  orders ;  and  every  week  makes 
a  report  of  his  service  to  the  chief  of  staff.  Besides 
these  duties,  which  are  assigned  to  him  by  arjny 
regulations,  the  provost-marshal-general  (also  the  pro- 
vost of  each  division),  since  the  promulgation  of  the 
Code  de  justice  militaire^  exercises  jurisdiction  over 
the  territory  occupied  by  the  army  (or  the  division), 
and  assisted  by  a  clerk  (a  non-commissioned  officer  or 
corporal  of  his  arm),  decides  of  himself  in  all  penal 
cases  involving  a  penalty  of  not  more  than  six  months' 
imprisonment,  or  a  fine  of  not  more  than  200  francs  ; 
and  in  all  cases  of  claims  for  damages  which  do  not 
exceed  150  francs.f  3d.  The  Wagon-master  of  the 
general  headquarters,  a  superior  officer  charged  with 
the  direction  of  the  equipages  following  the  army,  and 

*  The  provosts  can  inflict  a  fine  to  the  amount  of  100  francs.  (Service 
en  camjmgne^  art.  175.) 

t  Code  de  justice  militaire  pour  Varmee  de  terre,  du  9  juin  1857, 
art.  52,  75. 


184  COJVIBINATION   OF   THE   ARMS. 

the  preservation  of  order  among  tlie  wagons  and  do- 
mestics of  tlie  staff. 

There  are  also  connected  witli  each  division  a 
commandant  of  headquarters,  a  provost,  and  a  wagon- 
master — officers  of  a  grade  inferior  to  that  of  the  offi- 
cers who  hold  similar  positions  in  the  general  head- 
quarters. 

3.  standing  Armies. — ^In  Ranee,  active  armies 
are  formed  only  in  case  of  war,  or,  as  exceptions, 
upon  certain  points  of  the  national  domain,  when 
the  security  of  the  interior  is  in  danger.  This  pol- 
icy, which  is  also  that  of  Austria,  leaves  the  enemy 
uncertain  as  to  the  mode  of  organization  which  is 
to  be  finally  adopted  in  the  armies  formed  to  oppose 
him ;  and,  besides,  reserves  the  power  of  varying  this 
mode,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  war  to  be  un- 
dertaken. 

Eussia  and  Prussia  have  adopted  a  different  policy, 
and,  both  in  peace  and  in  war,  keep  their  troops  con- 
stantly formed,  in  co?ys  d'^armee,  divisions,  and  bri- 
gades. Thus  the  Prussian  army,  besides  the  Koyal 
Guards,  and  the  brigades  garrisoning  Mayence  and 
Luxemburg  (fortified  places  of  the  Germanic  Con- 
federation), consists  of  eight  permanent  corps  dJarmee^ 
each  embracing  two  divisions  of  infantry,  two  brigades 
of  cavalry,  one  regiment  of  artillery,  and  one  battalion 
of  engineers.  Under  this  system,  the  troops  complete 
their  education  better,  especially  with  respect  to  com- 
bined mancBUvres,  become  accustomed  to  the  generals 
who  command  them,  and  are  eminently  qualified  to 


ORGANIZATION   OF   ACTIVE   ARMIES. 


185 


act  promptly  or  to  repel  an  invasion ;  but  they  remain 
a  long  time  in  the  same  garrisons,  and  this  is  a  posi- 
tive disadvantage,  on  account  of  the  habits  which  the 
soldiers  may  there  acquire.  The  troops  who  fre- 
quently travel,  as  they  do  in  France,  and  are  therefore 
not  accustomed  to  any  fixed  garrisons,  are,  in  conse- 
(j[uence,  more  easily  mobilized. 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 

MARCHES. 

The  army  being  organized,  it  is  next  to  be  trans- 
ported from  the  place  of  its  formation  to  a  point  more 
favorable  for  its  action.  This  requires  a  march  of  a 
greater  or  less  number  of  days. 

1.  Marches  of  Concentration. — ^The  march  will 
be  of  easy  and  simple  execution  when  it  takes  place 
far  from  the  enemy,  and  is  thus  performed  as  a  mardi 
of  concentration.  The  army  is  then  put  in  motion  by 
small  fractions,  and  moves  upon  several  parallel  routes. 
Each  fraction  will  march  in  open  lines  on  each  side  of 
the  road  to  leave  a  free  circulation ;  will  make  a  grand 
halt  at  about  the  middle  of  the  march ;  will  travel 
from  six  to  ten  leagues  per  day,  and  will  observe  the 
most  perfect  discipline  in  any  town  where  it  may  be 
lodged  for  the  night  or  receive  its  daily  supplies. 

All  marches  should  be  performed  by  day ;  for  a 
night  march,  especially  from  midnight  to  four  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  gains  nothing  that  is  not  more  than 
lost  by  the  relatively  greater  fatigue  suffered  by  the 


I 


I 


MARCHES.  187 

soldiers.  The  soldier  needs  at  least  six  liours  of  sleep : 
to  assert  the  contrary  is  to  utter  nonsense. 

A  march  should  be  conducted  slowly,  in  order  to 
save  the  strength  of  the  troops.  Assuming  that  there 
is  sufficient  time,  one  hour  at  least  should  be  allowed 
for  a  league,  including  the  short  halt  necessary  after 
each  league,  and  an  additional  half  to  three  quarters 
of  an  hour  should  bfe  allowed  for  the  principal  halt. 

Slowness,  and  especially  uniformity  of  gait,  are 
equally  important  for  cavalry.  When  far  from  the 
enemy,  this  arm  need  not  govern  its  rate  of  motion 
by  that  of  the  infantry. 

2.  Marches  of  IWaiaceiivre. — If  the  march  takes 
place  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  it  assumes  the  char- 
acter of  a  march  of  manoeuvre^  and  requires  addi- 
tional precautions.  Its  disposition  should  be  based 
upon  the  principle  of  being  always  in  a  condition  to 
check  and  to  repel  an  attack.  With  this  object,  in- 
stead of  proceeding  in  fractions  distributed  on  each 
side  of  a  road,  the  army  will  still  march  upon  several 
routes,*  but  grouped  on  each  route  in  column  of  one 
section  at  least,  or  one  division  at  most.  Each  column 
should  be  sufficiently  strong  in  front  to  resist,  and 
should  at  the  same  time  be  so  short  that  the  front 
and  rear  can  support  each  other.  While  beyond  the 
circle  of  activity  of  the  enemy,  the  column  may  ad- 
vance at  full  distance,f  but  within  this  circle,  or,  so 

*  111  order  to  subsist  more  easily  bj  requisitions,  and  also  to  keep  the 
enemy  in  uncertainty. 

t  It  is  assumed  that  the  column  then  occupies  the  same  space  as  in 
order  of  battle. 


188  COMBII^ATION   OF   THE   ARMS. 

to  speak,  under  tlie  cannon  of  the  enemy,  and  pre- 
paring for  combat,*  it  will  gain  ground  in  more  com- 
pact order. 

In  a  mixed  column,  tlie  infantry,  accompanied  by 
its  artillery,  march  at  the  head ;  and  the  cavalry 
always  in  the  rear.  A  different  arrangement  would 
compromise  the  whole  column  in  the  case  of  a  strong 
attack  on  the  front,  as  was  proved  in  the  case  of  the 
central  column  of  the  French  forces  at  the  battle  of 
the  Trebbia  (June  19,  1799). 

The  number  of  columns  will  often  vary,  according 
to  the  kind  of  troops,  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and 
the  end  to  be  attained.  Their  distance  will  be  calcu- 
lated so  as  to  permit  easy  communication  between 
them,  and  also  of  their  reunion  ;  and  for  this  purpose, 
the  chief  of  one  column  should  know  the  effective 
force  and  the  direction  of  the  other  columns.f 

Notwithstanding  this  multiplicity  of  columns  they 
should  not  habitually  reckon  upon  mutual  protec- 
tion, which  their  distance  and  their  specific  object 
may  prevent ;  and,  besides,  prudence  dictates  that 
each  should  rely  upon  itself  for  this  protection.  In 
this  view,  we  employ  the  ancient  and  well  known  sys- 
tem, the  result  of  experience,  of  detaching  a  small 
portion  of  the  moving  force  in  advance,  in  rear  and 
upon  the  flanks  of  the  column,  so  as  to  surround  it 
with  almost  a  continuous  chain,  as  mobile  as  the 
column  itself,  and  destined  to  parry  the  first  blows. 

*  The  place  of  combat  is  usually  reached  first  hj  the  head  of  the 
column. 

t  Service  en  camj^agne^  art.  120. 


MAKCHES.  189 

This  covering  portion  is  in  preference  chosen  from  the 
light  troops ;  it  embraces  an  advance-guard^  a  rear 
gitard^  and  flanhers. 

The  advance-guard  precedes  the  column.  It  is  of 
mixed  composition,  but  variable,  according  to  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  road  and  the  proximity  of  the  enemy ; 
it  scours  the  country  and  watches  for  any  attempted 
attack,  whether  open  or  covert,  baffles  it  or  restrains 
it,  and,  in  all  cases,  gains  time  for  the  column  to  dis- 
pose itself  for  combat.  For  this  purpose  the  advance- 
guard  also  protects  itself  by  an  advance-guard  or  some 
scouts.  It  should  also  open  the  road  or  make  it  prac- 
ticable, and  for  this  reason  a  company  of  sappers  often 
accompanies  it.  At  branch  roads,  it  will  be  careful  to 
indicate  the  direction  taken  by  landmarks,  in  order  to 
avoid  all  mistakes  and  to  point  out  the  road  to  be- 
lated soldiers  and  vehicles.  In  the  daytime  this  is 
effected  by  blazing  trees  or  tying  bundles  of  straw  to 
posts  along  the  proper  road  ;  but  at  night,  by  station- 
ing non-commissioned  officers,  who  are  successively 
relieved. 

The  commandant  of  an  advance-guard  should  pos- 
sess all  the  qualities  required  of  a  chief  of  detach- 
ment. It  is  his  duty  to  avail  himself  of  all  the  aux- 
iliary expedients  employed  in  reconnoissances,  espe- 
cially to  draw  information  from  the  guides,  from  the 
inhabitants,  and  from  prisoners ;  and  also  to  cause 
prompt  reconnoissances  to  be  made  by  the  officers 
under  his  orders.  He  turns  all  villages,  woods,  or 
defiles,  through  which  it  might  be  dangerous  to  pass ; 
levies  contributions  upon  the  villages  to  keep  his  troops 


190  COMBmATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

constantly  supplied  with  subsistence  for  two  or  three 
days ;  makes  his  grand  halt  in  a  covered  place,  sur- 
rounding it  with  sentinels  posted  upon  the  eminences 
or  on  the  roads ;  and  is  careful  during  his  march  not 
to  betray  his  approach  by  the  noise  of  trumpet  or  drum. 

The  advance-guard  will  vary  in  force  from  one 
fifth  to  one  tenth  of  the  column.  Its  distance  from 
the  column  will  be  at  least  equal  to  the  length  of  the 
column,  so  that,  even  in  the  most  unfavorable  case, 
that  is,  when  the  advance-guard  is  driven  back,  and 
does  not  succeed  in  retarding  the  approach  of  the  ene- 
my, the  rear  of  the  column  may  yet  have  time  to  re- 
join the  front,  and  also  to  come  into  line. 

The  rear-guard  closes  the  march,  and  is  smaller 
than  the  advance-guard.  Its  province  is  to  arrest  any 
adverse  detachment,  or  any  suspected  individual, 
prowling  in  the  rear  of  the  column.  It  frequently 
protects  itself  also  by  an  extreme  rear-guard.  In  a 
forward  march,  it  escorts  the  baggage,  which  is  always 
separated  from  the  body  of  the  troops,  and  brings  up 
the  stragglers.  In  a  retreat,  it  performs  the  principal 
and  most  glorious  part :  in  that  case,  relieved  of  the 
baggage,  which  then  goes  on  the  side  farthest  from 
pursuit,  it  avails  itself  of  the  resources  of  petty  w^ar- 
fare,  and  of  the  obstacles  of  the  ground,  to  paralyze 
the  forces  of  the  pursuer.  The  chief  of  the  rear- 
guard should  possess  high  qualifications :  perhaps  he 
does  not  need  to  be  as  fertile  in  invention  as  the  chief 
of  the  advance-guard,  but  he  certainly  requires  more 
energy  and  coolness.  jN'ey,  in  the  retreat  from  Eussia, 
immortalized  himself  as  the  chief  of  the  rear-guard. 


I 


MAECHES.  191 

The  flankers^'  marcli  parallel  to  the  column,  upon 
each  of  its  flanks.  They  scatter  themselves  in  groups 
of  three^  at  400  or  500  paces  from  the  road,  and  recon- 
noitre, while  protecting  themselves  behind  the  inequal- 
ities of  the  ground,  but  also  exploring  every  recess  and 
every  obstacle.  To  give  warning,  they  despatch  one 
of  their  number,  and  never  have  recourse  to  discharg- 
ing their  guns,  except  in  the  case  of  a  surprise. 

We  are  now  acquainted  with  the  order  of  march 
of  a  separate  column  :  let  us  return  to  an  assemblage 
of  columns — an  army. 

This  assemblage  will  be  preceded  by  a  general  ad- 
vance-guard, relatively  to  all  the  columns ;  each  of  these 
still  requires  its  special  advance-guard.  There  will  also 
be  a  general  rear-guard. 

We  may  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  general  di- 
rection about  to  be  adopted  by  an  army  (or  by  a 
column),  by  ordering  the  preparation  of  provisions 
as  if  for  a  movement  in  another  direction.  This  ruse, 
to  which  every  one  may  resort,  is  always  effective. 

The  chief  of  a  column  thrown  forward  for  a  spe- 
cial purpose  in  advance  of  an  army,  even  beyond  the 
general  advance-guard,  will  scatter  along  his  route 
small  posts  of  cavalry,  for  the  purpose  of  conveying 
his  messages  promptly ;  and  when  he  despatches  an 
officer  upon  a  mission  to  the  general-in-chief,  he  should 
also  send  after  him  two  others,  at  intervals  of  a  half 
hour  from  each  other,  as  the  first  might  lose  his  way.f 

*  Do  not  confound  these  flankers  with  tlie  skirmishers,  which  the 
advance  and  rear-guards  detach  for  their  own  security, 
t  Letter  of  Napoleon  to  Marmont,  July  11,  1809. 


192 


COMBLN^ATIOIS"   OF   THE   AKMS. 


MAECH  OP  MAN(EU7EE  BY  THE  FEONT. 


£  Adyance-guard. 


■  7  E  ear-guard. 


d 


Marches  of  manoeuvre  of  an  army  are  executed 
either  by  the  front  or  by  the  flank. 

In  the  first  case,  the  columns  remain  grouped  to- 
gether, adopt  a  close  formation,  and  follow  parallel 

routes,  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  not  to  occupy 
much  more  space  on 
the  front  of  the 
marcW  than  the  ex- 
tent of  the  front  of 
the  army  in  order  of 
battle;  for  an  attack 
then  presents  few 
dangers,  even  when  it 
comes  from  the  side. 
In  fact,  if  this  combi- 
nation of  ^^  columns,  instead  of  continuing  its  march 
in  the  direction  ah^  is  suddenly  obliged  to  take  the  per- 
pendicular direction  <?cZ,  it  still  has  an  advance-guard  in 
the  column  2,  a  rear-guard  in  the  column  6,  and  two 
flanking  corps,  in  the  columns  1  and  T  ;  and  the  case 
would  be  the  same  for  the  directions  ha  and  dc.  Thus, 
with  this  arrangement,  a  sudden  change  in  either  di- 
rection becomes  easy,  and  the  possibility  of  such 
changes  sometimes  constitutes  the  whole  secret  of 
marches.  The  march  of  the  Austro-Eussian  army 
under  Kutusoff,  from  Olmutz  to  Wischau  and  Aus- 
terlitz,  in  1805,  is  an  example  of  this  arrangement. 

In  the  second  case,  in  which  a  march  by  the  flank 
is  vigorously  executed  in  a  single  and  long  column, 

*  We  Q.2^  front  of  the  march  the  space  between  the  columns  2  and  6. 


I 


MAKCHES.  tH^^  193 

either  to  move  along  the  positions  of  the  enemy  or  to 
traverse  a  narrow  and  unavoidable  route,  in  order  to 
arrive  promptly  before  a  town,  or  upon  the  field  of 
battle,  the  army  in  movement  runs  greater  danger; 
since,  by  the  manoeuvre  itself,  it  is  already  in  a  state 
of  crisis,  and  in  this  situation  exposes  its  flank.  Never- 
theless, these  dangers  are  sometimes  voluntarily  in- 
curred, principally  with  a  view  to  gaining  time.  In 
this  event,  besides  observing  the  precaution  of  form- 
ing at  full  distances,  to  preserve  exactly  the  inter- 
vals, and  to  conceal  the  march  under  the  cover  of 
night,  or  of  a  fog,  it  will  be  best  to  place  on  the  men- 
aced side,  at  about  1,000  yards  from  the  column,  a 
flanking  corps,  marching,  as  much  as  possible  paral- 
lel to  it,  and  possessing  its  own  protecting  auxiliaries, 
namely,  an  advance-guard,  a  rear-guard,  and  flankers. 
Frederic  the  Great  usually  fell  upon  his  enemies  by  a 
march  by  the  flank,  and  he  succeeded  by  this  method, 
because  he  employed  soldiers  expert  in  manoeuvres 
against  troops  of  little  mobility ;  nevertheless,  at  Kol- 
lin  (June  18,  1757),  a  march  of  this  kind,  executed 
under  the  fire  of  the  Austrians,  was  fatal  to  him,  in 
spite  of  the  tenacious  energy  of  his  foot  soldiers,  who 
returned  seven  times  in  succession  to  the  charge. 

Whether  made  by  the  front  or  flank,  marches  of 
manoeuvres  must  be  rapid.  Without  the  celebrated 
march  of  Massena's  division,  running  on  the  13th  of 
January  from  Verona  to  Rivoli,  fighting  on  the  14th 
by  the  side  of  the  soldiers  of  Joubert,  returning  on  the 
15th  upon  Mantua,  and  fighting  on  the  16th  at  Favo- 
rita,  Bonaparte  would  not  have  obtained  his  two  final 
13 


194  combi]S"atio:n^  of  the  arms. 

victories,  and  so  happily  terminated  tlie  campaign  of 
1796.  Fifteen  years  later,  in  the  month  of  April, 
1809,  during  the  operations  about  Eatisbonne,  if  the 
army  of  the  Archduke  Charles  had  not  been  so  slow 
in  his  offensive  operations  amidst  our  scattered  forces, 
and  had  not  taken  three  days  (from  the  19th  to  the 
22d  of  April)  to  move  about  six  leagues  (from  Rohr 
to  Eckmiihl),  the  first  part  of  the  campaign  would 
have  resulted  more  favorably  to  his  arms. 

It  is  principally  when  the  march  of  manoeuvre  is 
directed  against  an  enemy  wholly  defeated,  and  be- 
comes, in  consequence,  a  pursuit,  that  rapidity  becomes 
indispensable, — provided,  be  it  well  understood,  that 
this  rapidity  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  strength  and 
prudence  which  it  is  essential  to  preserve  in  the 
presence  of  an  energetic  though  vanquished  enemy, 
capable  of  turning  again  and  assuming  the  offensive. 

The  march  of  the  vanquished  party,  who  is  retiring 
— in  a  word,  the  retreat — is  also  a  march  of  manoeuvre. 
This,  indeed,  is  implied  in  what  we  have  said.  But 
to  constitute  a  retreat,  we  must  not  forget  that  there 
must  be  a  series  of  retrograde  marches.  Napoleon,  on 
the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  certainly  did  not 
beat  a  retreat,  but  he  nevertheless  made  one  retro- 
grade march,  in  order  to  entice  the  Austrians  and  Eus- 
sians  upon  the  battle-field  which  he  had  selected  and 
studied !  We  have  above  indicated  the  important 
parts  to  be  performed  by  the  general,  and  the  particu- 
lar rear-guards,  which,  in  this  case,  become  the  head 
of  the  army  or  of  the  column. 

We  will  add  that,  to  have  any  chance  of  success  in 


MAECHES. 


195 


retreat,  we  must  carefully  guard  the  flanks,  as  being 
more  vulnerable  than  in  a  forward  movement ;  and 
endeavor  to  preserve  a  certain  distance  in  advance 
of  the  rear-guard,  to  gain  which  the  latter  will  give 
special  battle,  as  was  done  by  the  prince  Bagration  at 
Hollabrunn,  November  16,  1805. 

We  will  confine  our  remarks  upon  marches  to 
these  brief  hints,  as  we  do  not  intend  to  enter  upon 
strategy,  which  would  exceed  the  limits  prescribed  for 
these  Mements, 


r 


CHAPTEK    THIED. 

BATTLES. 

1.  Primitive  Order  of  Battle. — After  a  marcli  de- 
signed for  tlie  purpose,  or  in  case  of  a  fortuitous  ren- 
conter,  an  army  meets  the  enemy  and  gives  Hm  battle. 
How  is  it  to  be  disposed  for  tlie  action  ?  This  we 
are  now  about  to  consider,  at  first  from  a  theoretical 
point  of  view,  under  the  most  ordinary  circumstances, 
and  upon  the  supposition  that  the  field  of  combat  is 
perfectly  horizontal,  and  free  from  all  kinds  of  obstacles. 

In  preparing  for  battle,  the  whole  army  is  drawn 
up  in  three  distinct  masses,  destined  to  take  part  in 
the  contest  at  different  times — a  first  line,  a  second 
line,  and  a  reserve. 

The  first  line  brings  on  the  action.  The  mission 
of  the  second  line  is  to  afford  the  first  both  moral  and 
material  support :  moral  support,  by  inspiring  confi- 
dence by  its  simple  presence ;  material  support,  either 
by  offering  a  rallying  point,  or  by  taking  its  place  in 
the  contest.  Therefore,  from  the  instant  when  the 
first  line  becomes  engaged,  we  should,  in  general, 
avoid  withdrawing  the  troops  of  the  second  line  from 
their  position,  to  take  them  to  another ;  for  this  would 


BATTLES.  19.7 

botli  discourage  the  combatants,  who  would  no  longer 
feel  themselves  supported,  and  would  embolden  the 
enemy,  who  would  take  the  movement  for  the  begin- 
ning of  a  retreat.  The  duty  of  the  reserve  has  already 
been  explained. 

According  to  its  particular  destination,  each  of  the 
masses  of  the  order  of  battle  will  have  a  distinct  for- 
mation. The  fii^st  line  will  be  deployed,  for  it  is  ne- 
cessary that  it  offer  a  large  front,  with  the  smallest 
possible  intervals ;  for  large  intervals  would  be,  in  fact, 
breaches,  and  would  weaken  its  resistance.  The  sec- 
ond line  will  usually  be  formed  in  columns  by  bat- 
talions at  deploying  distance,  in  which  form  it  will  be 
better  prepared  to  advance  to  assist  the  first  line.  But, 
if  the  position  of  the  second  line  upon  the  battle-field 
is  such  as  to  expose  it  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery, it  will  be  better  to  deploy  it,*  since,  when  ex- 
tended upon  a  front  of  little  depth,  it  will  suffer  less 
from  the  projectiles.  The  reserve  not  being  required 
for  immediate  combat,  should  always  remain  grouped 
under  the  hand  of  the  general-in-chie£  It  will  there- 
fore be  massed  in  columns,  by  brigades,  in  rear  of 
the  second  line. 

The  next  question  is,  at  what  distance  from  each 
other  should  the  three  masses  of  this  primitive  order 
of  battle  be  established  ? 

*  At  the  battle  of  Moscow  a  brigade  of  the  second  line  lost  500  men 
in  ten  minutes,  because  it  preserved  the  order  in  column.  (Marbot, 
Itemarques  critiques  sur  les  considerations  sur  Vart  de  la  guerre^  p.  436.) 
In  similar  circumstances,  at  the  battle  of  Konieh  (December  21,  1832), 
Ibrahim  Pacha  saved  his  troops  by  deploying  the  second  line. 


198  COMBINATION   OF   THE   ARMS. 

Supposing  the  field  of  battle  to  be  wholly  free 
from  all  obstacles,  the  local  circumstances  will  be  the 
same  upon  the  whole  extent  of  the  front,  and  the  sec- 
ond line  should  hold  itself  at  a  distance  of  300  yards 
in  rear  of  the  first.  At  this  distance  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  will  probably  reach  it  with  difficulty,  and 
yet  it  will  be  sufficiently  near*  to  give  effective  sup- 
port to  the  first  line.  The  same  interval  is  equally 
applicable  to  both  infantry  and  cavalry.  If,  however, 
the  plateau  on  which  the  combat  takes  place  is  of  such 
small  dimensions  that  the  second  line,  at  a  distance 
of  300  yards  from  the  first,  should  find  itself  near  the 
extreme  boundary,  this  distance  may  be  reduced,  but 
not  beyond  the  limit  that  would  bring  the  line  under 
the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

As  the  reserve  should  remain  fresh  and  intact  un- 
til the  decisive  moment,  while  the  lines  are  engaged, 
conjointly  or  separately,  it  will  be  posted  at  1,000  or 
1,200  yards  from  the  second  line.' 

The  cavalry  should  never  form  the  centre  of  the 
line  of  battle,  for  all  their  power  depends  upon  move- 
ment, and  in  that  position  they  could  neither  move 
forward  nor  backward  without  breakino^  the  line.  Be- 
sides,  as  they  do  not  make  use  of  their  fire-arms,  they 
are  not  so  capable  as  infantry  of  standing  the  fire  of 
the  enemy's  musketry  or  cannon  without  stirring. 
For  these  reasons,  they  are  usually  placed   on  the 

*  At  the  battle  of  PJo-Secco,  or,  rather,  at  the  battle  known  by  that 
name,  the  Spaniards  were  beaten,  in  spite  of  their  bravery,  in  conse- 
quence of  having  placed  their  second  line  1,400  or  1,500  yards  in  rear  of 
the  first. 


I 


BATTLES.  199 

flanks,  where  they  have  the  best  opportunity  to  start 
quickly  (^pendre  carrier e)^^  and  to  throw  themselves 
in  every  direction  for  attacking  and  turning  the  ene- 
my's flanks.  In  this  position,  too,  they  serve  as  a  sup- 
port to  the  extremities  of  the  line  of  infantry.  As  an 
exception,  however,  the  cavalry  may  form  the  centre 
of  a  line  of  battle,  when  the  two  bodies  of  the  infan- 
try placed  upon  the  wings  are  suflaciently  near  to  each 
other  to  give  adequate  protection,  by  their  fire,  to  the 
cavalry  placed  between  them,  and  thus  still  to  keep 
the  different  parts  of  the  army  united.f 

The  artillery  of  the  first  line  will  occupy  with 
strong  batteries  many  positions,  from  150  to  200 
yards  in  advance  of  the  front,  opposite  the  great  in- 
tervals of  the  order  of  battle :  to  increase  this  dis- 
tance would  expose  the  artillery  to  be  captured ;  to 
diminish  it  would  render  the  fire  of  the  artillery  dan- 
gerous to  the  infantry  posted  in  its  rear.  The  artil- 
lery of  the  second  line  will  wait  in  column  in  rear  of 
the  flanks  and  intervals  of  this  line ;  the  artillery  of 
the  reserve  will  remain  close  to  the  main  body  of  the 
reserve. 

The  parks,  ambulances,  and.  other  accessories,  will 
be  posted  in  a  safe  place  in  rear  of  the  reserve,  and 
covered  by  troops  of  the  rear-guard. 

For  the  facility  of  command,  and  the  entire  inde- 


*  That  is,  to  assume  the  charging  distance  of  about  300  yards  from 
the  point  to  be  attacked. 

t  Ternay,  Traite  de  Tactique^  t.  i.,  p.  24G.  We  may  add  that  this 
may  also  be  done  upon  a  contracted  battle-field,  when  the  wings  of  the 
position  are  formed  by  villages,  as  at  Essliug. 


200  COMBmATION   OF   THE   ARMS. 

pendence  of  the  lines,  the  troops  of  the  same  division 
will  generally  form  a  part  of  the  same  line,  especially 
the  infantry  troops. 

Such  are  the  principles  according  to  which  an 
army,  whatever  its  force,  is  drawn  up,  according  to 
the  primitive  order  of  battle ;  and  it  is  only  necessary 
to  add  that,  if  the  army  contains  several  divisions,  or 
corps  cParmee^  care  must  be  taken  to  leave  intervals 
between  them,  proportioned  to  their  effective  force, 
and  the  number  of  cannon  to  be  employed  in  front  of 
the  line  of  battle. 

In  the  following  figure  of  the  primitive  order  of 
battle,  we  give  a  greater  development  to  the  second 
line  than  the  first,  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  first, 
both  by  infantry  and  cavalry. 

PKIMITIVE  OEDEE  OF  BATTLE. 


A 


tt  tt 

CZ]  13   EH  ^  E!]  IS  13 


This  primitive  order  of  battle  is  in  reality  but  a 
diagram  to  regulate  the  position  and  the  disposition 
of  the  various  elements  of  the  army — merely  an  order 


BATTLES.  201 

of  review^  from  wliicli  innumerable  circumstances 
in  war  may  often  compel  us  to  depart.  Accidents 
of  ground,  tlie  superiority  of  tlie  enemy  in  cav- 
alry or  in  artillery,  the  defective  composition  of  the 
army  itself,  may  force  the  general-in-chief  to  adopt  a 
less  symmetrical  order  of  battle ;  but  in  all  cases  he 
must  save  himself  a  reserve,  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
draw  up  his  forces  upon  two  lines,  in  addition  to  the 
reserve,  even  when  it  might  be  necessary  for  that  pur- 
pose to  reduce  the  extent  of  the  front  which  he  pre- 
sents to  the  enemy. 

2.  Orders  of  Battle. — Whatever  the  number  of 
lines  of  an  order  of  battle,  it  is  useful  to  know  the 
various  figures  that  order  may  assume,  and  any  good 
reasons  for  such  dispositions  of  troops.^  The  forms 
of  these  figures  will  be  more  readily  understood  by 
tracing  a  single  line  to  represent  each  of  the  opposing 
orders  of  battle. 

The  various  figures  may  be  reduced  to  four  prin- 
cipal ones : 

1st.  Parallel  order, — When  the  two  armies  are 
drawn  up  parallel  to  each  other  upon  the  whole  line. 

PAEALLEL  OEDEE. 


Assailant. 


the  order  is  the  simplest  of  all ;  the  assailing  army  is 
everywhere  equally  weak,  everywhere  equally  strong, 


202  COMBIN-ATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

and  there  is  notliing  to  indicate  tlie  point  upon  whicli 
its  first  efforts  will  be  directed. 

This  was  the  habitual  order  of  battle  of  the  first 
nations  of  antiquity,  among  whom  the  art  of  war  was 
not  far  advanced ;  but  it  is  used  even  at  the  present 
day,  upon  the  defensive,  when  the  object  is  to  bar 
the  wav  of  an  assailant. 

Sometimes,  in  this  order,  the  centre  of  the  assailant 
is  strengthened,  and  presents  a  column  instead  of  one 
or  two  lines ;  or  a  wing  may  receive  an  increase  of 
troops,  or  else  have  a  particular  corps  perpendicular 
to,  and  in  front  of  the  line,''^  forming  a  crotchety  or  L. 
In  the  latter  two  cases,  the  order  approximates  to  the 
following,  and  possesses  several  of  its  properties. 

2d.  Ohlique  order, — The  assailant  advances  one 
wing,  the  right,  for  instance,  and  refuses  the  other,  so 
that  he  keeps  the  whole  line  of  his  adversary  in  check, 
and  yet  engages  but  a  small  portion  of  his  troops. 
This  is,  consequently,  the  most  suitable  order  for  an 
army  of  inferior  force,  which  thus  has  its  first  reserve 
in  the  wing  refused. 

OBLIQUE  OEDER. 


Assailant. 


In  reality,  excepting  the  case  of  an  attack  by  the 
centre,  almost  every  offensive  order  of  battle  partakes 

*  The  same  order  in  rear  of  tlie  line  is  called  apotence. 


BATTLES.  /  203 

of  the  nature  of  tlie  oblique,  for  it  is  very  rare  that 
one  portion  of  the  line  does  not  attack  before  another. 

Epaminondas  at  Leuctra  and  at  Mantinsea,  Caesar 
at  Pharsalia,  Gustavus  Adolphus  at  Leipsic,  Frederic 
at  several  battles,  and  especially  at  Leuthen,  Bona- 
parte at  Marengo,  employed  the  oblique  order. 

If  the  obliquity  of  the  assailing  line  is  so  great  as 
to  make  this  line  form  a  right  angle  with  the  front  of 
the  adversary,  the  order  of  battle  takes  the  name  of 
the  perpendicular  order.  This  particular  case  of  the 
oblique  order  hardly  deserves  mention,  since  it  must 
always  be  of  short  duration,  the  interest  of  the  enemy 
evidently  requiring  him,  in  such  case,  to  effect  at  least 
a  partial  change  of  front. 

3d.  Concave  order, — This  order  may  be  formed  by 
echelons,  as  in  the  following  figure,  or  in  a  semicircle ; 
but  it  is  better  for  the  march  to  be  by  echelons.  Its 
advantage  consists  in  great  concentration  of  fire  ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  flanks  are  very  much  exjDosed, 
and  require  to  rest  firmly  upon  some  obstacle,  a  river, 


COXCAYE  OEDEE. 

I       I       I       I       i 


Assailant. 


for  example,  as  in  the  formation  adopted  by  the 
Archduke  Charles,  against  the  French,  in  the  battle 
of  Essling. 


204  COMBmATION   OF   THE  AEMS. 

In  general,  this  order  is  rather  the  result  of  changes 
incident  to  the  contest,  than  of  premeditated  design. 

A  successful  use  of  the  concave  order  was  made 
by  the  famous  Hannibal  at  Cannae,  by  the  Eoman 
general  Narses  at  Casilinum  (a.  d.  553)  against  the 
Franks,  and  by  the  English  at  Crecyo 

4th.  Convex  order, — ^This  order  is  formed  either 
by  echelons  on  the  centre,  or  in  a  semicircle.  It  serves 
for  the  defence  of  a  defile  or  a  bridge  indispensable  to 
a  retreat,  or  better  still  to  resist  a  concave  formation. 
Except  in  these  two  cases,  it  is  a  bad  disposition  to 
adopt  against  an  unbroken  and  compact  line,  for  its 
flanks  are  more  feeble  than  in  any  other  order,  and  if 

CONVEX  ORDEE. 


Assailant. 


the  centre  gives  way,  the  defeat  of  the  army  is  certain. 
It  has  no  chance  of  success  except  against  an  exces- 
sively extended  and  disjointed  line,  or  against  an  at- 
tack in  four  or  ^y^  columns,  firing  in  divergent  di- 
rections.* 

The  Turks  formed  for  attack  in  the  convex  order, 
almost  in  a  triangle.     After  the  first  shock,  the  two 

*  The  fire  of  the  convex  order  takes  place  in  diverging  lines  from  the 
moment  that  its  echelons  are  so  much  subdivided  and  increased  in  num- 
ber as  to  approximate  to  the  semicircular  form. 


BATTLES.  205 

wings  formed  again  and  advanced  beyond  tlie  centre, 
thereby  transforming  their  order  into  the  concave. 

In  practice,  none  of  these  orders  of  battle  could  be 
assumed  with  the  exactness  indicated  by  the  figure. 
We  endeavor  to  conform  to  the  system  indicated  as 
much  as  possible,  taking  this  system,  however,  as  a 
mere  approximation. 

We  must  not  forget  that  an  order  of  battle,  what- 
ever may  be  its  tactical  form,  its  figure,  or  its  name, 
may  be  traced  continuously ,  or  with  intervals^  either  in 
whole  or  part.  With  intervals^  it  possesses  little  so- 
lidity, and  gives  less  fire ;  and  it  should  never  be  so 
formed  unless  at  a  sufficient  distance  from  the  enemy, 
or  when  the  cavalry  forms  the  second  line  and  stands 
ready  to  charge  in  the  intervals  threatened  by  the 
enemy.  A  continuous  order  has  but  small  intervals, 
which  are  indispensable  for  the  movement  of  the 
corps  which  constitute  it. 

3.  Conduct  of  the  Battle. — ^We  have  now  learned 
the  number  of  lines  in  which  an  army  is  drawn  up 
for  combat,  and  the  figure  which  its  order  of  battle 
assumes.  There  are,  however,  yet  other  conditions  to 
be  fulfilled  to  secure  a  fair  chance  of  success  in  the 
struo^ojle. 

We  fight  a  battle  either  to  repel  an  attack  and 
preserve  a  favorable  camj),  or  voluntarily  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow,  conquer  a  region  of  country,  reach 
an  important  city  or  relieve  it,  or  to  terminate  the 

*  By  intervals  are  usually  meant  spaces  equal  to  the  front  of  the  full 
portions,  as  in  the  checker-formation. 


206  COMBINATION-   OF  THE   AKMS. 

campaign  and  secure  a  peace.  After  having,  from 
various  motives,  deferred  this  great  act,  we  must 
almost  always  come  to  it  at  last,  as  the  only  prompt 
solution  and  frequently  less  costly  than  the  prolon- 
gation of  the  war. 

He  who  wishes  to  give  battle  need  not  have  at  his 
disposition  a  number  of  troops  much  superior  to  that 
of  his  adversary ;  it  is  sufficient  that  the  character  of 
his  soldiers,  the  ground  on  which  the  contest  is  to 
take  place,  the  genius  of  his  officers,  or  any  circum- 
stances whatever,  affi)rd  him  some  probability  of 
success. 

He  will,  a  priori^  calculate  the  possible  issues  of 
the  action,  and  will  place  himself  so  as  to  augment 
them  if  he  is  victor,  and  diminish  them  if  he  is  van- 
quished. In  the  former  case,  the  best  he  can  do  is  to 
cut  the  line  of  operations  of  the  enemy ;  in  the  latter, 
it  will  be  to  preserve  his  own  line,  and  his  depots. 

The  general-in-chief  will  determine  upon  his  order 
of  battle  according  to  the  means  at  his  disposal,  and 
the  obstacles  to  be  surmounted.  He  will  especially 
adapt  it  to  the  ground,  making  it  weaker  where  the 
ground  is  strong,  and  vice  versa^  ]30sting  light  troops 
in  the  more  irregular  portions,  and  artillery  upon  the 
commanding  points ;  each,  in  short,  upon  the  locality 
where  they  can  act  at  once  with  the  greatest  facility 
and  the  greatest  energy.  As  far  as  possible,  he  will 
have  those  vulnerable  parts  of  his  formation,  the 
flanks,  supported  by  natural  obstacles,  or  he  Avill 
strengthen  them  by  bodies  of  troops,  principally  in- 
fantry troops,  for  cavalry  is  no  longer  a  protection 


BATTLES.  20T 

against  a  flanking  attack  from  the  moment  it  has  been 
compelled  to  move  at  a  gallop  and  to  charge  from  a 
distance.  If  he  refuses  one  wing,  he  will  place  his 
heavy  artillery  there  *  in  order  to  keep  the  opposing 
wing  at  a  distance  and  to  prevent  its  advancing  suffi- 
ciently to  destroy  the  effect  of  this  oblique  arrange- 
ment by  restoring  the  parallelism  of  the  two  orders 
of  battle. 

The  choice  of  the  point  of  attack  will  be  deter- 
mined by  principles  of  strategy,  tactics,  or  character 
of  ground.  If  the  enemy  keeps  one  of  his  wings  in 
proximity  to  his  lines  of  communication  or  to  his  fron- 
tier, strategy  requires  that  the  attack  should  com- 
mence upon  that  wing.  Where  the  enemy  is  near 
some  dangerous  obstacle,  which  covers  him,  do  not, 
on  any  account,  attack  him  on  the  side  nearest  that 
obstacle,  but  direct  your  blows  beyond,  so  as  to 
penetrate  the  lines  which  face  you,  and  drive  him 
headlong  upon  the  obstacle.  There  is  also  another 
case  in  which  a  tactical  principle  determines  the 
direction  of  the  attack.  Suppose  the  order  of  battle 
of  the  enemy  presents  a  void,  or  any  other  defect, 
then  you  should  doubtless  throw  yourself  upon 
this  weak  point,  always  guarding  yourself  by  small 
flanking  reserves  against  any  traps  he  may  lay  for 
you.  Finally,  a  topographic  reason  will  determine 
the  choice  of  a  point  of  attack  when  the  enemy  occu- 

*  The  same  recommendation  may  be  offered,  though  it  is  not  of  so 
much  consequence,  in  the  case  of  a  refusal  of  the  centre,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  advancing  the  middle  of  his  line,  and  opposing  a 
convex  order  to  a  concave  order. 


208  COMBES'ATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

pies  some  elevations/^  tlieii  aim  at  tlie  mastery  of  tlie 
higliest,  and  if  you  succeed,  all  Ms  other  positions 
must  fall.  A  village  or  a  wood  may  sometimes  per- 
form tlie  same  part  as  such  an  eminence,  and  will,  for 
the  same  reasons,  require  your  special  attention. 

The  general-in-chief  most  frequently  determines  his 
point  of  attack  by  a  combination  of  principles  :  thus, 
for  example,  he  may  be  governed  by  both  tactical  and 
topographical  reasons.  This  is  a  matter  of  inspira- 
tion— of  genius — much  more  than  of  experience. 

"When  his  choice  turns  upon  one  of  the  wings,  his 
object  will  be,  in  some  cases,  to  surround  his  adver- 
sary ;  in  others,  to  take  him  in  flank.  An  enveloping 
attack  should  not  be  executed  by  a  long  circuit,  for 
the  corps  intrusted  with  its  execution  may  then  get 
astray,  or  appear  too  late.  To  attempt  it  upon  several 
sides  at  once,  moreover,  divides  the  army,  and  makes 
it  weak  throughout,  an  evil  of  the  greatest  magnitude 
in  the  presence  of  a  bold  and  active  adversary.  This 
was  experienced  by  Alvinzi  in  I'? 9 6,  on  the  day  of 
Eivoli,  when  one  of  his  two  flanking  columns,  that 
of  Quasdanowich,  was  unable  to  debouch  upon  the 
plateau,  on  which  were  the  two  divisions  of  Bona- 
parte ;  and  the  other,  that  of  Lusignan,  appeared  at 
the  end  of  the  action,  when  the  French  were  already 
victorious,  and  was  itself  surrounded.  If  one's  whole 
army  is  thrown  upon  the  enemy's  flank,  it  amounts  to 
the  oblique  order  pushed  to  its  extreme  limits.  The 
enemy  usually  opposes  it  by  a  similar  manoeuvre,  and 

*  All  this  information  respecting  the  enemy  is  obtained  by  means  of  a 
preliminary  reconnoissance,  called  an  offensive  or  open  reconnoissance. 


BATTLES.  209 

attacks  the  weakened  flank.  Nevertheless,  sucli  an 
attack  may  be  greatly  favored  by  local  circumstances  : 
thus,  when  Bonaparte  was  advancing  to  attack  the 
Austrians  at  Areola,  his  movement  was  covered  both 
by  the  Adige  from  Verona  to  Konco,  and  by  the 
marshes  between  the  Adige  and  the  Alpon  :  hence  he 
threw  his  forces  upon  the  dykes  of  the  marsh,  where 
he  had  only  to  fear  a  resistance  in  front,  and  thus 
placed  himself  on  the  left  fianh  of  Alvinzi.  Even 
if  the  village  of  Areola  had  yielded  to  his  arms 
at  the  commencement  of  the  first  day  of  this  triple 
battle,  he  would  have  reached  Villa-Nova*  and  estab- 
lished himself  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  who  still  occupied 
Caldiero. 

Whatever  may  be  the  kind  of  attack,  or  the  point 
upon  which  it  is  directed,  we  must  make  our  own 
force  at  this  point  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy.  In 
bringing  our  forces  to  the  points  of  attack,  we  must 
especially  endeavor  to  cover  the  preparatory  steps, 
either  by  some  inequalities  of  the  ground,  or  by  a 
screen  of  skirmishers,  or  by  false  attacks.  Perfection 
consists  in  not  receiving  the  fire  (even  partial)  of  the 
enemy  imtil  the  action  is  engaged,  which,  however, 
is  not  always  possible.  By  concealing  our  intentions 
till  the  last  moment,  we  prevent  the  enemy  from 
making  his  first  dispositions  with  certainty. 

The  attack  being  arranged,  the  measures  to  be 
taken  by  each  independent  portion  of  the  order  of 
battle,  in  case  of  failure,  are  again  to  be  prescribed  and 

*  A  hamlet  at  the  intersection  of  the  Alpon  with  the  road  from  Vero- 
na to  Yicenza. 
14 


210  COMBINATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

explained,  and  the  posts  to  be  occupied  successively 
in  tlie  retrograde  movement  are  to  be  indicated,  some 
as  simple  points  of  transit,  others  as  rallying  points. 
The  order  of  the  day,  often  completed  by  verbal  in- 
structions, also  exhibits  each  person's  part  in  the  at- 
tack, develops  and  explains  the  principal  manoeuvre, 
sometimes  gives  the  reasons  upon  v^^hich  it  is  based, 
in  order  that  each  general  may  intelligently  perform 
his  part  toward  the  success  of  the  manoeuvre,  even 
should  circumstances  oblige  him  to  depai-t  from  his 
orders,  and  to  make  use  of  the  large  discretionary 
powers  necessarily  intrusted  to  him. 

The  general-in-chief  now  gives  the  signal,  and  the 
action  commences.  A  combat  of  skirmishers  upon  the 
front  of  nearly  the  whole  line,  and  especially  of  the 
centre,  is  the  necessary  prelude.  Under  the  screen 
formed  by  these  scattered  soldiers,  the  deployment  of 
the  first  line  is  completed,  if  it  had  not  before  been 
effected,  and  the  columns  of  attack  advance.  At  the 
moment  when  the  skirmishers,  having  advanced  some 
1,000  yards,  retire  and  unmask  the  front,  everything 
is  ready,  and  the  first  line  comes  into  play.  It  begins 
by  fire  of  artillery,  which  approximately  indicates  the 
distance  which  usually  separates  two  armies  drawn 
up  in  order  of  battle  at  the  beginning  of  the  action ;  * 
then  fire  of  musketry  follows,  as  soon  as  the  distance 
has  been  sufficiently  reduced,  either  by  the  regular 
progress  of  the  attack,  or,  sometimes,  by  the  mutual 
advance  movements  of  the  two  armies.     If  the  firing 

*  Artillery  becomes  fonnidable  at  about  1,200  yards. 


BATTLES.  211 

throws  tlie  enemy  into  disorder,  the  opportunity  is 
seized  for  making  a  bayonet-charge  upon  the  chosen 
point  of  attack.  This  first  charge,  resolutely  conduct- 
ed, may  succeed :  in  this  case,  we  must  not  give  way 
to  excitement  and  momentary  enthusiasm,  but  should 
re-form  our  ranks,  take  breath,  and  march  with  ensem- 
ble upon  the  second  line.  If  our  first  charge  fails,  we 
fall  back  calmly  upon  our  second  line,  which,  in  its 
turn,  charges,  either  alone,  or  in  combination  with  the 
unbroken  portions  of  the  first  line.  Now,  the  fighting 
must  be  desperate,  especially  in  the  decisive  direction ; 
for  this  struggle  of  the  principal  arm  decides  the  fate 
of  the  day. 

The  artillery  continues  to  fire,  to  assist  the  charges 
of  the  infantry,  and  its  action  is  kept  up  throughout 
the  whole  contest,  so  long  as  no  friendly  column 
masks  its  fire. 

The  light  cavalry  skirmishes  from  the  time  the 
first  blow  is  struck,  and  at  the  end  pursues.  The 
cavalry  of  the  line  charges  at  any  propitious  moment, 
but  chiefly  at  the  end,  to  finish  the  victory,  by  over- 
throwino;  the  last  masses  that  make  a  stand. 

If  the  action  of  the  two  lines  does  not  suffice, 
the  general-in-chief  "^^  detaches  a  part,  or  nearly  the 

*  During  the  action,  the  general-in-chief  occupies  some  elevated  point, 
with  a  chart  before  him,  and  a  telescope  in  his  hand.  He  is  calm  and 
watchful,  and  gives  his  orders  according  to  what  he  sees,  and  the  intelli- 
gence brought  to  him.  It  is  obviously  of  the  first  importance  that  every 
aide-de-camp  should  be  able  to  find  him  readily.  The  same  is  true, 
tliough  in  a  less  degree,  of  every  general  officer,  w  ho,  when  he  leaves  his 
usual  position,  should  make  it  known,  and  take  care  to  indicate  how  and 
where  he  is  to  be  found. 


212  COMBmATION   OF   THE   AEMS. 

whole  of  Hs  reserve,  at  tlie  decisive  moment,  of  whicli 
lie  is  the  sole  judge.'^* 

Success  crowning  the  last  vigorous  blow,  the  vic- 
tor may  commence  the  pursuit  without  delay,  but 
with  circumspection,  so  long  as  he  is  not  certain  of  the 
total  defeat  of  the  enemy ;  for  if  one  wing  on  each 
side  is  victorious,  the  party  that  starts  first  upon  a 
pursuit  will  be  easily  surrounded  or  taken  in  flank, 
and  will  ultimately  lose  the  battle. 

To  these  various  ojDerations,  add  the  more  or  less 
complete  cooperation  of  a  false  attack,  as  well  as  the 
inevitable  episodes  of  corps  imprudently  engaged  or 
overcome  by  numbers,  which  have  to  be  supported, 
and  you  have  before  you  a  foreshortened  picture  of 
the  action  as  carried  on  by  the  attacking  party,  or,  to 
use  the  common  expression,  a  picture  of  an  offensive 
hattle. 

The  army  which  accepts  instead  of  offering  battle, 
and  thus  fights  a  defensive  hattle^  observes  still  greater 
precaution  in  the  choice  of  its  position.  This  position 
should  be :  1st,  somewhat  elevated,  with  respect  to 
that  of  the  attacking  party;  2d,  firmly  supported 
upon  the  flanks ;  3d,  intersected  on  the  front  and  in 
the  salient  parts  of  the  front,  by  thickets,  villages, 
farms,  obstacles  easy  to  occupy  and  defend,  and  which 
divide  the  attack  of  the  assailant ;  f  4th,  it  should  al- 
low suflicient  freedom  of  movement  among  these  ob- 

*  "We  have  already  treated  of  the  functions  of  the  reserve  in  the  first 
chapter  of  this  Second  Part. 

t  In  the  absence  of  natural  obstacles,  redoubts  are  thrown  up,  as  was 
done  by  Peter  the  Great  at  the  battle  of  Pultowa. 


BATTLES.  213 

stacles ;  and,  5th,  should  offer  in  the  rear  several  ave- 
nues  of  retreat.  If  its  force  is  weak,  the  repelling  army 
forms  no  second  line,  except  in  uncovered  and  easily- 
accessible  places ;  which,  however,  be  it  observed,  does 
not  obviate  the  necessity  of  stationing  the  heaviest 
and  most  destructive  ordnance  at  the  principal  point, 
upon  which  the  assailant  will  most  probably  make  his 
strongest  demonstration,  and  which  is  the  key  of  the 
position.  It  keeps  a  watch  upon  its  flanks,  and  pro- 
tects them  by  battalions  en  'potence^  which  close  the 
extremities  of  the  lines  of  infantry,  and  assure  the 
order  of  battle  independently  of  the  cavalry — an  ad- 
vantageous arrangement  adopted  by  Frederic  the 
Great  in  his  first  two  battles,  at  Mollwitz  and  Czaslaw. 
Some  squadrons  specially  posted  in  echelons  in  the 
rear  of  the  second  line,  near  the  wing,  may  also,  by 
their  sudden  appearance,  fulfil  the  same  purpose.  It  is 
also  recommended,  as  a  final  means,  to  extend  the  sec- 
ond line  beyond  the  fii\st,  and  the  reserve  (which,  in 
this  case,  is  placed  almost  wholly  upon  the  flanks) 
beyond  the  second  :  this  renders  flanking  manoeuvres 
difficult  and  hazardous  undertakings  for  the  enemy. 

In  defensive  battles,  the  general-in-chief  awaits  the 
enemy,  and  acts  by  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry, 
everywhere  prepared,  but  not  announcing  any  other 
intention  than  that  of  resisting.  The  assailant  con- 
tinues his  movement,  and  when  his  manoeuvre  is  in 
full  tide,  the  defender  redoubles  his  fire,  catches  at  the 
least  indication  of  disorder  or  mistake,  and  throws 

*  See  note,  p.  202. 


214  COMBIIS'ATIOK   OF   THE   AEMS. 

himself  forward  to  profit  by  it,  with  tlie  whole  of  the 
troops  still  remaining  fresh.  If  no  such  indication  of 
disorder  or  mistake  is  presented,  he  charges  only 
when  the  first  line  is  too  much  pressed,  taking  for 
that  pm-pose  the  columns  of  the  second  line  and  a 
portion  of  the  cavalry. 

In  actions  of  this  kind,  when  we  do  not  succeed  in 
repelling  the  enemy,  we  resort  to  squares.  If  they 
are  well  combined  and  flank  each  other,  they  resist  a 
long  time,  and  may  defy  an  enemy  who  is  already  fa- 
tigued ;  and,  in  all  cases,  they  facilitate  the  defence, 
inch  by  inch,  of  an  irregular  field  of  battle,  make  the 
retreat  more  respected,  and  often  serve  to  gain  suffi- 
cient time  to  enable  the  defeated  party  to  commence 
this  retreat  under  cover  of  night.  Squares  may  also 
serve  against  an  enemy  very  superior  in  cavalry : 
example,  the  French  at  the  battle  of  Lutzen  (1813). 

A  flank  deprived  of  support,  being  uncovered  in 
consequence  of  the  progress  of  the  assailant,  may  again 
be  established  by  carrying  it  against  some  other  ob- 
stacle, or  even,  for  entire  security,  by  setting  fire  to  a 
village  in  its  vicinity.  The  battle  of  Warsaw  (1656), 
between  the  Poles  and  the  Swedo-Brandenburgers, 
presents  such  a  case  on  the  second  day  of  the  contest. 

There  are  circumstances  in  which  an  army  upon 
the  defensive  will  change  its  tactics  before  or  during 
the  contest,  and  will  suddenly  assume  the  offensive. 
It  may  be  that  the  commander  may  resolve  upon  a 
desperate  blow,  to  parry  an  attack  which  comes  be- 
fore his  preparations  are  completed ;  or  it  may  be 
pure  audacity  on  his  part.     In  such  case,  it  is  best  to 


BATTLES.  215 

attack  tlie  assailant  upon  liis  flank,  with  tlie  best 
troops,  or  reserves,  at  the  same  time  exciting  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  soldiers  and  exalting  the  courage 
with  which  such  a  resolution  inspires  them. 

Every  expedient  being  exhausted,  if  you  are  de- 
feated, abandon  the  field  of  battle,  beat  a  retreat,  but 
with  order  and  as  slowly  as  possible.  Send  off 
your  baggage  in  advance,  under  escort :  send  a  force 
to  occupy  the  defiles  through  which  you  must  pass. 
Adopt  for  your  two  lines  the  checker-formation  by 
battalions ;  for  the  first  line,  when  fatigued,  can  then 
retire  through  the  open  spaces  of  the  second,  or,  still 
better,  the  second  line  may,  by  a  slight  movement,  be 
brought  in  front  through  the  spaces  of  the  first,  which 
slight  offensive  demonstration  is  always  effective. 
When  both  line&  are  disorganized,  they  retire  and 
rally  beyond  the  reserve,  which  should  be  formed  in 
squares,  and  stubbornly  stand  its  ground. 

The  retreat  having  successfully  begun,  the  line 
nearest  to  the  enemy  turns,  from  time  to  time,  and 
makes  a  stand,  seconded  by  repeated  charges  of  the 
cavalry  upon  the  flank  of  the  pursuers.  In  this  man- 
ner, tune  is  gained  until  night  supervenes ;  then,  fa- 
vored by  darkness,  we  make  a  forced  march,  to  put 
a  respectable  distance  between  ourselves  and  the  ene- 
my, and  the  next  day  the  rear-guard  suffices  and  or- 
ganizes an  obstinate  defence. 

Here  we  will  terminate  our  exposition  of  the  mech- 
anism proper  of  the  contest.  To  dwell  longer  upon  it, 
in  an  abstract  and  didactic  manner,  would  be  of  little 
use  in  the  way  of  instruction.     To  obtain  a  just  idea 


216  COMBINATION    OF   THE   AEMS. 

of  a  battle,  it  is  necessary  to  read  a  great  number  of 
narratives,  to  know  the  antecedents  and  tlie  issues  of 
the  day,  to  possess  a  detailed  plan,  upon  wMch  we 
mark  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  and  correct  or 
change  this  disposition  according  to  the  views  we  ac- 
quire as  we  read ;  in  short,  we  must  give  ourselves  up 
to  systematic  and  extended  research.  We  must,  es- 
pecially, consider  each  battle  not  as  an  isolated  fact, 
but  as  the  necessary  and  calculated  end  of  a  march,  or 
of  a  combined  strategic  movement,  or  sometimes  of  a 
whole  campaign  ;  and  we  must  therefore  endeavor  to 
trace  in  it  the  denouement,  more  or  less  happy,  of  each 
of  the  measures  taken. 


PART  THIRD. 

MINOR      OPERATIONS. 


CHAPTER    FIRST. 

OUTPOSTS. 

Introduction. — In  the  field,  an  encamped  or  can- 
toned army  does  not  know  when  it  may  be  attacked ; 
and  therefore,  that  it  may  not  be  surprised,  it  must 
be  at  all  times  prepared  for  combat.  But  as  keeping 
constantly  upon  the  qui  vive  would  fatigue  it  too 
much,  a.  portion  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  watching 
over  the  safety  of  the  whole. 

This  portion  of  the  army  incurs  a  twofold  respon- 
sibility: 1st,  it  must  watch  the  enemy,  in  order  to 
give  notice  of  its  approach  ;  and  2d,  it  must  then  stop 
it,  in  order  to  give  time  for  making  the  preparations 
for  combat.  That  it  may  fulfil  these  purposes,  it  must 
necessarily  be  posted  in  advance  of  the  main  body  of 
the  troops,  on  the  side  toward  the  adversary :  hence 
the  various  fractions  of  this  portion  are  collectively 
designated  by  the  term  outposts, 

"We  thus  see  that  outposts  perform  the  same  ser- 


218  MINOR   OPEEATIOITS. 

vice  for  an  army  at  rest,  as  sMrmisliers  and  scouts 
for  one  upon  a  marcli.  Outposts  take  the  place  of  tlie 
scouts  (hatteurs  d'estrade)^  employed  by  tlie  ancients, 
wHcli  would  be  insufficient  with  the  modern  methods 
of  warfare. 

The  composition  of  outposts  is  based  upon  the 
character*  and  force  of  the  adversary ;  but  that  army 
will  be  the  best  guarded  whose  outposts  are  calculated 
upon  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  is  the  most  active. 
We  must,  indeed,  consider  outposts  as  the  eyes^ 
which  constantly  watch  the  enemy,  and  prevent  him 
from  approaching  unperceived. 

It  is  a  fundamental  rule  that  outposts  are  never  to 
fight  merely  for  the  sake  of  fighting.  Thus,  on  the 
eve  of  the  battle  of  Emmendingen,  October  18,  1796, 
a  skirmish  occun'ed  between  the  patrols  of  the  out- 
posts, and  in  this  untimely  action  the  Austrians  lost 
the  village  of  Malterdingen,  which,  notwithstanding 
their  occupation  of  the  heights  in  the  rear,  they  had  a 
hard  struggle  to  regain  on  the  following  day.f  A 
chief  of  outposts  must,  then,  consider  the  injurious 
consequences  which  might  ensue  were  he  to  hazard 
an  attatjk,  and  will  refrain  from  useless  combats.  His 
duty,  in  fact,  consists  in  covering  the  army,  and  not 
in  displaying  his  courage. 

The  outposts  will  have  accomplished  their  end,  if 

*  According  to  Decker,  the  German,  in  this  kind  of  service,  is  zeal- 
ous ;  the  Russian  dangerous  (on  account  of  his  numerous  and  vigilant 
Cossacks)  ;  the  English,  heavy  ;  the  Spaniard,  indolent;  to  which  we  will 
add,  the  Frenchman  is  often  too  confident. 

t  See  Principea  de  strategie  de  I'Archiduc  Charles,  translated  by 
General  Jomini,  1818,  v.  iii.,  p.  253,  260. 


OUTPOSTS.  219 

the  enemy  dare  not  attack  them,  and  is  obliged  to  de- 
fer the  combat  to  the  time  and  place  when  and  where 
it  will  be  accepted ;  but  to  attain  this  result,  they 
must  rely  solely  upon  their  own  vigilance,  and  not 
upon  the  inactivity  of  the  enemy.  A  single  oversight 
committed  by  an  outpost  may  lead  to  the  destruction 
of  the  whole  army ;  and  it  were  better,  therefore,  for 
the  army  to  have  no  outposts,  and  to  watch  over  its 
own  safety,  than  to  have  negligent  and  inefficient 
ones. 

In  outpost  warfare,  both  sides  act  with  caution, 
for  in  most  cases  neither  party  knows  precisely  the 
position  of  his  adversary ;  which  leads  the  Prussian 
general.  Decker,  to  say  that,  in  this  sort  of  warfare, 
"  one  sword  keeps  the  other  in  its  scabbard."*  Never- 
theless, we  must  not  push  this  caution  to  the  extreme 
of  putting  all  the  force  on  foot  at  once,  nor  so  far  as 
to  introduce  too  great  regularity  in  surveillance ;  since 
we  should  thereby  unnecessarily  weary  the  men,  and 
also  expose  ourselves  to  be  surprised  by  the  enemy, 
who  would  base  his  attack  upon  this  very  uniformity. 
It  was  in  consequence  of  this  regularity  that,  in  May, 
1762,  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  was  able  to  surprise 
and  overcome  the  Austrians  in  the  environs  of  Frey- 
burg.f 

'  In  accordance  with  their  twofold  mission,  of  both 
watching  and  impeding  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
the  outposts  are  to  be  placed  so  as  to  overlook  the 

*  De  la  petite  guerre^  traduction  Unger,  p.  67. 

t   Vie  du  prince  Henri  de  Pritsse,  1809,  p.  112.     This  anonymous 
work  is  due  to  general  the  Marquis  de  Bouill6. 


220  MmOR    OPERATIOIS-S. 

surrounding  ground  and  whatever  happens  there,  and 
also  so  as  to  be  able  to  fight  advantageously,  notwith- 
standing their  numerical  weakness. 

If  the  advance-guard  covers  the  army,  the  chain 
of  outposts  will  extend  beyond  the  advance-guard ; 
but  if  this  guard  camps  Avith  the  army,  the  chain  will 
be  formed  just  outside  the  camp.  In  both  cases  the 
method  of  placing  it  is  the  same ;  and  it  is  also  the 
same  whether  the  outposts  are  transient  (as  those 
which  are  established  every  night  before  an  army  in 
march),  qy  permanent  (as  those  which  protect  an  army 
in  winter  quarters,  or  in  a  defensive  position). 

When  the  army  marches,  the  advance  or  rear- 
guard of  each  column  furnishes  the  troops  for  the  out- 
posts ;  when  it  occupies  a  position,  the  advance  and 
rear-guards  resume  their  places  in  the  order  of  battle, 
and  the  outposts  are  supplied  from  the  corps  of  the 
first  line.  In  all  cases,  not  more  than  one  sixth  of  the 
whole  army  should  be  employed  upon  outpost  service. 

Outposts  consist  of: 

1st.   Grand  guards ; 

2d.    Small  posts ; 

3d.    Vedettes,  or  sentinels ; 

4th.  Patrols ; 

5th.  Sometimes,  posts  of  support. 

We  will  examine  each  of  these  in  succession. 

1.  Grand  Guards.— The  network  of  outposts  al- 
ways foiTQS  at  least  three  distinct  lines :  first  that  of 
the  grand  guards,  who  are  nearest  to  the  army,  then 
that  of  the  small  posts,  and  lastly,  that  of  the  sentinels 


OUTPOSTS.  221 

or  vedettes.  This  distribution  results  from  tlie  neces- 
sity which  every  body  of  troops,  whatever  its  force,  is 
under  of  guarding  itself  against  surprise,  and  of  dis- 
closing the  ground  as  far  as  possible  in  advance  and 
on  all  sides. 

To  begin  with  the  grand  guards :  these  are,  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinance  of  May  3,  1832,  respecting 
the  service  of  the  army  in  the  field,  "  the  advanced 
posts  of  a  camp  or  cantonment,  the  approaches  to 
which  they  should  cover." 

Their  number,  their  force,  and  their  position  are 
regulated :  1st,  in  a  detached  corps,  by  the  officer  in 
command  of  that  corps;  2d,  in  an  army,  by  each 
brigade  severally,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  that 
fraction  the  unity  which  is  the  more  necessary,  since, 
in  actual  engagements,  an  army  manoeuvres  and  fights 
by  brigades.  Besides,  when  the  outpost  service  is 
filled  from  a  number  of  combined  brigades,  the  gen- 
eral commanding  the  division  still  has  it  in  his  power 
to  modify  it,  and  point  out  to  the  brigades  the  best 
posts  to  occupy  to  maintain  their  mutual  connection 
and  protect  their  flanks.* 

As  far  as  possible,  the  infantry  grand  guards, 
which  serve  for  support,  will  be  combined  with  the 
cavalry  grand  guards,  which  perform  the  duty  of  ad- 
vanced sentinels.  If  it  can  be  done,  it  will  be  useful 
to  attach  to  the  infantry  grand  guards  a  certain  num- 
ber of  horsemen,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  obtain 
prompt  intelligence  respecting  the  enemy. 

The  grand  guard  of  a  regiment,  or  even  of  a  bat- 

*  Pr^val,  Commentaires  sur  le  service  en  campagne^  p.  73. 


222  MINOR   OPERATIOl^S. 

talion,  whetlier  infantry  or  cavalry,  is  commanded  by 
a  captain.  Its  force  depends  upon  its  object  and  the 
means  at  disposal,  and  also  upon  tbe  rule  that  it  re- 
quires four  men  for  one  sentinel ;  but  subsequent  data 
may  modify  this  force. 

The- grand  guards  are  placed  at  the  outlets  whose 
defence  is  of  the  highest  importance,  else  in  a  com- 
manding  and  covered  position  in  the  centre  of  the  re- 
gion to  be  observed.  To  place  them  with  a  wood  in 
their  rear  would  be  exposing  them  to  destruction. 
Their  position  may  be  changed  at  the  close  of  the  day. 
Upon  hilly  ground,  and  especially  in  the  midst  of  a 
hostile  population,  it  is  prudent  to  keep  them  near  to 
the  army.  Even  upon  level  ground,  if  they  are  placed 
at  a  great  distance,  it  will  be  proper  to  establish  inter- 
mediate posts. 

The  grand  guards  are  seldom  dispensed  with,  and 
never  without  orders  from  the  general.  But  the  ordi- 
nance authorizes  those  who  are  exposed  upon  a  plain 
to  attacks  of  cavalry,  to  erect  barricades,  dig  a  circu- 
lar ditch,  or  cover  themselves  by  an  abatis.  Among 
the  ancients,  all  posts  were  required  to  be  in- 
trenched, or,  at  least,  covered  by  embankments.  This 
practice  rendered  the  troops  timid,  by  causing  them 
to  imagine  that  they  could  be  secured  only  by  a  kind 
of  rampart ;  besides,  it  was  inconsistent  with  the  rules 
of  offensive  warfare  which  is  most  congenial  to  the 
French  character,  and  has  consequently  been  aban- 
doned. 

The  commandant  of  a  grand  guard  should  estab- 
lish a  sure  communication  between  himself  and  his 


OUTPOSTS. 


k 


small  posts,  and  also  between  himself  and  tlie  corps 
from  whicli  it  lias  been  detached.  For  this  purpose, 
he  will  open  the  ground  and  clear  it  of  obstacles.  On 
the  side  toward  the  enemy,  he  will,  on  the  contrary, 
obstruct  the  roads,  destroy  the  bridges,  and  bar  de- 
files, to  avoid  surprises. 

Each  grand  guard  may  receive  special"  orders,  ac- 
cording to  the  position  it  occupies.  Its  general  orders 
will  be  to  give  notice  to  the  neighboring  posts,  to  the 
corps  from  which  detached,  and  to  the  general,  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  and  of  apprehended  attacks ; 
it  should  also  examine  all  individuals  which  come  into 
its  vicinity,  and  arrest  those  who  are  not  provided 
with  passports  signed  by  a  known  general,  and  all 
soldiers  who  may  attempt  to  pass  beyond  the  line  of 
outposts. 

The  grand  guard  must  not  allow  its  fire  to  give 
much  light,  but  should  mask  it  on  the  side  of  the  ene- 
my, either  by  a  wall,  or  a  rise  of  the  ground,  or  by 
kindling  it  in  a  hole  dug  in  the  ground  for  the  pur- 
pose. In  all  cases,  a  pile  of  moist  earth  should  be 
kept  at  hand,  with  which  to  extinguish  the  fire  sud- 
denly, if  necessary,  in  case  of  surprise.  The  enemy 
may  be  deceived  as  to  the  position  of  the  grand  guard 
by  means  of  flying-fires  kept  up  by  sentinels. 

During  the  night,  the  grand  guard  must  exercise 
increased  vigilance,  for  it  is  then  most  important  to 
be  guarded  against  unforeseen  attacks.  If  an  infantr}^ 
grand  guard,  one  half  of  the  men  should  keep  watch, 
whilst  the  other  half  sleep  :  if  a  cavalry  grand  guard, 
the  horses  should  be  kept  bridled,  and  the  men  should 


224  MmOE   OPEEATIONS. 

not  sleep.  The  commandant  of  tlie  grand  guard  is 
forbidden  to  rest  or  sleejD. 

In  case  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy,  the  conduct  of 
the  grand  guard  should  be  as  follows.  As  soon  as  it  is 
threatened,  or  as  soon  as  it  is  attacked,  the  grand 
guard  gives  notice  to  the  general  of  the  brigade  or  the 
colonel  of  its  regiment ;  then,  if  it  does  not  occupy 
a  defile  or  an  enclosed  post,  it  marches  toward  the 
enemy  and  measures  strength  with  it  if  not  in  too 
great  force,  or  else  manoeuvres  so  as  to  embarrass 
its  progress.  In  all  cases  it  avoids  committing 
itself  too  far,  for,  if  once  cut  off,  there  is  no  longer  any 
obstacle  between  the  enemy  and  the  camp;  but  it 
keeps  its  ground  until  the  army  is  in  line,  or  until  it 
is  relieved.  When  the  grand  guard  occupies  a  defile, 
or  an  intrenched  post,  it  maintains  its  ground  so  long 
as  its  supplies  last,  or  until  the  greater  part  of  the 
men  are  killed ;  then  it  endeavors  to  rejoin  the  army, 
still  trying  to  inflict  damage  upon  the  enemy. 

The  line  of  grand  guards  is  usually  as  much  as 
2,500  yards  in  advance  of  the  army. 

2.  Small  Posts. — The  small  posts  are  to  the  grand 
guards  what  the  grand  guards  are  to  the  army :  that 
is,  while  the  grand  guard  covers  the  army,  it  has 
need  to  be  itself  covered  in  turn.  For  this  purpose  it 
detaches  advanced  posts,  placed  between  it  and  the 
line  of  vedettes  and  sentinels,  the  total  force  of  which 
should  not  exceed  one  third  of  its  own  force.  These 
smaller  posts  are  placed  500  yards  in  advance  of  the 
grand  guards. 


OUTPOSTS.  225 

The  first  care  of  the  commandant  of  a  grand  guard 
is  to  reconnoitre  all  kinds  of  communications  by 
which  his  position  may  be  reached  ;  and  in  accordance 
with  this  reconnoissance  he  determines  the  force  and 
the  position  of  his  small  posts  and  of  the  sentinels  or 
vedettes  beyond  them.  These  positions  may  be  modi- 
fied in  cases  of  necessity.  Sometimes  they  are  not 
the  same  by  night  as  by  day.  In  all  cases  the  small 
posts  should  not  change  place  at  the  same  time  with 
the  grand  guards. 
jL  The  small  posts  are  established  at  cross-roads,  the 
debouches  of  villages,  woods,  and  defiles,  at  the  corners 
of  marshes,  or  on  hill  tops.  It  is  an  essential  condition 
that  they  should  be  seen  by  their  grand  guard,  and 
that  they  should  see  their  sentinels  or  vedettes.  They 
should  never  be  placed  opposite  to  obstacles  suffi- 
ciently near  to  cover  a  surprise. 

A  small  post  is,  according  to  its  importance,  com- 
manded by  an  officer,  or  non-commissioned  officer. 
The  commandant  of  the  grand  guard  gives  the  chief 
of  each  small  post  detailed  instructions  upon  the  sur- 
veillance to  be  exercised,  and  the  measures  to  be 
taken  to  defend  themselves  and  effect  a  retreat. 

As  soon  as  he  has  taken  his  position,  a  chief  of  a 
post  should  reconnoitre  the  surrounding  localities,  and 
avail  himself  of  the  means  they  may  offer  to  insure 
his  own  safety  and  that  of  his  sentinels  and  vedettes. 
He  will  make  his  chief  preparations  to  resist  an  attack 
in  the  rear,  which  is  not  an  uncommon  occurrence 
with  isolated  posts. 

The  small  posts  are  forbidden  to  light  fires,  when 
15 


226  MESrOR   OPERATIONS. 

these  fires  might  contribute  to  their  being  surprised. 
The  small  posts  of  cavalry  may  be  relieved,  under 
certain  circumstances,  either  every  four  or  every  eight 
hours. 

Besides  the  ordinary  line  of  small  posts,  some  of 
the  other  nations  often  station  upon  points  favorable 
for  observation,  in  advance  of  the  line  of  sentinels  or 
vedettes,  posts  of  four  or  five  men,  two  of  whom  are 
always  on  the  watch.  These  are  called  Cossack-posts^ 
but  the  French  army  makes  no  use  of  this  kind  of  posts. 

3.  Sentinels  and  Tedettes. — ^The  sentinels  (or  ve- 
dettes) cover  the  small  posts,  as  the  latter  cover  the 
grand  guards.  They  constitute  the  last  link  of  the 
chain  of  outposts,  and  are  placed  500  yards  in  ad- 
vance of  the  small  posts. 

The  small  posts  of  infantry  detach  sentinels ;  those 
of  cavalry,  vedettes.  "Whether  foot  soldiers  or  horse- 
men, these  sentries  are  so  placed  as  to  command  a  dis- 
tant view  of  the  surrounding  ground.  They  are  to  be 
concealed  from  the  enemy  by  a  wall,  a  hedge,  a  tree, 
a  hillock,  a  pile  of  earth  or  of  any  materials,  or  a  hay- 
stack ;  and  they  must  never  expose  any  other  por- 
tion of  their  persons  than  the  head.  Even  in  level 
country,  they  can  be  sheltered  by  digging  a  hole  in 
the  ground  about  4  J  feet  deep,  in  which  they  bury 
themselves  as  far  as  the  chest,  placing  around  the 
hole,  to  protect  their  heads,  some  fresh  branches  of 
trees,  planted  in  such  a  form  as  to  resemble  a  clump 
of  bushes.* 

*  This  expedient  may  also  be  employed  to  coTer  a  post,  by  substitut- 


OUTPOSTS.  227 

The  sentinels  and  vedettes  watch  closely  the 
movements  of  an  enemy  who  is  within  range,  and  ap- 
prize their  small  posts  of  an  attack  by  the  discharge 
of  a  gun.  If  the  enemy  is  at  a  distance,  they  listen 
for  the  slightest  noise,  redoubling  their  vigilance  at 
the  most  trifling  incident,  and  call  attention  by  signals 
to  everything  which  appears  to  them  to  be  of  a  meii- 
acing  nature.  According  to  the  character  of  their  sig- 
nals, the  chief  of  a  small  post  repairs  in  person  to  the 
point  which  it  occupies,  either  alone  or  with  a  por- 
tion of  his  force. 

The  vedettes  should  keep  the  collar  of  their  cloaks 
turned  down,  in  order  that  they  may  hear  the  better. 
If  they  are  lancers,  they  may  take  off  the  flamme  of 
their  lance  in  order  not  to  be  so  conspicuous  to  the 
enemy.  They  should  keep  their  eye  upon  the  neigh- 
boring vedettes,  to  see  that  none  of  them  are  destroyed. 
In  case  of  imminent  peril,  the  sentinels  and  vedettes 
are  doubled,  so  that,  if  there  is  need  for  it,  one  of 
them  may  be  detached  to  give  warning.  Double 
vedettes  are  principally  useful  among  heights ;  for  a 
vedette  posted  upon  an  eminence  to  watch  the  en- 
virons, would  easily  be  turned  while  his  attention  was 
engaged,  if  another  vedette  at  the  foot  of  the  slope 
did  not  baffle  the  enemy  in  the  attempt.  During  the 
night  all  the  vedettes  remain  on  the  lower  grounds. 

Sentinels  and  vedettes  are  forbidden  to  talk  or  to 


ing  for  the  hole  a  ditch  of  sufficient  size.  To  deceive  the  enemy,  the 
branches  of  trees  must  be  frequently  renewed.  We  borrow  this  idea  from 
the  TraiU  des  troupes  Ugeres  (p.  589)  of  the  general,  Count  de  la  Eoche- 
Aymon. 


228  MINOE    OPERATIONS. 

smoke.  They  should  be  wholly  absorbed  in  their  im- 
portant and  delicate  mission ;  for  the  slightest  negli- 
gence on  their  part  may  involve  the  loss  of  their  small 
post  and  compromise  the  whole  army. 

4.  l>istribiitioii  of  the  Ontposts. — The  proper  dis- 
tance to  leave  between  the  most  advanced  outpost 
and  the  camp  or  cantonment,  may  be  fixed  at  about 
three  quarters  of  a  league,  as  an  average  estimate ; 
let  us  say  3,500  yards.*  The  distance  of  the  small 
posts  from  the  grand  guards,  and  from  the  line  of  sen- 
tinels or  vedettes,  will  be  from  400  to  500  yards  each, 
which,  if  we  take  the  higher  number,  gives  a  distance 
of  1,000  yards  between  the  extreme  line  of  sentinels 
or  vedettes,  and  the  line  of  the  grand  guards.  The 
enemy  will  thus  have  at  least  1,000  yards  to  pass  over 
after  they  have  been  signalled,  before  they  can  reach 
the  grand  guards.  Supposing  the  ground  perfectly  free 
from  all  obstacles,  it  will  take  them  about  three  min- 
utes to  traverse  this  space,  and  this  wdll  give  time 
enough  to  the  grand  guards  to  bridle  and  mount  their 
horses,  and  to  advance  to  the  succor  of  their  small 
posts.  With  these  distances,  therefore,  the  army  will 
be  sufficiently  covered ;  and  yet  they  are  not  so  great 
as  to  prevent  the  parties  at  the  different  posts  seeing 
each  other  distinctly,  which  considerations  have  led  to 
their  adoption. 

According  to  these  distances,  the  network  of 
outposts  upon  level  ground  forms  the  following 
figure.     Upon  more  uneven  ground,  the  figure  would 

*  Lallemaiid,  Traite  des  operations  secondaires,  t.  i.,  p.  2. 


OUTPOSTS. 


229 


become  more  irregular,  and  the  various  lines  would 

SYSTEM  OF  OUTPOSTS. 


I 


Advanced  post  of 
police  guard. 


%- 


X— 


Bivouac  of  a  Begiment. 
AAA  A  AAAA AAA  A  A  AAA A  AAA  AAA  A arms. 


.•  :^- 


X— 


..O    O  O  0  O    O  O   O O    0    0    o   o  o   o    o. 


..o  o   o  o   o_ 


.0    0    0   0    0- 


Soldiera' 
.0  o  o  o  o  o   0  o Jires. 

Officers' 

. O    0    0   0    O jiygg^ 


.o Staff  fires 

Police 
— " "    guard. 


230  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

become  more  curved,  the  general  proportions,  how- 
ever, remaining  the  same. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  distances  cor- 
respond to  the  positions  assumed  during  the  day.  At 
night,  it  will  often  be  prudent  to  contract  the  whole 
system  of  outposts,  and  especially  to  bring  the  line  of 
sentinels  or  vedettes  nearer. 

5.  Posts  of  Support. — Sometimes  posts  of  support 
are  established  between  the  grand  guards  and  the 
front  of  the  camp  or  bivouac,  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
sisting for  some  time  an  enemy  who  may  succeed  in 
passing  the  first  lines  of  the  outposts,  and  thus  give 
the  army  time  to  take  up  arms.  These  posts  are 
furnished  with  cannon,  and  composed  chiefly  of  in- 
fantry, taken  from  the  camp  and  not  from  the  grand 
guards,  for  the  latter  should  attend  only  to  the  ground 
in  their  front. 

These  posts  of  support,  therefore,  form  a  fourth 
line  of  outposts,  nearest  to  the  army.  They  are  to  be 
placed  at  the  outlets  of  valleys  and  woods,  and  the 
approaches  of  bridges  and  defiles,  which  the  grand 
guards  may  have  to  pass  in  their  retreat. 

6.  Patrols,  I.ook-oiits,  Rounds. — ^The  service  of 
outposts  being  one  which  requires  to  be  thoroughly 
performed,  it  should  be  subject  to  an  active  and  se- 
vere surveillance.  The  brigadier-general  and  superior 
ofiicer  of  each  regiment  supervise  the  grand  guards ; 
the  commandant  of  each  grand  guard  supervises  his 
small  posts  and  sentinels,  or  vedettes,  by  means  of 


I 


OUTPOSTS.  231 

patrols  and  rounds,  tlie  number  of  which,  and  their 
circuits,  he  fixes  according  to  circumstances. 

A  round  is  the  general  name  given  to  a  circuit 
made  either  by  a  commissioned  or  a  non-commissioned 
officer,  attended  by  two  or  three  men,  for  the  purpose 
of  inspecting  the  small  posts  and  sentinels,  and  keep- 
ing them  upon  the  alert.  Patrols  may  be  defined  as 
small  detachments  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  taken  from 
a  post,  to  perambulate  its  vicinity  and  to  watch  over 
its  safety.  Sometimes  the  patrols  go  beyond  the  ex- 
terior cordon  of  outposts,  to  have  a  better  look-out 
upon  the  doings  of  the  enemy,  and  then  receive  the 
designation  of  loohouts.  The  latter  must  not  be  too 
numerous,  for  the  sentinels,  seeing  them  frequently 
coming  in,  would  become  negligent ;  but  when  there 
is  occasion  to  employ  them,  notice  is  to  be  given  to  the 
sentmels  near  whom  they  must  pass  in  coming  in,  lest 
they  be  taken  for  parties  of  the  enemy.  The  neglect 
of  this  precaution  was  the  occasion,  near  Placentia,  in 
1796,  of  a  fatal  mistake,  whereby  the  French  general, 
Laharpe,  was  killed  by  his  own  soldiers.  We  may 
also  distinguish  the  patrol  from  the  look-outs,  by  say- 
ing that  the  former  is  defensive  and  the  latter  offensive. 
The  defensive  patrol  evidently  embraces  the  rounds. 

Arrangement  of  a  defensive  patrol, — It  is  composed 
of  from  three  to  eight  men,  commanded  by  a  corporal — 
a  small  force,  which  can  readily  escape  in  case  of  need. 
These  move  not  in  straight  lines,  but  in  zig-zag  courses, 
in  order  to  embrace  more  ground.  During  the  day  they 
should  preserve  a  distance  from  each  other  of  150  yards, 
which,  at  night,  will  be  reduced  to  20  or  30  yards. 


232  MEN^OR    OPERATIONS. 

If  the  patrol  consists  of  only  three  men  (fig.  1), 
they  will  be  placed  on  a  straight  line. 

If  there  are  four  men  (^g.  2),  they  will  form  a  loz- 
enge, one  point  in  advance,  the  corporal  at  the  oppo- 
site point. 

If  there  are  ^ve  men  (fig.  3),  they  will  still  form  a 
lozenge,  and  the  corporal  will  occupy  the  centre. 


DEFENSIVE   PATKOLS. 

A 

••. 

• •. 

/ 

s • 

Fig.  1. 

<      * 

V 

c 

Fig.  2. 

Fig.  3. 

C      / 

Fig.  4 

A .....m 

""\ 

/    \ 

.• 9,^ 

I 

\ 

P          •^ 

e 

\ 

P 

•    • 

•         • 

/ 

'v. 

\ 

•      fi 

""■■■■/ 

Fig.  5. 

V 

Fig.  6. 

Y 

Fig.  7. 

If  there  are  six  men  (fig.  4),  the  corporal  remains 
at  the  centre,  but  the  lozenge  will  be  truncated,  by 
putting  two  men  in  advance,  the  figure  thus  becoming 
an  irregular  pentagon. 

If  there  are  seven  men  (fig.  5),  we  have  the  same 
arrangement,  only  the  corporal  will  have  one  man  by 
his  side. 

If  there  are  eight  men  (figs.  6  and  'T),  either  the 
same  arrangement,  putting  two  men  with  the  corpo- 
ral ;  or  else  the  patrol  will  form  a  lozenge,  with  three 
men  in  each  side. 

Arrangement  of  an  off ensive patrol. — ^These  patrols 


OUTPOSTS. 


233 


are  usually  composed  of  cavalry,  and  tlieir  force  varies 
from  ten  to  thirty  men.  Like  the  defensive  patrols, 
they  should  never  remain  in  too  compact  mass,  so  as 
not  to  be  liable  to  being  captured  at  once ;  but  they 


OFFENSIVE    PATEOLS. 

(Patrol  of  15  horses.) 

t 

Advance-guard. 
o 

i 

CMef 

o 

Flanker,  o 

0  Flan 
o       o       o 

0      o 
(Patrol  of  30  horses.) 

X 

Bead  of  the  advance-guard.   °  ^  ^ 


Advance-guard. 


near-guard. 


Flankers,    o 
o 


oQiief 

o  o  o    o  o  o 
o  o  o     o  o  o 


o    Flankers. 
o 


Bear-guard. 


234  MmOR   OPERATIONS. 

should  spread  out  as  mucli  as  their  force  and  the 
localities  will  allow. 

The  foregoing  diagram  exhibits  the  mode  of  forma- 
tion according  to  general  La  Roche-Aymon. 

In  each  formation  two  men  are  placed  at  the  head 
and  rear,  in  order  that  if  one  has  something  to  com- 
municate to  the  chief  of  the  patrol,  the  otheii^may  keep 
his  post  without  taking  his  eyes  from  the  object  which 
has  seemed  worthy  of  an  immediate  report. 

During  night  patrols,  the  chief  of  a  patrol  may 
need  to  know  the  hour,  but  he  should  not  light  a  lan- 
tern, which  would  reveal  his  position  to  the  enemy. 
Frederic  recommended,  in  this  case,  that  the  officer 
should  light  a  piece  of  tinder  under  his  cloak,  which, 
being  passed  over  the  watch  face,  would  give  light 
enough  to  show  the  hands.^ 

In  concluding  this  chapter,  we  will  recommend  to 
our  readers  to  refer  to  article  VIII.  of  the  Ordonnance 
sur  le  service  en  cam])agne^  which  contains  circumstan- 
tial details,  indispensable  to  be  known,  respecting  out- 
posts, the  study  of  which  will  involve  no  difficulties 
after  what  we  have  above  given. 

*  Instruction  secrete,  chap.  iii.     [In  these  days  of  friction  matches,  a 
simpler  expedient  will  suggest  itself  to  every  reader.— 2V.] 


CHAPTER   SECOND. 


DETACHMENTS.* 


1.  General  Observations. — Outposts  may  be  re- 
garded as  purely  defensive  detachments,  Tlie  detach- 
ments which  are  the  subject  of  the  present  chapter, 
may,  in  contradistinction  to  outposts,  be  called  offen- 
sive detacliments. 

Their  object  is  to  occupy  a  post  of  observation,  or 
to  capture  such  a  post ;  to  protect  or  to  attack  a  con- 
voy, a  foraging  party,  a  reconnoissance,  or  cantonment ; 
to  levy  contributions  in  the  neighboring  localities, 
either  in  kind  or  in  money ;  to  destroy  a  magazine,  to 
make  a  diversion,  to  harass  a  marching  column  by 
repeated  skirmishes,  to  lay  ambuscades,  to  cut  the 
communications  of  the  enemy,  to  make  prisoners,  to 
take  hostages,  or  to  throw  a  supply  of  men  and  muni- 
tions into  a  besieged  town. 

In  the  composition  of  a  detachment,  we  must  have 
regard :  1st,  to  the  object  and  the  duration  of  its  ser- 
vice ;  and  2d,  to  the  nature  of  the  country  and  to  the 

*  Upon  detachments,  consult  art.  ix.  of  the  Ordonnance  sur  le  service 
des  armees  en  campagne,  of  May  3,  1832. 


236  MINOR    OPEEATIONS. 

disposition  of  its  inliabitaiits.  According  to  tlie  nature 
of  these  various  data,  tlie  detachment  will  be  composed 
either  of  infantry  alone,  or  of  cavalry  alone,  or  of  a 
combination  of  both.  Infantry  and  cavalry  are  usually 
to  be  detached  only  in  the  regularly  constituted  frac- 
tions of  a  regiment,  such  as  the  battalion,  squadron, 
company,  platoon,  or  section,  as  this  method  facili- 
tates its  administration,  and  is  more  conducive  to  dis- 
cipline. The  artillery  and  the  engineers  do  not  enter 
into  the  composition  of  detachments  except  by  acci- 
dent. In  the  following  pages  we  will  distinguish  be- 
tween detachments  of  infantry^  detacliments  of  cavalry^ 
and  mixed  detacliments. 

By  the  French  army  regulations,  the  commandant 
of  a  detachment  has  the  same  authority  over  the  troops 
placed  under  his  orders  as  a  chief  of  a  corps.  He  is 
responsible  for  the  safety  of  his  force,  and,  up  to  a  cer- 
tain pointy  for  the  result  of  the  combats  in  which  he 
engages.  Upon  his  return,  he  makes  a  report  to  the 
officer  who  detached  him,  in  relation  to  his  proceed- 
ings, in  conformity  with  his  instructions  and  their  re- 
sults ;  and  also  a  report  to  each  of  the  chiefs  of  the 
corps  which  furnished  soldiers  for  his  detachment,  in 
relation  to  the  police,  discipline,  and  administration 
of  the  forces. 

The  officer  selected  for  the  command  of  a  detach- 
ment should  be  firm,  prudent,  and  experienced ;  he 

*  This  qualified  language  of  the  regulations  was  necessary;  for  a 
chief  of  a  detachment  may  sometimes  be  beaten  without  having  omitted 
any  duty.  "We  should  also  not  forget  the  saying  of  Turenne  ;  "  Quand 
un  homme  n'a  pas  fait  de  fautes  a  la  guerre,  il  ne  I'a  pas  faite  longtemps." 


I 


DETACHMENTS.  2  3  7 

should  know  how  to  observe,  and  also  how  to  relate 
what  he  observes  in  exact  terms,  without  drawing  upon 
his  imagination ;  he  should  also  be  able  to  speak  the 
language  of  the  country,  and  be  accustomed  to  estimate 
distances.  He  must  supply  himself  with  a  telescope 
and  accurate  charts.  He  will  employ  good  guides,  and 
will  derive  from  them  all  possible  information  respect- 
ing the  distances  and  the  nature  of  the  roads  over 
which  he  must  pass.  Before  starting,  he  will  make 
himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  precise  pur- 
port of  his  mission,  and  will  ask  for  any  necessary  ex- 
planations from  the  chief  who  sends  him ;  after  start- 
ing, he  will  execute  his  instructions  to  the  letter. 
Some  important  but  unforeseen  circumstance  may, 
however,  compel  him  to  depart  from  them  in  part ;  in 
this  case  he  should  conform  to  their  spirit,  and  con- 
duct himself  with  reference  to  the  general  interests  of 
the  service  ;  but,  to  justify  this,  there  must  exist  real 
impossibility.  Should  he  extricate  himself  skilfully 
from  such  a  position,  he  will  prove  his  capacity  for 
war,  and  earn  a  title  to  be  selected  for  diflScult  com- 
mands.* 

Before  setting  out,  he  will  assemble  his  detach- 
ment, carefully  pass  it  in  review,  and  assure  himself 
that  it  is  provided  with  everything  necessary,  pro- 
visions, munitions,  stores,  etc.  He  will  inspect  the 
arms,  equipment,  and  clothing.  In  the  infantry,  he 
will  direct  his  attention  to  the  shoes  and  the  knap- 
sacks ;  in  the  cavalry  he  will  inspect  the  packing,  and 
see  that  the  horses'  shoes  are  in  good  condition. 

*  Jacquinot  de  Presles,  p.  390. 


238  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

A  detachment,  wlien  marching,  is  always  in  a 
state  of  feebleness,  since  the  column  is  lengthened, 
and  the  order  of  march  is  not  suitable  for  combat, 
especially  when  the  distances  have  been  lost.  Hence 
it  is  indispensable  that  it  should  have  time  to  form 
itself  in  case  of  a  sudden  attack ;  and  on  this  account 
it  is  preceded  by  a  small  body,  called  the  advance- 
guard^  which  explores  the  country  and  gives  notice 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  For  similar  purposes, 
a  small  body  is  placed  in  rear  of  the  detachment,  called 
the  rear-guavd.  Thus  a  detachment  marches  between 
an  advance-guard  and  rear-guard.  But  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  be  guarded  in  front  and  rear ;  a  hostile  body 
might  debouch  perpendicularly  to  the  route,  and  fall 
upon  the  flank  or  the  centre  of  the  column,  and  the 
advance  and  rear-guards  would  not  be  able  to  oppose 
them.  This  danger  is  guarded  against  by  throwing 
out  skirmishers  or  flankers  on  the  right  and  left,  upon 
the  flanks  of  the  detachment,  whose  duty  it  is  to  scour 
the  surrounding  country  and  to  examine  all  the  by- 
ways, going  across  the  fields,  if  necessary,  marching 
in  various  directions,  watching  for  unusual  sounds, 
and  inspecting  every  suspicious  object ;  without,  how- 
ever, separating  too  far  from  the  main  body,  as  they 
would  be  liable  to  be  cut  ofi*.  No  fixed  rules  can  be 
given  for  all  detachments  as  to  the  force  of  the  ad- 
vance and  rear-guards,  and  the  number  of  flankers :  it 
is  evident,  however,  that  their  importance  increases 
with  the  effective  force  of  the  detachment  and  the 
complications  of  the  ground.     Some  authors  consider 


DETACHMENTS.  239 

one  fourth  tlie  force  of  a  detaclimeiit  as  the  proper 
jDroportion  for  the  advance-guard."^"* 

The  commandant  of  a  detachment  will  usually  re- 
main at  the  head  of  its  principal  portion.  Sometimes 
he  will  stop  to  see  the  whole  force  defile  before  him, 
and  take  that  occasion  of  correcting  the  order  of 
march.  He  will  frequently  go  forward  to  the  ad- 
vance-guard to  give  his  instructions,  and  to  reconnoitre 
the  country  in  front ;  or,  if  he  has  a  staff  officer  under 
his  orders,  he  may  send  him  upon  this  reconnoissance, 
as  the  special  qualifications  of  such  an  officer  will  ena- 
ble him  to  gain  speedy  and  exact  intelligence.  It  is 
important  for  the  chief  of  a  detachment  to  know  the 
cardinal  points  at  night,  and  if  he  has  no  compass,  he 
will  regulate  his  course  by  the  stars,  chiefly  by  the 
jpole  stai\  which  is  very  nearly  at  the  north  pole  of 
the  heavens.  This  recommendation  is  especially  ap- 
plicable to  the  war  in  Algeria,  where,  on  account  of 
the  uncertainty  of  the  Arabic  roads  southward,  it  is 
important  that  every  soldier  should  be  acquainted 
with  this  star,  which  will  be  of  great  use  to  him,  in 
case  he  loses  his  way. 

"A  chief  of  a  detachment,"  says  Jacquinot  de 
Presles,f  "  should  often  suppose  himself  on  the  point 
of  being  attacked,  and  ask  himself  wliat  course  lie 
would  take  if  the  enemy  were  suddenly  to  qp^ear  ;  if 


*  The  details  of  this  paragraph  have  been  substantially  given  in  Part 
Second,  chapter  ii.,  in  speaking  of  columns  on  the  march  ;  but  thej  are  so 
important  that  their  repetition  in  connection  with  detachments  will  not 
be  thought  useless. 

t  Cours  d'art  militairc,  p.  404. 


240  MIIfOR   OPERATIOJS-S. 

the  answer  embarrasses  him,  if  a  course  at  once  pru- 
dent and  honorable  does  not  occur  to  Ms  mind,  lie  is 
not  yet  a  good  officer^  and  his  detachment  is  very  much 
exposed ;  for  it  is  probable  that  he  will  lose  his  pres- 
ence of  mind  if  he  be  attacked." 

Moreover,  the  detachment  which  is  commanded  by 
a  skilful  chief  is  necessarily,  at  the  moment  of  battle, 
more  composed  and  better  prepared  for  the  contest, 
than  one  indifferently  commanded ;  and  the  energy 
of  its  action  ought  to  give  evidence  of  this  fact. 

As  a  last  general  observation,  we  will  add  that  a 
detachment,  whether  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  or  of  both 
(without  artillery),  should  not  be  deterred  from  the 
fulfilment  of  its  mission  by  having  to  cross  a  river. 

Detachments,  like  partisans,*  have  a  right  to 
shares  of  booty. 

2.  Betacliineiits  of  Infantry. — A  detachment  of 
infantry  may  undertake  all  kinds  of  enterprises,  even 
the  most  daring.  They  are  mostly  charged  with  noc- 
turnal expeditions ;  with  coups-de-main  in  a  hilly  or 
wooded  country ;  with  the  attack  and  defence  of  ob- 
stacles, such  as  houses,  barricades,  woods,  defiles ;  with 
escorting  or  attacking  convoys,  and  with  ambuscades. 

When  a  detachment  is  sent  to  maintain  a  position, 
it  should  at  once  intrench  itself  there,  and  make  use 
of  all  the  resources  which  the  locality  affords  for  the 
purpose.  Thus,  for  example,  for  want  of  trees  in  the 
vicinity,  it  may,  if  necessary,  demolish  some  huts  and 

*  See,  hereafter,  chapter  vi.  of  this  Part. 


DETACHMENTS. 


241 


use  the  wood  in  the  construction  of  barricades ;  but 
the  commandant  must,  nevertheless,  remember  that 
the  regulations  respecting  campaign  service  prescribe 
that  all  destruction  of  property  is  to  he  avoided  which 
is  not  indispensable. 

A  detachment  of  infantry  can  easily  conceal  and 
barricade  itself;  it  can  be  covered  by  almost  anything ; 
and  therefore  its  march,  which  is  comparatively  noise- 
less, is  readily  screened  from  observation ;  it  scarcely 
leaves  any  trace  of  its  passage,  and  can  travel  consid- 
erable distances  without  renewing  its  supply  of  pro- 
visions; all  these  are  advantages  which  it  possesses 
over  a  detachment  of  cavalry. 

When 'a  detachment  of  infantry  falls  in  with  the 
enemy,  the  best  course  for  it  to  pursue,  is  to  assume  a 
bold  front  and  rush  to  the  attack.  At  night  especially, 
and  in  favorable  localities,  this  course  will  have  the 
best  chance  of  success.  Hilly  ground  is  the  most  fa- 
vorable for  its  action ;  but  upon  a  plain  it  will  be  at  a 
disadvantage  against  cavalry.  It  should,  therefore, 
avoid  travelling  a  great  extent  of  level  country,  at 
least  during  the  day.  Frequently,  when  it  has  not 
been  able  to  accomplish  its  purpose  in  a  single  night, 
it  will  halt  and  conceal  itself  during  the  day  behind 
some  obstacle,  and  not  set  out  again  upon  its  march 
until  night.  In  mountainous  districts  it  may  march 
by  day,  but  it  will  yet  be  proper  to  avoid  the  villages 
and  frequented  roads. 

In  order  to  offer  greater  resistance  to  the  enemy, 
a  detachment  of  infantry  should  march  in  column  by 
sections.  It  must  not  be  obliged  to  put  files  in  the 
16 


242 


MESrOR   OPERATIONS. 


rear  in  contracted  ground,  for  it  is  a  vicious  formation, 
and  an  embarrassing  one  in  case  of  attack ;  lience  the 
sections  should  be  formed  upon  a  small  front :  ten  or 
twelve  files  will  be  sufficient.  There  should  be  an 
even  number  of  sections,  so  as  to  facilitate  the  foima- 
tion  of  a  square.  Like  all  detachments,  it  will  have 
an  advance  and  a  rear-guard ;  and  we  can  here  assign  a 
more  precise  limit  for  the  approximate  force  to  be 
given  to  these  two  fractions  of  a  detachment  of  infan- 
try, namely  one  half  (at  most)  of  the  whole  force,  if 
the  latter  be  under  500  men  ;  but  if  the  force  be  over 
500  men,  the  advance-guard,  the  rear-guard,  and  the 
flankers  should  not  together  exceed  one  tJiird  the 
force.  For  a  forward  march,  the  advance-guard  will 
be  the  most  considerable  of  the  secondary  portions  of 
the  detachment;  for  a  retrograde  movement,  it  will 
be  the  rear-guard.  According  to  these  considerations, 
the  marching  formation  of  a  detachment  of  infantry  is 
as  follows : 


DETACHMENT  OF  150  MEN. 
(In  three  ranks.) 
1        1 15  men, 


■•    1 


DETACHMENT  OF  90  MEN. 
(In  two  ranks.) 
f  t^    8  men. 

Advance-guard.    ■< 


3C 


\ 


Q  5  men. 


Principal  corps    . 
and  nankers. 


Eear-guard, 


2U 


CJ    6  men. 


DETACHMENTS. 


243 


3.  Betaclimeiits  of  Cavalry. — Detacliments  of  cav- 
alry are  principally  used  in  such  service  as  requires 
celerity,  as  that  of  escorts,  rapid  reconnoissances,  levy- 
ing contributions,  posts  of  observation,  etc.  In  opera- 
tions of  tHs  kind,  the  mounted  soldier  may  make 
good  use  of  his  fire-arms. 

The  duty  of  the  advance-guard  of  a  detachment 
of  cavalry  will  be  to  give  warning  of  the  presence  of 
the  enemy.  The  detachment,  upon  this  warning,  may 
either  charge  or  retreat,  according  to  circumstances ; 
but  it  should  not  remain  stationary  unless  it  has  not 
been  itself  discovered. 

A  detachment  of  cavalry  has  the  advantage  upon 
level  ground  ;  but  irregular  ground  is  unfavorable  to 
it.  Defiles  are  dangerous  to  it,  as  infantry  can  there 
easily  lie  in  ambush ;  these  should,  therefore,  be 
avoided  by  a  detour ;  but  if  that  is  not  possible,  they 
should  first  be  explored  by  scouts,  or  by  some  of  the 
horsemen  themselves  (on  foot,  however)  ;  and  after- 
ward the  defile  should  be  passed  at  a  gallop.  When 
the  defile  is  more  than  a  league  in  length,  the  recon- 
noissance  of  it  must  be  abandoned ;  and  in  this  case 
it  must  be  entered  with  caution,  breaking  up  the  de- 
tachment into  platoons  of  ten  or  twelve  horsemen 
each,  and  marching  in  a  disconnected  manner,  so  as 
to  present  more  void  than  full  space  to  the  fire  of  an 
ambuscaded  enemy.  In  this  way,  and  aided  by  the 
rapidity  of  movement,  the  detachment  will  probably 
escape  serious  damage.  It  would  be  an  excellent 
safeguard  to  occupy  the  overlooking  heights  before 


244  MmOR  OPERATIONS. 

entering  into  tlie  defiles,  but  this  is  often  a  difficult 
operation  for  cavalry. 

A  detachment  of  cavalry  will  usually  form  by 
platoons,  which  is  the  most  suitable  order  for  combat. 
The  extent  of  the  front  of  each  platoon  should  be  such 
that  the  detachment  leaves  a  portion  of  the  road  free, 
in  order  that  it  may  easily  make  a  half  turn  in  the 
event  of  a  sudden  attack,  which  does  not  permit  it  to 
deploy.  It  will  also  be  prudent  to  keep  the  left  side 
of  the  road ;  for,  in  a  rencontre,  it  will  then  be  at- 
tacked by  the  right  flank,  which  is  the  strong  side  of 
the  horseman. 

4.  Mixed  i>etachiiaeiits. — Mixed  detachments  pos- 
sess more  coherence  or  stability  than  those  consisting 
of  a  single  arm.  No  others  should  be  employed  in 
insurgent  districts.  The  escorts  of  a  convoy,  of  a  for- 
aging party,  or  of  a  park,  having  to  act  over  a  great 
extent  of  country,  should  be  mixed. 

The  order  of  march  of  a  mixed  detachment  varies 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  ground  it  traverses. 
On  level  ground,  the  cavalry  takes  the  lead,  and 
watches  over  the  safety  of  the  detachment ;  but  in  a 
country  cut  up  by  mountains  and  ravines,  and  covered 
by  woods,  the  infantry  forms  the  advance-guard,  and 
also  flanks  the  column.  It  is  the  same  at  night,  with 
the  difference  only,  that  the  distances  between  the  ad- 
vance and  rear-guards  and  the  principal  body  are  di- 
minished.^'    In  a  varied  region,  sometimes  level  and 

*  L^orier,  Theorie  de  Vofficier  superieure,  p.  138. 


DETACHMENTS. 


245 


at  other  times  broken,  tlie  detadiment  will  observe 
the  same  order  as  in  broken  ground  and  at  night ;  be- 
cause but  one  order  of  march  can  be  adopted,  if  we 
do  not  wish  to  disorganize  the  detachment  by  fre- 
quent interchanges  of  the  troops  of  the  advance-guard 
and  of  the  principal  body ;  and  also  because,  when  the 
infantry  takes  the  lead,  the  cavalry  may  always,  in 
case  of  necessity,  come  up  rapidly  to  the  head  of  the 
column. 

When  a  mixed  detachment  meets  the  enemy,  it 
may  either  retire  or  fight.  If  it  fights,  it  will  be 
draivn  up  in  two  lines,  either  in  echelons,  or  checker- 
wise — the  force  of  the  echelons  depending  upon  the 
total  effective  force  of  the  detachment,  and  being,  if 
necessary,  even  as  small  as  a  half  squadron.  The  dis- 
positions for  combat,  however,  are  of  infinite  variety, 
but  are  almost  always  determined  by  the  nature  of 
the  ground.  If  the  flanks  of  the  position  are  covered 
by  woods,  and  are  thus  favorable  to  a  protracted  de- 
fence, it  will  be  well  to  throw  out  a  part  of  the  infan- 
try upon  these  flanks,  as  skirmishers. 

To  complete  this  brief  sketch,  we  give  on  the  fol- 
lowing pages  the  order  of  march  of  two  mixed  detach- 
ments, one  marching  on  level  ground,  the  other  in 
broken  or  hilly  ground.  These  figures  (in  which  the 
symbol  0  denotes  a  single  horseman,  and  O  a  single 
foot  soldier)  explain  themselves. 


246 


MINOE   OPERATIONS. 


MIXED  DETACHMENT  OF  800  FOOT  AND  50  HOKSE,  MAECHING  ON 
LEVEL  GKOUND. 


«% 


»  It  « 


JSIIbrses 


♦  0 
0 


3  Infantry 


Principal  corps  (Infantry— 240  men). 
10 


3 
o 

o 

o 

• 

o 

,0 

vvv 

<>00 

o 

^ 

Q 

^  Infantry 


00 


DETACHMENTS. 


247 


MIXED  DETACHMENT  OF  200  FOOT  AND  50  HOPwSE,  MAECHING  IN 
BROKEN  GEOUND. 


«  o       31  Hnrry^ 


Patrol  of  10  foot     I      [ 


Principal  corps  (132  men). 
il 

3\  z:::^ 


~ 

1 

^ 

fl 

o 

s- 

s 

<a 

>, 

^ 

s 

,4 

^ 

□  Patrol  of  10  foot. 


o 

o     o 

4 


InfryO 


CHAPTER   THIRD. 

ARMED     EECOIS^NOISSANCES. 

IisTTEODUcTiois-. — Armed  reconnaissance  *  is  the  des- 
ignation applied  to  any  movement  of  troops,  made 
with  the  object  of  discovering  or  verifying  one  or 
more  particulars  respecting  the  position,  the  force,  the 
movements,  or  even  the  intentions  of  the  enemy. 

This  definition  shows  that  such  a  reconnoissance 
constitutes  the  basis  of  every  military  operation,  and 
ought  to  precede  it.  Without  a  reconnoissance,  we 
should  be  constantly  liable  to  surprises. 

Since  armies  generally  cover  their  marches  by 
flankers,  and  their  camps  and  cantonments  by  a  chain 
of  outposts,  it  follows  that,  in  order  to  obtain  a  view 
of  their  disposition,  we  must  push  beyond  these  flank- 
ers or  this  chain,  by  a  reconnoissance,  which  can  clear 
away  the  obstacles  to  such  an  inspection.  We  see, 
therefore,  in  advance,  that  the  service  of  reconnois- 
sances  is  attended  with  difficulties  and  complications. 

We   must  not   confound  the  reconnoissance  by 

*  In  these  Elements  we  are  not  required  to  treat  of  topograpMcal  re- 
connoissancee. 


AEMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  249 

patrol,  made  by  tlie  gi^and  guards  for  tlieir  security, 
witli  a  reconnoissance  proper.  Tlie  patrol  reconnoi- 
tres within  narrower  limits,  confining  itself  to  its 
chief  purpose — that  of  assuring  itself  of  the  position 
in  which  the  enemy  is  posted,  without  troubling  itself 
with  their  tactical  arrangement,  or  with  the  topo- 
graphical strength  of  their  position;  while  a  recon- 
noissance examines  in  detail  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
the  weak  points  of  his  position,  the  mode  of  attack- 
B       ing  it,  the  composition  of  the  opposing  corps  in  troops 

■  of  the  several  arms,  the  character  of  the  soldiers,  the 

■  vigilance  of  the  officers,  the  condition  of  their  sup- 

■  plies,  the  designs  of  their  chief,  the  confidence  he  in- 

■  spires,  etc. ;  in  short,  sees  and  collects  as  much  infor- 
^^^  mation  as  possible. 

^^t        "We  shall  distinguish  ^ve  kinds  of  reconnoissance  : 
^^B       1st.  Daily  reconnoissances ; 
^^B       2d.    Special  reconnoissances ; 
^^B       3d.    Secret  reconnoissances ; 
P^B       4th.  Offensive  reconnoissances ; 

5th.  Reconnoissances  in  Africa. 
I  Before  entering  upon  these  last,  we  shall  speak  of 

the  reports  which  should  accompany  every  reconnois- 
sance, and  shall  cite  some  historical  examples,  calcu- 
^^       lated  to  show  the  importance  of  this  minor  operation 
mm       of  war. 

Armed  reconnoissances  do  not  always  bring  back 
all  the  information  needed,  even  when  they  are  suc- 
cessful, and  it  becomes  necessary  to  complete  them  by 
accessory  means,  which  we  shall  also  study.  We  shall 
first  say  a  few  words  respecting  the  maps  which  ex- 


250  MESrOR   OPERATIO]S"S. 

Mbit  tlie  form  and  character  of  tlie  country ;  we  shall 
speak  of  tlie  guides  who  conduct  the  columns  safely 
through  their  various  detours ;  we  shall  point  out  the 
questions  to  be  put  to  deserters,  to  the  inhabitants,  to 
travellers,  to  prisoners,  in  order  to  make  a  profitable 
use  of  them ;  we  shall  treat  of  spies  and  of  the  proper 
treatment  of  them ;  and  we  shall  conclude  with  details 
respecting  the  principal  signs,  the  observation  of  which 
may  develop  some  particulars  respecting  the  enemy. 

1.  l>aiiy  Reconifloissances.* — Daily  reconnoissances 
are  made  to  ensure  the  safety  either  of  the  camps  or 
cantonments,  or  of  the  advanced  posts.  They  should 
ascertain  the  designs  of  the  enemy,  and  whether  he 
is  preparing  to  march,  to  surprise,  or  to  fight.  Cer- 
tain signs  will  guide  them  in  this  respect,  especially 
what  occurs  at  the  outposts ;  for  if  they  are  increased, 
it  is  a  sign  of  stagnation ;  if  such  posts  are  modified, 
it  denotes  a  change  of  position. 

In  a  level  country  the  reconnoissances  will  be  made 
by  light  cavalry ;  but  in  mountainous  countries,  they 
will  be  made  by  infantry,  which,  however,  should  be 
accompanied  by  some  horsemen  for  the  prompt  trans- 
mission of  intelligence.  In  a  varied  country  the  re- 
connoitring body  will  be  composed  of  troops  of 
both  arms,  and  in  all  cases  the  numbers  should  be 
small. 

The  service  of  reconnoissances,  like  that  of  out- 
posts, must  be  divested  of  regularity,  for  this  would 

*  The  reader  will  do  well  to  consult,  in  relation  to  daily  reconnois- 
sances, the  Ordonnance  sur  le  service  en  campagne,  art.  x.,  chap.  i. 


AKMED    RECONNOISSANCES.  251 

soon  give  the  enemy  tlie  knowledge  of  the  usages 
practised,  and  would  facilitate  the  destruction  of  the 
corps  of  reconnoissance. 

It  is  an  essential  principle  in  reconnoissances  that 
to  reconnoitre  is  not  to  attack.  Moreover,  a  reconnoi- 
tring body  should  march  with  precaution,  conceal  its 
presence,  and  avoid  compromising  itself  It  should 
consider  combat  not  as  its  end,  but  solely  as  the  ex- 
treme means  of  obtaining  information,  by  taking  pris- 
oners. There  is  also  another  case  in  which  it  may  re- 
sort to  combat ;  namely,  when  it  falls  in  with  a  de- 
tachment of  the  enemy  marching  rapidly  upon  the 
camp ;  it  will  then  retard  their  advance  by  assailing 
them,  having  first  detached  a  horseman  to  give  warn- 
ing to  the  camp.  In  such  a  case,  it  should  not  hesi- 
tate ;  it  should,  nevertheless,  take  advantage  of  local 
peculiarities  to  the  utmost  extent,  to  compensate  for 
its  numerical  inferiority. 

A  reconnoissance  should  march  as  a  detachment, 
with  an  advance-guard,  a  rear-guard  and  flankers. 
The  latter  should  take  care  never  to  be  out  of  sight 
of  the  principal  body  during  the  day,  as  one  or 
more  of  them  carried  off  would  suffice  to  guide  the 
enemy  upon  the  track  of  the  reconnoissance,  and 
would  enable  them  to  surprise  it  before  it  suspected 
danger. 

In  order  to  avoid  ambuscades,  a  reconnoissance 
should  not  traverse  inhabited  districts  before  having 
examined  them  thoroughly,  and  taken,  when  necessary, 
hostages  for  the  peaceful  disposition  of  the  inhabi- 
tants.    It  should  arrest  all  individuals  following  its 


252  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

path  or  attempting  to  pass  it,  who  might,  otherwise, 
give  notice  of  its  movements  to  the  enemy. 

"When  a  reconnoissance  cannot  accomplish  its  pur- 
pose without  halting,  it  should  do  so  behind  some 
accident  of  ground,  a  wood,  or  a  wall,  which  will  con- 
ceal it ;  and  should  also  cover  itself,  during  the  halt, 
by  some  vedettes  stationed  on  the  roads  on  the  side 
from  whence  an  attack  is  to  be  feared. 

A  reconnoissance  may  successfully  reconnoitre  a 
column  of  the  enemy  on  the  march.  For  this  purpose 
it  will  follow  the  column,  keep  alongside  of  it  without 
allowing  itself  to  be  perceived,  see  it  defile  before  it- 
self, count  it,  note  the  number  of  troops  of  each  of  the 
different  arms,  its  materiel  and  its  accessories ;  will 
observe  whether  it  appears  formidable,  and  how  it 
protects  itself;  what  are  its  habits  in  setting  out,  in 
halting,  and  in  passing  through  defiles ;  in  what  part 
it  appears  most  vulnerable ;  w^hat  its  designs  appear  to 
be ;  whether  its  troops  are  fatigued  ;  in  a  word,  it  will 
gather  the  most  circumstantial  information  possible 
respecting  the  column. 

2.  Special  Reconnoissances. — In  the  language  of 
the  Ordinance  respecting  field  service,  the  object  of 
special  reconnoissances  will  be,  in  general,  as  follows : 

"  1st.  To  determine  distances,  the  condition  of  the 
roads  and  the  repairs  they  may  require,  the  configura- 
tion of  the  ground,  and  facilities  or  obstacles  it  pre- 
sents, in  order  to  regulate,  thereby,  the  march  of  the 
columns  and  of  the  different  arms ; 

"  2d.  To  explore,  in  all  their  parts,  the  positions  to 


•       AEMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  253 

be  successively  occupied  by  the  columns,  either  for 
the  purpose  of  supporting  all  attacks,  or  of  sustaining 
themselves  in  case  of  resistance  or  an  offensive  demon- 
stration on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  or  of  insuring  their 
retreat. 

"  3d.  To  reconnoitre  the  position  and  the  force  of 
the  principal  or  intrenched  posts  of  the  enemy,  the 
configuration  of  his  positions,  the  defences  he  may 
have  established  there,  the  difficulty  or  the  means  of 
attacking  them. 

f"  4th.  Finally,  to  estimate,  as  nearly  as  possible, 
the  forces  of  the  enemy  at  every  point." 
Special  reconnoissances  belong  to  the  province  of 
the  officers  of  the  several  staffs.  Thus,  for  example, 
when  the  object  of  the  reconnoissance  is  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  march  of  the  columns,  or  to  ascertain 
the  force  of  the  enemy,  it  is  intrusted  to  an  officer  of 
the  staff  corps ;  if  it  relates  to  the  condition  of  the 
roads,  or  to  the  intrenched  posts  of  the  enemy,  or  to 
the  establishment  of  field  works,  it  should  be  executed 
by  an  officer  of  engineers ;  when  it  relates  to  the 
means  of  reaching  the  enemy's  position  from  a  dis- 
tance, by  means  of  artillery  favorably  placed,  it  is  put 
in  charge  of  an  artillery  officer.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
easy  to  imagine  circumstances  in  the  field  in  which 
such  a  distribution  could  not  be  rigorously  observed, 
and  in  which  an  officer  of  engineers  might  at  some 
point  execute  a  reconnoissance  which  more  properly 
belonged  to  the  province  of  a  general  staff  officer, 
while,  at  another  point,  the  latter  might  reconnoitre 
the  most  favorable  location  of  some  field  work. 


254  MINOR   OPEEATIONS. 

The  general  officer  who  orders  a  special  reconnois- 
sance,  gives  particular  instructions  to  tlie  officer  to 
whom  lie  intrusts  it :  the  latter  communicates  these 
instructions  to  the  general  of  the  brigade  whose  out- 
posts he  must  pass.  The  general  of  brigade  adds 
to  these  instructions  whatever  his  own  special  knowl- 
edge of  the  localities  and  the  acts  of  the  enemy  may- 
suggest,  and  furnishes  the  reconnoitring  officer  with  a 
detachment.  If  the  latter  finds  it  necessary  to  the 
success  of  his  expedition  to  carry  some  posts  of  the 
enemy,  he  should  not  make  the  attack  without  the 
authority  of  the  brigadier-general.  The  observance  of 
this  rule  is  indispensable,  as  the  engagement  in  ques- 
tion might  assume  large  proportions,  compromise  the 
brigade,  and  sometimes  even  force  it  to  an  untimely 
combat ;  and  the  brigadier-general  is  the  only  one  in 
a  proper  position  to  judge  of  the  opportuneness  of  a 
contest  on  his  front. 

3.  Secret  Reconnoissances. — ^The  daily  and  spe- 
cial reconnoissances  of  which  we  have  spoken,  usually 
require  but  a  few  hours  for  their  execution,  and  are 
usually  made  in  broad  daylight.  But,  besides  this 
general  case,  in  which  reconnnoissances  of  this  kind 
may  be  designated  as  ostensible  (or  open)^  there  are 
cases  where  it  is  important  to  make  them  secretly: 
they  are  then  called  secret  reconnoissances,  and  may 
occupy  several  days  and  nights,  according  to  the 
greater  or  less  distance  of  the  enemy,  his  greater  or 
less  strength,  and  the  more  or  less  hilly  character  of 
the  country. 


AKMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  255 

The  importance  of  keeping  reconnoissances  secret  is 
obvious ;  for  if  it  be  advantageous  to  obtain  information 
respecting  tlie  position  and  intentions  of  tlie  enemy 
and  to  baffle  bis  designs,  it  is  still  more  desirable  that 
the  enemy  should  not  know  that  v^e  have  obtained 
possession  of  his  secrets  and  the  key  of  all  his  opera- 
tions, whereby  we  are  enabled  with  certainty  to  para- 
lyze his  eflPorts.  However,  while  it  is  important  to 
conduct  a  reconnoissance  secretly,  it  rarely  happens 
that  absolute  secrecy  is  possible  ;  the  enemy  frequent- 
ly discovers  it,  and  it  then  resolves  itself  into  the  open 
reconnoissance. 

Let  us  consider  these  secret  reconnoissances  more 

Miy. 

A  secret  reconnoissance  is  a  delicate  and  difficult 
operation ;  for  it  is  necessary  first  to  find  the  enemy 
without  allowing  one's  self  to  be  perceived,  then  to 
reconnoitre  him,  that  is,  to  examine  him  with  care, 
and  to  collect  the  greatest  amount  of  information  re- 
specting him.  It  should  be  intrusted  to  officers  of  light 
troops,  often  assisted  by  a  staff  officer.  The  officer  in 
charge  of  it  should  be  experienced,  and  have  under 
his  orders  none  but  veteran  soldiers ;  for  fresh  re- 
cruits, unaccustomed  to  combat,  might  cause  total 
failure.  He  will  act  with  prudence,  as  his  mission 
requires,  but  yet,  in  decisive  moments,  he  will  display 
boldness,  or,  at  least,  resolution,  without  which  he 
would  often  be  liable  to  see  nothing  and  fail  of  his 
object ;  for  the  best  conducted  reconnoissance  is  that 
which  brings  back  the  greatest  amount  of  useful  infor- 
mation.    An  irresolute  officer  will  fear  to  expose  his 


256  MusroE  opeeations. 

detacliment  or  his  person,  and  at  tlie  last  moment, 
either  from  negligence,  or  sometimes  even  fr-om  fear, 
will  not  approach  sufficiently  near ;  and  then  he  will 
make  a  false  report,  assuredly  more  dangerous  than 
the  absence  of  all  information  concerning  the  enemy. 
"What  we  have  said  in  relation  to  the  chief  of  the  se- 
cret reconnoissances  is  applicable  to  the  officers  under 
him,  and  the  non-commissioned  officers  to  whom  he  in- 
trusts some  particular  duty,  or  who  accompany  him  in 
his  nearest  approaches  to  the  enemy :  these  officers 
and  soldiers  should  be  mature,  experienced  in  war- 
fare, zealous,  and  faithful.  To  the  same  effect  Mar- 
shal Montluc  says,  in  his  Commentaries :  "  Cajntaines^ 
mes  amis^  il  faut  plus  tost  vous  Tiazarder  d'^estre  pris 
et  sQavoir  le.  vray^  que  non  pas  vous  fonder  sur  le 
rapport  des  mlains.  lis  out  la  peur  si  avant  dans 
le  ventre^  quHl  leur  semhle  que  tous  les  huisso7is  sont 
des  esquadrons^  et  Vasseurent^  et  cependant  fiez-vous 
Id  /  c'est  comme  quand  Us  voyent  cent  escuSj  il  leur 
semhle  advis  qvHil  y  en  a  mille,  Envoyes  tousjours 
quelques  soldats  sans  peur^  et  que  plus  tost  Us  se 
Jiazardent  /  et  si  vous  voulez  faire  mieux^  allez-y  vous 
mesme.  Ainsi  ay-je  tousjours  faict^  et  m^en  suis  hien 
trouvSr 

A  no  less  indispensable  quality  of  the  commandant 
of  a  secret  reconnoissance  is  sang-froid^  for  this  will 
often  save  him,  and  in  all  cases  will  qualify  him  to 
approach  close  to  the  enemy,  and  there  determine 
with  his  own  eyes  his  position  and  his  defences.     The 

*  Under  the  date  1545,  Montluc  cites  the  case  of  an  officer  who  saw 
four  hundred  horsemen  in  a  valley  where  there  was  not  a  single  soldier. 


AEMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  "25T 

career  of  the  most  illustrious  of  engineers  furnishes  in 
this  connection  a  striking  example.  At  the  siege  of 
Luxembourg  (1683),  Vauban,  in  order  to  reconnoitre 
the  place,  went  every  night  to  within  a  short  distance 
of  the  outer  works,  accompanied  by  some  grenadiers, 
who  remained  at  the  foot  of  the  glacis,  lying  flat  on 
the  ground,  while  he  ascended  the  glacis  and  ap- 
proached the  covered  way.  On  one  occasion  he  was 
perceived  by  some  of  the  garrison,  who  aimed  their 
pieces  at  him ;  but  continuing  to  advance,  and  raising 
his  hand  to  signify  to  them  that  they  must  not  fire, 
was  taken  for  one  of  their  own  officers,  continued  his 
inspection,  then  slowly  retired,  saved  by  his  admirable 
sang-froid  and  his  excess  of  temerity. 

The  chief  of  the  reconnoissance  should  also  be  able 
to  speak  the  language  of  the  country,  and  if  he  can 
also  write  it,  it  will  be  still  better.  By  employing  the 
idiom  of  the  country,  he  will  not  appear  to  be  so 
much  of  a  stranger  to  the  inhabitants  and  prisoners 
whom  he  may  question,  and  this  will  render  them 
more  communicative.  This  condition,  which  is  appli 
cable  also  to  all  kinds  of  reconnoissances,  more  espe- 
cially requires  to  be  mentioned,  because  we  are,  in 
France,  generally  too  indifferent  to  the  study  of  for- 
eign languages — a  study  of  great  utility  in  war,  as 
this  example  shows.  If  the  non-commissioned  officers 
of  the  reconnoissance  can  also  speak  the  language  of 
the  country,  they  can  supply  the  place  of  their  supe- 
rior officers,  and  can  be  employed  upon  the  thousand 
ruses  which  serve  to  extricate  a  detachment  from  an 
unfortunate  position.  For  want  of  a  knowledge  of 
17 


258  MIlSrOR    OPERATIONS. 

the  language  of  the  country,  that  of  the  Latin  may  be 
of  advantage  to  the  officer,  by  enabling  him  to  con- 
verse with  the  priests  and  educated  persons ;  but  for 
that  purpose  he  should  also  have  acquired  the  accent 
with  w^hich  the  Latin  is  spoken  by  the  inhabitants. 

The  chief  of  a  secret  reconnoissance  should  supply 
himself  with  a  good  telescope  and  an  accurate  chart 
of  the  country  he  is  to  traverse,  or,  at  least,  with  a 
sketch  prepared  at  head-quarters.  If  he  can  obtain 
any  statistical  or  military  information  from  officers 
who  have  been  over  the  surrounding  localities,  he 
will,  of  course,  not  neglect  to  avail  himself  of  it. 

The  detachment  charged  with  the  performance  of 
a  secret  reconnoissance  will,  in  general,  be  composed 
of  light  cavalry.  Its  effective  force  should  be  suffi- 
ciently small  to  permit  it  to  conceal  its  march,  and 
yet  strong  enough  to  enable  it  to  resist  an  enemy's 
patrol.  From  fifteen  to  forty  horses*  will  satisfy 
these  conditions.  If,  besides  its  ordinary  duty  of  col- 
lecting information,  the  reconnoissance  have  to  at- 
tempt some  minor  operation — such  as  carrying  a  post, 
firing  a  magazine,  disorganizing  a  convoy — there  may 
be  some  foot  soldiers  added  to  it.  Unless  the  ground 
be  exceedingly  intricate,  secret  reconnoissances  may  al- 
most always  be  performed  by  experienced  light  caval- 
ry troops,  for  the  horseman  can  go  anywhere,  if  he  is 

*  The  Cossacks  often  make  reconnoissances  with  a  smaller  number. 
Some  five  or  six  set  out,  and  have  been  known  to  go  as  far  as  twenty 
leagues  from  their  camp  or  cantonment.  This  results  from  their  peculiar 
habits  of  living,  for  they  are,  in  fact,  mounted  partisans,  and,  in  case  of 
need,  exist  upon  almost  nothing. 


AEMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  259 

bent  upon  it.  Tlie  reconnoissance  sets  out  secretly, 
without  covering  itself  by  numerous  and  scattered 
flankers,  who  would  attract  attention.  It  will  move 
with  alacrity,  in  order  to  arrive  near  the  enemy's  posts 
before  day.  It  should  not,  however,  go  so  rapidly  as 
to  exhaust  its  strength  before  the  end  of  the  opera- 
tion. "  The  powers  of  the  horse,"  says  General  Brack,^ 
"  are  the  fortune  of  the  horseman  ;  if  they  are  all  ex- 
!■  pended  in  one  hour,  what  is  left  ?  The  little  strength 
H  that  prudence  might  have  husbanded,  would  save  life 
B  and  obtain  the  cross  of  honor.  Let  the  officer  upon 
H  a  reconnoissance  especially  remember  this." 
I  The  reconnoissance  marches   with    an    advance- 

■  guard,  which  is  accompanied  by  a  guide.  It  will  be 
I  prudent  to  mount  the  latter  upon  a  white  horse  dur- 
I  ing  a  nocturnal  march,  in  order  that  he  may  always  be 
I  distinguished,  however  thick  the  darkness  may  be. 
I^^ft  When  near  the  enemy,  the  chief  of  the  reconnois- 
sance will  point  out  to  his  men  a  rallying  point,  situ- 
ated in  the  rear,  to  which  every  horseman,  at  his  or- 
der, or  upon  a  preconcerted  signal,  shall  repair,  in  case 
it  becomes  necessary  to  disperse  in  order  to  escape 
from  a  pursuit.  In  anticipation  of  the  possibility  of  a 
forced  dispersment,  it  is  prudent  to  send  back,  from 
time  to  time,  to  the  point  of  departure,  a  note  con- 
taining the  information  already  collected.  It  should 
be  written  in  very  fine  characters  upon  a  small  piece 
of  paper,  which  the  messenger  places. in  his  glove.  In 
case  of  attack,  if  he  sees  he  cannot  escape,  he  has 

*  Avant-postes  de  cavalerie  legere,  p.  189. 


260  MmOE   OPERATIONS. 

orders  to  swallow  tMs  paper,  or  to  put  it  into  Lis 
pistol  as  a  wad,  so  as  to  destroy  it  in  firing. 

After  tlie  rallying  point  has  been  pointed  out,  tlie 
commanding  officer  will  form  tlie  reconnoitring  body 
in  three  echelons;  then,  availing  himself  of  the  va- 
rious obstacles  of  the  ground  as  covers,  he  will  ad- 
vance with  a  guide  and  an  escort  of  two  or  three 
horsemen  to  the  lines  of  the  enemy's  patrols.  If  he  is 
not  perceived,  he  will  observe  whatever  is  of  interest ; 
if  discovered,  he  will  fall  back  to  his  troop,  which 
has  remained  in  rear.  The  successive  appearance  of  the 
echelons  will  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  force  of  the 
detachment,  and  it  is  probable  that  some  favoring  ob- 
stacle may  be  reached  while  he  is  hesitating.  If  not, 
the  troop  should  disperse. 

The  echelons  formed  by  the  reconnoissance  need 
not  be  very  regular.  Their  distance  depends  upon 
the  ground,  but  it  will  be  prudent  not  to  make  it 
more  than  1,000  yards,  in  order  that  each  may  see  the 
others. 

When  the  reconnoissance  has  been  discovered,  it 
is  often  best  to  renew  it  as  soon  as  the  enemy  has  re- 
turned to  his  position,  which  will  surprise  him,  and 
thus  secure  better  opportunities  of  seeing. 

Again,  the  officer  in  charge  of  a  secret  reconnois- 
sance may  accomplish  his  purpose  sometimes,  by  leav- 
ing his  troop  at  one  or  two  leagues'  distance  from  the 
enemy's  outposts^  g^^'^g  forward  alone  with  a  guide, 
and  establishing  himself  by  the  break  of  day  in  a 
bush  or  tree,  or  in  any  position  from  which  he  can 
observe  during  the  day  and  the  following  night. 


I 


ARMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  261 

Finally,  wlien  we  do  not  succeed  in  gaining  suffi- 
cient information  by  other  means,  we  endeavor  to 
make  prisoners ;  but  tben  it  will  be  better  to  do  so 
by  stratagem  than  by  open  force. 

We  must  not  forget  that,  in  secret  reconnoissances, 
as  in  all  others,  notwithstanding  the  difficulty  of  the 
operation,  promptness  and  dispatch  are  necessary  to 
give  reliable  value  to  the  results,  for  in  war  every- 
thing changes  with  such  rapidity  as  to  make  any  in- 
formation a  little  old  totally  false. 

The  object  being  attained,  the  secret  reconnois- 
sance  retires  as  quickly  as  possible ;  and,  to  escape  the 

^ enemy's  attention,  makes  itself  as  small  as  possible. 
Sometimes  its  return  is  secured  by  intermediate  posts, 
which  it  has  echeloned  upon  the  road  in  its  advance 
movement. 
4.  Offensive  Reconnoissances. — When  even  the 
secret  reconnoissances  have  failed,  and  the  Auxiliary 
resources  for  obtaining  information  prove  insufficient, 
there  is  nothing  left  but  open  force.  In  the  case 
where  two  armies,  having  been  for  some  time  at  a 
distance  from  each  other,  come  suddenly  face  to  face, 
it  is  also  well  to  obtain  positive  information  of  the 
situation  of  the  enemy  by  a  grand  reconnoissance, 
which,  like  other  open  reconnoissances,  is  called  an 
offensive  reconnaissance.  This  designation  is  given 
to  it,  because  it  attacks  in  order  to  reconnoitre,  where- 
as the  other  reconnoissances,  already  treated  of,  not 
only  shun  combat,  but  are  cautious  not  even  to  put 
themselves  in  danger. 


262  MINOR    OPERATIOIirS. 

To  effect  an  offensive  reconnoissance,  a  detachment 
is  expressly  formed  for  tlie  purpose,  composed,  when 
possible,  of  artillery  and  light  cavalry,  in  order  that  it 
may  be  master  of  its  movements.  This  detachment 
pierces  the  net-work  of  outposts,  drives  back  whatever 
covers  the  enemy,  and  penetrates  to  some  commanding 
point,  and  keeps  up  the  skirmish  until  the  reconnoi- 
tring officer  has  s^en  everything. 

Prudence  requires  that  a  force  should  be  in  con- 
stant readiness  to  sustain  the  detachment  engaged  in 
an  offensive  reconnoissance,  or  to  collect  it  again  if  it 
has  been  too  quickly  withdrawn.  The  infantry  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  affording  this  support ;  and 
the  whole  army  should  be  prepared  to  march  in  case 
some  accidental  and  favorable  circumstance  should 
suddenly  afford  an  opportunity  of  falling  upon  the 
enemy ."^  Care  should  also  be  taken  to  throw  out 
patrols  in  various  directions,  to  guard  against  a 
manoeuvre  to  turn  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  recon- 
noissance. 

It  is  frequently  the  general-in-chief  himself  who 
directs  the  offensiv^e  reconnoissance,  and  he  then  usu- 
ally executes  it  with  the  advance-guard  of  the  army. 
Frederic  and  Napoleon  both  followed  this  course — 
chiefly  upon  the  eve  of  a  battle — in  order  to  reconnoi- 
tre for  themselves  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
settle  their  plans  of  attack.  In  this  case  the  reconnois- 
sance becomes,  in  a  manner,  an  experimental  comhat ;  f 

*  Marrnont,  Esprit  des  institutions  militaires,  pp.  162,  1G5. 
t  The  officers  used  to  call  this  reconnoissance  the  rehearsal  of  the 
play. 


I 

p 


ARMED    RECONNOISSANCES.  263 

and,  if  it  fails,  it  will  be  better  to  postpone  the  battle 
until  a  superiority  of  force  is  secured. 

As  offensive  reconnoissances,  notwithstanding  the 
precautions  taken  not  to  accept  a  serious  combat,  may 
go  farther  than  is  intended,  and  bring  on  unexpected 
consequences,  the  regulations  upon  field  service  pre- 
scribe that  they  shall  be  ordered  only  by  the  general- 
in-chief,  and  add :  "  They  are  allowed  to  be  under- 
taken by  other  general  ofiicers  only  in  cases  where 
they  are  acting  apart  and  out  of  the  reach  of  all  co- 
operation ;  or,  finally,  in  those  urgent  cases  in  which 
they  should  not  hesitate  to  take  the  responsibility." 

5.  Report. — ^The  regulations  recommend  that  a 
report  be  made  of  each  reconnoissance,  drawn  up  in  a 
clear,  simple,  and  positive  manner,  distinguishing  in- 
formation obtained  from  actual  observation,  from  that 
obtained  by  hearsay,  and  giving  the  spelling  of  proper 
names  with  care.  For  special  and  offensive  reconnois- 
sances they  prescribe,  in  addition,  a  sketch  of  the  ground 
and  of  the  defensive  arrangements  of  the  enemy. 

The  written  report  which  accompanies  a  reconnois- 
sance is  as  indispensable  to  the  general-in-chief  as  the 
map  of  the  country  in  which  he  operates.  The  clear- 
ness and  precision  required  in  its  style  should  not  pre- 
vent its  embracing  all  the  details  necessary  to  throw 
light  upon  the  results  of  the  reconnoissance ;  and  it  is 
better  that  it  be  too  explicit  (provided  it  be  correct) 
than  too  concise — for  an  incomplete  statement  always 
embarrasses  the  person  who  receives  it.  The  proper 
preparation  of  a  report  requkes  an  officer  sufficiently 


264  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

accustomed  to  reflection  not  to  be  easily  led  into  er- 
ror, and  sufficiently  calm  to  exercise  judgment  and  to 
compare  with  coolness  tLat  wliicli  lie  lias  observed 
with  that  which  he  has  merely  glanced  at,  without 
allowing  himself  to  be  affected  either  by  the  dangers 
he  may  have  incurred,  or  by  the  rapidity  with  which 
he  is  compelled  to  conduct  his  operations.  This  rapid- 
ity, indeed,  is  such  that,  often  in  the  space  of  a  few 
hours,  an  officer  may  have  assembled  his  detachment, 
executed  the  reconnoissance,  prepared  his  report,  and 
finished  his  sketch.  For  this  reason,  officers  cannot 
take  too  much  pains  to  qualify  themselves,  as  soon  as 
possible,  for  the  preparation  of  such  reports,  by  suit- 
able studies  and  practice  ;  because,  if  they  become  ex- 
pert in  them,  they  will  be  capable  of  rendering  good 
service  to  armies,  and  while  making  themselves  useful 
to  their  country,  will  earn  distinction  and  honorable 
reward.  In  practising  the  preparation  of  such  reports, 
the  officer  should  aim  at  doing  it  both  quickly  and 
well — two  essential  conditions  in  many  circumstances 
of  military  life,  especially  in  war ;  for  to  do  it  quickly 
and  badly  is  worse  than  doing  nothing,  which,  at 
least,  would  not  lead  the  general  into  error  by  an  in- 
exact account ;  and  to  do  it  well,  but  slowly,  is  often 
to  work  to  no  purpose,  for  in  the  field  all  things 
change  so  rapidly  that  exact  and  true  information  at 
the  middle  of  the  day  becomes  faulty  and  consequent- 
ly worthless  before  night.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  a 
mind  slow  to  conceive  is  not  fit  for  the  service  of 
reconnoissances ;  in  the  words  of  Allent :  ^*  "  In  war, 

*  Essai  sur  les  reconnoissances  militaires. 


t 


AEMED    EECOKKOISSAlSrCES.  265 

in  those  reconnoissances  where  the  time,  the  general, 
or  the  enemy,  does  not  allow  more  than  a  coup  d'oeil^ 
all  is  lost  if  the  officer  stops  to  reflect :  the  moment 
of  action  passes  whilst  he  is  deliberating." 

In  many  cases  the  officer  charged  with  a  reconnois- 
sance,  instead  of  reducing  his  observations  to  writing, 
should  confine  himself  to  rendering  a  verbal  report ; 
for  examjole,  when  the  operation  admits  of  no  delay. 
It  is  also  very  important  for  officers  to  exercise  them- 
selves in  making  this  species  of  report,  in  order  to 
acquire  the  rare  faculty  of  describing  in  few  words, 
and  yet  with  clearness,  everything  of  consequence  that 
they  have  seen  or  learned. 

It  is  evident  that,  to  make  a  report,  written  or 
oral,  in  a  suitable  manner,  we  should  have  acquired 
the  habit  of  putting  our  thoughts  into  shape  quickly, 
and  of  giving  them  a  form  which  renders  them  intelli- 
gible, and  a  dress  which  renders  them  acceptable  to 
everybody.  This  habit  is,  indeed,  almost  the  whole 
art  of  writing  or  speaking  well — a  more  difficult  art 
than  is  commonly  thought,  and  one  which  is  only  ac- 
quired by  assiduous  labor,  whatever  may  be  our  nat- 
ural gifts. 

6.  Historical  Examples. — ^The  following  examples 
will  serve  to  demonstrate  the  importance  of  exact  and 
circumstantial  reconnoissances  to  the  success  of  mili- 
tary operations. 

I.  In  1706 :  "  If  M.  de  la  Feuillade  had  been  better 
acquainted  with  the  plain  of  Piedmont  and  the  foot 
of  the  Alps,  he  would  not  have  wasted  two  months  in 


266  MINOR    OPEEATIOlJfS. 

running  after  tlie  Duke  of  Savoy,  after  the  latter  had 
left  Turin  with  his  cavalry:  and  when  he  had  led 
that  prince  to  the  entrance  of  the  valley  of  Luzerne, 
he  would  not  have  sent  word  to  the  king  (Louis 
XIV.),  as  he  so  imprudently  did,  that  he  held  the 
enemy  in  a  country  from  which  he  could  not  escape  ; 
for  he  would  have  known  that  there  are  none  of  the 
valleys  terminating  in  Piedmont,  which  do  not  possess 
one  or  more  practicable  routes  of  communication  with 
the  neighboring  towns;  and  that,  consequently,  the 
duke  could  pass  out  of  the  valley  of  Luzerne  by  his  left 
or  his  right,  as  might  please  him,  and  thus  get  out  of 
the  way  of  M.  de  la  Feuillade,  who  was  on  his  front."  * 
IL  In  the  early  part  of  the  month  of  November, 
1805,  after  the  capture  of  Ulm,  Marmont,  charged  with 
occupying  Leoben,  followed  the  course  of  the  river  Enns 
from  Steyer  to  the  village  of  Reifling,  and  after  reach- 
ing the  latter  place  was  desirous  of  obtaining  informa- 
tion respecting  the  enemy,  who  was  endeavoring  to 
reach  the  mountains :  "  I  then  sent,"  he  states  in  his 
Memoir es^^-  "  Captain  Testot-Ferry,  one  of  my  aides- 
de-camp,  an  experienced  and  distinguished  soldier, 
wdth  two  hundred  horse  of  the  Eighth  Chasseurs,  and 
ordered  him  to  go  up  the  river  Salza.  "When  within 
one  league  of  the  grand  route,  some  peasants  informed- 
him  that  an  Austrian  battalion  had  just  arrived,  and 
had  encamped  a  league  beyond.  Determining  to  re- 
connoitre it  before  returning,  he  inspected  the  shoes 
of  the  horses-,  and  selected  those  which  could  best  march 
over  the  ice-covered  ground.     The  rest  he  left  behind 

*  Memoires  de  FenquUre,  chap.  liii.        t  Vol.  ii.,  185T,  pp.  331,  332. 


ARMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  267 

as  a  reserve,  and  set  out  witli  120  horses.  Having  ar- 
rived near  the  place  where  he  had  "been  informed  the 
camp  was  situated,  he  went  alone  through  a  wood  to 
observe  them  without  being  seen.  He  there  saw  the 
battalion  wholly  engaged  in  establishing  the  camp,  in 
careless  security,  having  placed  no  guard.  He  rejoined 
his  detachment,  left  his  trumpeters  on  the  skirts  of 
the  woods,  and  at  the  instant  they  sounded  the 
charge,  fell  upon  the  camp,  throwing  down  and 
breaking  the  muskets.  He  collected  the  disarmed 
battalion  and  brought  it  to  my  head-quarters.  This 
battalion  numbered  450  men  and  19  officers.  This 
feat  is  certainly  one  of  the  handsomest  peiformances 
of  light  troops  on  record." 

HI.  After  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  the  French 
army  made  a  false  movement,  in  consequence  of  a  badly 
executed  reconnoissance.  Lannes  and  the  cavalry  of 
the  reserve  started  in  pursuit  of  the  vanquished  forces 
by  the  road  to  Olmutz ;  but  only  the  baggage  and 
parks  of  the  enemy  had  gone  by  this  road,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  countermand  all  the  orders  to  reach  the 
route  to  Hungary  by  Goeding,  which  was  the  actual 
line  of  retreat. 

IV.  The  following  example  exhibits  the  import- 
ance of  boldness  in  secret  reconnoissances.  In  1809, 
Captain  (afterward  General)  Curely  was  charged 
with  the  reconnoissance  of  the  Austrian  army,  com- 
manded by  the  Archduke  John,  in  the  environs  of 
Eaab.  At  the  head  of  one  hundred  horse,  he  left  his 
division  behind  some  ten  leagues,  hung  about  the  rear 
of  the  enemy,  and  succeeded  in  secreting  himself  in  a 


268  MmOR   OPERATIONS. 

wood  about  3,000  yards  from  tlie  Lead-quarters  of  the 
archduke.  A  long,  dusty  plain  separated  him  from 
the  village  in  which  these  head-quarters  were  estab- 
lished. In  his  ambuscade  he  waited  for  night,  in  the 
mean  time  questioning  some  Austrian  marauders  ar- 
rested by  his  soldiers,  to  obtain  information,  upon 
which  to  base  his  plan.  A  considerable  drove  of  oxen 
happening  to  pass,  he  seized  upon  it,  and  penned  it 
within  the  woods.  At  nightfall  he  set  the  drove  in 
motion,  with  his  horsemen  in  the  midst  of  it,  leading 
their  horses  by  the  bridle  ;  and,  covered  by  the  thick 
dust  raised  by  this  pretended  convoy,  he  approached 
the  village  without  being  in  the  least  disturbed  by 
the  enemy,  who  imagined  themselves  perfectly  secure 
on  the  side  of  the  wood  from  which  he  was  coming. 
Having  thus  reached  the  village,  Curely  shot  down 
one  of  the  Austrian  sentries,  and  thereupon  (the  dis- 
charge of  his  pistol  being  the  preconcerted  signal),  his 
horsemen  mounted  and  rushed  forward,  dealing  sabre 
strokes  for  some  minutes  in  all  directions.  The  sur- 
prised enemy  were  so  completely  disordered  and  stupe- 
fied that  the  detachment  left  the  village  and  rejoined 
its  division  without  losing  a  man  or  a  horse.  Upon 
his  return,  Captain  Curely  communicated  the  most 
precise  information  respecting  the  position  of  the 
Austrian  army,  and  from  this  position  was  also  in- 
ferred that  of  the  French  army  of  Italy,  which  was  in 
pursuit  of  the  Archduke  John,^* 

V.  At  the  battle  of  Busaco  (1810),  the  position 
of  Wellington,  although   very  strong,  '^  could  have 

*  De  Brack,  Avant-postes  de  cavalerie  legere^  1831,  p.  200. 


ARMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  269 

been  turned  by  tlie  left ;  and  if  the  reconnoissances 
ordered  by  Massena  liad  been  well  executed,  the  army 
of  the  enemy  might  have  been  attacked  in  reverse  and 
thrown  upon  the  Mondego.  But  these  reconnoissan- 
ces were  not  made,  or  were  but  imperfectly  made,  and 
as  the  ground  did  not  permit  Massena  to  embrace 
the  whole  field  of  battle,  he  had  not  time  to  change 
his  dispositions  in  order  to  afford  Ney  and  Eeynier  the 
cooperation  which  would  probably  have  insured  suc- 
cess." *  This  battle  of  Busaco,  between  Massena  and 
Wellington,  belongs  to  the  campaign  of  Portugal  in 
1810,  and  was,  as  is  known,  bloody  and  indecisive. 

VI.  Frequently  an  ofiicer  or  non-commissioned 
officer  may  run  the  risk  of  reconnoitring  alone,  and 
should  then  resort  to  ruse.  In  this  connection  the 
following  fact  is  deserving  of  mention :  In  1814,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Vic-de-Bigorre,  the  French  had  posted 
one  of  their  bodies  of  rear-guards  on  a  hill,  the  end 
of  which  abutted  on  the  high  road,  the  slope  be- 
ing clothed  with  trees  and  defended  by  skirmishers. 
"Lord  "Wellington  was  desirous  to  know  whether 
a  small  or  a  large  force  thus  barred  his  way,  but 
all  who  endeavored  to  ascertain  the  fact  were 
stopped  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  At  last  Cap- 
tain William  Light,  distinguished  by  the  variety  of 
his  attainments,  an  artist,  musician,  mechanist,  seaman 
and  soldier,  made  the  trial.  He  rode  forward  as  if  he 
would  force  his  way  through  the  French  skirmishers, 
but  when  in  the  wood  dropped  his  reins  and  leaned 

*  Memoires  de  Massena^  par  le  g^ndral  Koch,  avec  on  atlas  dress6  par 
lo  commandant  Lapie,  du  corps  d'etat-major,  t.  i.,  p,  lii. 


270  MINOE   OPERATIONS. 

back,  as  if  badly  wounded ;  Lis  horse  appeared  to 
canter  wildly  along  tlie  front  of  tlie  enemy's  light 
troops,  and  they,  thinking  him  mortally  hurt,  ceased 
their  fire  and  took  no  further  notice.  He  thus  passed 
unobserved  throus^h  the  wood  to  the  other  side  of  the 
hill,  where  there  were  no  skirmishers,  and  ascending 
to  the  open  summit  above,  put  spurs  to  his  horse,  and 
galloped  along  the  French  main  line,  counting  their 
regiments  as  he  passed.  His  sudden  appearance,  his 
blue  undress,  his  daring  confidence,  and  his  speed, 
made  the  French  doubt  if  he  was  an  enemy,  and  a 
few  shots  only  were  discharged,  while  he,  dashing 
down  the  opposite  declivity,  broke  from  the  rear 
through  the  very  line  of  skirmishers  whose  fire  he 
had  first  essayed  in  front.  Reaching  the  spot  where 
Lord  Wellington  stood,  he  told  him  there  were  but 
■^ve  battalions  on  the  hill."  * 

7.  Reconi&oissauces  in  Africa.-j- — In  Africa,  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  get  a  view  of  the  enemy;  the 
Arab  camp  is  everywhere  and  nowhere  at  the  same 
time.  It  would,  therefore,  be  dangerous  to  make  re- 
connoissances  in  force  in  that  region ;  it  is  better  to 
rely  exclusively  upon  Arab  Umiers,  and  to  meet  the 
enemy's  cunning  by  cunning. 

The  name  limiers  (hloodJiounds^  i.  e.,  spies)  is  ap- 
plied to  some  native  horsemen,  who  are  under  the  ex- 
clusive direction  of  the  commandant  of  a  column,  and 

*  Napier,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War^  book  xxiv.,  chap.  iv. 
t  This  article  is  extracted  from  the  pamphlet  entitled  De  la  guerre  en 
Afrique^  by  General  Yusuf. 


AEMED    KECONNOISSANCES.  211 

can  report  directly  to  him  at  all  times.  They  disguise 
themselves  by  putting  on  the  bornouse  worn  by  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country.  They  act  by  day  or  by 
night,  on  foot  or  on  horseback,  according  to  circum- 
stances ;  and  four  or  five  are  sufficient.  They  take 
various  dii^ections,  and  when  they  have  important  in- 
formation to  give  and  are  not  able  to  return  in  person, 
they  communicate  it  by  preconcerted  signals ;  for 
example,  by  fires  combined  in  a  particular  manner, 
the  light  of  which  they  conceal  with  their  bornouses 
and  again  uncover  it,  alternately,  so  as  to  produce  in- 
termittent lights,  the  longer  or  shorter  duration  of 
which  has  a  predetermined  signification. 

In  critical  moments,  these  spahis  may  feign  to  de- 
sert ;  but  this  desertion  ought  to  appear  to  be  real  in 
the  eyes  of  the  troops,  and  especially  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Arab  allies,  and  the  general  alone  should  know  that 
it  is  but  feigned.  By  this  means,  in  the  campaign  in 
Morocco  (1844),  Marshal  Bugeaud  knew  all  that  oc- 
curred in  the  army  of  the  enemy,  and  even  the  con- 
versations that  took  place  in  the  imperial  tent. 

These  limiers  convey  their  messages  with  certainty 
by  scattering  themselves  along  the  road  between  the 
enemy  and  the  body  from  which  they  have  been  sent. 
This  method  is  especially  applicable  to  night  attacks. 

If  it  becomes  necessary  to  take  some  prisoners, 
they  get  up  a  mock  skirmish  with  the  rear-guard  of 
their  own  column.  At  the  sound  of  the  firing,  some 
veritable  enemies  make  their  appearance,  and  aft(»* 
some  minutes  of  pretended  skinnishing,  in  w^hich  the 
skirmishers  of  the  column  participate  to  only  a  small 


272  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

extent,  tlie  limiers  seize  upon  several  of  the  real  com- 
batants, from  whom  tlie  desired  information  is  after- 
ward obtained. 

These  limiers  are  also  employed  to  discover  tlie 
secret  provision  pits  of  the  Arabs,  the  guards  of  which 
are  always  invisible  to  Europeans.  Several  limiers 
assemble  near  the  supposed  position  of  the  pits,  and 
warmly  discuss  a  project  of  attacking  the  French. 
Their  words  arousing  the  patriotism  of  the  guardian 
of  the  pit,  he  soon  comes  out  of  his  hole  to  join  with 
those  whom  he  supposes  to  be  friends.  They  imme- 
diately seize  upon  him,  and  compel  him  to  reveal  the 
location  of  the  pits.  This  ruse  is  not  to  be  neglected, 
as  an  expeditionary  column  may  subsist  anywhere  if 
it  finds  these  pits ;  in  fact,  the  corn  which  they  con- 
tain, serves,  in  case  of  need,  both  for  the  sustenance 
of  the  men  and  of  the  horses. 

8.  Maps. — Maps  are  of  indispensable  utility  to  the 
officers,  since,  without  them,  they  can  neither  make 
nor  study  war.  There  are  two  kinds,  general  or  geo- 
graphical maps,  and  special  or  topographical  maps : 
the  first  serve  for  the  ensemble  of  operations,  the  sec- 
ond for  the  details  of  the  contest. 

The  great  development  of  public  works  and  the 
progress  of  industry  at  the  present  day,  conspire  to 
disturb  the  accuracy  of  maps ;  for  the  positions  of 
highways  and  manufactories  are  now  rapidly  changed 
or  modified.  We  should,  therefore,  even  when  the  map 
is  of  recent  date,  and  executed  by  an  author  of  distinc- 
tion, always  verify  it  before  trusting  to  it. 


ARMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  273 

This  verification  presents  no  difficulty  when  we 
are  acquainted  witli  the  country  represented.  "We 
carefully  examine  and  compare  the  cities,  towns,  vil- 
lages, rivers,  brooks,  mountain-chains,  forests,  woods, 
roads :  thus  we  observe  whether  the  inhabited  places 
are  properly  located  on  the  water  courses ;  whether 
the  rivers  are  shown  to  rise  in  the  mountains  and  to 
follow  the  valleys ;  whether  the  roads  pass  through 
certain  towns  or  villages.  If  the  portions  compared 
are  found  exact,  we  may  infer  that  the  whole  map  is 
worthy  of  confidence. 

If  we  are  acquainted  with  but  one  portion  of  the 
country,  we  verify  this  portion,  and  if  we  find  it  cor- 
rect, we  infer  the  probable  accuracy  of  the  whole 
map. 

Finally,  if  we  know  nothing  whatever  of  the 
country,  we  survey  a  portion  of  it,  and  if  our  survey 
agrees  with  the  map,  the  latter  is  considered  to  be 
reliable. 

Besides  this  general  verification  of  the  map,  we 
must  rectify  the  topographical  maps,  especially  in  the 
environs  of  inhabited  places,  by  questioning  persons 
familiar  with  the  recent  state  of  the  country,  or  else, 
by  making  a  survey  of  some  particular  locality,  which 
we  first  draw  upon  a  sheet  of  tracing  paper,  and  then 
transfer  to  the  map  itself.  The  importance  of  thus 
verifying  the  maps  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the 
Allies  who,  during  the  campaign  in  the  interior  of 
France  in  1814,  were  often  led  into  error  with  respect 
to  the  roads  by  the  maps  of  Cassini,  which  they  used 
without  testing  them.  The  necessity  of  such  verifica- 
18 


274  3^ms^0R  operations. 

tion  is  most  especially  felt  in  the  case  of  the  maps  of 
the  Algerian  districts,  which  are,  for  the  most  part, 
unfinished,  and  are  far  from  being  satisfactory. 

Of  the  charts  which  are  found  on  sale,  we  should 
prefer  those  which  are  executed  in  the  countries  they 
represent,  foreign  maps  being  usually  defective.  We 
may  add,  however,  that  we  may  confide  in  the  maps 
prepared  since  1815  by  the  staffs  of  several  European 
armies,  even  for  foreign  countries,  but  especially  in 
those  which  emanate  from  the  war  office  of  the  French 
government. 

The  road  maps^  that  is,  those  on  which  the  dis- 
tances from  point  to  point  are  marked,  are  especially 
useful  to  military  men,  as  they  save  the  trouble  of 
using  the  dividers  and  scale  :  but  unfortunately,  since 
the  introduction  of  railways,  scarcely  any  road  maps 
are  made,  and  perhaps  the  only  one  of  the  kind  is  the 
station  map  {carte  (Tetapes),  The  public,  therefore,  no 
longer  possesses  the  means  of  knowing  the  distances 
from  point  to  point,  except  as  calculated  by  the  rail- 
road lines  and  from  tables  of  distances.  Military  men 
should  not  be  satisfied  with  this,  for  railroads  do  not 
always  follow  the  shortest  route  between  two  points, 
and,  moreover,  in  war  they  may  be  broken  up  ;  and 
in  no  case  will  they  suffice  for  operations  of  detail. 

9.  Onndes. — ^The  best  topographical  maps,  even 
those  which  omit  nothing,  would  not  always  suffice 
to  guide  the  columns  or  detachments  of  an  army 
through  the  labyrinth  of  roads  and  paths  of  an  ene- 
my's country,  without  the  aid  of  men  specially  em- 


I 


AKMED    RECONNOISSANCES.  275 

ployed  to  direct  them  to  the  desired  place  by  the  most 
convenient  route.     These  persons  are  called  guides. 

In  the  employment  of  guides,  we  have  the  addi- 
tional advantage  over  the  exclusive  use  of  maps,  of 
being  able  to  gain  information  from  them  respecting 
the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants,  the  resources  of  the 
country,  and  the  preparations  of  the  enemy.  In  case 
of  need,  when  we  are  assured  of  their  fidelity,  they 
may  also  serve  as  emissaries  to  collect  on  their  way 
secret  information,  without  exciting  suspicion. 

For  these  reasons,  an  army  cannot  dispense  with 
men  who  are  acquainted  with  the  country  in  which  it 
is  to  fight.  History  indeed  furnishes  numerous  in- 
stances of  detachments  beaten  or  destroyed  in  conse- 
quence of  not  having  taken  guides,  or  of  having  em- 
ployed bad  ones,  or  of  having  neglected  to  watch 
over  them. 

Guides  should  be  chosen  from  the  class  of  persons 
best  acquainted  with  every  irregularity  of  the  ground 
and  its  most  concealed  paths ;  such  as  the  rural  police- 
guards,  country  letter-carriers,  forest-keepers  and  game- 
keepers, good  huntsmen,  poachers,  shepherds,  wood- 
cutters, smugglers,  partisans,  certain  outlaws,  the  cice- 
rones  who  in  times  of  peace  conduct  travelers  in  their 
search  for  natural  curiosities,  the  difi^erent  categories 
of  migratory  laborers,  emigrants,  peddlers.  All  these 
are  poor,  easy  to  gain  over,  and  suitable  for  guides. 
In  some  cases,  especially  when  we  have  need  of  in- 
formation requiring  intelligence,  we  may  take  these 
guides  from  a  higher  class  of  the  population,  but 
always  from  among  those  who  thoroughly  understand 


276  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

the  country,  as,  for  example,  among  tlie  employes  of 
tlie  excise,  tax  gatherers,  land  surveyors,  constructors 
of  bridges  and  roads,  giving  a  preference  to  those 
who  speak  our  own  language. 

In  order  to  obtain  guides,  when  they  have  not 
been  procured  in  advance,  we  apply  to  the  mayor  or 
other  prominent  functionary  of  the  locality  to  name 
them.  If  the  individuals  designated  refuse  from  pa- 
triotic motives  to  act  as  guides,  we  compel  them  to  do 
so  by  force.  If  we  perceive  that  their  refusal  results 
from  the  fear  of  compromising  themselves  in  the  eyes 
of  their  fellow-citizens,  we  make  a  show  of  maltreat- 
ing them,  that  they  may  appear  to  yield  only  to  force, 
and  afterward  reward  them  liberally.  In  case  the 
local  authorities  are  reluctant  to  name  suitable  per- 
sons for  guides,  when  there  must  always  be  some  who 
are  capable  of  acting  in  that  capacity,  we  seize  these 
functionaries  themselves  and  compel  them  to  march 
with  the  columns  as  guides.  This  course  was  often 
adopted  by  the  French  in  the  Peninsular  war. 

History,  moreover,  abounds  in  examples  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  employing  violence  in  order  to  find  guides. 
Thus  the  king  of  Prussia,  Frederic  the  Great,  in  his 
"  Military  Instruction,"  relates  that,  "  in  the  year 
1760,  while  crossing  Lusatia  to  march  into  Silesia,  we 
had  need  of  guides.  Some  were  found  in  the  Vandal 
villages,  but  when  brought  in  they  pretended  not  to 
understand  the  German  language,  which  embarrassed 
us  greatly.  We  bethought  ourselves  of  administering 
some  blows,  and  they  forthwith  spoke  German  like 
parrots." 


ARMED    RECONlSrOISSANCES. 


277 


Before  trusting  a  guide,  we  must,  by  questioning 
him,  assure  ourselves  of  his  intelligence.  With  this 
object  we  should  interrogate  them  separately,  without 
formality,  as  if  in  ordinary  conversation.  This  is  an 
art  of  itself,  for  the  peasants,  especially  such  as  usually 
serve  as  guides,  are  much  more  astute  than  they  appear 
to  be.  We  should  compare  their  answers  w^ith  each 
other,  and  with  the  topographical  maps.  If  there 
seems  to  be  a  sufficient  degree  of  accordance,  we  may 
conclude  that  they  do  in  fact  possess  the  knowledge 
B  to  which  they  pretend.  To  facilitate  this  comparison, 
B  and  to  avoid  errors,  we  should  be  careful,  when  speak- 
B  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  guides,  to  pronounce  the  names  of  towns 
B  and  provinces  in  the  same  manner  as  the  inhabitants 
ft     of  the  country. 

^^^B  We  should  also  endeavor  to  discover  the  failings 
\W  or  vices  of  a  guide  ;  for  if  he  be  a  drunkard,  he  will 
lead  us  astray  ;  if  open  to  bribery,  he  will  sell  us  ;  if 
a  coward,  he  will  lose  his  head  at  the  first  whistle  of 
the  enemy's  bullets.*  A  knowledge  of  his  character, 
moreover,  enables  us  to  draw  some  inferences  respect- 
ing the  march  he  is  leading  us ;  for,  suppose  he  is 
I  naturally  timid,  if  he  appears  unwontedly  bold,  you 
may  be  sure  the  road  he  is  causing  you  to  follow  is 
not  so  fine  as  he  represents ;  if  he  is  sad  and  fearful, 
the  road  adopted  is  more  favorable  than  he  pretends.f 


*  This  may  happen  to  him  though  he  be  not  altogether  a  co-ward,  for 
he  can  hardly  be  wholly  indifferent  when  bringing  death  to  his  own 
friends,  and  when  he  is  liable  to  be  struck  down  by  a  friendly  ball. 

t  Santa-Crnz,  Bejlexiona  militaires  etpolitiques^  translation  of  Vergy, 
V.  iii.,  p.  265. 


218  MINOR    OPERATIOTTS. 

The  degree  of  confidence  to  be  reposed  in  a  guide 
also  deserves  some  consideration.  If  lie  belongs  to 
the  nation  with  which  you  are  at  war,  you  should  fear 
his  patriotism,  for  he  may  seek  to  serve  his  country 
by  leading  you  astray.  If  he  professes  a  different 
religious  faith  from  your  own,  put  yourself  upon 
your  guard  against  his  fanaticism,  for  he  may  be- 
lieve he  is  serving  God  by  betraying  you.  There- 
fore choose  your  guides  as  much  as  possible  from 
people  of  your  own  country ;  or,  when  these  cannot 
be  found,  from  men  who  have  some  direct  interest  in 
your  success  and  whose  fidelity  you  have  put  to  the 
proof. 

Even  when  the  guides  are  deserving  of  confidence, 
some  precautions  are  to  be  observed.  Take  as  hos- 
tages their  wives  and  children ;  seize  upon  their  pro- 
perty; threaten  them  with  severe  penalties  if  they 
betray  you,  such  as  the  burning  of  their  houses,  or 
the  death  of  their  hostages  and  themselves :  promise 
them  abundant  reward  for  their  fidelity,  and  keep 
your  promises  scrupulously. 

Treat  them,  moreover,  with  kindness ;  pay  them 
liberally ;  put  them  on  horseback  if  it  is  necessary  for 
the  rapidity  of  your  march ;  though,  if  you  distrust 
them,  you  may  let  them  ride  bareback.  As  you  ad- 
vance into  the  country  discharge  them,  for  they  are 
mostly  well  acquainted  only  with  the  surroundings 
of  their  own  villages.  It  will  be  proper,  however,  to 
detain,  and  even  to  imprison  those  who,  from  your 
questions,  may  have  been  able  to  guess  your  designs, 
which  they  might  communicate  to  the  enemy. 


I 

I 


AEMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  279 

Wlien  you  interrogate  guides  respecting  the  char- 
acter of  the  roads,  never  rely  entirely  upon  the  repre- 
sentations of  a  single  guide,  not  only  because  he  may 
intend  to  deceive  you,  but  because  persons  unused  to 
military  operations  make  no  distinction  between  roads 
suitable  for  artillery  and  those  suitable  for  cavalry  or 
infantry.  The  following  fact,  related  by  Frederic, 
fully  confirms  this  observation :  "  In  1745,"  he  says, 
"after  the  battle  of  Sorr,  when  the  Prussian  army 
wished  to  retire  into  Silesia,  I  had  some  persons 
brought  from  Trautenau  and  Schazlar,  to  question 
them  as  to  the  roads  over  which  I  desired  to  take  the 
columns.  They  told  me  confidently  that  these  roads 
were  admirable,  and  that  they  passed  over  them  with 
their  carriages  with  the  greatest  ease,  and  that  many 
wagoners  did  the  same.  A  few  days  after,  the  army 
made  this  march.  I  was  obliged  to  make  my  arrange- 
ments for  retreat  in  these  parts.  Our  rear-guard  was 
briskly  attacked,  but,  by  the  precautions  I  took,  we 
lost  nothing.  These  roads,  in  a  military  point  of 
view,  were  very  bad ;  but  those  from  whom  I  had  ob- 
tained information  respecting  them  understood  noth- 
ing about  them,  and  what  they  told  me  was  in  good 
faith,  and  wdtli  no  intention  of  deceiving  me.  We 
should,  therefore,  not  trust  to  the  report  of  ignorant 
persons,  but,  with  the  map  in  hand,  should  consult 
them  upon  every  configuration  of  the  ground,  and  see 
whether  we  cannot  sketch  something  additional  upon 
the  paper,  which  wdll  convey  a  more  exact  notion  of 
the  road  than  the  map  itself." 

In  general,  at  least  two  guides  are  to  be  attached 


280  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

to  eacli  column  or  detacliment ;  one  is  to  marcL.  with 
the  advance-guard,  the  other  to  remain  near  the  com- 
manding officer.  These  two  guides  should  not  be  ac- 
quainted with  each  other,  but  should  be  used  so  as  to 
make  one  act  as  a  check  upon  the  other.  It  is  well, 
besides,  to  have  two  guides,  for  the  purpose  of  sup- 
plying the  place  of  one  who  may  be  killed  or  severely 
wounded.  If  we  have  more  than  two,  one  of  them  is 
often  placed  with  the  rear-guard. 

A  detachment  should  always  take  a  guide,  even 
"svhen  it  is  pursuing  a  frequented  road,  because  a  sud- 
den attack  may  compel  it  to  resort  to  the  cross  roads, 
w^here,  without  this  precaution,  it  might  go  astray. 

The  guide  placed  with  the  advance-guard,  who,  in 
fact,  conducts  the  column,  may  be  allowed  to  march 
unrestrained,  if  we  are  sure  of  him  ;  nevertheless,  it  is 
always  prudent  to  place  him  between  tw^o  non-commis- 
sioned officers  or  soldiers,  who  are  instructed  to  fire 
upon  him  at  the  least  attempt  at  escape — a  fate  of 
which  he  is  to  be  duly  warned.  In  woody  and  moun- 
tainous countries,  especially  in  night  marches,  even 
this  precaution  is  not  sufficient,  for  the  peasants  are 
very  dexterous  in  slipping  away  and  disappearing  be- 
hind irregularities  of  the  ground,  and  especially  at  the 
approach  of  danger.  For  this  reason  it  is  well  to 
search  them  and  take  away  their  knives  or  any  other 
cutting  instruments,  then  to  tie  them  with  a  rope 
about  their  middle,  and  even  to  bind  their  hands  be- 
hind them;  it  will  then  be  impossible  for  them  to 
escape  except  by  cutting  the  rope  with  their  teeth — 
an  operation  which  would  probably  be  discovered  in 


ARMED    EECONNOISSAiq^CES.  281 

time  to  prevent  its  success.  The  column  will  thus  be 
insured  against  tlie  contingency  of  being  left  without 
a  guide  upon  unknown  roads. 

When  the  guide  is  thus  tied,  an  occasional  pull  on 
the  rope  will  serve  to  keep  him  awake  on  his  horse — 
for  if  he  should  fall  asleep,  the  conducting  of  the  col- 
umn would  be  abandoned  to  the  instinct  of  *the 
horse.  This  expedient  is  constantly  resorted  to  in 
night  marches  of  the  French  columns  in  Algeria. 

10.  Deserters. — Deserters  from  the  enemy  are  ar- 
rested and  disaiTued  at  the  outposts.  They  are  inter- 
rogated relative  to  the  situation  of  their  posts  by  the 
commandant  of  the  grand  guards,  who  sends  them  to 
the  general  of  the  brigade.  The  latter  questions  them, 
and  then  orders  them  to  the  head-quarters  of  the  divi- 
sion, where  they  are  subjected  to  a  systematic  exami- 
nation by  the  chief  of  the  staff.  These  are  the  rules 
laid  down  for  them  in  the  regulations  respecting  field 
service. 

Deserters  are  not  to  be  trusted :  they  should  not 
be  allowed  to  communicate  with  any  but  the  proper 
officers,  and  should  be  promptly  escorted  out  of  the 
army,  for  they  are  sometimes  spies  in  disguise. 

Deserters  are  always  very  apt  to  give  information 
respecting  the  enemy  which  is  calculated  to  insure 
them  a  welcome,  for  this  purpose  exaggerating  the 
critical  situation  of  the  army  they  have  just  left. 
Therefore  we  should  not  too  readily  put  faith  in  the 
answers  of  these  unfortunates,  but  should  skilfully  in- 
terrogate several  of  them  separately,  and  compare  their 


282  MINOE   OPEKATIONS. 

answers  A  deserter  should  be  asked  tlie  cause  of  his 
desertion,  how  he  effected  his  escape  through  the 
chain  of  outposts  of  the  enemy,  the  number  and  force 
of  his  regiment,  whether  his  regiment  contains  many 
recruits,  w^here  it  is  encamped,  how  duty  is  performed 
in  it,  what  is  the  character  of  its  superior  officers, 
whether  the  camp  is  abundantly  supplied,  the  propor- 
tion  of  sick,  the  various  rumors  that  are  current  in  it, 
etc.  The  questions  are  to  be  varied  according  to  the 
character  of  the  army  to  which  he  belongs,  and  accord- 
ing as  he  has  left  an  encamped  troop,  or  one  upon  a 
march.  He  is  also  to  be  questioned  as  to  the  points 
upon  which  he  has  seen  intrenchments  being  erected, 
roads  repaired,  magazines  established,  provisions  sup- 
plied, boats  collected,  convoys  organized,  arms  distrib- 
uted, reenforcements  arriving,  ambulances  prepar- 
ing, etc. 

11.  Inhabitants — By  preference  we  interrogate 
the  mayor,  or  chief  magistrate,  the  postmaster,  the 
curate,  the  schoolmaster,  the  distinguished  or  most  in- 
fluential man,  superintendents  of  work-shops  or  fac- 
tories, the  superintendent  of  the  railway  depot,  men 
who  have  served  as  guides  for  the  enemy,  the  directors 
and  agents  of  the  mails,  the  superiors  of  religious  so- 
cieties, tavern-keepers,  messengers,  etc. 

The  questions  put  to  them,  according  to  their  intel- 
ligence, will  be  :  Where  is  the  enemy  ?  In  what  direc- 
tion is  he  marching  ?  What  is  his  force  ?  What  is  the 
state  of  his  discipline  ?  Of  what  arms  do  the  troops 
consist?     Do  the  men  appear  fatigued,  and  are  the 


I 
i 


AEMED    RECONNOISSANCES.  283 

liorses  lean  ?  "What  language  do  the  soldiers  speak  ? 
Do  tliey  belong  to  tlie  line,  or  are  they  of  tlie  militia  ? 
How  does  the  enemy  guard  himself?  Does  he  often 
make  reconnoissances,  and  how  does  he  conduct 
these  operations  ?  What  route  leads  to  the  enemy  ? 
Has  it  any  defiles,  and,  if  so,  can  they  be  turned? 
How  does  the  enemy  behave  toward  his  guides  ?  Do 
the  officers  appear  restless  and  dejected  ?  What  is 
the  population  of  this  or  that  village,  its  distance,  and 
its  resources  ?  Is  the  road  leading  to  it  broad,  paved, 
or  macadamized  ?  By  what  fords  or  bridges  may  the 
neighboring  water  courses  be  passed  ?  etc. 

The  inhabitants  should  be  separately  questioned, 
and,  as  much  as  possible,  in  their  own  language  ;  and 
this  again  illustrates  the  importance  of  a  knowledge 
of  foreign  languages  to  officers  of  light  troops,  who  are 
specially  charged  with  making  reconnoissances. 

12.  Traveller§. — ^Travellers,  whether  on  foot,  on 
horseback,  or  in  carriages,  who  come  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy,  will  probably  have  nothing  import- 
ant to  communicate,  as  the  enemy  would  not  have  al- 
lowed them  to  pass  if  he  had  in  preparation  any  ope- 
ration which  could  be  jeopardized  by  their  indiscre- 
tion. It  will,  therefore,  be  sufficient  to  demand,  as 
La  Eoche-Aymon  suggests,*  their  names  and  pass- 
ports ;  whence  they  come,  and  their  destination ; 
whether  they  have  met  troops  marching ;  their  kind 
and  number,  or,  rather,  the  time  it  required  to  23ass 
the  length  of  the  column ;  the  effective  force  of  the 

*  Des  troupe  Ugeres^  p.  531. 


284  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

masses  of  troops  occupying  towns  tlirongh  whicli 
they  have  passed  or  sojourned ;  the  condition  of  these 
troops,  the  proportion  of  their  sick  and  of  their  re- 
cruits; what  villages  are  occupied  by  the  enemy; 
whether  his  outposts  are  close  together  and  well  sup- 
ported ;  what  is  the  condition  of  the  roads  and  bridges, 
and  which  of  them  is  the  enemy  repairing ;  or  what 
points  is  he  fortifying ;  whether  there  is  any  scarcity 
of  provision,  of  forage,  or  of  ready  money ;  whether  the 
country  people  are  suffering,  and  whether  their  cattle 
are  preserved  or  have  been  seized  by  the  enemy ;  what 
are  the  public  rumors ;  what  does  the  last  newspaper 
they  have  read  contain  ? 

These  interrogatories  are  to  be  put  with  the  greater 
calmness  and  attention,  as  they  often  may  serve  to 
discover  spies  who  are  passing  themselves  off  as  trav- 
ellers. In  order  to  succeed  in  their  detection,  we  try 
to  bring  about  manifest  contradictions  in  their  an- 
swers, and  then,  by  severity  and  menace,  provoke  con- 
fessions which  usually  reveal  a  part  of  the  intentions 
of  the  enemy. 

We  should  add  the  remark,  in  relation  to  in- 
habitants and  travellers,  that  they  are  not  military 
persons,  and  consequently  do  not  describe  the  country 
in  the  way  a  soldier  would  do.  This  circumstance 
must  not  be  lost  sight  of  in  questioning  them,  and 
their  testimony  must  be  rectified  by  discussing  with 
them  the  positions  of  places  and  the  directions  of  the 
roads  laid  down  on  the  maps. 

13.  Prisoners. — ^The  questions  to  be  put  to  prison- 
ers are  about  the  same  as  those  put  to  deserters. 


AEMED   KECONNOISSANCES.  285 

Some  authors  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  we 
should  rely  upon  their  testimony  even  less  than  upon, 
that  of  deserters ;  but  Marshal  Marmont  is  of  a  differ 
ent  opinion:  ^'The  answers  of  prisoners,"  says  he, 
"are  almost  always  frank  and  sincere.  We  learn 
more  from  them  than  from  the  most  faithful  spies. 
The  latter  often  confound  the  names  of  corps  and  of 
generals,  and  very  imperfectly  estimate  the  force  of 
the  troops  upon  which  they  report It  is  sur- 
prising to  see  with  what  candor,  simplicity,  and  truth 
I  a  prisoner  will  reply  to  questions,  without  suspecting 
their  bearing,  without  imagining  that  he  is  faithless 

rto  the  cause  he  has  zealously  served,  and  which  he  is 
far  from  wishing  to  betray.''  * 
There  is  no  stronger  proof  of  the  utility  of  the  in- 
formation gained  from  prisoners  than  the  pains  taken 
to  capture  soldiers  and  stragglers  of  the  enemy,  not 
only  in  the  daily  reconnoissances,  but  even  by  special 
coups-de-main,  of  which  the  following  is  an  example  : 
On  the  20th  of  February,  1814,  in  his  defensive  cam- 
]3aign  in  the  south  of  France  against  the  English  army 
under  Wellington,  Marshal  Soult,  "  wishing  to  make 
some  prisoners  in  order  to  obtain  positive  informa- 
tion respecting  the  force  and  positions  of  the  enemy, 
ordered  a  night  attack  upon  the  troops  who  were 
before  Sauveterre  (near  Orthez).  Two  or  three 
hours  after  sunset,  when  the  enemy  had  abandoned 
themselves  to  repose,  and  the  soldiers,  stretched  out 
before  good  fires,  had  become  oblivious  of  fatigue 
and  danger,  a  French  detachment,  commanded  by  an 

*  Esprit  des  institutions  militaires,  pp.  161,  277. 


286  3imOR    OPERATIONS. 

officer  wlio  combined  prudence  witli  audacity,  crept 
with  stealthy  steps  into  the  bivouac  without  being 
perceived.  At  a  given  signal  he  seized  upon  the  allies ; 
an  outcry  was  raised ;  night  increased  the  danger ;  the 
enemy  rushed  to  arms,  fired  at  random  and  at  each  other. 
The  French  handful  of  brave  fellows,  in  accordance 
with  their  orders,  recrossed  the  Gave,  and  returned  to 
Sauveterre  without  a  man  wounded,  bringing  with 
them  some  fifty  prisoners,  yet  half  asleep,  and  quite 
ashamed  at  finding  themselves  taken  in  such  a  manner. 
It  may  be  imagined  that  this  little  scene  afforded  no 
small  amount  of  amusement  to  the  French  soldiers."  * 

14.  Spies. — One  of  the  most  ready  means  of  pro- 
curing detailed  information  consists  in  the  employ- 
ment of  spies.  We  may  define  a  spy  as  a  person  sent 
out  by  a  military  chief  to  examine  the  movements  of 
the  enemy,  to  discover  his  plans,  and  to  report  them. 

There  are  sometimes  to  be  found  persons  who, 
from  devotion  to  their  prince  or  their  country,  will 
undertake  to  act  temporarily  as  spies.f  "  The  debt 
which  the  State  incurs  by  deeds  of  this  kind  cannot 
be  paid  by  money,  and  the  government  which  desires 
to  be  worthy  of  such  subjects  should  proportion  the 
reward  rather  to  their  devotion  than  to  the  service 
rendered.  J  "    These  spies  are  rare. 

*  Pellot,  Memoire  sur  la  campagne  des  Pyrenees,  p.  104. 

t  Thus  an  officer  disguised  as  a  peasant  may  gain  entrance  to  a  place 
to  discover  the  means  of  surprising  it ;  e.  g.,  M.  de  Gouru  (an  officer  of 
the  regiment  of  Count  Saxe),  at  Prague,  in  1741,  and  Ney  at  Manheira, 
1798. 

X  Manuel  des  etats-majors,  par  le  general  Thiebault,  p.  96. 


I 


ARMED    RECOKNOISSANCES.  287 

As  to  the  spies  who  follow  this  trade  for  money, 
they  must  be  regarded  as  miserable  beings,  who,  for 
the  most  part,  are  the  slaves  of  passions  which  require 
gold  for  their  gratification.  These  are  the  more  nu- 
merous class.  Notwithstanding  their  baseness,  we 
are  obliged  to  employ  them,  because  they  are  often 
the  only  means  of  obtaining  secret  information  indis- 
pensable to  success.  All  classes  furnish  such  spies. 
Even  at  the  topmost  round  of  the  social  ladder  they 
are  found,  of  the  most  devoted  kind,  provided  they 
are  liberally  paid,  according  to  their  condition ;  men 
and  women,  priests  and  laymen,  are  equally  open  to 
the  enticements  of  this  shameful  trafiic.  Here  are  two 
examples : 

1st.  Pnnce  Eugene  of  Savoy,  one  of  the  most  for- 
midable adversaries  of  France  during  the  reign  of 
Louis  XIV.,  for  a  long  time  had  the  postmaster  of 
Versailles  in  his  service  as  a  spy,  paying  him  a  fat 
pension.  This  miscreant  opened  the  dispatches  ad- 
dressed to  the  generals,  and  sent  copies  of  them  to 
the  head  of  the  imperial  armies,  who  usually  received 
them  sooner  than  the  chiefs  of  the  French  armies. 

2d.  Marshal  Luxembourg  had  corrupted  one  of 
the  secretaries  of  the  English  king,  William  III.,  who 
informed  him  of  the  movements  of  his  enemies.  This 
was  discovered  by  the  English,  and  the  traitor  was 
made  to  write  to  the  French  general  that  the  Allies 
would  on  the  next  day  go  uj)on  a  grand  foraging  ex- 
pedition/'^' Lulled  into  tranquillity  by  this  announce- 
ment, which  was  also  confirmed  by  numerous  reports, 

*  Memoircs  des  Marquis  de  La  Fare,  1734,  p.  222 


288  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

Luxembourg  remained  in  his  camp  at  Steenkirk.  At 
break  of  day,  tke  whole  army  of  tbe  Allies  fell  upon 
his  sleeping  troops ;  but  the  courage  and  discipline  of 
the  soldiers,  the  coolness  and  the  skilful  manoeuvres 
of  Luxembourg,  changed  this  surprise  into  a  complete 
victory  (1692).^- 

The  service  of  espionnage  requires  great  celerity, 
for  the  information  thereby  obtained  gets  old  quickly. 
It  requires  persons  of  adroitness  and  boldness,  who 
are  accustomed  to  find  their  way  through  any  intri- 
cacies of  the  country,  and  whose  faculties  are  stimu- 
lated by  the  love  of  gain.  In  every  country  such  will 
be  found  among  smugglers,  peddlers,  poachers,  and 
the  various  traders  who  visit  the  cantonments.  In 
the  large  towns,  they  may  also  be  obtained  among 
keepers  of  inns  and  restaurants,  and  all  those  who 
have  frequent  and  numerous  relations  with  the  pub- 
lic.f  Non-commissioned  officers,  and  sometimes  intel- 
ligent soldiers,  are  instructed  to  talk  with  these  indi- 
viduals, discover  those  who  would  consent  to  act  as 
spies,  and  bring  them  to  the  chief  of  the  staff.  When 
the  army  is  distributed  in  cantonments,  these  non- 
commissioned officers  or  soldiers  may  engage  the  in- 
habitants who  lodge  them  to  play  the  part  of  spies, 
which  they  can  generally  do  without  difficulty,  as 

*  The  French  soldiers  then  wore  the  cravat.  On  the  occasion  of  this 
surprise  they  tied  their  cravats  in  haste,  and  the  cravat  tlms  knotted  be- 
came the  fashion,  under  the  name  of  cravate  d  la  Stebikerque. 

t  From  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  Spain  (1710)  and  during  the  stay 
of  the  Austrians  in  Madrid,  Vendome  employed  as  a  spy  in  that  capital, 
a  keeper  of  a  billiard  saloon,  a  Frenchman  who  had  established  himself 
in  the  Peninsula,  and  spoke  several  languages. 


AKMED    KECOOTJOISSANCES.  289 

there  will  almost  always  exist  some  secret  means  of 
communication  between  the  neighboring  localities  of 
a  territory  occupied  by  the  enemy.  At  outposts, 
when  two  armies  remain  for  a  long  time  face  to  face, 
the  soldiers  of  the  two  sides  sometimes  get  together  to 
chat  and  drink.  In  these  moments  of  familiarity,  a  sly 
overture  may  sometimes  be  made  to  one  of  the  sol- 
diers of  the  enemy,  to  try  his  disposition  to  serve  as 
a  spy,  which,  if  favorably  received,  can  afterward  be 
followed  up  by  a  seductive  offer. 

When  all  these  means  fail  in  procuring  spies,  the 
usages  of  war  authorize  a  last  resort — cruel  indeed, 
but  justified  by  the  necessity  of  obtaining  intelligence 
of  the  enemy.  It  is  to  select  a  rich  proprietor,  the 
father  of  a  family,  to  compel  him  to  go  over  to  the 
enemy  under  the  pretext  of  escaping  from  violence,  and 
then  to  require  him  to  report  all  that  he  knows,  under 
penalty  of  seeing  his  wife  and  his  children  imprisoned 
or  put  to  death,  and  his  property  burned,  should  he 
fail  to  perform  the  part  thus  forced  upon  him.  An 
intelligent  man,  acquainted  with  the  language  of  the 
country,  is  often  associated  with  him,  who  passes  for 
his  servant,  accompanies  him  everywhere,  and  some- 
times himself  reports  the  results  of  the  espionnage. 
The  proprietor  is  answerable  for  this  man,  and  is 
threatened  with  the  same  consequences  in  case  he  is 
lost,  as  would  follow  his  own  negligence  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  mission.  This  plan,  which  should  be 
resorted  to  only  in  the  last  extremity,  was  suggested 
by  Frederic  the  Great. 

When  we  are  fighting  in  our  own  country,  we 
19 


290  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

should  expect  almost  all  the  inhabitants  to  serve  as 
spies  upon  the  enemy,  and  to  hold  it  to  be  honorable 
to  point  out  the  way  of  attacking  him,  in  defiance  of 
the  dangers  to  which  this  patriotic  conduct  may  ex- 
pose him.  It  is  then  useful  to  cause  a  soldier  to  as- 
sume the  garb  of  a  citizen,  as  he  may  then  more  com- 
pletely observe  whatever  relates  to  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  without  exciting  suspicion. 

If  we  are  carrying  on  war  in  a  country  which  is 
divided  by  two  political  ]3arties,  by  giving  our  aid 
to  one  of  these  parties,  we  can  know  everything  done 
by  the  enemy,  since  the  party  whose  cause  we  espouse 
will  espy  the  other,  as  occurred  with  the  French  army 
in  the  campaign  of  1823  in  Spain.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
we  are  fighting  in  the  midst  of  an  uprising  people, 
who  are  undertaking  a  national  resistance,  it  becomes 
exceedingly  difficult  to  procure  intelligence,  for  all 
espionnage  fails,  as  the  French  experienced  in  1812  in 
Russia,  and  in  1813  in  Germany."^ 

We  satisfy  ourselves  of  the  fidelity  of  spies,  either 
by  comparing  the  information,  with  respect  to  the 
same  object,  as  furnished  independently  by  several,  or 
by  determining  whether  the  intelligence  they  bring 
really  secures  to  us  some  great  advantage  over  the 
enemy,  since,  in  this  case,  it  is  evident  that  they  are 
not  betraying  you  to  serve  him  ;  f  or  else  by  making 

*  We  may  then  try  the  expedient  of  dressing  up  a  detachment  of  our 
soldiers  in  the  uniform  of  the  enemy,  selecting  for  this  purpose  those  who 
speak  the  language  of  the  country.  The  peasants  may  thus  be  imposed  upon 
and  led  to  relate  what  they  know.    But  this  plan  is  not  always  successful. 

t  Reflexions  militaires  et  politiques,  par  Santa-Cruz,  traduit  par 
Vergy,  t.  ii.,  p.  372. 


I 


AEMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  291 


one  spy  act  as  a  spy  upon  another.  As  soon  as  we 
begin  to  suspect  a  spy,  we  warn  him  that  the  report 
he  has  made  will  be  verified,  that  he  will  be  put 
under  guard  until  this  verification  is  completed,  and 
that  his  life  is  staked  upon  his  veracity  * 

Notwithstanding  all  these  precautions,  spies  are 
frequently  double^  that  is,  they  serve  both  parties  at 
the  same  time.  If  we  suspect  this  state  of  things, 
the  best  course  is  to  endeavor  to  gain  them  over  by 
rich  presents  and  more  distinguished  treatment,  and 
then  to  get  rid  of  them  altogether,  if  their  reports  do 
not  offer  anything  of  special  interest.  We  may  also 
adroitly  let  fall  some  words  in  their  presence,  convey- 
ing the  idea  of  some  false  movement  to  be  executed, 
in  order  that  they  may  lead  the  opposing  general  into 
en'or  by  reporting  it  as  a  real  movement,  which  they 
have  had  the  skill  to  discover.  The  celebrated  Rus- 
sian general  Suwarrow,  well  known  for  his  energy  and 
his  singularities,  perceiving  one  day,  in  Poland,  that 
there  was  a  spy  among  the  men  of  his  suite,  gave  or- 
ders that  the  army  should  hold  itself  in  readiness  to 
march  at  the  first  crowing  of  the  cock.  The  spy  noti- 
fied the  enemy  that  they  would  be  attacked  about 
midnight ;  but  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  Suwar- 
row went  through  his  camp  imitating  the  crowing  of 
a  cock ;  his  troops  were  immediately  put  in  motion, 
and  the  enemy,  surprised  by  this  early  attack,  were 
beaten.  I  cite  this  whimsical  feat,  to  show  the  kind 
of  ruses  to  which  one  may  have  recourse,  in  case  of 
necessity,  to  deceive  double  spies. 

*  Manuel  dca  Hats-majors^  par  Thi6bault,  p.  99. 


292  MINOR    OPEEATIONS. 

Spies  sliould  not  reside  in  a  camp,  nor  communi- 
cate with  the  soldiers.  They  should  not  be  acquainted 
with  each  other ;  and  that  they  may  not  be  compro- 
mised, they  should  be  known  under  an  assumed  name 
— nom  de  guerre. 

As  spies  adopt  all  sorts  of  disguises  to  obtain  ad- 
mission into  a  camp,  we  should  watch  all  persons  who 
present  themselves  with  that  object,  such  as  beggars, 
traders,  itinerant  musicians,  and  even  the  inhabitants 
who  are  attracted  by  simple  curiosity.  Courtezans 
often  play  the  part  of  spies ;  and  soldiers  should  avoid 
going  far  to  find  them,  for  they  not  unfrequently  pay 
for  a  moment  of  forgetfulness  with  their  lives.  They 
should  never  forget  the  case  of  the  Duke  de  Guise, 
who,  in  1647,  lost  Naples  for  a  rendezvous  with  a 
woman  who  sold  him  to  the  Spaniards.  Ecclesiastics 
and  monks,  especially  in  the  countries  of  Southern 
Europe,  also  sometimes  act  as  spies,  and  perform  the 
part  in  a  superior  style,  which  renders  them  very  dan- 
gerous, of  which  the  French  troops  had  cruel  expe- 
rience in  Spain  and  in  Italy.  The  best  course  in  rela- 
tion to  them  is  to  attach  them  to  us  as  much  as  possi- 
ble, as  they  may  furnish  useful  intelligence,  but  yet 
always  to  mistrust  them.  If  our  army  is  fighting  in 
a  country  where  the  prevailing  religion  is  different 
from  our  own,  we  shall  have  on  our  side  those  of  the 
inhabitants  who  profess  our  religion,  and  conse- 
quently a  large  number  of  spies  will  be  at  our  dis- 
posal. This  was  Napoleon's  experience  in  1806  and 
1807  upon  the  Prussian  territory,  where,  according  to 
La  Roche- Aymon,  the  French  army  had  no  partisans 


I 


AEMED    EECONNOISSANCES.  293 

more  zealous  tlian  the  Catholic  priests  of  Khenish 
Prussia. 

Amoug  other  individuals  attached  to  an  army,  a 
watch  should  be  kept  upon  sutlers,  who  hear  the  con- 
versations of  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  sol- 
diers, and  also  upon  quartermasters'  and  commissaries' 
clerks,  who  must  approximately  know  the  condition 
and  effective  force  of  the  several  corps.  Both  often 
serve  as  spies  for  the  enemy. 

The  information  received  from  spies,  as,  indeed, 
almost  every  matter  in  war,  should  be  kept  a  pro- 
found secret,  and  especially  when  in  presence  of  the 
enemy ;  for  the  most  trifling  undertaking  usually  be- 
comes impossible  from  the  moment  it  is  noised  abroad. 
Therefore,  do  not  allow  it  to  be  known  that  you  are 
frequently  and  accurately  informed  of  the  doings  of 
your  adversary,  as  he  will  then  set  about  discovering 
the  sources  of  your  information,  and  will  adopt  meas- 
ures to  render  it  useless.  The  king  of  Castile,  Al- 
phonso  X.,  speaking  one  day  with  the  Count  d'Artois, 
heedlessly  told  him  that  he  was  perfectly  acquainted 
with  every  secret  negotiation  entered  upon  by  France. 
This  imprudent  speech  put  the  French  upon  the  alert, 
and  led  them  to  discover  that  the  spy  who  gave  Al- 
phonso  his  information  was  a  valet-de-chambre  of  the 
king  of  France. 

To  conclude  this  article,  we  will  add  that  spies, 
as  soon  as  they  are  arrested,  should  be  thoroughly 
searched,  and  their  every  movement  carefully  watched, 
for  they  frequently  endeavor  to  destroy  the  dispatches 
they  carry.    Sometimes  these  dispatches  are  concealed 


294  MmOE   OPEEATIOl^fS. 

in  some  part  of  tlieir  clothing.  Two  examples  will 
illustrate  tins  :  In  1704,  a  spy  charged  by  the  Elector 
of  Bavaria  with  carrying  a  letter  from  Marshal  Marsin 
to  a  Hungarian  chief,  rolled  it  and  compressed  it  so 
completely  that  he  succeeded  in  enclosing  it  in  a  but- 
ton of  his  coat,  though  his  dexterity  did  not  save  him 
from  being  discovered  and  hung.*  In  the  campaign 
of  1777,  during  the  American  war  of  Independence^ 
an  English  spy,  being  discovered,  swallowed  a  silver 
ball.  The  Americans  got  it  from  him  by  administer- 
ing an  emetic.  It  proved  to  be  hollow,  and  contained 
a  message  consisting  of  six  lines  from  a  generaLf 

15.  Indications. — In  addition  to  the  various  auxil- 
iary and  complementary  methods  of  obtaining  informa- 
tion upon  a  reconnoissance,  which  we  have  above  con- 
sidered, the  observation  of  indications  is  of  great  im- 
portance. "We  understand  by  this  expression  the  no- 
tation of  any  sign,  mark,  or  signal  whatever,  visible  or 
audible,  which  reveals  in  any  degree  the  presence,  the 
force,  or  the  plans  of  the  enemy. 

The  art  of  divining  the  intention  of  the  enemy 
from  slight  indications  is  one  which  rarely  misleads, 
and  is  one  of  the  most  precious  attributes  of  military 
genius.  In  the  familiar  spirit  which  inspired  Socrates, 
in  the  white  hind  which  followed  and  counselled  Ser- 
torius,  in  the  god  IsTeptune  from  whom  Scipio-Africa- 
nus  the  younger  pretended  to  receive  revelations,  we 
see  figured  the  art  of  using  indications.     To  become 

*  Mauvillon,  Vie  de  Prince  Eugene  de  Savoie,  1740,  t.  ii.,  p.  139. 
t  Sparks'  Writings  of  "Washington. 


AHMED    KECONNOISSANCES.  295 

skilful  in  this  art,  we  should  study  tlie  character,  the 
customs,*  and  the  interests  of  the  nation,  the  general, 
and  the  troops  with  whom  we  are  contending;  we 
must  acquire  habits  of  observation  and  comparison,  so 
as  to  distinguish  the  least  sign  of  change  in  the  campf 
or  in  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  This  art  of  inter- 
preting indications  belongs  to  the  moral  part  of  war, 
and  is  mostly  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  the  human 
heart.  Marshal  Villars  was  so  well  skilled  in  it  that 
the  Duke  of  Savoy  remarked  of  him,  "  This  Duke 
of  Villars  is  a  wizard ;  he  divines  everything  I  am 
about  to  do." 

The  observation  of  indications  may  be  useful  to 
non-commissioned  officers  ^s  well  as  to  their  chiefs. 
The  principal  indications  may  be  enumerated  as  fol- 
lows: 

If  the  enemy  is  distributing  shoes  in  the  canton- 
ments, and  if  the  soldiers  are  cleaning  their  arms,  it  is 
an  indication  of  movement. — If  numerous  supplies  are 
arriving,  or  if  new  uniforms  are  seen,  new  troops  are 
about  to  be  added  to  the  old  ones  to  make  an  attack. 
— ^If  storehouses  of  provisions  are  established  at  cer- 
tain points,  it  indicates  that  troops  are  to  assemble 

*  "  I  liave  been  assured  that  the  entire  success  of  the  passage  of  the 
To  by  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy,  in  1706,  depended  upon  a  game  of  cards 
at  which  a  certain  general  regularly  played  at  a  particular  hour,  and  from 
■which  it  -was  not  possible  to  divert  him."  {Essai  sur  les  qualites  cfun 
general,  in  4to.,  Milan,  1758,  p.  67.) 

t  Before  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus  (B.  0.  208)  Hasdrubal,  the  broth- 
er of  Hannibal,  heard  the  command  sounded  once  m  the  camp  of  the  pra3- 
tor  and  twice  in  that  of  the  consul,  and  from  that  time  had  no  doubt  that 
the  two  Roman  consuls  were  combined  against  him.     (Livy,  xxvii.  47.) 


296  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

there. — A  collection  of  boats  "brought  from  a  distance 
to  one  point  of  the  same  bank  of  a  river,  denotes  an 
attempt  at  its  passage ;  if  they  are  burned,  an  unob- 
structed retreat  is  in  contemplation. — If  important 
bridges  are  destroyed,  the  retreat  will  be  long. — If 
they  are  collecting  ladders  in  a  bivouac,  there  will  be 
an  assault  upon  some  fortified  place. — "When  the  ene- 
my masks  his  movements  upon  the  field  of  battle  and 
masses  his  squadrons,  he  is  preparing  a  formidable 
attack ;  if  he  deploys  his  troops,  he  is  about  to  take  a 
position. — ^If  he  sends  his  artillery,  ambulances,  and 
parks  to  the  rear,  it  is  an  indication  either  of  retreat 
or  a  change  of  front. — If  the  bivouac  fires  appear  to  be 
more  numerous  but  smaller,  or  if  they  are,  from  their 
position,  too  visible,  successively  lighted  and  quickly 
extinguished,  it  denotes  feebleness  or  retreat. — When 
the  enemy  attacks  at  the  break  of  day,  his  move- 
ment will  be  general ;  if  he  attacks  in  the  evening,  his 
movement  will  be  partial,  and  probably  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  reconnoitre,  to  take  position,  or  to 
gain  time  to  cover  a  retreat. — Foot-prints  of  men  and 
horses,  tracks  of  wheels,  observed  in  respect  to  their 
direction,  their  greater  or  less  depth,  and  their  num- 
ber, furnish  information  in  relation  to  the  direction, 
force,  and  composition  of  a  column. — ^The  dust  raised 
by  a  column  gives  similar  indications;  it  forms  a 
dense  and  slightly  elevated  cloud  in  the  case  of  infan- 
try, less  dense  and  more  elevated  in  that  of  cavalry, 
very  dense  in  that  of  the  parks  and  equipages ;  the 
dust  of  foragers  is  lighter  and  more  extended  than 
that  of  squadrons. — ^The  sound  of  marching  reveals  a 


AEMED   EECONNOISSANCES.  297 

passing  column  in^the  vicinity. — If  tlie  glitter  of  tlie 
aiTJS  of  a  body  discovered  in  tlie  distance  is  very 
bright,  tlie  troops  are  probably  facing  you ;  if  other- 
wise, their  backs  are  toward  you. — In  an  insurgent 
country,  a  timid  or  an  insolent  bearing  of  the  popula- 
tion indicates  that  the  adversary  is  remote  and  feeble, 
or  near  and  strong. — By  the  number  of  bivouac  fires 
w^e  may  calculate  approximately  the  force  of  the  ene- 
my ;  for  to  each  fire  there  are  reckoned  10  Frenchmen, 
4  Kussians,  5  Dutchmen,  6  Englishmen,  or  6  Germans. 
— ^The  particular  enemy  that  is  advancing  is  recog- 
nized by  the  shape  of  the  masses,  the  straightness  of 
the  lines,  the  form  and  size  of  the  head-gear,*  the 
color  of  the  pantaloons  and  of  the  shoulder-straps  and 
belts ;  also  by  the  color  of  the  coats  or  cloaks,  which 
varies  with  the  different  European  nations,  being 
green  in  Russia,  red  in  England,  white  in  Austria, 
sky  blue  in  Bavaria,  deep  blue  in  Prussia,  Spain, 
Wurtemberg,  and  the  smaller  states  of  Germany. 

In  the  observation  of  indications,  we  must  en- 
deavor to  distinguish  those  which  are  only  apparent, 
and  which  are  sometimes  employed  by  the  enemy  to 
deceive ;  such,  for  example,  as  running  fires  (^feux 
volanti)  in  bivouacs. 

*  Prussia  and  Russia  have  adopted  a  leather  helmet ;  in  other  nations, 
the  shako,  the  straw  hat,  the  cap,  and  the  chachia  are  found. 


CHAPTEE    FOUETH. 

PASSAGE  OF  EIVEES. 

Water  courses  are  among  tlie  most  frequent  and 
most  formidable  obstacles  to  tlie  prosecution  of  war ; 
and  it  is  therefore  of  the  first  importance  to  know  how 
to  overcome  them.  They  are  crossed  in  various  ways, 
according  to  their  nature  and  to  the  means  at  our  dis- 
posal :  sometimes  by  bridges,  which  always  require 
both  material  and  labor ;  sometimes  in  the  most  prim- 
itive and  simple  manner,  that  is,  by  passing  through 
the  water,  either  wading  or  swimming ;  sometimes  by 
waiting  until  the  cold  of  winter  has  congealed  the 
liquid  element  and  converted  it  into  a  firm  highway. 

We  are  here  concerned  chiefly  with  the  consider- 
ation of  expeditious  methods  of  crossing  rivers;  in 
short,  with  improvised  passages :  but  these  especially 
require  that  we  carefully  examine  the  peculiarities  of 
the  water  course,  and  for  this  purpose,  as  in  all  mili- 
tary matters,  a  preliminary  operation  is  necessary. 

1.  Reconnois§aiice  of  a  River. — The  recomiois- 
sance  of  a  river  should  determine  the  following  par- 
ticulars : 


II 


PASSAGE   OF   KtVERS.  299 

1st.  Its  course  from  its  source  to  its  moutli ;  the 
windings  of  this  course  and  the  most  decided  bends ; 
its  islands,  and  whether  these  are  bare  or  covered 
with  plantations ;  the  nature  of  its  banks ;  the  exist- 
ence of  any  tow-path,  and  of  roads  terminating  upon 
it ;  the  direction  of  the  current ;  dams,  mills,  sluices ; 
the  means  of  changing  the  channel ;  the  nature  of  the 
bed ;  its  periodical  or  sudden  risings ;  the  frequency 
of  its  freezing,  and  the  usual  strength  of  the  ice. 

2d.  Its  tributaries  and  their  military  importance ; 
the  distance  to  which  the  ocean  tide  ascends;  the 
point  at  which  it  begins  to  be  navigable ;  the  kind 
and  the  number  of  boats  existing  upon  its  waters. 

3d.  Its  depth  and  breadth ;  the  velocity  of  the 
current ;  the  probable  time  required  to  cross  it — ele- 
ments which  we  should  determine  for  ourselves,  and 
not  from  hearsay. 

4th.  The  fortified  places  or  posts  which  it  washes ; 
the  use  that  may  be  made  of  it  in  defensive  or  offen- 
sive operations. 

5th.  All  the  points  of  crossing ;  either  points  suit- 
able for  an  improvised  bridge,  or  where  fords  are 
practicable  ;  whether  bridges  are  already  in  existence, 
and  rest  upon  stone  or  wooden  piers ;  swivel,  draw 
or  flying  bridges  (ferry  or  trail)  ;  giving  for  each  its 
length  and  breadth,  its  degree  of  strength,  and  the 
mode  of  defending  or  of  destroying  it. 

These  various  points  are  to  be  brought  together 
and  explained  with  the  utmost  exactness.  For  we 
must  be  prepared  to  avail  ourselves  of  every  natural 
or  artificial  advantage,  if  we  wish  to  obstruct  the  pas- 


300  MmOE   OPERATIONS. 

sage  of  the  river,  and  to  avoid  all  kinds  of  obstacles 
if  we  wish  to  cross  it  in  force. 

3.  Discovery,  Destruction,  and  Repair  of  Fords.^ — 

A  ford  is  any  part  of  the  river  where  the  water  is  so 
low  that  we  can  cross  without  boats  and  without 
swimming. 

The  depth  of  a  ford  should  not  exceed  three  feet 
for  infantry,  nor  four  feet  for  cavalry  and  for  vehicles 
whose  load  may  be  wet  without  injury ;  but  for  those 
loaded  with  materials  that  should  be  kept  dry,  the 
depth  should  not  exceed  two  feet. 

As  the  existence  of  a  ford  renders  all  other  less 
expeditious  means  of  crossing  a  river  wholly  unneces- 
sary, it  is  important  to  make  a  careful  search  for  them. 
They  are  to  be  discovered  as  follows : 

If  we  see  a  path  or  road  starting  from  each  of  the 
opposite  banks,  we  may  almost  always  infer  the  exist- 
ence of  a  ford ;  but  a  road  on  one  side  only,  often  in- 
dicates merely  a  point  to  which  horses  are  brought  to 
water. 

If,  at  the  time  of  low  water,  the  river  flows  rapidly 
between  two  banks  of  sand,  there  is  a  probability  of 
the  existence  of  a  ford  from  one  of  these  banks  to  the 
other,  although  this  ford  may  not  have  been  used,  and 
may  not  be  known  to  the  inhabitants."^  Fords  of  this 
kind  are  produced  by  the  swollen  waters  at  the  end 
of  winter,  and  are  not  entirely  safe. 

Eivers  of  moderate  breadth  are  frequently  ford- 

*  It  is  not  prudent  to  rely  upon  the  statements  of  the  peasants  res- 
pecting the  number  or  nature  of  fords. 


PASSAGE   OF   EIVERS. 


301 


able  below  mill  sites,  or  near  tbeir  mouths  or  con- 
fluence with  another  river;  for  in  these  cases  the 
meeting  of  different  currents  produces  a  loss  of  ve- 
locity, and  hence  a  deposit  of  earthy  matter,  form- 
ing a  bank  of  sufficient  height  to  constitute  a  ford. 

A  ford  is  reconnoitred  by  an  officer  in  a  boat, 
rowed  from  bank  to  bank.  He  holds  a  sounding  lead 
at  the  end  of  a  rope  about  a  yard  in  length  (for  ex- 
ample) from  a  float,  and  wherever  the  lead  touches 
the  bottom,  a  stake  is  planted ;  a  continuous  line  of 
stakes  indicating  the  course  of  the  ford. 

A  ford  may  be  easily  traced  also  by  a  body  of 
lancers  trying  the  bottom  with  their  lances ;  or,  in- 

^ deed,  by  a  number  of  swimmers,  wading  as  long  as 
they  find  a  foothold,  and  swimming  over  the  deeper 
parts. 
In  general,  a  river  presents  fewer  fordable  places 
in  the  winding  portions  of  its  course,  than  in  the 
straight  ones,  except  in  the  case  of  double  bends. 
For,  as  the  following  figure  shows,  the  current  which 


FORD  IN  A  DOUBLE  BEND. 


strikes  at  A  carries  off  the  earth  from  that  point  and 
throws  it  toward  the  bank  BC,  near  which,  therefore, 


302  MIXOR   OPEEATIONS. 

the  deptli  is  soon  diminislied ;  in  like  manner  tlie  cur- 
rent, skirting  at  E,  wears  away  the  bank  and  increases 
the  quantity  of  water  on  that  side,  at  the  expense  of 
the  portion  near  FG ;  thus  the  simultaneous  eleva- 
tion of  the  corresponding  parts  BC  and  FG  may  form 
a  ford. 

Sometimes  rivers,  which  are  not  fordable  in  a  di- 
rection at  right  angles  to  their  banks,  present  a  ford 
in  an  oblique  direction,  not  suspected  at  first.  These 
oblique  fords  possess  the  advantage  that  the  current 
frequently  aids  the  soldier  in  reaching  the  opposite 
shore. 

A  good  ford  satisfies  six  princij)al  conditions : 

1st.  The  hank  of  the  river  from  which  we  set  out 
shovld  he  higher  tlian  that  we  wish  to  reach,  in  order 
that  we  may  manoeuvre  without  being  discovered  by 
the  enemy,  and  may  also  command  his  position  with 
our  batteries. 

2d.  Wide  fords  are  prefer  able,  because  it  is  im- 
portant to  the  assailant  to  present  a  strong  front  to 
the  enemy. 

3d.  The  toater  should  not  he  rapid,  for  strong  cur- 
rents fatigue  the  soldier,  and  sometimes  carry  him 
away. 

4th.  The  hottom  of  the  ford  should  he  even  and 
firm,  for  loose  soil  fatigues  and  mires  the  foot  soldier, 
while  one  scattered  with  stones  wounds  his  feet.  A 
rocky  bottom,  moreover,  is  too  slippery.  Hence  a 
gravel  bottom  is  the  best. 

5th.  Tlie  hank  on  the  side  next  the  enemy  should 
have  a  gentle  slope ;  for,  if  it  were  abrupt  and  steep, 


Il 


PASSAGE   OF   EIVEES.  303 

the  enemy  might  witli  great  ease  prevent  the  soldier 
from  climbing  the  ascent,  or  from  making  an  effective 
use  of  his  weapons. 

6th.  A  ford  which  the  enemy  could  destroy  hy  open- 
ing duices  in  his  possession^  would  he  a  had  one  ;  and 
the  same  may  he  said  of  one  which  could  he  washed 
away  hy  a  heavy  rain  or  a  sudden  thaw.  In  such 
cases,  the  enemy,  or  chance,  might  interrupt  the  pas- 
sage at  a  moment  when  but  a  small  number  of  troops, 
insufficient  to  withstand  the  enemy,  had  reached  the 
opposite  shore. 

Every  ford,  the  utility  of  which  has  been  estab- 
lished, should  be  guarded  and  protected  with  as  much 
care  as  a  bridge ;  and,  in  case  of  need,  by  field  forti- 
fications. On  the  other  hand,  every  ford  which  may 
probably  be  of  use  to  the  enemy  should  be  destroyed 
or  in  some  way  obstructed. 

From  the  preceding  enumeration  of  the  various 
conditions  which  a  good  ford  must  fulfil,  we  readily 
infer  the  mode  of  obstructing  or  destroying  it. 

A  ford  may  be  obstructed  by  throwing  into  it 
trees  with  all  their  branches,  and  with  their  tops  di- 
rected toward  the  opposite  shore,  turning  them 
obliquely  to  the  course  of  the  stream  when  the  cur- 
rent is  rapid.  It  would  appear  to  be  expedient,  when 
possible,  to  bind  these  trees  together,  either  with  iron 
chains*  or  tarred  ropes.  We  may  substitute  for  this 
abatis,  or  combine  with  it,  stakes  of  various  lengths, 

*  As  was  clone  by  Count  de  la  Roche  in  two  fords  of  the  Montre,  a 
small  stream  of  Alsace.  (See  his  Essai  sur  la  petite  guerre^  1770,  in 
12mo.) 


304  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

driven  witli  great  force,  whieli  cannot  be  pulled  npj 
without  much  difficulty;  also  caltrops,  planks  filled 
with  nails,  or  harrows.  By  distributing  these  differ-] 
ent  obstructions  in  all  parts  of  the  ford,  its  passage! 
will  be  rendered  almost  impossible.  We  may  also] 
render  a  ford  inaccessible  by  vertically  cutting  awa^ 
the  bank  of  which  we  are  in  possession. 

To  break  up  or  destroy  a  ford,  we  may  dig  a 
broad  and  deep  ditch,  or  several  smaller  ones,  across] 
it,  following  the  direction  of  the  stream ;  scattering  the! 
excavated  earth  upon  the  surface  of  the  water,  instead 
of  throwing  it  upon  the  bank,  where  it  would  lead 
the  enemy  to  suspect  that  the  ford  had  been  disturbed.] 
These  ditches  being  filled  with  water  and  unknown  to] 
the  enemy  will  cause  the  loss  of  a  part  of  their  sol- 
diers and  will  arrest  the  progress  of  the  rest.     For] 
the  same  purpose  we  may  dig  wells  or  pits,  eithei 
near  the  shore  or  in  the  middle  of  the  ford,  planting 
a  heavy  stake  in  the  centre  of  each.     The  soldiers 
and  horses  plunging  into  these  will  greatly  paralyze 
the  action  of  a  column  attempting  to  cross.     Finally, 
a  ford  may  be  destroyed  by  increasing  the  volume 
of  water  flowing  over  it,  which  may  be  done  either 
by  constructing  a  dam  below  it,  or  by  removing  dams, 
artificial  or  natural,  above  it. 

The  repair  of  a  ford  that  has  been  broken  up  or 
destroyed,  or  the  improvement  of  a  defective  one,  is  to 
be  undertaken  in  the  following  manner : 

If  the  volume  of  water  has  been  increased  by 
means  of  a  dam,  we  endeavor  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  dam  and  destroy  it :  if  a  dam  has  been  removed 


I 


PASSAGE   OF   EIVEKS.  305 

above  the  ford,  we,  of  course,  restore  it.  If  tlie  enemy 
has  dug  ditches  or  wells  in  the  middle  of  the  ford 
these  are  to  be  filled  with  stones  covered  with  fascines, 
If  the  ford  has  been  obstructed  with  caltrops,  stakes, 
spiked  planks,  and  harrows,  all  these  mischievous  ar 
tides  are  to  be  removed  by  means  of  rakes,  the  ope 
ration  being  protected  by  sharpshooters  concealed 
behind  the  trees  on  the  banks.  Folard  recommends 
for  this  purpose  the  use  of  iron  claws  or  grapples,  at- 
tached to  long  ropes,  and  thrown  out  as  far  as  possible 
into  the  ford.  As  to  caltrops,  this  author  doubts 
"  whether  they  can  ever  be  entirely  removed  where 
the  bottom  is  of  gravel,  and  firm;"'^*  and  the  best 
course  is  then  to  sink  upon  the  bottom  a  series  of  hur- 
dles loaded  with  stone.  But  sometimes  this  method 
fails,  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon  a  passage 
that  is  too  perilous.  It  is  evident,  moreover,  that  the 
broader  the  river,  the  more  difficult  will  it  be  to  clear 
the  ford. 

When  the  bottom  of  a  ford  is  not  sufficiently  firm, 
it  may  be  improved  by  sinking  a  bed  of  fascines  or 
hurdles  weighted  with  stones.  The  entrance  and  exit 
of  the  ford  are  to  be  rendered  easy,  when  necessary, 
by  constructing  gentle  slopes  on  the  two  banks.  If 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  breadth  is  not  fordable, 
the  deep  part  may  be  filled  with  fascines  loaded  with 
stones,  or  with  boxes  filled  with  stone,  sand,  or  earth. 


*  Polyle^  avec  Commentaire,  par  le  Chevalier  de  Folard,  1Y29,  t.  v.,  p. 
147.  In  a  muddy  or  sandy  bottom  they  are  quickly  sunk,  and  are  for- 
midable only  to  the  first  soldiers  who  cross. 

20 


306  MINOE    OPEEATIONS. 

A  ford  that  is  too  narrow,  is  widened  in  the  same 
manner. 

It  is  a  good  precaution,  especially  in  broad  and 
rapid  rivers,  to  mark  out  the  whole  ford,  by  planting 
two  rows  of  strong  stakes,  upon  which  marks  can  be 
made  which  will  show  whether  any  change  in  the 
depth  of  the  water  occurs. 

In  reference  to  such  changes,  it  is  proper  to  ob- 
serve : 

1st.  That,  as  a  ford  is  easily  broken  up,  we  must 
not  rely  upon  it  as  a  sure  means  of  communication 
between  two  corj^s  d'armee, 

2d.  That  it  is  imprudent  to  trust  to  fords  in  rivers 
and  brooks  in  mountainous  countries,  where  even  a 
very  moderate  rain  may  dig  them  out,  or  swell  their 
waters. 

We  will  corroborate  this  second  observation  by  a 
passage  from  Colonel  de  Carrion-Nisas.*  "  The  river 
Cinca,"  he  says,  "  which  caused  the  disasters  of  Csesarf 
and  of  the  Duke  of  Orleans,J  was  no  less  fatal  to  the 
French  in  the  Spanish  war  from  1808  to  1813.  The 
garrison  of  a  small  town,  washed  by  this  stream,  was 
ordered  to  cross  it.  According  to  the  usual  practice, 
but  in  this  position  imprudently,  five  companies, 
which  were  destined  to  form  the  advance-guard,  were 

*  Essai  SILT  Vhistoire  generate  de  Vart  miUtaire,  1824,  t.  ii,,  p.  142. 

t  Read  attentively  chapters  xl.  and  xlviii.  of  Book  I.  of  Caesar's  Com- 
mentaries (on  the  Civil  "War).  The  words  of  the  great  writer  suggest  the 
improvidence  of  the  general  who  neglects  to  ohtain  sufficient  informa- 
tion, or  who  does  not  take  into  consideration  the  accidents  to  which  he 
is  liable  from  the  nature  of  the  country  in  which  he  is  waging  war. 

J  At  the  siege  of  Lerida  (1707),  which  he  nevertheless  captured 


» 


PASSAGE   OF   RIVERS.  307 

passed  over  on  the  preceding  day.  During  the  night 
the  river  rose  and  cut  off  these  five  companies  from 
their  companions,  who  saw  them  slaughtered  by  the 
guerillas  without  being  able  to  help  them." 

3.  Fording  a  River. — Fords  rarely  answer  for  the 
passage  of  a  whole  army,  but  are  of  frequent  use 
for  detachments,  and  facilitate  the  minor  operations 
of  war. 

Before  allowing  your  troops  to  plunge  into  the 
water,  to  cross  a  ford,  see  that  they  are  not  overheated 
and  perspiring — a  hygienic  precaution  which  prevents 
many  serious  diseases,  and  which  should  be  especially 
observed  when  the  waters  are  cold  and  swollen. 

If  the  ford  has  not  previously  been  staked  out, 
let  it  be  done  by  some  horsemen,  or  take  an  expe- 
rienced guide  from  the  country,  or  stretch  ropes  on 
the  right  and  left  to  confine  the  extreme  files,  so  that 
the  soldiers  may  not  get  off  the  track  and  lose  their 
foothold. 

Where  a  river,  though  fordable,  is  sufliciently 
rapid  to  carry  away  men,  place  in  its  bed,  up-stream, 
anything  which  will  act  as  an  obstacle  and  break  the 
force  of  the  current,  such  as  trees,  wagons,  and  even 
horsemen.  Also  place  below  the  ford  a  line  of  men 
on  horseback,  to  pick  up  the  soldiers  who  may  be  car- 
ried away.  These  horsemen,  whether  up-stream  or 
down,  must  not  be  too  close  together,  as  they  would, 
if  in  a  compact  body,  form  a  sort  of  dam,  and  would 
have  the  pressure  of  too  great  a  volume  of  water  to 
support. 


308  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  foot  soldiers:  the] 
should  never  march   in  close  order  in  a  somewhat] 
rapid  ford,  as  this  would  render  the  file  on  the  sid( 
up  stream  liable  to  be  overturned. 

Infantry  should  enter  a  ford  obliquely,  unless  th( 
direction  of  the  solid  path  of  the  ford  prevents.    The] 
should  also  cross  in  regular  platoons,  with  intervals 
between  them.     They  take  off  their  shoes,  roll  u] 
their  pantaloons,  put  their  cartridge-boxes  upon  thei^ 
knapsacks,  and  carry  their  arms  at  will,  though  it 
best  to  carry  them  upon  the  shoulder  which  is  uj 
stream.     The  object  of  the  last  two  precautions  is 
keep  the  ammunition  and   arms  from  getting  wet." 
The  men  of  the  same  rank  grasp  each  other  by  the 
sword  belt,  so  as  to  form  a  chain  to  assist  in  support- 
ing inexperienced,  feeble,  or  clumsy  soldiers.     The}' 
should  not  look  at  the  water,  but  direct  their  eyes  to 
a  fixed  and  elevated  point  upon  the  shore. 

Cavalry  crosses  a  ford  without  difficulty.  It  is 
only  necessary  for  the  men  to  raise  their  feet  to  avoid 
getting  wet,  hold  up  their  horses,  and  fix  their  eyes 
upon  some  tree  or  steeple  on  the  opposite  shore. 
These  precautions  are  more  particularly  useful  where 
the  water  course  is  broad. 

Occasionally,  each  horseman  may  successfully  carry 
across  a  foot  soldier  riding  behind. 

When  the  several  arms  cross  a  ford  separately,  the 
cavalry  and  artillery  should  cross  after  the  infantry ; 
otherwise  they  would  break  up  the  bottom  and  make 
the  crossing  for  the  latter  difficult  or  impossible. 

Several  fords  near  each  other  facilitate  the  passage, 


II 


I 


PASSAGE    OF   EIVEES.  309 

if  they  are  not  too  narrow  :  tlie  proceeding  for  each  is 
the  same  as  above. 

Alexander  the  Great  crossed  the  Granicus  by  a 
ford,  oUiquely  and  in  several  columns.  One  of  the 
most  celebrated  modern  instances  of  the  passage  of  a 
river  by  a  ford,  is  that  of  the  Tagliamento,  in  1797,  by 
three  French  divisions  conducted  by  Bonaparte,  push- 
ing before  them  the  Archduke  Charles  in  the  direction 
of  the  capital — Vienna,  which  was  the  objective  point 
of  the  campaign. 

To  show  the  importance  which  a  ford  may  ac- 
quire, we  will  cite  two  facts  in  French  history  as  exam- 
ples :  If  (in  August,  1346)  a  prisoner  had  not  pointed 
out  to  Edward  III.  the  ford  of  Blanquetaque  below 
Abbeville,  the  English,  being  thus  arrested  by  the 
river  Somme  and  pursued  by  the  superior  forces  of 
Philip  VI.  of  France,  would  have  come  to  the  end  of 
their  good  fortune,  and  there  would  have  been  no 
Crecy  to  tarnish  the  glory  of  the  French  arms.  If  (in 
the  early  part  of  August,  1809),  after  the  battle  of  Tal- 
avera,  Marshal  Ney  had  been  able  to  find  the  ford  of 
Almaraz  on  the  Tao;us,  the  forces  of  Soult  would  have 
effected  a  passage  and  menaced  the  rear  of  the  English 
army,  and  ruined  it,  by  compelling  a  disastrous  re- 
treat, despite  the  recent  victory  of  Wellington. 

4.  Swimming  a  River. — An  officer  who  can  swim 
has  it  in  his  power  to  perform  important  services. 
We  will  cite  two  examples :  At  the  siege  of  Lille, 
in  1708,  Captain  Dubois  introduced  himself  into 
the  place  by  the  river  Deule,  often  swimming  below 


310  MINOE   OPERATIONS. 

the  surface.  He  conferred  witli  Marshal  Boufflers,  be- 
took himself  again  to  the  water  with  a  note  enveloped 
with  waxed  muslin  in  his  mouth,  and  although  he  got 
entangled  in  the  weeds,  had  the  fortune  to  escape  and 
to  bring  back  to  the  Duke  of  Burgundy  an  account 
of  the  situation  of  the  defenders. — On  the  26th  of 
May,  1800,  Franceschi,  an  aide-de-camp  of  General 
Soult,  having  left  the  First  Consul  at  the  foot  of  the 
Great  Saint-Bernard,  approached  the  besieged  and 
famished  city  of  Genoa  in  a  boat  pulled  by  three 
oarsmen.  He  passed  the  English  cruisers  in  the  night, 
and  had  nearly  escaped,  when  daylight  appeared. 
Immediately  a  shower  of  balls  poured  upon  his  boat, 
killing  one  of  his  oarsmen  and  wounding  another.  In 
this  perilous  moment  he  did  not  hesitate,  but  resolved 
to  swim  the  remaining  distance  to  the  city.  Tying  his 
dispatches  about  his  neck,  he  plunged  into  the  water, 
but  subsequently,  remembering  that  he  had  left  his 
sword,  and  not  being  willing  to  allow  it  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  English,  returned  to  the  boat,  seized 
his  weapon,  and  carrying  it  between  his  teeth,  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  the  shore,  though  almost  exhaust- 
ed. He  bore  to  Massena,  the  general-in-chief,  the 
promise  that  in  three  weeks  Bonaparte  would,  by 
forced  marches,  come  to  the  relief  of  the  city.* 

A  knowledge  of  swimming  may  enable  an  officer 
to  save  his  life.  When  Prince  Eugene  Poniatowski, 
while  covering  the  French  retreat  after  the  battle  of 
Leipsic,  plunged  into  the  Elster  rather  than  surrender 

*  Traite  de  natation,  essai  sur  son  application  a  I'art  de  la  guerre,  par 
le  vicomte  de  Conrtivron,  officier  superieur;  tliird  edition,  1836,  p.  166. 


I 


I 


\ 


PASSAGE   OF   EIVERS.  311 

(October  19th,  1813),  lie  would  not  liave  been  drowned 
if  he  had  known  how  to  swim  * 

Soldiers,  as  well  as  officers,  should  know  how  to 
swim.  In  fact,  a  detachment  of  infantry  composed  of 
troops  who  cannot  swim,  will  be  retarded  by  an  in- 
significant stream,  and  paralyzed  in  its  operations. 

We  must  confess  that  the  Frencli  are  far  behind- 
hand in  the  art  of  swimming.  Notwithstanding  the 
occasional  and  temporary  existence  of  bodies  of  swim- 
mers in  its  ranks,f  their  army  has  suffered  itself  to 
be  surpassed  in  this  respect  by  several  foreign  armies, 
and  especially  by  the  Prussian.  J 

But  notwithstanding  this  lamentable  condition  of 
things,  w^e  will  add  a  few  words  upon  the  passage  of 
rivers  by  swimming : 

To  effect  sucli  a  passage,  a  point  of  the  river 
should  be  chosen  where  the  current  is  least  rapid  and 
the  banks  are  of  easy  access.     The  latter  condition  is 


*  Pouiatowski  had  before  narrowly  escaped  drowning  in  the  Sereth, 
at  the  siege  of  Jassy. 

t  For  example,  Soult  organized  a  company  of  150  swimmers  at  the 
passage  of  the  Linth  (September  25  th,  1799).  This  company,  command- 
ed by  the  first  adjutant,  Dellard,  threw  themselves  into  the  water,  with, 
their  sabres  between  their  teeth,  and  pistols  tied  on  their  heads,  and, 
under  the  protecting  fire  of  the  artillery,  reached  the  opposite  shore  in  a 
few  seconds  and  dispersed  the  advance-posts  of  the  enemy.  Consult  the 
Memoires  de  Massena,  par  Roch,  t.  iii.,  p.  36T.  In  1853,  I  proposed  the 
creation  of  a  battalion  of  swimmers  for  the  French  army  as  a  specialty, 
■which  it  was  desirable  to  establish  and  to  perfect  by  study  and  practice. 
(See  Duparcq's  "  Commentaires  sur  Claiisewitz^  livre  vi,,  observation 
Ko.  22,  p.  193,  197.) 

X  See  Duparcq's  "  JEtudes  Jiistoripces  et  militaires  sur  la  Prusse " 
(1854),  t.  i.,  p.  227. 


312  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

desirable  for  infantry,  but  indispensable  for  cavalry ; 
for  without  a  point  of  support  upon  whicli  the  horse 
can  place  his  hind  feet,  and  hence  spring  upon  the 
bank,  he  will  often  be  drowned. 

The  infantry  swimmers  should  put  their  effects 
and  arms  upon  their  heads  and  shoulders,  their  sabres 
between  their  teeth,  in  order  to  have  one  weapon 
available  at  the  moment  of  landing.  Sometimes  they 
can  place  these  effects  and  arms  upon  a  small  raft,  or 
a  wherry,  if  they  can  construct  or  procure  one.  They 
should  swim  obliquely  to  the  current,  and  down 
stream,  so  as  to  be  assisted  by  the  propelling  force  of 
the  water.  If  they  are  accompanied  by  horsemen,  the 
latter  should  take  to  the  water  above  the  infantry,  so 
as  to  break  the  force  of  the  current.* 

With  a  proper  degree  of  boldness,  cavalry  may 
likewise  cross  a  river  by  swimming.  Almost  all 
authors  say  the  horse  is  a  good  swimmer ;  still,  ac- 
cording to  Warnery,f  he  should  be  exercised  at  it. 
This  animal  swims  with  his  crupper  under  water, 
and  hence  the  necessity  of  placing  the  valise  of  the 
horseman,  and  everything  which,  by  being  wetted, 
would  become   too   heavy,   either   upon   the   rider's 


*  This  method  was  followed  by  Cffisar  in  the  passage  of  the  Loire, 
and  by  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  the  passage  of  the  Meuse  (15G9). — Infan- 
try swimmers,  supported  by  a  number  of  skirmishers,  will  be  of  especial 
service  in  capturing  boats  collected  by  the  enemy,  near  the  opposing 
shore,  for  effecting  a  passage,  or  boats  that  are  drifting  down  the  stream. 

t  This  author,  in  fact,  informs  us  that  in  the  first  war  of  Silesia, 
three  hundred  hussars,  attempting  to  cross  the  Oder,  were  for  the  most 
part  drowned  with  their  horses,  although  these  horses  were  of  the  swim- 
ming species.     {Commentaires  sur  Montecuculli  et  Turpin,  t.  ii.,  p.  183.) 


PASSAGE   OF   RIVERS.  313 

shoulders,  or  in  a  boat,  or  upon  a  raft.  Cavalry  should 
also  cut  the  water  obliquely  to  the  current,  moving  in 
ranh  and  preserving  some  distance  between  the  two 
ranks.  The  men  should  manage  their  horses  with 
gentleness,  and  speak  to  them  encouragingly. 

Each  platoon  of  cavalry  may  also  be  carried  across 
a  river  by  putting  the  horsemen  in  a  boat,  and  letting 
the  horses  swim  behind  it,  held  by  the  reins  in  the 
hands  of  the  men.  This  mixed  mode  is  not  entirely 
safe ;  the  horses,  abandoned  by  their  riders,  lose  con- 
fidence, press  toward  the  boat,  and  may  overturn  it. 
Sometimes  a  number  of  the  horses  refuse  to  enter  the 
water  in  this  manner.* 

The  plan  of  making  each  horseman  carry  a  foot 
soldier  mounted  behind,  has  also  been  tried.  It  was 
in  this  way  that  Marshals  Turenne  and  Gramont 
crossed  the  Necker  in  1645. 

The  Tartars  cross  rivers  on  rafts  constructed  of 
tnisses  of  straw  or  of  reeds.  They  send  their  horses 
into  the  water  in  front  of  their  frail  little  rafts,  and 
while  holding  them  by  the  tail  with  their  left  hands, 
apply  stout  blows  with  the  right,  drive  them,  swim- 
ming, to  the  opposite  shore. 

One  of  the  most  celebrated  passages  of  a  river  by 
swimming  was  that  of  the  Rhine  at  Tolhuys  by  the 

*  For  want  of  other  means,  the  Spanish  general  Sancho  Darilla  fol- 
lowed this  plan  in  crossing  the  Douro  with  his  cavalry  in  1580,  when 
going  to  meet  the  king  of  Portugal.  According  to  Folard  (Polybius,  v.  iv., 
p.  55),  this  method  was  successful  in  1639,  in  the  passage  of  the  Rhine 
bv  the  Duke  of  Longueville,  and  in  1708  in  the  passage,  by  a  regiment  of 
dragoons,  over  the  arm  of  the  sea  which  separates  the  town  of  Sluis  from 
the  island  of  Cadzand. 


314  MmOE   OPERATIONS. 

Frencli  army  in  1672.  At  this  place  tlie  river  proved 
to  be  fordable  in  part,  and  tliere  was  only  a  distance 
of  about  150  yards  to  be  crossed  by  swimming.  Louis 
XIV.  directed  the  operation.  His  body-guard  crossed 
by  squadrons  in  regular  formation,  and  in  the  words 
of  Quincy,  "  it  was  an  extraordinary  spectacle  to  see 
these  magnificent  troops  swimming  in  order  of  battle, 
in  the  midst  of  so  broad  and  rapid  a  stream."  * 

5.  Passage  upon  Ice. — Where  a  river  is  not  frozen 
across  its  channel,  plant  two  or  three  pointed  trunks 
of  trees,  upright,  in  the  bed  of  the  river  at  a  short 
distance  down  the  stream,  which  wdll  serve  as  a  bar- 
rier to  the  floating  ice,  and  thereby  hasten  the  total 
congelation  of  the  surface. 

Ice  is  not  to  be  ventured  upon  where  it  does  not 
touch  the  water ;  for  if  it  does  not  float,  but  forms 
arches,  an  excess  of  weight,  and  especially  any  sudden 
jar,  may  break  it.  It  should  be  at  least  three  inches 
thick  for  infantry,  and  four  and  a  half  inches  for  cav- 
alry and  light  artillery.  From  six  and  a  half  inches 
upwards,  it  supports  the  largest  and  most  heavily 
loaded  wagons. 

When  the  cold  season  continues,  the  thickness  of 

*  Histoire  militaire  de  Louis  XIV.,  t.  i.,  p.  822.  This  river  passage 
is  almost  always  cited  as  one  effected  by  fording  alone.  Santa-Cruz, 
however,  says  {Eejlexions  militaires  etpoUtiques,  traduction  Vergy,  t.  ii., 
p.  288)  that  the  king's  guard  crossed  the  Ehine  "  more  swimming  than 
fording."  This  is  the  famous  crossing  commemorated  by  Boileau,  and 
which  Feuquiere  characterizes  as  "  a  performance  in  which  success  was 
the  result  of  temerity  only,  and  which  should  never  be  cited  as  an  exam- 
ple to  be  followed."    (Memoires,  part  iii.,  chap.  Isx.) 


PASSAGE   OF   EIVEES.  315 

the  ice  may  be  artificially  increased,  if  it  appears  to 
be  insufficient :  for  this  purpose,  cover  it  with  straw, 
sand,  and  hurdles;  sprinkle  with  water  frequently, 
especially  in  the  evening,  and  wait  a  night. 

In  crossing  upon  ice,  the  infantry  should  break 
step,  and  horsemen  and  drivers  of  vehicles  should 
dismount.  Sand  and  earth  should  be  spread  upon 
the  ice,  to  save  the  men  and  horses  from  slipping. 

As  to  vehicles,  artillery,  eta,  it  is  important  to  dis- 
tribute their  weight  over  a  large  extent  of  the  frozen 
surface,  instead  of  allowing  it  to  rest  upon  a  single 
point :  this  will  be  accomplished  by  laying  the  road 
with  two  continuous  rows  of  planks  for  the  wheel 
tracks.  But  it  will  be  still  better  to  substitute  sliding 
for  rolling :  for  this  purpose  fasten  the  two  wheels  of 
each  side  upon  a  strong  plank  by  quoins  and  clamps, 
thus  converting  the  vehicle  into  a  sledge,  which  can 
be  readily  dragged  from  one  shore  to  the  other. 

In  all  passages  upon  ice,  particularly  when  they 
are  executed  by  an  army  in  retreat,  redouble  your 
activity  and  vigilance  to  avoid  disorder  and  confusion, 
which  would  inevitably  prove  disastrous. 

We  have  two  fine  examples  of  river  passages  upon 
ice,  in  the  progress  of  the  Grand  Elector  of  Branden- 
burg upon  the  frozen  Frische-Haif  (1679)  with  9,000 
men  in  sledges  ;  and  in  the  capture  of  the  Netherland 
fleet  on  the  ice  of  the  Zuyder  Zee,  by  the  French  cav- 
aby,  in  the  conquest  of  Holland  by  Pichegru,  in  1795. 

6.  ImproTised  Bridges. — The  construction  of  most 
improvised  bridges  belongs  to  the  artillery  service. 


316  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

We  shall  briefly  consider  only  some  of  tlie  most  sim- 
ple kinds. 

Bridge  of  ladders. — A  foot  bridge  sufficient  for 
tlie  passage  of  a  small  detachment  over  a  brook,  may 
be  very  quickly  made  of  two  stout  ladders  laid  hori- 
zontally from  bank  to  bank,  and  firmly  secured.  The 
rounds  are  placed  vertically,  and  the  distance  between 
the  two  ladders  may  be  about  one  yard.  Planks  laid 
closely  throughout  the  whole  length  and  secured  to 
the  two  ladders,  bind  the  whole  together,  and  give  a 
solid  footpath. 

Bridges  of  undressed  trees, — ^This  is  the  simplest 
of  all  the  bridges  suitable  for  a  river.  It  consists  of 
trunks  of  trees  in  the  bark,  only  their  branches  being 
trimmed  off,  thrown  from  one  bank  to  the  other — to 
the  number  of  five  or  six,  or  more,  according  to  the 
breadth  desired  for  the  bridge — and  covered  with  any 
kind  of  planking.  The  possibility  of  constructing  such 
bridges  depends  upon  finding  trees  of  sufficient  length, 
which  does  not  often  happen  except  where  the  rivers 
are  narrow. 

Bridge  of  wagons. — This  kind  of  bridge,  being 
more  ingenious,  than  really  useful,  is  rarely  em- 
ployed ;  but  as  it  may  serve  in  a  case  of  urgency,  we 
will  describe  it.  One  or  more  wagons  are  rolled  into 
the  water  (where  the  stream  is  not  more  than  forty 
yards  wide,  a  single  wagon  in  the  middle  will  answer) 
and  are  secured  with  stakes.  These  serve  as  piers, 
upon  which  are  laid  beams,  which  are  then  covered 
with  planks,  to  form  the  bridge-floor.  Pieces  of  plank, 
or  blocks,  are  inserted  between  the  tops  of  the  wagons 


\ 


PASSAGE   OF   RIVERS.  31T 

and  the  beams,  to  compensate  for  tlie  inequalities  of 
tlie  bed,  and  to  raise  tlie  level  of  the  floor  to  the  re- 
quisite height. 

This  bridge  can  be  employed  only  in  a  gentle  cur- 
rent, and  a  depth  of  not  more  than  two  yards. 

In  the  year  1543,  the  French  army  in  Italy  had  r(i- 
course  to  a  similar  bridge ;  for  we  read  in  the  Com- 
mentaires  of  Marshal  Montluc  that  "  the  next  day  we 
passed  the  river  Po,  over  which  we  constructed  a  bridge 
of  wagons  for  the  infantry,  for  the  cavalry  did  not  re- 
quire it,  as  the  water  only  reached  the  horses'  bellies." 

Bridge  of  ropes, — ^This  bridge  is  used  in  moun- 
tainous countries,  over  torrents  with  precipitous 
banks,  and  where  the  construction  of  other  kinds  of 
bridges  seems  impossible. 

The  most  simple  kind*  consists  of  half  a  dozen 
ropes,  an  inch  and  a  half  in  diameter,  stretched  from 
one  bank  to  the  other,  about  twenty  inches  apart,  and 
kept  in  position  by  cross-pieces  of  Avood :  upon  these 
ropes  a  floor  of  plank  is  then  laid.  Such  a  bridge  is 
only  suitable  for  infantry.  It  is  prudent  also  to  pro- 
vide it  with  guard  ropes  answering  as  hand-rails ;  and 
further,  to  diminish  its  oscillation  by  means  of  diag- 
onal ropes  fastened  to  the  banks.  Its  application  is 
confined  to  streams  of  about  twenty-five  yards  in 
breadth  at  the  maximum. 


*  In  the  wild  parts  of  America,  a  simple  cable  stretched  from  one 
bank  to  the  otlier  answers  for  crossing  brooks  or  torrents  flowing  at  the 
bottom  of  a  ravine ;  but  as  we  must  then  make  use  of  our  hands  and 
feet  to  get  across,  and  as  the  passage  is  always  long,  dangerous,  and  un- 
certain, this  method  cannot  be  recommended  in  a  military  point  of  view. 


318  MINOR   OPERATIOIS'S. 

A  rope-bridge  may  also  be  constructed  upon  the 
principle  employed  for  wire  suspension-bridges.  In 
this  case,  heavy  pieces  of  timber  are  planted  verti- 
cally on  the  two  banks,  in  the  place  of  abutments,  to 
which  two  long  cables  are  attached,  w^hich  hang  in  the 
catenary  form  and  support  the  floor.  This  floor  rests 
upon  a  number  of  cross-pieces,  which  are  suspended  by 
small  vertical  cords  from  the  various  points  of  the 
catenary. 

Small  pile-hridge, — For  the  purpose  of  bringing 
two  posts  into  communication,  bridges  are  thrown 
over  small  rivers  or  brooks,  resting  ujoon  j)iles,  which 
are  nothing  more  than  heavy  stakes  or  stout  branches 
of  trees.  One  or  two  rows  of  such  piles,  parallel  to 
the  direction  of  the  stream,  usually  suffice.  Strong 
transoms  of  plank  are  nailed  upon  the  tops  of  the 
opposite  piles,  upon  which  beams  are  laid  extending 
from  bank  to  bank,  forming  the  bridge-floor. 

Such  a  bridge  is  easily  improvised,  as  these  small 
piles  may  be  driven  with  a  simple  maul,  or  hand  pile- 
driver. 


p 


• 


CHAPTER    FIFTH. 

CONVOYS. 


Introductiois'. — A  convoy  is  an  expedition  de- 
signed to  furnisli  an  army,  body  of  troops,  place, 
camp,  or  post,  either  witli  money,  arms,  materiel,  am- 
munition, provisions,  live  stock,  or  stores  of  any  kind. 
The  term  is  also  applied  to  the  conveyance  of  the  sick, 
the  wounded,  and  prisoners. 

For  want  of  convoys  an  army  may  perish,*  and 
therefore  their  organization  demands  the  greatest  care. 
Their  outfit  and  superintendence  come  under  two  dif- 
ferent heads :  one  purely  administrative,  and  apper- 
taining to  the  military  intendance  ;  the  other  tactical, 
and  appertaining  to  the  command.  We  shall  here  con- 
sider only  the  latter,  and  shall  regard  a  convoy  as  one 
of  the  minor  operations  of  war 

From  this  point  of  view,  a  convoy  should  never 
march  without  an  escort,  for  it  is  in  vain  to  suppose 
that,  because  it  is  hehind  the  army,  upon  ground  swept 
beforehand  by  the  moving  columns,  it  needs  no  protec- 

*  "  Lines  of  convoys,"  said  Bulow,  "  are  the  muscles  of  the  military 
body,  whicli  would  become  paralytic  if  they  were  sundered."  (Esprit 
du  systcme  de  guerre  modeme^  trad.  Laverne,  p.  51,  52.) 


320  MmOK  OPERATIONS. 

tion  of  its  own.  The  force  and  composition  of  this 
escort  must  be  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  con- 
voy and  the  character  of  the  country  to  be  crossed,  by 
the  importance  attached  to  its  success,  the  distance  to 
be  travelled,  the  situation  of  the  enemy,  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  inhabitants,  and  other  circumstances  of  va- 
rious kinds.  The  escort  is  always  larger  for  a  convoy 
of  materiel,  and  especially  of  powder,  which  it  is  im- 
portant to  keep  at  a  distance  from  the  scene  of  com- 
bat, and  out  of  danger  from  fire.  It  should  generally 
be  composed  of  infantry  and  a  small  body  of  cavalry, 
the  number  of  the  latter  being  diminished  in  propor- 
tion as  the  country  is  more  woody  or  mountainous. 
This  cavalry  will  serve  to  reconnoitre  and  watch  the 
enemy.  The  principle  is  that  the  escort  should  be 
mixed^  so  as  to  overcome  all  kind  of  difficulties  and 
any  obstacles  it  may  meet ;  consequently  there  should 
be  added  to  it  some  artillery  and  a  few  sappers  (or, 
for  want  of  these,  workmen  of  the  country  with  their 
implements),  who  can  be  employed  to  level  roads  or 
to  construct  places  of  shelter. 

The  grade  of  the  commandant  of  a  convoy  is  pro- 
portioned to  the  importance  of  the  expedition.  His 
authority  is  absolute  over  the  troops  of  all  the  arms 
which  compose  the  escort.  The  regulations  prescribe 
merely  that  in  the  case  of  convoy  of  ammunition,  he 
should  defer  to  the  advice  of  the  artillery  officer  in 
respect  to  the  precautions  to  be  observed  during  the 
march  and  in  halts.  The  command  of  such  a  convoy 
is  usually  given  to  an  artillery  officer,  an  arrangement 
which  avoids  all  complication. 


CONVOYS.  321 

Besides  his  verbal  orders  and  explanations,  the 
chief  of  a  convoy  receives  the  most  detailed  written 
instructions  from  the  general  who  detaches  him.  No 
superior  officer  on  the  route  can  modify  these  instruc- 
tions, nor  can  he  retard  the  march  of  the  convoy ;  but 
every  one  should  rather,  for  the  general  good,  endea- 
vor to  promote  its  object. 

"  The  command  of  a  convoy,"  says  Jacquinot  de 
Presle,*  "  is  one  of  the  most  delicate  missions  with 
which  an  officer  can  be  charged.  In  fact,  nothing  is 
more  difficult  to  defend,  or  easier  to  attack,  than  a  file 
of  wagons,  sometimes  extending  a  long  distance,  which 
the  least  obstacle  may  impede.  Whatever  difficulties 
this  operation  may  present,  the  officer  to  whom  it  is 
intrusted  should  nevertheless  remember  that,  with  in- 
telligence and  courage,  obstacles  are  often  surmounted 
before  which  an  ignorant  man,  without  energy,  would 
succumb ;  for  though  the  defence  of  a  convoy  is  diffi- 
cult, the  attack  upon  it  is  sometimes  badly  conceived 
or  imperfectly  managed." 

I  1.  Organization  of  the  Convoy. — As  SOOn  as  the 

commanding  officer  has  received  his  instructions  and 
the  necessary  explanations,  he  collects  the  convoy  and 
examines  into  the  means  placed  at  his  disposal. 
I         In  respect  to  the  troops,  he  reviews  them  as  any 
chief  of  a  detachment  must,  and  sees  that  both  infan- 
try and  cavalry  are  provided  with  everything  neces- 
^^    sary  in  the  way  of  ammunition  and  equipment. 
^H  In  respect  to  the  materiel,  he  examines  in  detail 

L 


■  CouTB  (Vart  militaire,  1829,  p.  554. 
21 


322  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

every  wagon  and  its  harness,  as  well  as  its  load,  to 
see  whether  the  former  are  in  good  condition  and  the 
latter  suitably  distributed.  Should  they  prove  other- 
wise, he  requires  them  to  be  changed,  or  at  least  to  be 
repaired ;  and  should  his  demand  not  be  complied  with, 
he  should  represent  distinctly  the  condition  in  which 
he  is  thus  placed,  in  order  to  diminish,  to  that  extent, 
his  own  responsibility  in  case  of  a  reverse. 

For  prudence,  he  requires  several  empty  wagons, 
and  also  spare  pieces;  for  example,  wheels,  poles, 
horse-shoes,  ropes,  etc. 

If  the  convoy  is  large,  he  divides  it  into  several 
divisions,  each  of  500  wagons  at  the  maximum,"^  and 
each  division  is  then  also  subdivided  into  component 
groups  of  about  50  wagons  each.  In  all  cases,  each 
isolated  group  should  have  a  portion  of  the  foot  sol- 
diers of  the  escort  to  watch  over  and  protect  it ;  and 
this  will  limit  the  subdivision  and  necessitate  propor- 
tioning it  to  the  number  of  the  escort.  Besides,  the 
forces  must  not  be  so  minutely  parcelled  off  that  they 
cannot  act  together ;  in  fact,  an  excessive  distribution 
would  convert  a  military  expedition  into  a  civic  pro- 
cession, artistically  grouped. 

The  more  valuable  wagons  are  placed  at  the  head 
of  each  division,  in  the  following  order :  money,  the 
j)apers  and  documents  of  the  staff,  arms,  ammunition, 
provisions,  equipment,  officers'  baggage  in  the  order 
of  grade,  sutlers'  and  traders'  equipages.  By  the  liead^ 
we  here  mean  the  portion  of  the  convoy  which  is  the 

*  One  hundred  wagons  to  a  division  is  a  good  number. 


CONVOYS.  323 

strongest  or  best  protected.^  To  speak  more  generally, 
this  portion  should  embrace  those  vehicles  the  pres- 
ei-vation  of  which  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  in  re- 
lation to  the  special  object  in  view.  In  a  convoy  of 
prisoners,  those  who  are  known  to  be  the  most  hostile 
and  dangerous  are  to  be  placed  at  the  head.  In  a 
mixed  convoy,  composed  of  wagons  and  beasts  of  bur- 
den, the  latter  will  take  the  head,f  in  order  that  the 
roads  may  not  be  cut  up  by  the  wheels  before  they 
pass,  and  also  that  they  may  more  readily  escape  in 
case  of  attack. 

Like  every  marching  column,  the  convoy  is  organ- 
ized with  an  advance-guard  and  a  rear-guard.  The  lat- 
ter is  required,  because  in  this  operation  an  attack 
upon  the  rear  is  as  probable  as  any  other ;  in  addi- 
tion, it  is  well  to  have  a  reserve  to  act  as  a  guard  and 
to  fight  upon  the  most  exposed  flank.  The  advance- 
guard,  the  rear-guard,  the  main  body,  and  the  reserve, 
have  each  their  own  commander ;  the  commandant  of 
the  convoy  reserves  no  special  command,  in  order  to 
be  free  to  go  everywhere  and  examine  everything. 

In  the  organization  of  a  convoy,  it  is  necessary  to 
bear  in  mind  certain  numerical  data,  the  most  useful 
of  which  are  given  in  the  following  summary : 

One  caisson  carries,    \  ^^^^  ^'""'''^'^  ....  1,650  pounds.^ 

(  with  oxen,  ....  770  " 
One  mule  carries,  on  his  back,  on  the  average,  220  " 
One  horse      "  "  "  190       " 

One  ox  "  "  "  130       " 


*  The  enemy  frequently  allows  the  head  to  pass,  in  order  that  the 
rest  of  the  convoy  may  feel  more  secure. 

t  Thus  pack  horses,  for  example,  should  go  before  the  wagons. 

I  Including  the  weight  of  the  caisson,  the  load  being  thus  only  1,320  lbs. 


324  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

A  caisson  witli  four  horses  occupies  in  the  iile 
about  thirteen  yards,  with  a  breadth  of  five  feet,  and 
requires  an  interval  of  at  least  one  yard  in  the  rank 
and  one  and  a  half  yards  in  the  file.  On  level  ground 
it  can  move  at  the  rate  of  two  and  a  half  miles  per 
hour;  in  hilly  country  only  one  and  three  quarter 
miles  per  hour. 

It  will  be  well  rather  to  fall  below  these  numbers 
than  to  exceed  them ;  and  in  order  that  the  loads  may 
not  be  increased  beyond  the  amount  fixed  at  the  out- 
set, the  soldiers  should  be  forbidden  to  put  their 
knapsacks  upon  the  wagons. 

2.  OTarcli  of  tlie  Convoy. — Before  setting  out,  the 
country  through  which  the  convoy  is  to  pass  is  to 
be  examined ;  this  service  is  performed  by  spies  or 
partisans,  and  is  also  to  be  continued  during  the 
march.  The  march  should  be  performed  at  a  uniform 
rate,  rather  too  slow  than  too  fast,  in  order  that  the 
slowest  team  may  keep  up  with  the  rest ;  for  it  is  im- 
portant that  the  convoy  should  not  increase  its  length, 
since  it  would  become  disjointed,  and  more  exposed  to 
attack. 

The  advance-guard  precedes  the  convoy.  The 
common  rule  is  that  it  should  start  two  hours  in  ad- 
vance when  the  country  is  level,  and  only  one  houi' 
when  it  is  broken.  It  is  better  to  be  governed  by  the 
principle  that  its  distance  from  the  main  body  should 
increase  with  the  length  of  the  convoy,  in  order  that 
it  may,  by  reason  of  this  very  distance,  give  the  latter 
time  to  make  its  defensive  preparation.     When  this 


1 


CONVOYS.  325 

distance  is  considerable,  it  would  be  well  to  have  a 
second  advance-guard  of  quite  small  force,  and  very 
near,  capable  of  resisting  an  enemy  who  had  escaped 
the  notice  of  the  first. 

The  business  of  the  advance-guard  is  to  reconnoi- 
tre, to  remove  obstacles,  and  to  transmit  information 
to  the  commandant.  For  these  purposes,  it  reexam- 
ines places  of  concealment,  such  as  woods,  villages, 
and  defiles,  and  keeps  up  a  communication  with  the 
convoy  through  horsemen  distributed  along  the 
route. 

The  march  is  generally  in  two  files.*  On  the  out- 
=;ide,  two  soldiers  keep  a  watch  upon  the  drivers  of 
wagons  which  have  been  drawn  from  the  country  by 
requisition.  These  drivers,  being  also  taken  from  the 
country,  may  be  treacherous,  for  example,  by  upset- 
ting their  vehicle  in  some  difficult  spot,  where  there 
might  be  an  ambuscade ;  or,  not  being  soldiers,  they 
may  attempt  to  escape  in  time  of  danger.  The  guards 
have  orders  to  fire  upon  any  one  who  attempts  to 
run  away. 

In  each  fraction  of  the  convoy,  a  number  of  work- 
men are  charged  with  the  examination  of  the  wagons 
during  the  march,  and  to  point  out,  in  advance,  as  far 
as  possible,  any  one  in  which  an  accident  is  likely  to 
occur.  If,  notwithstanding  this  precaution,  a  wagon 
breaks,  or  if  for  any  reason  it  requires  repair,  it  is 

*  If  the  road  is  too  narrow,  and  does  not  admit  of  two  files  for  more 
than  a  league  at  a  time,  it  will  be  better  to  march  in  single  file  altogeth- 
er, so  as  not  to  lose  time  and  produce  disorder  by  continual  changes  of 
formation. 


326  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

taken  off  the  road,  and  when  repaired,  takes  its  place 
in  the  rear.  If  the  repair  is  impossible,  the  load  and 
'the  horses  are  distributed  among  the  nearer  wagons. 

The  escort,  in  protecting  the  convoy,  takes  posses- 
sion of  all  dangerous  positions  or  outlets  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  route,*  and  does  not  abandon  them  till  all 
the  wagons  have  passed.  If,  for  example,  a  defile  is 
to  be  passed,  the  escort  occupies  the  neighboring 
heights,  and  endeavors  to  discover  the  enemy  from  as 
great  a  distance  as  possible.  In  this  case  it  is  proper 
to  divide  the  escort  into  several  parts — especially 
when  the  defile  is  not  sufficient  for  the  passage  of 
more  than  one  wagon — so  that  the  defenders  may  be 
nearer  to  the  objects  which  the^^  are  required  to  guard : 
they  are  to  be  reunited  after  the  passage  is  effected. 

When  arriving  at  the  point  of  destination,  so  far 
from  becoming  careless  and  negligent,  the  command- 
ant redoubles  his  care  and  vigilance,  to  make  a  proper 
disposition  of  affairs  in  conjunction  with  the  friendly 
detachment  that  has  been  sent  out  to  meet  the  con- 
voy, or  else  to  join  the  outposts  of  the  camp  or  the 
place  without  producing  confusion. 

3.  Halts  and  Parks. — The  convoy  stops  every  hour 
to  give  the  horses  time  to  breathe,  and  to  allow  lagging 
wagons  to  come  up  ;  these  are  short  halts  of  ^ve  min- 
utes. Long  halts,  during  which  the  convoy  may  be 
attacked,  or  at  least  be  observed  and  counted  by  the 

*  For  example,  the  debouches  of  a  river  or  of  a  chain  of  mountains, 
when  the  convoy  is  moving  parallel  to  one  of  these  almost  impassable 
obstacles. 


CONVOYS.  327 

emissaries  of  the  enemy,  should  be  avoided.  They 
should  be  indulged  in  only  at  strong  positions,  in 
places  previously  reconnoitred,  and  known  to  be  fa- 
vorable for  defence.  In  all  cases,  the  horses  are  not 
to  be  unharnessed,  even  for  feeding,  and  the  drivers 
should  remain  near  them.  While  resting,  a  military 
guard  must  be  maintained. 

The  expedition  may  occupy  several  days,  and  then 
the  convoy  is  parked  at  night.  Sometimes,  also,  it  is 
parked  by  day,  as  well  as  by  night,  when  it  is  obliged 
to  stop  in  consequence  of  the  occupation  of  the  road 
by  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy ;  the  park  then 
assumes  a  more  defensive  and  solid  form  than  in  the 
first  case. 

In  the  park  of  a  convoy,  the  wagons  occupy  the 
exterior,  or  perimeter,  whilst  the  horses,  whether  har- 
nessed or  not,  being  more  vulnerable,  are  upon  the 
interior.  If  there  are  caissons  loaded  with  inflam- 
mable materiel,  they  are  drawn  up  with  the  horses  as 
much  in  the  centre  and  as  completely  sheltered  from 
the  projectiles  of  the  enemy  as  possible. 

The  form  of  the  park  may  be  either  closed  or  open. 
When  closed,  it  offers  more  resistance,  and  somewhat 
resembles  an  intrenchment ;  it  is,  in  fact,  a  barricade 
of  wagons,  sometimes  circular,  sometimes  rectangular, 
employed  for  a  regular  and  obstinate  defence.  We 
here  give  three  examples  of  it : 

The  park  'No.  1,  which  we  take  from  Joly  de 
Maizeroy,*  is  protected  on  the  outside  by  the  grand 

I  *  Cours  de  tactique,  1785,  t.  ii.    la  this  park,  the  wagons  might  also 

be  placed  at  right  angles  to  the  circumference  (the  figure  represents  them 

II 


328  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

guards  and  several  pieces  of  artillery,  and  tlie  platoons 
of  the  infantry  of  the  escort  are  placed  within,  behind 
the  circle  formed  by  the  wagons.  When  the  wagons 
are  very  numerous,  this  author  recommends  that  two 
such  parks  be  formed  and  connected  tactically  by 
cavalry  placed  between  them  in  one  or  two  lines. 
This  cavalry  takes  the  place  of  a  curtain  in  fortifi- 
cation. 

PAEK  NO.  1. 


El 


^v       /^     c:=^      ^     <       y 

^  r,        ^        ^         ^\ 


/ 


/ 


ISI 


The  park  No.  2,  taken  from  the  "  Eegulations  for 
the  Prussian  Cavalry,"  established  by  Frederic  the 
Great,  presents  a  solid  arrangement  with  an  interior 
space,  which  is  very  useful.  With  the  rear  resting 
upon  a  river,  it  is  defended  on  the  front  and  flanks 
by  platoons  of  infantry  covered  by  chevaux-de-frise ; 
and  upon  the  most  advanced  angles,  by  cannon,  firing 

with  their  length  in  the  circumference)  the  hind  wheels  being  outside 
and  the  poles  toward  the  centre.  This  would  require  more  wagons,  but 
the  barricade  would  be  more  dense  and  solid. 


CONVOYS.  329 

either  balls  or  grape,  according  as  tlie  enemy  is  at  a 


PAKK    NO.    2. 

WW  -WW  WW 

AAAK  AAAA  AAA  a 


.  'Ill II III! III!  . 

[]  WACONS FACING  EACH  OTHER      U  \ 

HllflmlrtmlllmmmmWm  i 

nlji()KnlnttKlnhllrilHln  m 


WOUNDED 


Ui Hi  III  til  Iff  lb'  i!t  iSi  A  til  111  III 
^n  WAGONS  FACING  EACH  OTHER 

'  iUiiUtlltt 


PAKK  NO.  8. 


JxZFimeel  GnarcL 


greater  or  less  distance.    This  park  is  fally  prepared 
to  receive  the  enemy. 

A  close  formation,  with  the  horses 
in  the  interior,  shown  in  park  No.  3, 
is  that  to  which  we  would  naturally 
resort,  when  the  convoy  is  marching 
in  two  files  upon  a  wide  road,  and 
is  suddenly  met  by  an  imposing  force 
of  the  enemy.  [1 

The  park  No.  4,  given  by  the  Arch- 
duke Charles,*  is  suitable  in  cases  of 
attacks  by  a  small  force.  Being  formed 
of  partial  parks  by  divisions,  situated 
at  the  same  distances  as  in  columns, 
it    possesses    the   advantage,   both   in  ' 

forming  and  in  breaking  up,  of  resuming  the  march 


iijl 


*  Principes  de  la  grand  guerre^  p.  TO,  and  plate  ix.  of  Diiparcq's 
translation. 


330 


MINOR    OPEEATIONS. 


with  great  facility,  as  all  the  divisions  can  move  at 
the  same  time  without  incommoding  each  other. 


PARK  NO.  4. 


Ijf  y  1 1 1 

iiiif 


In  the  parks  2,  3,  4,  the  horses  remain  harnessed 
to  the  wagons,  whilst  in  No.  1  they  are  stationed  in 
the  centre.  In  all  the  parks,  the  drivers  bivouac  near 
their  horses  and  watch  them. 

In  general,  the  parks  are  to  be  formed  far  from  in- 
habited places  and  woods  which  would  afford  facil- 
ities to  the  enemy ;  and  advantage  is  to  be  taken  of 
any  obstacles  of  the  ground  to  diminish  the  number 
of  points  of  attack. 

These  details  respecting  parks  show  that  convoys, 
while  supplying  an  army,  may  also  become  a  defen- 
sive accessory :  they  then  receive  the  name  of  tahors 
(intrenchment  of  baggage  for  defence  against  cavalry). 
Zisca,  the  chief  of  the  Hussites,  made  great  use  of 


CONVOYS.  331 

them  in  the  early  paii:  of  the  fifteenth  century ;  and 
more  recently  the  Cossacks  have  employed  them  very 
successfully  in  resisting  superior  armies  and  extricat- 
ins:  themselves  from  critical  situations. 

4.  Befeiice  of  the  Convoy. — As  a  convoy  includes 
a  large  number  of  non-combatants,  and  may  therefore 
be  seized  with  a  sudden  panic  upon  the  appearance 
of  the  enemy,  it  is  prudent  and  useful  to  exercise  the 
whole  body,  from  time  to  time,  in  the  manoeuvre  it 
would  be  required  to  execute  in  case  of  attack. 

At  the  first  intimation  of  the  approach  of  the  ene- 
my, the  files  are  closed  and  greater  order  is  observed 
in  marching.  Without  seeking  the  combat,  the  escort 
watches  the  positions  which  overlook  the  route,  and 
in  case  of  necessity  disputes  them ;  but  if  the  enemy 
is  in  too  great  force,  it  will  be  necessary  to  halt.  In 
this  case,  the  best  course  is  at  once  to  put  the  horses 
in  safety,  to  prevent  their  being  hamstrung.  The 
manoeuvre  is  simple :  the  right  file  turns  to  the  left, 
and  the  left  file  to  the  right,  bringing  the  heads  of  the 
teams  toward  each  other,  as  in  the  park  No.  3 :  no 
wagons  are  placed  across  the  front  and  rear  unless  the 
contest  becomes  serious,  and  calls  for  the  employment 
of  every  resource. 

The  essential  point  is,  in  general,  to  keep  the  ene- 
my at  a  distance,  especially  from  a  convoy  of  ammuni- 
tion or  of  sick  and  wounded.  This  is  to  be  done  by 
the  skirmishers,  and  while  the  fight  is  carried  on  at  a 
distance,  the  convoy,  covered  on  all  sides,  should  file 
off  at   increased  speed  and  endeavor  to  gain  some 


332  MINOR    OPEEATIONS. 

woods  or  village,  or  any  obstacle  which  may  serve  as 
a  shelter.  This  method  will  be  successful  where  the 
attack  is  only  upon  the  flank.  If  the  position  of  the 
enemy  is  not  exactly  known,  it  would  be  better,  pro- 
vided the  force  of  the  assailant  is  not  too  formidable, 
to  halt  the  convoy  during  the  action,  and  to  resume 
the  march  after  the  road  has  been  cleared. 

The  attack  on  the  flank  will  almost  always  be 
central.  As  soon  as  this  is  ascertained,  the  reserve  or 
the  main  body  of  the  escort  is  to  be  reenforced  at  the 
expense  of  the  advance  and  rear-guards.  This  main 
body  is  to  occupy  the  threatened  positions  along  the 
route,  during  the  whole  time  the  convoy  is  passing. 

In  the  case  of  an  attack  on  the  front,  the  advance- 
guard  occupies  these  positions,  which  are  successively 
relieved,  but  no  position  is  abandoned  until  the  last 
wagon  has  passed. 

An  attack  in  the  rear  is  repelled  by  the  rear-guard, 
which  makes  a  stubborn  defence  while  retiring  by 
echelons,  throwing  up  obstructions  and  cutting  off  all 
communication.  The  rear-guard  in  this  case  keeps  up 
a  communication  with  the  convoy,  for  the  transmis- 
sion of  intelligence,  by  horsemen  distributed  along  the 
road. 

In  passing  a  dangerous  place,  it  is  proper  not 
only  to  occupy  the  heights  and  threatening  positions 
in  good  season,  but  also  to  divide  the  convoy  into 
small  convoys  completely  organized,  each  having  its 
own  advance-guard,  rear-guard,  reserve,  and  even 
flankers  :  under  this  multiple  protection  they  will  be 
able  to  pass  in  security,  one  after  the  other. 


CONVOYS.  333 

Should  tlie  defence  fail,  and  tlie  enemy  prove  vie-  - 
torious,  the  wagons  should  not  be  suffered  to  fall  into 
his  hands  untouched.  In  the  first  place,  a  certain 
number  of  them  are  to  be  sacrificed,  and  employed,  in. 
a  dilapidated  condition,  to  obstruct  the  road,  while 
the  remainder,  to  which  the  horses  of  the  broken 
wagons  will  be  added,  are  hurried  away.  If  this 
sacrifice  does  not  avail,  everything  is  to  be  destroyed ; 
the  wagons  burned,  and  the  horses  killed,  or  at  least 
hamstrung ;  and  then,  sword  in  hand,  the  escort  must 
cut  its  way  through  the  surrounding  foi'ce  of  the 
enemy. 

The  escort  should  be  satisfied  with  repelling  the 
enemy,  and  never  attempt  to  pursue  ;  for  its  principal 
duty  is  to  remain  near  the  wagons  and  protect  them ; 
besides,  it  would  run  the  risk  of  falling  into  an  am- 
buscade. 

In  the  defence  of  a  convoy  of  prisoners,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  observe  the  precaution  of  compelling  the 
prisoners  to  lie  down  during  the  engagement  with  the 
enemy,  and  not  to  rise,  under  pain  of  death,  until  the 
signal  is  given ;  ^  otherwise,  many  a  prisoner  would 
be  able  to  assist  the  assailant  by  signs,  or  by  various 
attempts  of  a  dangerous  character.  In  this  connection 
the  regulations  recommend  that  the  convoy  reach 
some  village  as  soon  as  possible,  where  the  prisoners 
can  be  shut  up  in  some  large  building,  the  approach 
to  which  is  to  be  defended.  This  method  exposes  the 
escort  to  a  more  destinictive  fire,  as  the  enemy  will  no 

11  *  The  same  penalty  is  to  be  inflicted,  during  the  march,  upon  any 

prisoner  who  resists  orders  or  attempts  to  leave  the  ranks. 


334  3^nN0R   OPERATIONS. 

longer  be  deterred  by  tlie  fear  of  hitting  their  own 
men  when  these  are  protected  behind  walls. 

In  the  conduct  and  defence  of  a  convoy,  the  ele- 
ments of  success  are  activity,  resolution,  coolness,  and 
perpetual  vigilance.  In  the  words  of  Frederic,  "  The 
officer  in  command  must  preserve  his  temper  under 
all  provocations  and  difficulties,  and  should  especially 
be  on  his  guard  against  false  reports." 

5.  Attack  of  a  Convoy. — We  may  attack  a  convoy 
with  a  force  inferior  to  the  escort ;  for  in  this  species 
of  action  the  advantage  is  on  the  side  of  the  assailant, 
who  chooses  his  own  time  and  place,  and  brings  a 
solid  force  against  a  scattered  one ;  and  if  he  also  re- 
sorts to  stratagem  and  false  attacks,  he  will  stand  a 
good  chance  of  success  in  his  principal  attack. 

The  attack  of  a  convoy  is  based  upon  previous  in- 
formation respecting  the  nature  of  this  convoy,  the 
management  of  those  who  conduct  it,  and  local  pecu- 
liarities. A  convoy  of  prisoners  or  of  animals  may 
be  carried  off  by  cavalry  alone.  In  other  cases  it  is 
necessary  to  have  infantry,  cavalry,  and  a  few  howit- 
zers. These  last  are  indispensable,  as,  wdthout  them, 
we  could  hardly  undertake  an  attack  upon  a  park. 

The  corps  of  attack  is  divided  into  three  masses : 
one  destined  to  engage  the  escort,  a  second  to  fall 
upon  the  wagons,  and  the  third  to  remain  in  reserve. 
The  first  mass  commences  by  harassing  the  escort,  so 
as  to  weary  it  and  lead  it  into  the  commission  of  some 
error;  then,  profiting  by  this  error,  the  uncovered 
convoy  is  attacked  with  lightning  speed.     In  ground 


CONVOYS. 


335 


more  or  less  hemmed  in  by  elevations,  attacking  botli 
extremities  of  the  colmnn  has  the  advantage  of  throw- 
ing the  centre  itself  into  confusion  and  uncertainty. 
Upon  level  open  ground,  we  should  confine  the  attack 
to  the  centre,  thereby  cutting  the  convoy  in  two,  and 
gaining  a  cheaper  victory  over  the  separated  por- 
tions. In  the  midst  of  such  an  attack,  a  few  well- 
timed  shells  spread  terror  among  the  enemy,  and 
hasten  the  result. 

If  the  convoy  forms  into  a  park  to  resist,  the  at- 
tack becomes  more  difiicult.  We  must  then  prepare 
to  make  a  breach  in  the  park,  precisely  as  in  a  wall. 
If  we  have  not  sufficient  artillery  to  cut  an  opening 
through  the  perimeter  of  the  park,  it  will  be  better 
to  wait  until  the  convoy  resumes  its  march,  and  then 
to  take  it  in  the  rear. 

In  attacking  a  convoy,  it  is  not  always  intended 
to  capture  and  carry  off  all  the  wagons.  In  general, 
we  are  satisfied  with  seizing  those  w^hich,  from  certain 
indications,  or  information  given  by  prisoners,  are 
known  to  be  the  most  valuable. 

Frequently,  indeed,  the  design  of  an  attack  is  still 
less  ambitious,  the  only  object  being  to  disorganize 
the  convoy  by  thrusts  at  one  or  more  points.  For 
this  purpose  the  attacking  body  ambuscades  the  con- 
voy sometimes  on  one  side  and  sometimes  on  the 
other,  and  rushes  through  it  several  times,  each  time 
doing  as  much  damage  as  possible,  by  cutting  the 
traces,  hamstringing  the  horses,  upsetting,  breaking, 
and  setting  fire  to  the  wagons.  In  this  operation, 
where  it  is  necessary  to  move  among  numerous  obsta- 


336  MmOE   OPEKATIOI^S. 

cles,  the  chasseurs,  and  especially  tlie  foot  chasseurs, 
are  most  suitable. 

6.  Convoys  toy  "Water. — We  have  thus  far  been 
speaking  exclusively  of  convoys  by  land.  Convoys  by 
water*  are  also  important.  They  transport  bulky  and 
heavy  supplies  with  extremely  simple  means  and  at 
small  expense  :  for  example,  we  consider  ourselves  for- 
tunate if  we  have  a  water  conveyance  for  bringing  a 
supply  of  siege  equipage  before  a  fortified  place. 

The  infantry  of  the  escort  is  distributed  in  small 
bodies  upon  the  several  boats  ;  there  are,  in  addition, 
an  advance-guard  and  a  rear-guard  of  foot,  in  boats 
specially  provided  for  them  ;  sometimes  also  flankers, 
on  light  boats,  where  the  river  is  sufficiently  wide  to 
allow  it.  The  cavalry  of  the  escort  follows  upon  the 
borders  of  the  stream,  and  keeps  open  its  communica- 
tion with  the  convoy.  It  is  preceded  and  followed  by 
an  advance-guard  and  rear-guard  of  mixed  composi- 
tion ;  these  are  frequently  useful  in  bearing  import- 
ant intelligence  to  the  floating  convoy  touching  its 
safety.  For  greater  security,  there  should  be  some 
spare  boats,  to  convey  the  infantry  from  one  side  of 
the  river  to  the  other,  when  required,  in  order  to  line 
both  banks  where  the  progress  of  the  convoy  is  re- 
tarded ;  as,  for  example,  at  a  bridge  or  a  dam,  or  in 
shallow  water. 

When  the  river  flows  between  steep  hills,  almost 
all  the  infantry  of  the  escort  marches  on  land,  with 

*  Upon  rivers  or  canals.  Convoys  hy  sea  are  of  nrncli  assistance  in 
provisioning  an  army ;  but  as  they  are  in  general  protected  by  a  maritime 
force,  they  do  not  come  ■within  the  scope  of  this  work. 


CONVOYS. 


337 


advance  and  rear-guards,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
the  enemy  from  occupying  the  heights,  from  which 
they  could  easily  annoy  the  convoy. 

The  defence  of  a  water  convoy  is  simple.  While 
the  attacked  escort  is  fighting  upon  the  bank  (employ- 
ing chiefly  fire-arms),  the  convoy  halts  in  the  vicinity. 
If  the  escort  gains  the  ascendency,  the  convoy  pro- 
ceeds under  its  protection ;  if  otherwise,  it  makes  all 
speed  to  escape ;  but  if  this  becomes  impossible,  the 
boats  are  scuttled. 

Ik  A  convoy  by  water  is  easily  destroyed,  even  with 
a  small  force.*  The  best  plan  is  to  ambuscade  it  in  a 
bend  of  the  river,  in  a  wooded  spot,  and  where  the 
channel  runs  near  the  shore,  so  as  to  be  able  to  attack 
(especially  with  cannon)  both  on  the  front  and  the 
flank,  and  even  to  enfilade  the  convoy,  which  is  occa- 

l|  sionally  possible,  as  the  an- 
nexed figure  shows.  If  this 
multiplied  attack  does  not 
bring  the  convoy  to  a  halt,  the 
cannon  are  aimed  at  the  water 
line  of  each  boat,  to  sink  them 
by  letting  in  water;  at  the 
same  time,  the  conductors  and 
defenders  of  the  boat  are  picked 

off  by  musket  shots.  In  this  way,  the  attack  being  con- 
stantly renewed,  the  boats  will  be  obliged  to  surrender. 


ATTACK  OF  A  CONVOY 
BOATS. 


OF 


*  We  raay  damage  such  a  convoy  by  filling  its  route  with  obstacles  in 
advance,  such  as  iron  chains  stretched  under  the  surface  of  the  water, 
sunken  boats,  fireships,  stockades,  etc.  In  combination  with  one  or  more 
of  these  obstacles,  the  attack  will  be  formidable. 
22 


338  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

After  tlie  convoy  is  captured,  a  difficulty  presents 
itself:  for  to  carry  it  by  water  is  to  follow  a  route 
marked  out  and  known  by  tke  enemy,  and  upon 
wkick  the  convoy  is  expected ;  and  to  carry  it  by  land 
requires  considerable  means  of  transportation,  prob- 
ably more  than  the  country  can  furnish.  Of  these 
two  j)roceedings,  the  latter  is  to  be  preferred,  except 
in  a  case  of  extreme  scarcity  of  transportation ;  but 
order  to  carry  it  out,  it  may  be  necessary  to  sacrifi< 
and  destroy  a  considerable  portion  of  the  materiel  o: 
the  convoy. 

•y.  Historical  Sxamples. — I.  Tlie  siege  of  Ooi'hie 
prevented  hy  the  entrance  of  a  convoy. — After  the 
taking  of  the  towns  Thionville  and  Arlon  by  the 
French  army  in  1558,  the  king  of  Spain  marched  with 
his  troops  in  great  haste  to  lay  siege  to  Corbie.  The 
French  were  at  a  loss  how  to  get  succor  to  the  place, 
for,  from  Marches,  where  they  then  lay,  to  Corbie, 
the  distance  is  some  thirty  leagues,  and  in  that 
day  troops  marched  slowly.  Nevertheless,  Montluc 
offered  to  undertake  the  expedition,  promising  to 
reach  Corbie  before  the  king  of  Spain.  His  advice 
was  at  first  rejected  in  the  council,  and  was  attributed 
to  his  boasting  disposition  ;  but  he,  in  his  usual  man- 
ner, flew  into  a  passion  and  cried,  "  If  the  king  will 
but  permit,  I  will  succor  the  town,  or  perish ;  "  upon 
which  he  was  authorized  to  act  as  he  desired.  Quickly 
enrolling  in  his  service  seven  ensigns,  and  collecting 
together  bread,  w^ine,  oats,  hay,  and  a  chest  full  of 
powder,  drawn  by  three  horses,  this  adventurous  sol- 


CONVOYS.  339 

dier,  who  excelled  in  petty  warfare,  was  about  to  start, 
when  the  king  sent  him  word  that,  as  "  colonel-gen- 
eral "  of  the  infantry  ad  interim^  he  must  remain  to 
command  the  regiments  in  person  in  case  of  a  battle, 
and  that  the  command  of  the  convoy  that  had  been 
prepared  was  assigned  to  Captain  Brueil.  The  latter 
acquitted  himself  with  credit ;  he  marched  chiefly  by 
night,  with  prudence  and  circumspection,  stopping  in 
hidden  places,  and  avoiding  the  villages ;  and  was 
only  two  nights  out.  At  sunrise  after  the  second  night, 
he  appeared  before  Corbie.  At  about  300  paces  from 
the  town  he  was  assailed  by  the  Spanish  cavalry,  but, 
putting  his  troop  on  the  gallop,  he  reached  the  gate 
of  the  city,  and  then  made  a  stand  against  the  enemy 
upon  the  edge  of  the  ditch.  The  convoy  lost  seven 
or  eight  stragglers,  but  succeeded  in  entering  the  place 
with  the  powder,  after  which  the  Spaniards  no  longer 
ventured  to  undertake  the  siege. 

This  example  illustrates  the  value  of  celerity  and 
prudence  in  conducting  a  convoy,  and  proves  that  a 
little  timely  succor  thrown  into  a  place  may  save  it 
from  being  besieged. 

II.  Partial  success  of  a  convoy  introduced  into 
Lille  in  1708. — In  this  year,  Prince  Eugene,  covered 
by  the  army  of  Marlborough,  after  his  conquest  of 
Oudenarde,  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to  Lille.  The 
French  marshal  Boufflers,  with  1,600  men,  immor- 
talized himself  by  his  defence  of  the  city,  which  is  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  most  brilliant  defences  on  record. 
Nevertheless,  Lille  fell,  and  history  proves  that  this 
was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the  want  of  skill  of  the 


340  MmOE    OPEEATIONS. 

French  army  of  relief,  in  suffering  convoys  sent  to  the 
famished  troops  of  Eugene  to  pass.  We  have,  how- 
ever, one  instance  of  a  brilliant  coup-de-main,  which 
makes  some  amends  for  this  want  of  skill  in  other, 
cases. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  siege,  the  Chevalier 
de  Luxembourg,  who  was  subsequently  made  Marshal 
of  Montmorency,  was  sent  from  Douai  to  introduce  a 
convoy  of  powder  into  Lille.  He  collected  "  150 
grenadiers  and  2,000  cavalry,  each  carrying  a  musket, 
a  bayonet,  and  a  bag  of  fifty  pounds  of  powder.  To 
deceive  the  enemy,  these  troops  assumed  the  dress  of 
the  Dutch  soldiers."  ^  After  several  demonstrations, 
with  a  view  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  allies,  Lux- 
embourg gave  Marshal  Boufflers  notice  of  his  design, 
and  commenced  his  march.  Upon  leaving  Douai,  at 
Pont-a-Kache,  several  horsemen  of  the  centre  of  the 
column  carelessly  spilled  some  powder  upon  the  pave- 
ment, which  was  ignited  by  sparks  struck  from  the 
stones  by  the  iron  shoes  of  the  horses  in  the  rear 
of  the  column ;  a  number  of  men  and  horses  were 
scorched,  but  the  expedition  was  still  able  to  proceed. 
It  reached  the  camp  of  the  besiegers  upon  a  dark 
night,  and  represented  itself  as  bringing  ammunition  to 
the  allies,  and  being  pursued  by  the  French.  A  senti- 
nel hailed  them  in  Dutch,  and  an  officer  replied  in  the 


*  De  Vault,  Memoires  relatifs  d,  la  succession  cfEspagne^  t.  viii.,  p. 
107.  The  supply  destined  for  Lille  appears,  therefore,  to  have  consisted 
of  2,000  muskets  and  100,000  pounds  of  powder.  It  was  also  designed 
that  two  regiments  of  infantry  should  be  thrown  into  the  place  at  the 
same  time. 


I 


I 


same  language,  "  Soldiers  of  Marlborough."  Having 
reached  the  interior  barrier,  a  close  scrutiny  by  the 
captain  of  the  guard  had  to  be  undergone,  but  all 
his  questions  were  satisfactorily  answered,  and  the 
gate  was  opened.  Some  1,900  had  already  passed, 
when  one  of  the  officers,  impatient  at  the  slow  move- 
ment of  some  of  the  horsemen,  gave  the  imprudent  or- 
der Serre^  serre  (Close  up,  close  up).  At  these  words 
the  officer  of  the  guard  at  once  suspected  the  ruse,  and 
ordered  the  detachment  to  halt.  Luxembourg  paying 
no  attention  to  the  order,  the  enemy  fired,  and  three 
bags  of  the  powder  were  exploded,  killing  sixty 
Frenchmen  with  their  horses.  Nevertheless,  nearly 
the  whole  body  penetrated  into  the  town  with  their 
ammunition,  while  the  rear  of  the  convoy  succeeded 
in  escaping  back  to  Douai. 

But  for  the  untimely  exclamation  of  the  French 
officer,  the  entire  convoy  would  have  succeeded  in  en- 
tering the  place.  This  illustrates  the  necessity  of  pos- 
sessing sufficient  presence  of  mind,  in  ruses  of  this 
kind,  to  carry  them  out  successfully  to  the  end.  Bet- 
ter not  attempt  them  at  all,  than  to  unmask  the  de- 
sign too  soon. 

III.  Attach  of  a  water  convoy. — In  the  campaign 
of  1710,  Marshal  Villars  learning  that  a  convoy  was  on 
the  way,  by  water,  to  the  allies,  who  were  besieging 
Aire,  formed  a  project  to  cut  it  off: 

This  convoy,  consisting  of  fifty  barks,  came  down 
the  river  Lys,  escorted  by  1,000  infantry  and  500 
cavalry.  The  attack  was  made  at  the  village  of  Saint- 
Eloi-Vive,  between  Deynse  and  Courtrai.    The  convoy 


842  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

halted,  and  the  escort  formed  its  order  of  battle,  with 
the  cavalry  on  the  right,  without  protection,  the  in- 
fantiy  in  the  centre  and  on  the  left,  the  front  covered 
by  three  ditches,  the  left  resting  upon  an  impassable 
marsh  connecting  with  the  river. 

The  attacking  corps  detached  by  Villars  was  under 
the  orders  of  Kavignau,  and  consisted  of  800  grena- 
diers, 1,500  fusiliers,  and  300  dragoons.  Eavignau 
extended  his  left  to  outflank  the  enemy's  right,  and 
occupied  a  road  by  which  the  opposing  cavalry  might 
debouch  upon  his  infantry.  His  right,  composed  of 
fusiliers,  confined  itself  to  firing  across  the  marsh ;  his 
centre,  consisting  of  grenadiers,  crossed  the  three 
ditches  and  beat  down  the  enemy  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet ;  his  left,  which  included  the  dragoons,  over- 
threw the  cavalry  of  the  allies,  and,  turning  to  the 
right,  took  their  infantry  by  the  flank.  Almost  all 
the  allied  detachment  were  taken  prisoners  (500  men), 
slain,  or  drowned.  The  horses  who  pulled  the  trans- 
ports were  also  taken,  and  used  by  the  victors  to  car- 
ry off  their  prey.  As  to  the  powder,  instead  of  throw- 
ing it  into  the  water,  the  victorious  troops  adopted 
the  singular  expedient  of  setting  fire  to  the  three  trans- 
ports which  contained  it ;  the  consequence  of  which 
imprudence  was  an  explosion  of  such  magnitude  that 
the  Lys  was  separated  into  two  unnavigable  branches, 
and  the  village  of  Saint-Eloi-Vive  laid  in  ruins.* 

IV.  Attack  of  a  land  convoy. — In  the  month  of 
June,  1758,  Frederic,  having  laid  siege  to  Olmutz  with 

*  Histoire  de  Marlborough.,  an  anonymous  work  emanating  from  the 
imperial  press,  Paris,  1806,  t.  iii.,  p.  229  to  232. 


I 


CONVOYS.  343 

an  army  of  comparatively  feeble  force,  found  Limself 
in  need  of  large  supplies  of  ammunition.  He  expected 
from  Silesia  a  convoy  of  3,000  wagons,  wliicli  should 
have  come  by  Troppau,  and  took,  unfortunately,  a 
road  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy. 

The  convoy  started  with  an  escort  of  9,000  men, 
under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Mosel.  Its  march  was 
slow  and  irregular,  in  consequence  of  the  bad  state  of 
the  roads,  which  were  gullied  by  heavy  rains,  and  a 
large  number  of  the  wagons  stuck  fast  in  the  mud. 
Mosel  left  one  third  of  his  wagons  behind,  and,  thus 
lightenea,  continued  his  march.  While  passing  along 
a  deep  road,  he  was  assailed  by  some  Croates  posted 
in  a  wood,  and  repulsed  them ;  but  a  number  of  the 
peasant  drivers  being  panic-struck,  unhitched  their 
teams  during  the  fight,  and  ran  off  with  the  horses. 
The  convoy  was  thus  reduced  to  one  half.  ISTeverthe- 
less,  being  strengthened  by  a  reenforcement  sent  by 
Frederic,  it  continued  to  advance,  until  it  was  stopped 
near  a  wooded  defile  by  25,000  Austrians,  who,  firing 
upon  the  horses  to  disable  them,  and  upon  the  cais- 
sons of  powder  to  explode  them,  spread  confusion  in 
all  directions.  The  escort  drew  up  by  platoons  upon 
the  whole  line  of  wagons,  and  covering  them  in  this 
way,  sustained  the  conflict  for  two  hours ;  but  being 
everywhere  weak,  they  were  comj)elled  to  yield  to 
the  attacking  columns  in  spite  of  their  brave  and 
stubborn  resistance.  All  the  convoy  was  destroyed 
excepting  only  250  wagons,  including  37  loaded  with 
money,  which  reached  the  camp  of  the  king.  The 
Prussians  were  compelled  by  this  loss  to  raise  the 


344  MmOR   OPERATIONS. 

siege  of  Olmutz ;  *  and  tHs  event  had  an  important 
influence  upon  tlie  whole  campaign. 

V.  Rescue  of  a  convoy  of  prisoners, — In  1806, 
after  the  battle  of  Jena,  the  Prussian  lieutenant  Hel- 
wig  planned  and  executed  an  attack  upon  a  convoy 
of  prisoners.  This  convoy,  containing  8,000  Prussian 
prisoners,  was  on  its  way  to  Mayence,  and  had  to  pass 
through  Erfurt.  He  waited  for  it  with  eighty  horses 
in  ambush  near  Eichrodt,  which  is  in  the  vicinity  of 
Erfurt,  on  the  route  from  Eisenach  to  Goth  a,  and  not 
far  from  the  entrance  into  the  defiles  of  Thuringia. 
Dividing  his  force  into  three  platoons,  he  fell  apon  the 
four  companies  of  infantry  composing  the  whole  escort, 
and  finally  routed  them,  as  they  proved  too  feeble 
both  to  fight  and  at  the  same  time  guard  so  many 
men.f  The  escort  retreated,  and  the  prisoners  were 
rescued.  J 

This  is  one  of  the  most  striking  examples  of  the 
bad  consequences  resulting  from  the  employment  of 
too  small  an  escort,  especially  for  a  convoy  of  pris- 
oners. 

VI.  He-capture  of  a  convoy, — In  the  year  1811,  in 
the  environs  of  Placentia,  Spain,  some  French  dra- 
goons seized  upon  a  convoy  of  seventy  mules  loaded 
with  wine,  which  made  them  drunk,  and  in  this  con- 
dition attacked  a  body  of  Portuguese  infantry.    It 

*  Arclienholtz,  Histoire  de  la  guerre  de  Sept  Ans,  traduction  clu  Baron 
de  Bock,  Metz,  1789,  12mo. ;  t.  i.,  p.  102  to  106. 

t  At  the  same  period  I  find  a  French  escort  composed  of  eighteen  com- 
panies and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  for  a  convoy  of  22,000  prisoners.  This 
is  also  weak,  but  much  less  so  than  four  companies  for  8,000  prisoners. 

J  I  borrow  this  fact  from  Jacquinot  de  Presle. 


CONVOYS. 


345 


need  hardly  be  said  that  they  were  repulsed  and  the 
convoy  taken  from  them.* 

This  example  shows  that  when  a  convoy  has  been 
once  captm^ed,  the  first  care  should  be  to  put  it  out 
of  reach  of  danger. 

*  Napier's  History  of  the  Peninsular  War. 


CHAPTER    SIXTH 


PAKTISANS* 


The  term  partisans  is  given  to  isolated  bodies  in- 
tended to  reconnoitre  for  the  army  from  whicli  they 
are  sent,  and  also  to  protect  it,f  or  else  to  harass,  to 
retard,  and  to  deceive  the  enemy ;  to  cut  off  their  sup- 
plies, and  to  weaken  them,  by  comjDelling  them  to 
send  off  detachments  ;  or  again  to  punish  the  popula- 
tion by  levying  contributions,  etc. 

Partisans  do  not  act  solely  at  a  venture,  as  might 
be  supposed,  nor  do  they  trust  themselves  rashly  to 
chance ;  but  their  operations  are  connected  with  the 
general  plan  of  campaign,  and  depend  upon  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  under  whose  orders  they  are  undertaken. 
This  condition  shows  at  once  the  restrictions  under 

*  The  reader  is  referred  to  art.  xi.  of  the  Ordonnance  sur  le  service  en 
campagne.  Notwithstanding  the  official  existence  of  this  article  in  re- 
spect to  partisans,  we  would  observe  that  in  the  present  century  the 
French  (and  also  the  English)  have  almost  wholly  dispensed  with  parti- 
san warfare. 

t  Hence  they  are  frequently  also  q,q[\q(\.  JlanTcers.  The  Ordonnance 
says  ^^ corps  of  partisans,''''  and  ^'■detachments  of  fianlcers,''''  whence  it  ap- 
pears that  the  latter  may  be  less  numerous  and  have  not  the  same  need 
of  a  separate  organization. 


PAETISANS.  347 

wbicli  partisans  at  the  present  day  exist,  being  sub- 
jected (except  as  to  the  execution  of  their  orders)  to 
that  regularity  and  centralization  which  distinguish 
not  only  modern  armies,  but  all  associations ;  and 
hence,  also,  we  see  how  widely  they  differ  from  the 
]3artisans  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and  even  from 
those  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  respect  to  the  free- 
dom of  their  movements. 

The  composition  and  force  of  these  corps  are  pre- 
scribed in  the  French  regulations,  according  to  the 
object  to  be  accomplished,  the  difficulties  to  be  sur- 
mounted, the  length  of  the  route  to  be  travelled,  and 
the  probable  duration  of  the  expedition.  They  may 
sometimes  embrace  troops  of  different  arms,*  but  in 
preference  should  consist  of  light  cavalry,  which  is 
able  to  surprise,  to  strike,  and  to  retire,  almost  before 
being  perceived,  and  certainly  before  being  compro- 
mised. The  aim  should  be  to  form  them,  not  of  many 
Soldiers,  but  of  very  good  ones — for  here  quality  is 
mch  more  important  than  quantity,  as  history  fully 
roves.  Therefore,  select  your  volunteer  partisans  (I 
ay  volunteer^  because  the  first  condition  is  to  secure 
len  whose  disposition  leads  them  to  this  kind  of  ser- 
ice),  from  among  men  who  are  experienced  in  war 
nd  in  outpost  service,  good  marksmen,  skilful  with 
he  bayonet  and  sabre,  accustomed  to  gymnastic  exer- 
ises,  and  good  horsemen ;  men  who  will  not  object  to 
*  This  is  stated  in  conformity  with  the  regulations  referred  to.  Gen- 
..ral  Dufour  {Cours  de  Tactique,  second  edition,  p.  346),  thinks  there 
should  be  no  mixture  of  the  two  arms  (infantry  and  cavab-y),  in  order 
that  there  may  be  less  embarrassment  in  marching,  and  greater  mobility. 


348  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

taking  hold  of  a  spade  or  a  pickaxe  when  necessary, 
and  who  are  fond  of  the  soldier's  life ;  men  of  honor 
and  self  devotion ;  especially  let  them  be  temperate 
and  robust  men,  for  they  will  be  compelled  to  suffer 
the  privations  and  hardships  of  the  smuggler  in  addi- 
tion to  those  of  the  soldier. 

One  half  the  infantry  of  a  corps  of  partisans  should 
be  pioneers,  with  some  artillerists. 

The  light  cavalry  will  answer  very  well  if  com- 
posed of  ^\^  hundred  men,  taken  by  fifties,  from  the 
regiments  of  chasseurs,  hussars,  and  lancers. 

The  best  corps  of  partisans  will  be  found  to  be 
those  free  and  irregular  corps  which  are  raised  during 
war  by  officers  of  reputation,  who  are  detailed  both 
to  form  and  command  them ;  or  better  still,  those  who 
rise  into  notice  in  consequence  of  political  events,  and 
choose  their  own  leaders.  The  latter  free  corps  should 
have  their  existence  legalized  by  a  species  of  letter  of 
marque  :  they  may  be  called  land  privateers.* 

There  are  certain  essential  qualities  which  should 
be  combined  in  a  partisan  chief,  even  more  than  in  a 
commandant  of  a  detachment,  and  the  proper  selec- 
tion of  such  a  chief  is  of  even  greater  importance  than 
the  composition  of  the  corps.  He  is  to  be  chosen 
from  among  the  officers  of  the  most  willing  dispo- 
sition, without  regard  to  priority  of  rank  ;  further,  he 
should  be  young  and  yet  experienced,  and  should  be 
able  to  speak  the  language  of  the  country.    This  com- 

*  Some  authors  give  the  name  of  partisans  only  to  these  free  and  ir- 
regular corps;  regarding  those  as  provisional,  and  properly  to  be  desig- 
nated as  "  parties,"  which  are  composed  of  detachments  of  light  troops. 


PARTISANS.  349 

bination  of  qualities  will  certainly  be  difficult  to  find ; 
yet  not  impossible,  if  the  general  is  possessed  of  suffi- 
cient penetration  and  decision  to  distinguish  and  at 
tlie  same  time  disregard  the  jealousies  which  are  so 
apt  to  be  excited  by  rising  talent.  A  partisan  chief 
should  be  of  an  ardent  temperament  and  glowing 
imascination,  rather  than  a  cool  thinker  or  methodical 
calculator.  He  should,  besides,  be  vigilant,  firm,  col- 
lected, disinterested,  prompt,  adroit,  vigorous  both  in 
conception  and  in  execution,  of  strong  will,  and  the 
determined  resolution  to  succeed.* 

The  operations  of  partisans  embrace  all  those 
which  belong  to  petty  warfare ;  and  since  the  corps 
which  executes  them  is  not  strong  in  numbers,  it  must 
have  recourse  to  a  thousand  expedients  to  compen- 
sate for  its  feebleness,  relying  especially  upon  cunning 
and  audacity,  and  should  make  its  preparations  and  act 
with  secrecy.  For  such  a  corps,  to  obtain  much  with 
little,  is  a  necessity ;  and  therefore,  except  when  upon 
a  special  mission,  it  may  in  general  try  its  fortune  and 
venture  upon  hazardous  and  doubtful  enterprises ;  for 
if  it  succeeds  it  renders  an  important  service,  and  if  it 
perishes  the  loss  is  comparatively  small. 

Above  all,  it  must  cause  itself  to  be  respected.  In 
a  friendly  country,  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  this 
respect,  if  the  conduct  of  the  corps  is  such  as  to  in- 
spire confidence  and  admiration.  In  a  hostile  country, 
it  should  keep  the  population  in  a  state  of  quiet  sub- 
mission, and  for  this  purpose  it  must  not  hesitate  to 

*  Davidoff,  Essai  sur  la  guerre  de  partisans,  traduction  du  colonel 
comte  Heraclius  do  Polignac,  p.  65,  66. 


350  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

make  examples  when  necessary.  It  must,  moreover, 
multiply  itself,  so  to  speak,  and  wherever  it  goes 
must  create  alarm  and  disturbance,  to  conceal  the 
feebleness  of  its  actual  numbers.  Even  when  surprised 
and  almost  surrounded  by  treachery,  the  corps  should 
never  surrender ;  but,  as  such  an  event  must  have 
been  provided  for  in  advance,  each  soldier,  at  a  given 
signal  of  the  chief,  should  make  his  escaj)e  and  steal 
away  among  the  obstacles  of  the  ground,  to  meet  his 
comrades  at  some  previously  appointed  place  of  ren- 
dezvous. 

When  once  separated  from  the  army,  partisans 
should  bid  adieu  to  idleness  and  rest,  which  would 
lose  them  the  chance  of  more  than  one  attack.  Their 
eyes  must  never  close,  and  if  they  are  overcome  for 
an  instant  by  fatigue,  they  must  throw  out  a  line  of 
spies,  to  give  them  warning  of  the  approach  of  danger. 

They  march,  as  much  as  possible,  concealed  from 
the  enemy  by  the  elevations  of  the  ground.  Informa- 
tion previously  obtained  from  maps  or  from  the  in- 
habitants, will  direct  the  march,  which  is  also  to  be 
facilitated  by  a  guide,  while  it  is  reconnoitred  and 
protected  by  flankers,  posts,  and  sometimes  sentinels 
or  vedettes.  They  march  chiefly  by  night,  and  always 
with  order,  silence,  and  discipline.  To  ferret  out 
everything,  they  make  frequent  and  radical  changes 
of  direction.  They  must  be  hindered  by  nothing,  for 
the  lightness  of  their  equipment  gives  them  the  great- 
est mobility. 

They  avoid  inhabited  places.  When  obliged  to 
pass  through  them,  they  search  them,  or  take  hostages 


I 


PARTISANS.  351 

from  among  the  most  notable  persons.    "Wlien  merely 
obliged  to  pass  near  them,  they  make  requisitions  upon 
them  for  provisions  and  forage  for  a  larger  number  of 
men  than  their  troop  contains,  which  little  ruse  serves 
to  intimidate  the  population,  and  keep  them  in  check. 
They  conceal  their  approach  to  the  enemy  until 
the  last  moment.     Having  arrived  at  the  favorable 
point,  they  attack  with  vigor  and  spirit,  and  so  that 
neither  their  designs  nor  their  numbers  can  be  dis- 
covered.    Their  action  is  doubled  in  value  by  its  un- 
expectedness and  by  the  vigor  of  its  blows.     In  this 
respect  they  have  been  compared  to  vultures  darting 
i       upon  their  prey.     Or  else,  they  ambuscade  and  wait ; 
I      which  is  a  game  they  can  easily  play,  especially  in 
I      rainy  and  foggy  weather. 

^B      When  an  engagement  appears  doubtful,  they  at 
l^^once  retire  without  hesitation. 

I  The  regulations  recommend  that  the  chief  of  a 

I  corps  of  partisans  should  communicate  the  object  of 
his  expedition  to  the  chief  who  comes  immediately 
after  him.  This  formality  should  always  be  strictly 
observed ;  for  he  may  perish,  while  the  orders  con- 
cerning the  object  and  extent  of  the  operation,  as 
well  as  the  point  of  rendezvous,  are  secret  orders, 
which  cannot  be  understood  by  anybody  merely  from 
an  inspection  and  comparison  of  the  first  acts  of  the 
!  corps,  as  may  be  done  in  the  case  of  most  other  de- 
tachments. 

Accordino;  to  article  119  of  the  "  Service  en  Gam- 
pagne^'^  prizes  taken  by  partisans  belong  to  them, 
when  it  has  been  shown  by  the  authentic  declaration 


352  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

of  a  competent  authority,  that  these  prizes  consist  of 
things  taken  from  the  enemy.*  They  are  sold  for  the 
benefit  of  the  partisans,  with  the  exception  of  arms 
and  munitions  of  war,  which  are  appropriated  to  the 
use  of  the  army,  an  allowance  nearly  equivalent  to 
their  value  being  made  for  them.  The  division  of  the 
profits  of  this  sale,  or  indemnity,  among  the  partisans, 
is  made  according  to  rank  : 

Each  superior  officer  receives         .        .        .        .5  parts. 

Each  captain 4    " 

Each  lieutenant  (first  or  second)    ....  3     "  ,■ 

Each  non-commissioned  officer   .        .        .        .       2     " 
Each  corporal  or  soldier 1     " 

The  commandant  of  the  expedition  has  six  parts 
besides  what  his  grade  gives  him.  This  arrangement 
applies  to  any  isolated  detachment  which  succeeds  in 
bringing  in  a  prize  :  "  It  would  be  unjust  and  impoli- 
tic," says  General  Preval,  "  to  deprive  detachments  of 
this  privilege." 

It  appears  from  this  that  the  hope  of  gain  serves 
also  to  excite  the  zeal  and  increase  the  courage  of  par- 
tisans. But  another  consequence  is  a  tendency  to  ra- 
pacity, which  is  constantly  fed  by  new  gains.  The 
general-in-chief  will  therefore  find  it  expedient  to  force 
them  to  make  an  exact  list  of  all  the  requisitions 
which  they  have  exacted,  and  to  produce  this  list 
upon  their  return,  accompanied  with  certificates  from 
the  local  authorities. 

A  number  of  partisan  leaders  have  made  them- 
selves distinguished  names.     In  the  beginning  of  the 

*  Things  taken  from  the  inhabitants  are  returned  to  them. 


PARTISANS.  353 

Thirty  Years'  War  (1618),  Count  Ernest  de  Mansfeld, 
a  man  of  excessive  ferocity,  distinguislied  himself  as  a 
partisan  chief.  In  lYOO,  we  have  in  France  Dumoulin, 
who  in  the  midst  of  winter,  marched  with  his  dragoons 
fifteen  leagues  without  halting,  to  form  an  ambuscade. 
In  the  wars  for  the  succession  in  Austria  (from 
1T40  to  1745),  we  notice  among  the  Austrians  the 
fierce  Mentzel,  Trenck,  a  cousin  of  the  celebrated  pris- 
oner of  Frederic  II.  at  Magdebourg,  and  Nadasty, 
with  his  Pandours ;  and  among  the  French,  Fischer, 
the  founder  of  a  corps  which  bore  his  name,  Grassin, 
and  La  Morliere.  During  the  Seven  Years'  War,  we 
may  mention  Lieutenant-colonel  Emmerich,  the  author 
of  a  small  work  upon  the  special  duties  of  partisans ; 
in  the  campaign  of  1809,  the  Prussian  major  Schill ; 
and  between  1812  and  1814,  the  Eussians.  Seslawine 
and  Michel  Orloffi 

We  cite  a  few  historical  examples,  to  illustrate 
the  nature  of  the  operations  executed  by  partisans. 

1st.  Dangeau  relates  that  on  the  21st  June,  1710, 
a  French  partisan,  leaving  Namur  with  250  men, 
succeeded  in  entering  Lille,  overcame  the  guard  which 
was  at  the  gate,  proceeded  to  the  centre  of  the  town, 
and  took  the  whole  guard,  killing  their  commander. 
He  then  pillaged  the  houses  of  the  minister  of  the 
emperor  and  the  residence  of  a  Dutch  officer  who  com- 
manded in  Liege,  and  having  secured  a  large  amount  of 
booty,  left  the  city  with  50  prisoners.  In  this  afi'air, 
there  was  but  one  soldier  killed  and  one  wounded."  * 

*  Journal  de  Dangeau^  nouvelle  4(1.,  par  MM.  Souli^,  Dnssieux,  de 
Chemievidres,  etc. 
23 


354  3IIN0E    OPERATIONS. 

2d.  In  1712,  Marshal  Villars  detached  "  Pasteur,  a 
brigadier  of  the  troops  from  Spain,  and  a  very  good 
partisan,  for  the  purpose  of  penetrating  into  Holland, 
where  there  were  no  troops.  This  officer  acquitted 
himself  well ;  he  approached  very  close  to  Rotterdam, 
and  burned  the  small  towns  of  Tortolles  and  Sleim- 
bourg.  This  expedition  astonished  the  Dutch,  who 
were  not  accustomed  to  see  us  so  near  to  them."  * 

3d.  "  A  partisan  officer  having  remarked  that  two 
regiments  of  the  enemy,  w^hile  on  a  march,  had  en- 
camped on  the  two  opposite  sides  of  a  ravine,  to  pass 
the  night,  stole  into  the  ravine  and  caused  his  soldiers 
to  fire  a  volley  to  the  right  and  left  upon  the  two 
regiments.  The  latter  fired  in  lurn,  supposing  the 
enemy  to  be  before  them "  (but,  as  it  appears,  fired 
upon  each  other),  "  and  were  very  much  astonished 
on  the  following  day  to  find  so  many  killed  on  each 
side."  t 

4th.  "I  remember,"  says  Le  Miere  de  Corvey,J 
"  that  in  1798,  while  in  command  of  a  company  of 
partisans  in  Belgium,  I  was  sent  to  Loo-Christi,  some 
leagues  from  Ghent.  I  had  no  more  than  25  men 
with  me,  and  was  suiTounded  by  more  than  400  of 
the  enemy.  I  had  been  ordered  to  wait  for  the  arrival 
of  the  rest  of  my  company,  which  had  dispersed,  and 

*   Vie  de  Villars,  publiee  par  Anquetil,  1784,  12mo.,  t.  ii.,  p.  232. 

t  Harangue  latine  sur  Vart  militaire,  traduite  par  Tabb^  Creyssent 
de  la  Moseille,  a  la  suite  de  VExamin  de  plusieurs  observations  sur  la  lit- 
terature,  Paris,  1779,  p.  379.  I  adduce  this  fact  because  it  contains  a 
hint  of  a  useful  ruse,  but  I  regret  not  being  able  to  give  a  clearer  account 
of  it. 

t  Bes  partisans  et  des  corps  irreguliers,  1823,  p.  256,  257. 


I 


PARTISANS. 


355 


l( 


could  not  collect  until  tlie  next  day.  This  village, 
being  open  on  all  sides,  was  not  tenable,  and  I  made 
use  of  a  ruse.  I  sent  for  tlie  bailiff,  and  told  him  I  was 
in  momentary  expectation  of  the  arrival  of  100  horses 
and  250  infantry,  and  ordered  an  immediate  supply 
of  100  rations  of  forage  and  350  of  provisions,  which 
the  bailiff  furnished  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  I 
then  ordered  the  inhabitants  to  return  to  their  homes 
and  to  keep  quiet.  After  dark,  I  secretly  sent  out 
small  detachments,  which  returned  by  another  road 
with  my  drummer  in  front,  beating  the  night  march. 
This  manoeuvre  I  repeated  several  times.  The  ruse 
was  successful,  and  I  passed  the  night  undisturbed ; 
but  the  officer  who  relieved  me  the  next  day  with  75 
men  was  beaten  two  days  after  by  the  enemy,  who 
had  concentrated  their  forces  and  knew  they  had  but 
75  men  to  contend  with." 


CHAPTER   SEVENTH. 

SUEPEISES    AND    A3IBUSCADES. 

Inteoduction. — Against  every  anticipated  and 
open  attack  there  exists  a  metliod  of  defence  wMcIl  isi 
taught  by  the  military  art ;  and  to  put  it  in  practice, 
even  before  superior  forces  and  under  unfavorable  cir- 
cumstances, requires  only  that  we  have  sufficient  time 
to  make  the  proper  preparations.  But  this  time  is  in- 
dispensable, and  if  it  is  not  given,  we  are  surprised^ 
and  find  ourselves  in  a  critical  situation. 

A  surprise,  therefore,  offers  a  priori  an  advantage 
to  the  assailant,  by  reason  of  its  unforeseen  character 
— an  advantage  which  may  enable  a  feeble  troop  to 
overcome  and  to  crush  a  numerous  one,  and  which 
compensates  largely  for  the  uncertainty  incident  to 
this  kind  of  operations. 

To  succeed  in  them,  surprises  must  be  prepared  in 
concealment,  and  hence  they  are  most  frequently  em- 
ployed in  a  hilly  country.  They  demand  prompt  exe- 
cution ;  for  the  data  upon  which  they  are  based  soon 
change,  and  delay  produces  uncertainty  as  to  the  po- 
sition and  plans  of  the  enemy.  They  should  also  have 
reference  to  troops  imperfectly  guarded;  and  hence 


SUEPKISES   AND   AMBUSCADES. 


S51 


they  will  be  attempted  against  detachments  rather 
than  against  armies,  for  in  these  days  the  latter  all 
make  use  of  thoroughly  organized  measures  for  their 
security.  These  measures,  remarks  Clausewitz,*  ren- 
der surprises  very  rare  in  modern  warfare ;  yet  they 
are  not  impossible,  for  vigilant  and  experienced  troops, 
even  against  an  army. 

Surprises  may  be  employed  either  in  offensive  or 
defensive  operations.  The  assailant  effects  them  by 
an  unexpected  march,  or  the  suddenness  of  his  attack : 
and  the  defender,  by  the  secrecy  and  thoroughness  of 
his  arrangements ;  but  a  true  surprise  is  most  effective 
in  offensive  warfare,  and  constitutes  one  of  its  most 
important  elements. 

Two  methods  of  preparing  a  surprise  offer  them- 
selves:  1st.  To  resolutely  await  the  adversary  and 
ambuscade  him  near  the  route  he  is  pursuing ;  2d.  To 
advance  upon  the  enemy  by  a  rapid  and  circuitous 
march.  Let  us  examine  these  two  methods.  The 
gi'eater  part  of  the  precautions  to  be  used  in  the  one 
will  apply  also  to  the  other. 

1.  Surprises  by  Ambuscade. — ^The  term  ambus- 
cade comes  from  a  word  in  the  low  Latin,  copied  by 
the  Spanish  and  Italian  languages,f  and  signifies  in 
the  woods;  in  fact,  wooded  places  are  favorable  for 
this  kind  of  operation. 


*  De  la  guen'e^  traduction  Neuens,  t.  iii.,  p.  800. 
t  In  low  Latin,  emboscata^  in  Spanish,  emhoscada,  in  Italian,  imbosca- 
According  to  the  translator  of  Santa-Cruz,  the  Spaniards  in  the  last 
mtnry  said  emlosques,  and  hosque  in  their  language  signifies  a  wood. 


358  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

The  purpose  of  an  ambuscade  may  be  to  capture 
a  post,  a  cantonment,  a  patrol,  a  drove  of  cattle,  or  a 
convoy  of  military  stores  or  merchandise ;  or  to  seize 
upon  some  of  the  inhabitants,  especially  an  important 
personage  (a  prince,  general,  ambassador,  bearer  of 
dispatches,  etc.) ;  sometimes,  also,  to  make  a  recon- 
noissance,  or,  again,  to  fall  upon  a  troop,  which  is 
either  on  a  march  or  already  engaged  in  a  combat. 

The  composition  of  the  corps  charged  with  an  am- 
buscade requires  the  most  minute  attention.  The  offi- 
cers and  the  soldiers  should  be  experienced  and  ready,  1 
full  of  -confidence  in  those  who  direct  them,  quick  to] 
strike,  in  darkness  and  in  the  midst  of  obstacles, 
wherever  and  whenever  ordered.  The  selection  of 
the  horses  is  of  the  same  importance.  White  ones  are 
too  easily  seen  at  a  distance ;  therefore  take  those  of 
a  dark  color  in  preference.  As  the  least  noise  might 
give  the  alarm,  reject  animals  which  snort  from  fear, 
as  also  those  which  neigh  upon  the  slightest  occasion. 
Hence,  it  will  be  seen  that  mares  are  to  be  preferred 
for  surprises;  besides,  they  are  more  quiet,  support 
heat  and  thirst  better,  and  can  urinate  without  halt- 
ing. For  these  reasons  the  Arabs  prefer  them  in  all 
adventurous  enterprises ;  *  but  we  ought  to  add  that, 
in  case  of  a  pursuit,  if  they  are  wounded,  they  have 
less  force  and  energy  to  carry  their  riders  beyond  the 
reach  of  danger. 

Since  it  is  evident  that  profound  silence  is  here 
one  of  the  first  elements  of  success,  both  in  the  march 

*  Les  chevaux  de  Sahara,  par  le  general  Daumas,  third  ed.,  18mo., 
1855,  p.  Y6,  note  2. 


SURPRISES    AND   AMBUSCAD] 


359 


and  in  the  ambuscade,  no  dogs  should  be  allowed  to 
accompany  the  expedition,  notwithstanding  their  qual- 
ities as  watches,  for  it  would  be  difficult  to  prevent 
being  betrayed  by  their  untimely  barking.  The  expe- 
dition should  start  by  night  to  conceal  its  departure, 
and  so  as  to  reach  the  place  of  ambuscade  by  the 
break  of  day,  which  is  the  more  favorable  time  for 
discovering.  It  should  follow  paths  that  are  little 
frequented  and  free  from  stones,  for  the  horses'  feet 
among  them  would  make  too  much  noise.  The  horse- 
men should  also  be  directed  to  secure  their  equipment 
in  a  solid  manner,  and  to  cover  their  scabbards  with 
hay,  in  order  to  avoid  all  clanking  sounds. 

If  the  road  to  the  place  of  ambuscade  has  been  sof- 
tened by  rain  and  retains  footprints,  these  must  be 
obliterated  by  a  roller  or  by  sweeping  the  road  with 
long  branches  of  trees — an  operation  that  may  be  in- 
trusted to  a  small  rear-guard  of  foot  soldiers  ;  ^  other- 
wise the  enemy  will  follow  your  tracks  and  will  dis- 
cover you;  unless,  indeed,  you  deceive  him,  as  has 
been  often  recommended,  by  going  considerably  be- 
yond the  place  of  ambuscade,  and  returning  to  it  by  a 
bend  across  fields  and  over  very  dry  ground. 

The  position  selected  for  the  ambuscade  should  be 
of  sufficient  extent  to  contain  the  force,  an  "  out  of  the 
way  "  and  lonely  place,  but  open,  with  a  sufficiently 
extended  front,  and  with  at  least  two  outlets,  one 
suitable  for  retreat,  the  other  for  making  a  sudden 
attack  upon  the  enemy.  "When  the  ambuscade  is 
probably  to  be  occupied  more  than  one  day,  select 

*  Santa-Cruz,  Reflexions  militaires,  t.  ii.,  p.  242. 


360  MmOR   OPERATIONS. 

tlie  position  near  some  spring,  if  possible,  so  as  to  se- 
cure a  supply  of  water:  provisions  you  can  readily 
carry  with  you. 

Cavalry  is  in  its  nature  more  difficult  to  conceal 
and  place  in  ambuscade  tlian  infantry ;  ^  but  this  in- 
convenience is  in  a  measure  compensated  by  its  celer- 
ity, wMcli  enables  it  to  attack  at  tlie  instant  of  its 
discovery.  This  arm  should  lie  in  wait  in  winding 
valleys,  in  woods,  in  broad  ravines  with  not  very 
steep  sides,  or  in  isolated  farm-yards  ;  and  in  this  last 
case,  if  but  one  outlet  exists,  care  should  be  taken  to 
provide  a  second,  by  removing,  when  necessary,  any 
high  wall  or  fence. 

Infantry  can  be  concealed  at  the  bottom  of  a 
ditch,  behind  a  bank,  along  a  railway,  under  a  rock, 
among  hedges,  vines,  growing  grain — almost  anywhere, 
indeed,  for  they  can,  if  necessary,  sit  down,  or  even  lie 
at  fall  length.  The  position  of  an  ambuscade  should 
also  be  such  that  the  adversary  can  bring  but  a  portion 
of  his  forces  into  action.  If  the  purpose  is  to  surprise 
an  enemy  on  the  march,  the  position  should  be  not  far 
from  some  steep  descent,  a  ford,  or  a  plateau  favor- 
able for  a  halt ;  in  short,  near  places  where  the  enemy 
will  slacken  their  speed  and  preserve  less  order. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  enemy  to  be  surprised  is 
encamped  or  cantoned,  you  will  place  yourself  so  that 
you  may  emerge  from  the  ambuscade  when  the  men 
are  going  to  their  meals,  or  when  they  are  leading 
their  horses  to  water. 

*  Nevertheless,  ambuscades  are  often  composed  of  mixed  troops,  that 
is,  of  both  infantry  and  cavahy. 


SURPRISES  AND  AIUBUSCADES. 


361 


I 


After  having  decided  upon  tlie  position  of  the  am- 
buscade, do  not,  in  any  case,  enter  it  until  you  Lave 
previously  searched  it.  Place  your  troops  in  the  most 
concealed  manner  possible.  Surround  them  with  sen- 
tinels and  even  vedettes,  who  must  endeavor  to  fulfil 
the  twofold  and  difficult  condition  of  seeing  without 
being  seen ;  they  must  fall  back,  when  necessary, 
but  must  never  challenge  any  one.  You  can  second 
these  sentinels  and  increase  your  facilities  of  acquir- 
ing information  by  placing  near  the  road  a  soldier 
disguised  as  a  peasant  and  affecting  to  be  engaged 
in  tilling  the  ground.  Let  none  pass,  especially  in- 
habitants, but  put  them  imder  guard,  and  even  some- 
times tie  them  up. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  are  in  ambuscade,  they  should 
observe  increased  caution.  Talking,  smoking,  moving 
about,  or  going  off  upon  any  pretext,  making  any  kind 
of  noise,  and  lighting  a  fire,  should  all  be  forbidden. 
Going  to  sleep  should  be  especially  prohibited.  All 
the  soldiers  must  remain  awake,*  and  even  in  constant 
readiness  for  combat,  especially  in  an  ambuscade  of 
cavalry.  The  infantry  should  sit  or  lie  down,  and  in 
either  case  their  arms  should  be  placed  on  the  ground ; 
for  if  they  remain  standing  with  their  arms  in  hand, 
or  if  they  sit  with  them  between  their  legs,  a  gun 
might  be  accidentally  discharged  (as  they  are  all 
loaded),  and  thus  betray  the  existence  of  the  am- 
buscade. 


*  Several  general  oflScers  have  said  that  a  part  of  the  troop  miglit 
sleep  during  the  day ;  but  in  all  cases  it  would  be  very  dangerous  at 
1'         night,  as  one  of  the  examples  cited  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  proves. 


362  MmOE    OPEKATIOI^S. 

The  attack  upon  the  enemy  must  be  sndden,  and 
rather  upon  the  rear  than  the  front  of  his  column,  in 
order  to  produce  more  indecision  and  disorder  in  the 
ranks.  The  infantry,  after  discharging  a  full  volley,^ 
will  rush  upon  the  enemy  with  loud  cries :  the  cav- 
alry will  take  him  in  reverse  by  making  a  detour,  for 
the  purpose  of  blocking  his  way.  To  attack  at  the 
proper  instant,  neither  too  soon  nor  too  late,  is  the 
most  important  and  delicate  point  to  be  decided  by 
the  commanding  officer.  Soldiers  in  ambush  cannot 
but  feel  a  certain  degree  of  emotion  in  beholding  the 
enemy  passing  carelessly  and  gaily  almost  within 
arms'  length,  unconscious  of  the  danger  which  is  about 
to  fall  upon  him,  and  against  which  his  bravery  may 
prove  powerless ;  and  this  emotion  will  naturally  be 
increased  when  they  recall  the  fatigue  they  have  un- 
dergone and  the  risk  they  have  run  in  concealing 
themselves,  and  when  they  reflect  that  the  most 
trifling  incident  may  rob  them  of  the  fruit  of  all  their 
labor ;  hence  it  is  not  surprising  that,  in  their  anxiety 
to  put  an  end  to  this  uncertainty  and  to  grasp  the 
coveted  object,  they  often  act  with  too  much  precipi- 
tation, and  thus  cause  the  failure  of  the  enterprise. 
The  success  of  this  operation  of  petty  warfare,  there- 
fore, depends  greatly  upon  coolness,  as  well  as  upon 
the  quickness  of  eye  and  the  skill  which  are  the  nat- 
ural attendants  of  coolness. 

If  a  corps  purposely  fleeing  before  the  enemy  can 
thereby  draw  them  in  front  of  the  ambuscade,  success 

*  Some  sharpshooters,  properly  posted,  should  at  this  time  aim  at  the 
officers. 


SUEPEISES  AND   AMBUSCADES.  36& 

becomes  almost  certain.  This  ruse  is  cMeily  employed 
in  retreats,  and  serves  to  aid  tlie  vanquislied  party  in 
retarding  and  weakening  tlie  pursuing  force. 

When  we  liave  discovered  tlie  existence  of  an  am- 
buscade prepared  by  the  adversary,  an  excellent  way 
to  meet  it  is  to  prepare  a  counter-ambuscade,  for  tbe 
enemy  will  infallibly  be  disconcerted  when  be  finds 
himself  surprised  where  he  expected  to  surprise  others. 

2.  Surprises  by  a  March, — ^This  kind  of  surprise 
enables  us  to  avoid  the  inconvenience  of  a  too  precipi- 
tate attack,  but  depends  upon  the  exactness  of  a  cal- 
culation. The  march  must  be  calculated  so  as  to  fall 
upon  the  enemy  just  at  the  most  propitious  place  and 
time,  and  the  difficulty  in  this  calculation  is  to  make 
proper  allowance  for  delays  and  for  accidents. 

It  appears  best  to  attack  at  the  break  of  day, 
when  the  patrols  of  the  enemy  have  gone  in,  and  the 
fatigued  outpost  guards  are  reposing,  or  have  relaxed 
their  vigilance.  By  choosing  this  time  we  also  have 
the  advantage  of  daylight  for  the  end  of  the  operation, 
and  are  better  able  to  extricate  ourselves  from  any 
unforeseen  difficulties. 

In  the  case  where  we  are  aiming  at  troops  that  are 
on  the  march,  we  should  follow  a  route  either  at  right 
angles  or  very  oblique  to  theirs,  in  order  not  to  fall 
among  their  flankers,  and  to  remain  masters  of  the 
time  when  we  shall  choose  to  make  our  appearance. 

In  the  present  century  surprises  effected  by  means 
of  a  march  are  of  more  frequent  occurrence  than  am- 
buscades.    This  march  may  remain  very  secret,  by 


364  MmOR    OPERATIOl^S. 

imitating  tlie  plan  pursued  by  the  French  in  tlie  Por- 
tuguese campaign  to  surprise  tlie  Englisli  posts,  name- 
ly, by  wrapping  tlie  horses'  feet  in  pieces  of  sheep- 
skin, with  the  wool  inside,  tied  above  the  hoof 

We  cannot  conclude  these  remarks  more  appropri- 
ately  than  by  repeating,  with  General  Kleber :  "  A 
surprise  is  more  dishonorable  than  a  defeat,"  and  by 
quoting  the  following  precept  from  his  orders  of  the 
day :  "  The  bravest  man  may  be  beaten ;  but  whoever 
allows  himself  to  be  surprised  no  longer  deserves  to 
be  an  officer." 

3,  Historical  Examples, — I,  We  should  emerge 
from  an  ambuscade  in  a  solid  hody. — During  the  war 
in  Africa,  in  the  44th  year  before  the  Christian  era, 
"Labienus,  seeing  that  Caesar  would  be  obliged  to 
cross  a  certain  valley  and  a  wood,  placed  an  ambus- 
cade there.  Not  knowing  the  existence  of  the  snare, 
Caesar  had  sent  his  cavalry  in  advance ;  and  when 
they  reached  the  valley,  the  troops  of  Labienus,  for- 
getting their  orders,  or  executing  them  unskilfully,  or 
perhaps  fearing  to  be  overthrown  in  the  valley  by  the 
cavalry,  began  to  emerge  from  their  ambuscade  in  sin- 
gle file  and  one  soldier  at  a  time,  for  the  jDurpose  of 
gaining  the  neighboring  summit.  Our  horsemen  (says 
Caesar)  forthwith  went  in  pursuit  of  them,  killed  a 
large  number,  took  many  prisoners,  and  then,  turning 
to  the  hill,  obtained  possession  of  it,  having  first  driven 
off  the  troops  that  had  been  posted  there  by  Labienus, 
who  had  much  difficulty  in  saving  himself,  with  a 
part  of  his  cavalry."  ''* 

*  Caasar's  "  Commentaries :  The  "War  in  Africa,"  chap.  1. 


1 


I 


SUKPEISES   AND    AMBUSCADES.  365 

II.  In  surprises,  do  not  forget  to  adopt  some  dis- 
tingidsliing  feature  of  dress,  or  a  rallying  signal,^ — 
In  1667,  ViUars,  tlien  a  colonel,  was  sent  by  night  to 
reconnoitre  and  ascertain  wlietlier  an  embankment 
was  guarded.  He  advanced  witli  300  borse,  leaving 
tbe  remainder  of  bis  troop  in  tbe  rear,  marcbed  along 
tbe  causeway,  sent  bis  drummers  and  trumpeters 
abead  to  make  an  uproar  and  distract  tbe  attention  of 
tbe  enemy,  wbile  be  fell  suddenly  upon  bim  tbrougb 
a  breacb  in  a  deserted  barrier,  and  routed  bim,  in 
spite  of  bis  force  of  2,000  men.  In  tbe  very  beigbt 
of  tbe  action,  tbe  Frencb  reserve  arrived,  and  took  tbe 
combatants  in  tbe  rear.  "  ViUars,  supposing  bis  troop 
surrounded,  turned  back.  Tbere  was  a  sbort,  but 
murderous'  combat  of  Frenchmen  witb  Frencbmen, 
wbicb  ceased  only  witb  tbe  rallying  cry  of  ^  ViUars^ 
This  unfortunate  mistake  saved  a  part  of  tbe  enemy, 
wbo,  nevertheless,  were  dislodged."  f 

III.  Soldiei's  in  amhusTi  sJioidd  not  sleep, — On 
this  point,  the  Marquis  of  Santa-Cruz, J  one  of  the 
best  military  wTiters  of  Spain,  relates  the  following 
fact :  "  In  the  night  ambuscade  wbicb  we  formed  (in 
1710)  against  our  enemies  near  Mora  de  Ebro,  care 
was  not  taken  to  prevent  the  soldiers  from  going  to 
sleep.  They  were  in  a  profound  slumber  when,  a  lit- 
tle before  day,  a  horse  of  Don  Joseph  Miranda  got 

*  For  example,  the  shirt  thrown  over  the  dress,  as  at  the  taking  of 
Pontoise  in  1419.    A  surprise  was  then  called  a  camisade  (from  chemise). 

t  Vie  de  ViUars,  par  Anquetil,  t.  i.,  p.  18,  19.  In  attacking,  instead 
of  simply  reconnoitring,  the  impetuous,  Yillars  transgressed  his  orders. 

t  Reflexions  militaires  et  politiques,  traduction  Vergy,  t.  ii.,  p.  260. 


366  MmOR   OPEEATIONS. 

loose ;  and  hardly  had  he  begun  to  run  across  the 
fields,  when  the  soldiers,  awakened  by  the  noise,  be- 
gan to  call  to  arms,  some  firing  without  knowing 
where,  some  flying,  and  some  taking  each  other  for 
enemies,  so  that  the  ambuscade  was  discovered  before 
its  time  and  came  to  nothing." 

IV.  During  the  siege  of  Mayence  (1793),  the  be- 
sieged French  failed  in  a  surprise  attempted  upon  the 
Prussian  headquarters  located  at  Marienborn,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  cry  Vive  la  nation,  which  they  gave  at 
an  untimely  moment. 

V.  In  1796,  the  republicans  sent  a  chief  of  a  bat- 
talion with  200  grenadiers  and  25  mounted  chasseurs 
to  surprise  a  farmhouse  (la  metairie  de  la  Saugreniere). 
This  small  body  marched  in  four  different  ways,  with 
a  column  of  fifty  men  in  each,  and  thus  debouched  in 
silence  at  the  four  cardinal  points  of  the  plateau  on 
which  the  farmhouse  was  situated,  surrounded  the 
house  by  placing  four  men  with  loaded  guns  at 
each  of  the  corners  of  the  ground-floor,  while  two 
patrols  of  four  men  knocked  at  each  of  the  doors  and 
summoned  the  Vendean  chief  Stoiflet  and  the  three 
officers  who  had  taken  refuge  in  this  asylum,  to  sur- 
render. 

VI.  Tlie  vanquished  party  who  in  retreating  too 
near  to  the  pursuer,  without  some  covering  obstacle, 
may  he  easily  surprised, — Marshal  Marmont,  arriving 
at  Champaubert  on  the  evening  of  the  battle  of  Vau- 
champs,  February  14th,  1814,  learned  that  the  van- 
quished enemy  had  just  settled  themselves  about  two 
thirds  of  a  mile  off,  at  Etoges.     He  marched  upon  the 


SUEPEISES   AND   AMBUSCADES.  367 

position  in  tie  most  profound  silence  and  by  night, 
witli  800  foot  soldiers,  flanked  on  eacli  side  by  50 
skirmishers,  fell  upon  the  Kussian  outposts,  routed 
them  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  entered  the  village, 
found  the  enemy  scattered  and  engaged  in  establish- 
ing themselves,  and  took  nearly  the  whole  of  them 
prisoners,  to  the  number  of  4,000  men,  without  having 
fired  more  than  500  shots. 

YII.  In  July,  1845,  in  Algeria,  a  detachment  of 
300  foot  and  25  horse,  in  command  of  Manselon,  had 
marched  for  a  night  in  a  wooded  gorge  four  feet  wide, 
when  they  found  themselves,  at  the  first  dawn  of  day, 
within  ten  minutes  of  the  Douars  of  the  Sbeahs,  a 
tribe  whose  hospitality  had  just  been  shown  to  Bou- 
Maza,  and  which  it  was  intended  to  surprise.  After 
a  moment's  halt,  the  march  continued,  every  one  on 
the  alei-t  and  watchful ;  but  in  making  a  detour 
around  an  earthwork,  a  foot  soldier  stumbled  against 
a  stone,  and  his  fall  caused  his  gun  to  go  off.  "  Au 
galops  cavalierSj''  cried  the  commandant  at  once,  "  and 
try  to  make  amends  for  the  blundering  of  that  fool : 
we  will  follow  you  upon  the  run."  The  Arabs,  warned 
by  the  discharge  of  the  gun,  were  already  starting  off, 
for  between  the  untimely  signal  and  the  first  charge 
of  the  mounted  chasseurs,  they  had  had  three  minutes 
to  make  their  preparations ;  but  notwithstanding  the 
confusion,  the  coup-de-main  was  successful.* 

*  Souvenirs  de  la  vie  militaire  enAfrique^  par  le  comte  de  Castellane, 
in  18mo.,  1852,  pp.  196-198. 


CHAPTEE   EIGHTH. 

HEIGHTS. 

The  skilful  and  timely  occupation  of  positions  of 
this  kind,  and  tlieir  proper  defence  and  attack,  exer- 
cise an  important  influence  upon  the  final  result  of 
warlike  operations.  "We  shall  therefore  treat  of  them 
first  in  order. 

1.  Reconnoissance. — Before  occupying  a  height, 
we  must  first  reconnoitre  it. 

We  first  examine  the  outline  of  the  height.  In  this 
outline  there  should  be  shown  the  direction  of  the 
crest  or  ridge  which  bounds  the  plateau,  the  natural 
line  of  retreat,  the  course  of  valleys  bordering  upon  it, 
and  the  character  of  the  slopes  should  be  indicated. 
Every  road,  and  every  path,  even  the  smallest,  should 
also  receive  attention,  for  the  light  foot  soldier  may 
climb  up  anywhere,  and  we  should  indicate  even  the 
steep  paths  followed  by  the  goats. 

We  must  also  examine  i^iQpi'ofile  of  the  height,  its 
contour,  its  relief  from  the  bottom  of  the  valley  to  the 
summit,  the  peculiarities  of  the  slopes,  the  abrupt  es- 
carpments and  projections,  the  intermediate  plateaux, 
and  the  successive  rises. 


HEIGHTS. 


369 


I 


We  must  also  indicate  the  places  in  wiicli  a  com- 
bat may  be  engaged,  either  in  line  or  skirmishing, 
those  in  which  cavalry  might,  as  an  exception,  have 
a  chance  of  success,  and  finally  those  in  which  artil- 
lery may  be  posted  with  advantage. 

2.  Defence. — In  a  height,  as  upon  any  field  of  bat- 
tle, there  exists  a  line  of  demarcation  between  the 
ground  of  the  defence,  or  plateau^  and  the  ground  of 
the  attack,  or  dope.  This  line  has  been  named  the 
military  crest,  because  it  is,  in  fact,  analogous  in  posi- 
tion to  the  exterior  crest  of  a  parapet. 

Without  wishing  to  ascribe  undue  importance  to 
a  military  crest,  we  will  observe  that  this  line,  which 
has  a  somewhat  vague  existence,  and  is  to  be  found 
approximately  by  trial,  has  nevertheless  its  use  in  the 
contest.  In  fact,  it  is  upon  this  line  that  the  assailant 
is  to  be  stopped,  for  if  he  once  gains  the  plateau  he 


Defender. 


Assailant 


will  soon  master  it.    In  order  to  accomplish  the  object 

in  the  best  manner  possible/ the  defender  should  be 
24 


370 


MINOR   OPEEATIONS. 


placed  in  rear  of  the  military  crest^  and  very  near  to 
it.  By  very  near,  we  here  mean  from  a  yard  and  a 
half  to  nine  yards,  according  to  the  inclination  of  the 
slope.  Thus,  while  the  defender,  with  his  gun  point- 
ed, will  be  uncovered  only  to  the  shoulders,  he  will 
see  the  whole  body  of  the  assailant  as  he  climbs  the 
ascent,  for  a  distance  of  fifty  or  sixty  yards ;  whereas, 
if  he  were  stationed  forty  yards,  for  example,  behind 
the  crest,  he  would  be  below  the  prolongation  of  the 
slope,  and  would,  therefore,  be  unable  to  reach  his 


Assailant. 


Defender. 


adversary  while  climbing ;  at  the  same  time  he  would 
receive  the  grazing  fire  of  his  antagonist,  from  the  mo- 
ment the  latter  arrived  within  a  yard  and  a  half  of 
the  top  of  the  crest.* 

The  first  line  of  defenders  will,  therefore,  stand  on 
the  plateau,  near  the  military  crest.  I  say  first  line, 
for  it  will  be  well  to  have  two  lines  and  a  reserve. 

*  We  may,  however,  take  our  position  at  some  fifty  paces  behind  the 
crest,  when  the  assailant  is  ignorant  of  the  precise  position  of  the  enemy 
he  is  attempting  to  find ;  for  in  this  case  his  grazing  fire  will  probably 
not  take  place,  for  he  will  not  see  the  defender  while  ascending,  what- 
ever may  be  the  inclination  of  the  slope. 


HEIGHTS.  371 

The  first  line  will  be  in  order  of  battle,  or  spread 
out  as  skirmishers  if  the  plateau  abounds  in  under- 
growth, and  will  receive  the  assailant  by  a  fire  at  a 
short  distance,  a  little  before  he  reaches  the  crest.  If 
this  discharge  does  not  arrest  him,  they  must  charge 
upon  him  with  the  bayonet,  and,  having  overthrown 
him,  must  retire  coolly  to  their  first  position. 

The  second  line  will  stand  generally  in  order  of 
battle,  ready  to  second  and  to  assist  the  first. 

The  sole  business  of  the  reserve  will  be  to  oppose 
any  flanking  movements  of  the  enemy;  for  which 
purpose  it  will  watch  the  passages  by  which  such 
movements  might  be  effected. 

"With  such  a  mode  of  defence,  repeated  several 
times  if  there  is  a  succession  of  plateaux,  always  exe- 
cuted with  patience  and  coolness,  and  without  under- 
taking a  dangerous  and  useless  pursuit,  it  is  probable 
that  the  height  will  be  preserved.  We  may  add  to 
our  chance  of  success  by  resorting  also  to  well-com- 
bined flanking  fires.  It  is  in  the  latter  kind  of  firing 
that  cannon  may  here  become  of  real  service.  As  to 
cavalry,  it  is  evident  that  it  should  act  chiefly  with 
the  reserve  on  the  plateau. 

This  mode  of  defence,  which  requires  solid  and  ex- 
perienced infantry,  was  inaugurated  and  put  in  prac- 
tice by  the  English  against  the  valorous  but  too 
impulsive  French  soldiers  in  Spain ;  first  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Talavera  (July  28,  1809),  and  in  the  most  me- 
morable instance,  on  the  heights  of  Pampeluna  (July 
28, 1813).  In  this  last  affair,  the  French  ascended  the 
slope  in  close  columns  by  divisions,  and  an  English 


372  MIlSrOE   OPEEATIONS. 

line  received  them  witli  a  close  volley,  charged  upoi 
them  with  the  bayonet  and  threw  them  back,  thei 
returned  to  their  position  upon  a  run,  with  three  hi 
rahs.  They  met  a  second  attack  attempted  by  thi 
resolute  French  columns,  in  precisely  the  same  mannei 
and  with  the  same  success. 

3.  Attack. — In  the  first  place,  as  an  attempt  upoi 
the  front  would  be  too  destructive,  we  should  endei 
vor  to  turn  the  position,  and  until  the  last  momed 
seek  for  a  path  by  which  this  may  be  accomj^lished. 

If  we  are  finally  compelled  to  attack  in  front,  w( 
should  make  one  or  too  false  attacks,  designed,  as 
usual,  to  divide  the  attention  of  the  defender,  and  to 
promote  the  success  of  the  principal  attack. 

This  principal  attack  (the  others  being  analogous) 
will  be  made  by  a  large  number  of  light  troops,  sup- 
ported close  at  hand  by  small  and  mobile  columns.* 
A  single  broad  and  deep  column  would  be  a  false 
measure,  and  a  failure  to  place  skirmishers  in  front 
would  be  a  most  grave  and  disastrous  error — the  er- 
ror, in  fact,  which  was  committed  on  the  heights  of 
Pampeluna,  of  which  we  have  just  spoken.  For  these 
skirmishers  will  break  up  any  manoeuvre  by  the  Eng- 
lish mode  of  defence,  by  compelling  the  defenders 
also  to  disperse  in  order  to  meet  them,  or  else  to  waste 
their  fire,  and  in  any  case  will  deprive  the  defenders 
of  the  ensemble  and  of  the  expectant  situation  which 
constitutes  all  their  strength.f 

*  Columns  of  one  company,  for  example. 

t  See  Quelques  reflexions  sur  Vinfanterie  de  nos  jours^  par  le  g6n6ral 
de  Chambray,  in  the  Melanges  of  that  author. 


HEIGHTS. 


373 


^ 


> 


The  skirmishers  can  go  anywhere,  and  consequent- 
ly will  finally  succeed  in  advancing  up  the  slope. 
Under  their  protection  the  small  columns  will  gain 
some  intermediate  plateau  or  some  commanding  posi- 
tion, from  which  they  can  fire  directly  upon  the  de- 
fenders. If  this  fire  produces  effect,  they  will  ascend 
another  step ;  a  third  will  bring  them  upon  the  up- 
per plateau,  and  if  at  that  instant  one  of  the  false  at- 
tacks makes  a  more  violent  and  noisy  demonstration 
to  alarm  one  of  the  flanks,  it  is  probable  that  the  de- 
fenders will  yield,  and,  fearing  to  be  turned,  will  retire. 

The  good  discipline  of  the  assailant,  his  confidence, 
and  his  assurance  of  victory,  will  go  far  to  remove  the 
obstacles  and  to  diminish  the  perils  of  such  an  attaqk. 

4.  Attack  of  au  isolated  liciglit  in  Africa  by  a 
company  of  infantry. — A  company  frequently  acts 
alone  in  Africa,  and  as  a  young  ofiicer  may  occasion- 
ally be  called  to  command  one,  it  may  be  useful  to 
point  out  this  mode  of  attack,  which  we  derive  from 
the  verbal  instructions  of  Marshal  Bugeaud. 

The  company,  divided  into  foui^  half  sections,  takes 


ATTACK   OF  A  HEIGHT  IN  AFEICA. 


374  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

* 

its  position  at  200  yards  from  tlie  height.  The  half 
sections  on  the  extreme  right  (a)  and  left  (d)  are  de- 
tached to  the  right  and  left,  scattering,  so  as  to  take 
the  Arabs  defending  the  height  by  the  flanks,  and  even 
somewhat  in  the  rear.  When  these  skirmishers  have 
succeeded  in  producing  some  confusion  among  the  de- 
fenders by  their  firing,  the  two  half  sections  of  the 
centre  (b  and  6')  advance  under  the  orders  of  the  cap- 
tain, with  arms  at  a  shoulder,  until  within  about 
fifty  yards  of  the  foot  of  the  height,  and  then  fire 
a  full  volley  to  complete  the  confusion  of  the  defend- 
ers ;  then  they  rush  forward  at  a  run  with  fixed  bayo- 
nets and  scale  the  height.  This  discharge  serves  as  a 
signal  to  the  skirmishers  on  the  right  and  left,  and 
apprises  them  of  the  instant  when  they  must  rapidly 
move  upon  the  flank  and  almost  upon  the  rear  of  the 
defenders,  who  will  thus  find  themselves  taken,  so  to 
speak,  in  a  closed  circle,  unless  they  decide  to  aban- 
don their  position. 


CHAPTER    NINTH. 


WOODS. 


I 


Woods,  like  heigMs,  are  positions  where  infantry 
plays  tlie  principal  part,  and  hence  their  importance 
has  grown  with  the  increase  of  that  arm  and  the  mul- 
tiplication of  fire-arms. 

1.  Reconnoissance. — ^The  greater  the  obstacle  of- 
xered  by  a  wood,  the  greater  is  the  necessity  of  recon- 
i    noitring  it. 
|t       The  officer  sent  to  reconnoitre  a  wood,  leaves  from 
a  fifth  to  a  fourth  part  of  his  detachment  at  the  en- 
trance as  a  reserve.     Taking  the  principal  road  him- 
j   self  with  four  men  and  a  guide,  he  sends  into  each  of 
the  lateral  and  secondary  roads  a  patrol  of  from  four 
to  six  men,  who  should  keep  on  the  same  level  and  in 
■  communication  with  him.     He  completes  the  general 
indications  contained  in  the  map  of  the  country,  and 
gathers  the  materials  for  his  report,  from  the  informa- 
tion which  these  patrols  furnish,  from  his  own  obser- 
vation, and  from  the  replies  of  the  wood-cutters,  game- 
keepers, poachers,  and  other  individuals  whom   he 
meets  in  the  wood. 

This  report  must  show :  1st,  tJie  extent  of  the  wood, 


i 


376  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

in  order  that  tlie  time  necessary  to  pass  tlirougli  or 
to  turn  it  may  be  inferred ;  2d,  its  exterior  form>^  its 
salient  and  reentrant  portions,  and  whetlier  it  is  sur- 
rounded by  a  ditdi;  3d,  the  nature  of  the  wood^ 
wlietlier  forest  or  coppice ;  forest  trees  furnisli  abatis ; 
coppice  offers  little  hindrance  to  light  infantry,  and,  if 
the  ground  is  sterile,  even  light  cavalry  may  some- 
times pass  through  it ;  4th,  the  openings  in  the  wood, 
and  whether  these  openings  are  favorable  for  the 
operations  of  cavalry ;  5th,  the  number,  direction,  and 
condition  of  the  principal  roads ^  which  may  be  adapt- 
ed to  the  mechanism  of  the  defence,  by  permitting  the 
employment  of  artillery  and  cavalry ;  6th,  the  same 
respecting  cart  roads^  and  any  other  roads  auxiliaiy 
to  the  principal  ones;  '7th,the  form  of  the  j^a^A^,  their 
courses,  and  their  points  of  intersection,  for  the  paths 
facilitate  the  action  of  skirmishers  in  defence,  as  well 
as  the  march  of  patrols  and  guards ;  8th,  the  situ- 
ation and  sufficiency  of  Tunning  streams  and  stagnant 
loaters^  which  may  be  serviceable  in  ambuscades,  and 
offer  facilities  in  offensive  manoeuvres:  in  a  word, 
those  which  may  be  a  protection  to  the  defenders  and 
an  obstacle  to  the  assailants ;  9th,  finally,  the  neigh- 
boring villages,  hamlets,  country  seats,  abbeys,  farm- 
houses, and  isolated  buildings  in  general,  which  are 
capable  of  serving  as  habitations  or  storehouses  for  the 
defender,  together  with  their  distances  from  the  verge 
of  the  wood. 

2.  defence. — The  prime  object  of  the  defence  is 
to  arrest  the  assailant  at  the  verge  of  the  wood,  for 


WOODS. 


377 


I 


when  once  witliin  it,  the  assailant  will  likewise  profit 
by  the  nature  of  the  obstacle  (namely,  by  the  trees 
and  the  underwood),  to  fight  and  to  advance  under 
cover. 

The  outlets,  therefore,  are  to  be  closed,  and  the 
projecting  points  protected  by  abatis ;  these  project- 
ing points  may  also  have  additional  protection  by 
stationing  pieces  of  artillery  so  as  to  give  an  effective 
fire,  and  yet  not  exposed  to  be  readily  taken.  A  cen- 
tre of  action  is  to  be  selected,  either  naturally  or  arti- 
ficially connected  with  the  skirts  of  the  wood  by  con- 
venient communications. 


DEFENCE  OF  A  FOREST. 


m 


*    .^ 


■■Kv    ,lJ&^/         -s-yt^Vs^ 


^i^W 


f^^j 


-^     ^^-.s.>^. 


^ 


^r<> 


^ 


The  distribution  of  the  troops  will  be  based  upon 
the  fact  that  in  this  case  a  numerous  reserve  would  not 
have  free  scope  for  its  action.  As  large  a  number  of 
men  as  possible  will  therefore  be  put  into  action  at 
once,  one  half  the  force  being  thrown  upon  the  con- 


378 


MINOE    OPERATIOIS^S 


tour  of  the  wood  as  skirmisliers,  and  tlie  remaining 
half  divided  into  two  parts,  the  first  of  wliich  will  be 
placed  in  a  second  line,  while  the  other  forms  a  re- 
serve.    This  reserve  will  occupy  a  central  position, 


DEFENCE  OF  A  COPPICE. 


resting  upon  the  structures  prepared  for  the  defence,  if 
there  are  any,  and  keeping  a  watch  upon  any  flank  or 
rear  movements  which  the  enemy  may  attempt.  In  a 
forest,  the  second  line  will  spread  itself  in  small  col- 
umns ;  and  in  a  coppice,  partly  in  small  columns  and 
partly  as  skirmishers ;  in  all  cases,  this  line  should 
keep  at  about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  verge  of 
the  wood. 


3,  Attack — ^The  preparations  for  attack  are  made 
at  a  distance  from  the  wood,  and  beyond  the  extreme 
range  of  the  fire  of  the  defence.    When  these  prepara- 


WOODS. 


379 


tions  are  completed,  the  assailant  passes  rapidly  over 
the  clear  space  which  separates  him  from  the  wood,  so 
as  to  be  but  a  short  time  exposed  to  the  lire  of  the 
enemy^  yet  not  so  fast  as  to  get  out  of  breath,  for  the 
tremor  of  the  hand  produced  by  running  will  prevent 
his  making  an  effective  use  of  his  weapon  * 

The  point  of  attack  is  chosen  so  as  to  reach  or  to 
threaten  the  enemy's  line  of  communication  or  of  re- 
treat. We  here  refer  to  the  principal  attack,  which  is 
always  to  be  seconded  by  a  flanking  or  turning  move- 
ment. 

The  troops  who  attack  should  be  vigorous  and 
veteran  soldiers ;  for  if  they  fail  at  the  verge  of  the 
wood,  it  will  hardly  be  possible  to  renew  the  attack, 
and  many  lives  will  be  uselessly  sacrificed. 

These  troops  adopt  the  ordinary  subdivision  into 
two  lines  and  a  reserve,  the  second  line  about  one 
hundred  yards  behind  the  first,  and  the  reserve  about 
three  hundred  yards  behind  the  second  line. 

When  the  wood  is  very  dense,  the  two  lines  should 
remain  spread  as  skirmishers,  while  the  reserve  fol- 
lows it,  in  columns,  along  the  principal  roads.  When 
the  wood  is  sufiiciently  clear,  the  second  line  may  fonn 
in  small  columns,  capable  of  passing  everywhere,  the 
first  line  and  the  reserve  acting  as  before.  If  the  wood 
presents  openings,  the  assailant  should  have  a  special 
corps,  independent  of  the  reserve,  destined  to  fight  in 
these  openings.  With  this  addition,  the  attack  will 
be  made  according  to  the  above  methods. 

Besides  this  special  and  exceptional  corps,  and  be- 

*  The  carbine  is  the  best  arm  for  forest  combats. 


380  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

sides  the  reserve,  wticli  always  exists,  it  has  been 
recommended  to  protect  the  rear  of  all  the  troops  en- 
gaged, hj  placing,  at  some  distance  from  the  reserve, 
a  sufficiently  strong  rear-guard,  which  should  carefully 
watch  its  own  flanks  and  preserve  itself  in  readiness 
to  meet  any  counter  attack. 

4.  Example. — The  battle  of  Hohenlinden  (Decem- 
ber 3,  1800),  won  by  General  Moreau  over  the  Aus- 
trians,  illustrates  the  advantage  of  a  turning  move- 
ment in  forest  combats. 

The  French  were  deployed  between  Hohenlinden 
and  Harthofen ;  the  Austrian  centre,  engaged  in  the 
defile  of  the  forest  extending  from  Mattenboett  toward 
Hohenlinden,  tried  to  debouch  in  advance  of  their 
flanks,  upon  the  plain  of  Hohenlinden.  This  centre 
was  twice  checked  and  driven  back  by  the  French 
soldiers.  In  the  mean  time,  General  Richepanse,  sent 
by  Moreau,  marched  by  the  Ebersberg  road  upon  the 
village  of  Saint-Christophe  and  upon  Mattenboett, 
which  he  finally  reached,  after  incredible  labor. 
There,  he  obstructed  the  defile  which  'Nej  was  de- 
fending in  front,  and  in  which  the  enemy  was  en- 
closed. He  rushed  intrepidly  upon  the  Austrians, 
advanced  in  spite  of  showers  of  grapeshot,  threw  the 
enemy  into  the  most  complete  disorder,  and  made  a 
junction  with  Ney,  who  had  penetrated  from  the  Ho- 
henlinden side.  The  enemy's  centre,  beaten  on  all 
sides  and  hemmed  in,  surrendered ;  and  to  this  beau- 
tiful and  persevering  manoeuvre  of  Richepanse  the 
success  of  the  day  is  almost  w^holly  due. 


WOODS. 


381 


\ 


We  must  liere  call  especial  attention  to  the  fact 
that  in  this  action  the  conquerors  understood  the  art 
of  formation  better  than  the  conquered.  When  they 
penetrated  into  the  forest  occupied  by  the  enemy,  they 
did  so  by  isolated  companies,  marching  either  by  sec- 
tions or  by  the  flank,  and  connected  together  by  skir- 
mishers ;  they  could  thus  introduce  themselves  every- 
where without  ceasing  to  present  sufficiently  strong 
and  formidable  groups.  The  conquered  party,  on  the 
contrary,  as  a  contemporary  writer  observes,  adopted 
and  preserved  ^'  an  extraordinary  order  of  march, 
hardly  conceivable  even  in  time  of  peace.  Their  ad- 
vance-guard remained  composed  of  some  battalions 
of  grenadiers ;  then  followed  the  whole  park  of  artil- 
lery, then  the  body  of  the  army,  and  then  the  cavahy, 
which  was  still  at  the  entrance  of  the  wood  while 
Richepanse  was  taking  his  position  at  Mattenboett 
and  arresting  the  march."  * 

*  Moreau  et  sa  derniere  campagne,  par  un  officier  de  son  ^tat-major 
a  Tarm^e  du  Rhin,  Munich,  1801 ;  traduction  Frangaise,  Paris  et  Metz, 
1814,  8vo.,  p.  88. 


CHAPTER  TENTH. 

FARMS,     OR     HOUSES.* 

A  FARM  enclosure,  or  a  house,  rudely  and  hastily 
fortified,  when  occupied  hj  some  companies,  within 
some  ^ve  hundred  paces  of  an  army,  or  at  a  greater 
distance,  according  to  circumstances,  may,  in  spite  of 
the  projectiles  and  incendiary  missiles  of  the  assailant, 
disconcert  all  attacks,  greatly  promote  the  success  of 
a  battle,  aid  in  the  preservation  of  a  post,  and  thus 
save  an  entire  army,  notwithstanding  its  own  rela^ 
tively  small  importance. 

For  this  purpose,  the  farm  enclosure  or  the  house 
is  not  required  to  be  well  constructed  and  perfectly 
solid;  the  most  wretched  hovel  is  hard  to  take  when 
its  garrison  possess  resolution,  and  are  determined  to 
sell  their  lives  or  their  freedom  dearly.f 

However,  when  there  is  a  choice  between  two 
farm  enclosures  or  two  houses,  we  prefer  the  one  most 

*  The  French  word  ferme^  used  by  the  author  (literally  farm),  is  ap- 
plied here  only  to  the  structures  upon  the  farm  ;  that  is,  the  house,  out- 
buildings and  their  masonry  enclosure,  in  Europe  often  grouped  together, 
and  thus  forming  a  strong  defensible  position. — Tr, 

t  An  officer  frequently  gains  glory  by  the  heroic  defence  of  the  most 
dilapidated  post. 


FAEMS,    OR   HOUSES.  383 

defensible.  Brick  walls  liave  an  advantage  over  those 
of  rubble  or  of  dressed  stone,  as  tbey  are  not  so  easily 
breached  by  cannon. 

What  we  liave  to  say  respecting  the  defence  and 
attack  of  a  farm  enclosure  or  of  a  bouse,  will  be,  in 
the  main,  aj^plicable  to  those  of  a  block-house,  with 
the  difference  only,  that  the  latter  is  more  combus- 
tible. 

1.  ]>efieiice. — We  shall  not  here  treat  of  the  meth- 
od of  putting  the  farm  enclosure  or  a  house  in  a  con- 
dition of  defence,  as  that  subject  belongs  rather  to 
fortification  than  to  the  military  art.  We  will  merely 
observe  that  in  all  farm  enclosures,  as  in  every  house 
which  is  to  be  separately  defended,  we  should  select  a 
solid  portion  of  the  structure  to  serve  as  a  small  re- 
doubt, that  is,  as  a  rendezvous  or  last  place  of  refuge 
for  the  defenders  when  they  have  been  driven  out  of 
the  other  parts. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  defence  we  endeavor  to  com- 
pel the  assailant  to  follow  a  sort  of  regular  siege. 

The  points  which  the  enemy  must  occupy  are  illu- 
minated at  night  by  the  light  of  burning  brush  or  of 
torches,  that  we  may  be  able  to  direct  upon  him  the 
most  certain  and  destructive  fire;  and  in  order  to 
keep  him  under  fire  as  long  as  possible,  all  the  ave- 
nues and  approaches,  previously  cleared  of  dangerous 
shelters,  are  to  be  intercepted  by  accessory  defences. 

Every  enclosure,  or  portion  of  an  enclosure,  every 
court  and  outbuilding,  should  receive  for  its  defence  a 
portion  of  the  garrison  proportioned  to  its  importance. 


384  MINOR   OPEEATIONS. 

Tliis  portion  of  the  soldiers  fire  from  witMn,  tliroiigli 
loopholes  pierced  beforehand  through  the  walls. 

Behind  the  barricades  of  any  barrier,  or  of  a  door- 
way, there  should  be  eight  or  ten  men,  drawn  up  in  a 
semicircle,  firing  with  coolness  and  concentrically  upon 
the  point  attacked,  and  charging  with  the  bayonet 
when  the  obstruction  is  thrown  down.  Folard  pre- 
fers to  leave  a  door  open  and  to  obstruct  it  with 
strong  abatis,  protected  by  firing  from  the  ground 
floor,  and  especially  by  firing  through  openings  in  the 
floor  of  the  second  story  (machicoulis).  In  all  cases, 
while  the  assailant  is  taking  his  position  against  the 
door  and  is  endeavoring  to  break  it  down,  we  rain 
down  upon  him  from  the  upper  stories  eveiything 
which  can  be  turned  into  a  projectile,  gathered  for  thej 
purpose  in  advance ;  and  we  take  him  in  the  rear  bj 
musketry  from  any  neighboring  outbuildings. 

Any  ladder  placed  against  a  wall  is  immediately] 
pushed  away  by  a  pitchfork,  or  any  other  suitable^ 
implement,  passed  through  one  of  the  openings  of  thai 
first  story  and  worked  as  a  lever.  A  similar  proceed- 
ing answers  against  the  light  troops  of  the  enemy, 
who  may  be  sufficiently  nimble  and  dexterous  to  havCj 
reached  the  roof  itself 

The  defenders  must  not  be  sparing  of  destructivej 
sorties  upon  the  works  of  the  attacking  party  an( 
upon  their  preparations  for  the  attack,  nor  of  countei 
attacks  in  the  portions  already  conquered ;  sorties  and 
counter  attacks  which  require  in  their  conception  as 
well  as  in  their  execution  a  certain  mixture  of  auda- 
city and  prudence. 


p 


385 


I 


I 


He  looks  out  for  incendiary  attempts,  and  promptly 
extinguishes  any  fire  which,  the  enemy  kindles ;  and 
should  the  roof  be  set  on  fire,  he  must,  without  hesi- 
tation, tear  it  ofi;  It  is  true  this  amounts  to  depriving 
the  building  of  its  helmet,  as  it  were  ;  still,  even  with- 
out this  piece  of  armor,  the  defence  may  be  continued. 

The  garrison,  forced  by  degrees,  retire  from  build- 
ing to  building  till  they  reach  the  redoubt,  where  they 
make  another  and  a  final  defence.  When  they  con- 
clude to  evacuate,  they  leave  a  small  troop  in  this 
redoubt,  who  make  for  a  time  as  much  noise  as  possi- 
ble (while  the  main  body  escapes),  and  finally  capitu- 
late upon  the  best  terms  they  can  make. 

2.  Attack. — ^The  method  of  attack  is  of  course 
founded  upon  a  preliminary  reconnoissance,  as  in  all 
the  minor  operations  of  war.  The  following  is  the 
most  common : 

The  cavalry  watches  the  supporting  troops  with- 
out, and  guards  the  entrances  through  which  succor 
can  come. 

In  a  night  attack,*  we  commence  by  extinguishing 
the  fires  kindled  by  the  defenders,  while  we  endeavor 
to  illuminate  the  exterior  parts  of  the  farm  enclosure, 
and  especially  the  weak  portions. 

If  we  have  any  cannon  at  our  disposal,  we  place  a 
battery  (by  preference  of  howitzers)  about  three  hun- 
dred yards  from  the  farm  enclosure  or  the  house,  with 
which  we  try  to  breach,  in  its  lower  part  or  at  the 


*  Ordinary  attacks  commonly  commence  a  little  before  day. 
25 


386  MmOE    OPERATIONS. 

angles,  the  most  solid  building  of  tlie  first  enclosure, 
and  to  burn  tlie  roofs. 

Skirmishers,  ambuscaded  upon  the  flanks  at  two 
hundred  yards,  second  this  cannonade,  aim  at  the 
windows  and  other  openings,  prevent  the  defenders 
from  showing  themselves  there,  and  thus  obstruct 
their  firing  upon  the  attacking  troops. 

As  soon  as  the  artillery  and  the  skirmishers  have 
produced  their  efi^ect,  two  or  three  columns  of  assault 
advance  upon  the  breaches,  the  doors,  and  other  weak 
parts,  preceded  by  laborers  carrying  scaling-ladders, 
tools,  and  sandbags,*^*  and  protected  by  the  skirmish- 
ers, who  now  come  nearer  and  shoot  at  everything 
which  shows  itself  during  the  entire  contest. 

We  burn  or  burst  in,  or  tear  from  their  hinges,  the 
doors  that  have  escaped  destruction  by  the  cannon. 
We  make  search  for  secret  and  concealed  passages. 
We  debouch  simultaneously  from  several  adjacent 
openings  upon  some  broad  front  which  is  not  too 
much  exposed  to  a  fire  from  the  buildings  in  the 
rear ;  we  convert  this  space  into  a  place  of  arms,  and, 
as  far  as  possible,  we  enlarge  the  communications  con- 
necting this  place  of  arms  with  the  points  already 
mastered. 

If  there  is  a  second  enclosure,  this  as  well  as  the 
redoubt  is  to  be  carried,  if  possible,  by  several  attacks, 
all  supported  by  a  common  reserve. 

These  attacks,  like  those  directed  against  the  outer 
enclosure,  should  be  made  simultaneously,  with  the 
aid  of  ladders  placed  against  those  walls  which  are 

*  To  mask  the  lower  loopholes  of  the  defence. 


38T 


neither  flanked  nor  commanded.  If  the  escalade  is 
successful,  we  sprinkle  the  roof  with  expert  skirmish- 
ers, who,  firing  from  behind  the  chimneys  and  dormer 
windows,  will  compel  the  garrison  to  abandon  the 
upper  stories,  and  especially  the  staircases :  it  is  never 
necessary  to  venture  in  these  latter  until  success  is 
probable. 

If  the  garrison  make  a  sortie  during  the  operation, 
the  assailants  surround  them  and  take  them  prisoners, 
or  better,  pursue  at  their  heels  to  enter  with  them,  and 
follow  them  everywhere  in  the  interior. 

This  method  of  attack,  which  is  employed  in  tah 
ing  possession  of  a  farm  enclosure  or  house,  requires 
infantry  troops  chiefly.  If  we  merely  wish  to  destroy 
a  house — for  example,  one  containing  large  quantities 
of  stores — cavalry  is  almost  sufficient ;  for  they  have 
only  to  blockade  the  house  until  it  is  set  on  fire  by 
shells  from  a  number  of  howitzers,  the  operation  being 
covered  by  a  reserve  of  several  squadrons. 


CHAPTER  ELEVENTH. 

EEDOUBTS. 

We  shall  be  brief  upon  tlie  subject  of  redoubts,  as 
they  belong  rather  to  fortification. 

Redoubts  are  employed  to  defend  assailable  points 
which  are  open  to  attack  on  all  sides,  but  nevertheless 
within  reach  of  support,  such  as  hillocks,  the  entrance 
or  exit  of  a  defile,  or  the  flanks  of  a  position.  They 
are,  in  certain  cases,  very  suitable  for  fortifying  the 
front  of  a  line  of  battle. 

1.  Defence. — The  troop  charged  with  the  defence 
of  a  redoubt  is  divided  into  two  parts:  a  reserve 
equal  to  the  third  of  the  troop,  and  an  active  pai 
composed  of  the  other  two  thirds,  for  manning  th( 
parapet.  To  obtain  a  good  defence,  this  active  part 
should  be  sufiiciently  strong  to  furnish  two  men  for 
each  running  yard  of  the  parapet.  The  reserve  is  di- 
vided into  two  sections :  the  special  duty  of  the  first 
is  to  repulse  any  turning  attacks  upon  the  entrance 
of  the  redoubt ;  the  second  stands  in  readiness  to  go 
to  any  point  that  is  threatened. 

The  commandant  of  the  redoubt  should  explain  to 


REDOUBTS. 


389 


I 


tte  chief  of  eacli  fraction  of  tlie  troops  under  his  or- 
ders, the  nature  of  the  duty  he  is  to  perform. 

Up  to  the  moment  of  attack,  the  sentinels  alone 
are  charged  with  guarding  the  redoubt. 

When  the  enemy  appears,  he  is  to  be  received 
with  cannon  at  four  hundred  yards'  distance,  and  with 
musketry  at  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  It  is 
best  to  execute  the  firing  of  musketry  slowly  and  witli 
careful  aim ;  at  the  moment  of  beginning  this  firing 
the  soldiers  mount  upon  the  banquette. 

When  the  assailant  has  descended  into  the  ditch, 
and  is  attempting  to  climb  the  scarp,  the  defenders 
mount  upon  the  superior  slope  and  pour  a  destructive 
fire  upon  him  along  the  exterior  slope.  However,  if 
during  the  operation  of  the  escalade  the  assailant  has 
left  some  men  on  the  edge  of  the  counterscarp  to  fire 
upon  the  defenders,  the  latter  cannot  mount  upon  the 
superior  slope,  but  remain  behind  the  parapet. 

The  assault  being  repulsed,  a  well-sustained  fire  is 
turned  upon  the  enemy  as  he  retires,  and  then  the 
troops  come  down  from  the  banquette.  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  assault  succeeds,  it  is  the  part  of  the  reserve 
to  fall  upon  the  first  enemies  who  enter  the  redoubt, 
and  to  drive  them  back,  forcing  them  into  the  ditch. 


2.  Attack. — ^To  attack  a  redoubt,  the  attacking 
force  is  divided  into  three  columns.  Each  column 
embraces  some  sappers  with  tools,  whose  principal 
business  is  to  destroy  the  accessory  defences.  A  sup- 
porting troop,  or  reserve,  marches  in  rear  of  these 
columns. 


390  MINOR    OPEEATIONS. 

In  order  to  occupy  the  enemy,  and  to  harass  him, 
two  of  these  columns  make  false  attacks. 

The  principal,  or  veritable  attack,  is  made  at  a 
point  determined  by  the  situation  and  form  of  the 
redoubt,  as  much  as  by  the  position  and  force  of  the 
attacking  body. 

We  begin  by  silencing  the  artillery  and  musketr}^ 
of  the  defence  by  means  of  a  sustained  cannonade. 
Then  the  columns,  preceded  by  the  sappers  and  pro- 
tected by  skirmishers,  advance  upon  the  capital,  and 
without  firing.  The  sappers  remove  the  accessory  de- 
fences, and,  that  done,  the  columns  descend  into  the 
ditch.  Meanwhile,  some  skirmishers  posted  upon  the 
counterscarp  fire  without  intermission  to  prevent  the 
defenders  from  showing  themselves  upon  the  superior 
slope. 

We  scale  the  scarp,  and  after  an  instant  of  repose 
on  the  berme,  we  ascend  the  exterior  slope.  Having 
reached  the  top  of  this  exterior  slope,  we  fire  upon 
the  defenders,  and  when  upon  the  superior  slope  we 
fall  upon  them  with  the  bayonet.  At  this  moment  it 
is  necessary  to  avoid  scattering,  for  it  is  important  that 
each  attacking  column  which  succeeds  in  its  undertak- 
ing should  present  itself  in  mass  upon  a  single  point. 

The  skirmishers  who  had  remained  upon  the  coun- 
terscarp immediately  march  after  the  columns  to  sup- 
port them,  and  the  reserve  endeavors  to  turn  the  re- 
doubt by  the  entrance. 

The  columns,  once  in  the  redoubt,  throw  them- 
selves upon  the  gari'ison  and  upon  their  reserve,  beat- 
ing them  down,  and  advancing  until  they  reach  the 


EEDOUBTS. 


391 


i 


entrance,  from  wliicli  they  remove  tlie  barrier  to  give 
admission  to  the  flanking  corps. 

The  work  being  taken,  the  assailant  establishes  his 
reserve  facing  the  enemy,  in  order  to  parry  counter 
attacks,  and  to  give  his  columns,  which  have  neces- 
sarily suffered  in  the  attack,  time  to  form  again. 

Such  is  the  systematic  method  of  attacking  a  re- 
doubt, but  it  supposes  a  considerable  attacking  force. 

A  small  detachment,  a  half  company,  for  example, 
is  often  all  that  can  be  spared  for  the  attack  of  a  re- 
doubt. In  fact,  this  slight  force  will  be  sufficient 
where  but  one  redoubt  is  to  be  carried,  as  frequently 
occurs  in  battles,  containing  some  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  only  twenty  or  thirty  men.  Considering  the  feeble- 
ness of  the  assailants,  they  should  no  longer  think  of 
threatening  the  flanks  of  the  redoubt,  nor  of  ambus- 
cading sharpshooters  for  the  purpose  of  firing  upon 
the  defenders  with  all  the  precision  of  aim  attainable 
by  the  use  of  the  new  carbines.  The  best  method  of 
attack  in  this  case,  is  a  species  of  charge  as  foragers^ 
that  is,  the  attacking  body,  in  order  to  escape  the 
grape  showered  from  the  redoubt,  throws  itself  preci- 
pitately upon  it  at  a  full  run,  all  the  soldiers  spreading 
at  great  distance,  advancing  as  much  as  possible  in  a 
creeping ijosture,  and  rallying  together  upon  the  berme 
or  the  parapet  of  the  redoubt,  which  they  endeavor  to 
escalade  on  different  sides  at  the  same  time.  Such  an 
attack  requires  much  courage  and  skill,  and  especially 
good  luck.  In  fact,  during  the  wars  of  Napoleon,  the 
taking  of  such  a  redoubt  was  found  in  some  cases  to 
involve  the  loss  of  two  or  three  detachments  com- 


392  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

manded  by  an  officer ;  and  we  may  well  conceive  that 
tlie  successful  commander  received  a  brilliant  reward. 

3.  Example — The  most  memorable  example  of  the 
employment  of  redoubts  was  at  the  battle  of  Pultawa. 
We  will  permit  Marshal  Saxe,  the  great  advocate  of 
redoubts,  to  relate  the  affair  in  his  own  words.^* 

"In  the  month  of  July,  1709,  Charles  XII.,  having 
laid  siege  to  Pultawa,  Peter  the  Great  arrived  with 
his  forces  to  relieve  the  place. 

"  The  king  of  Sweden,  although  wounded,  declared 
to  his  generals  that  he  would  attack  the  Russian  army 
on  the  next  day.  The  arrangements  were  made,  the 
forces  were  drawn  up,  and  the  march  commenced  a 
little  before  day. 

"The  czar  had  established  seven  redoubts  on  thej 
front  of  his  infantry,  and  they  were  constructed  withj 
care.  There  were  two  battalions  in  each,  and  all  the 
Russian  infantry  remained  in  the  rear,  with  the  caval- 
ry on  the  flanks.  It  was  therefore  impossible  to  reach 
the  Russian  infantry  without  taking  these  redoubts, 
for  the  Swedish  forces  could  neither  leave  them  in  their 
rear  nor  pass  between  them  without  being  over- 
whelmed by  their  fire.  The  king  of  Sweden  and  his 
generals,  who  were  ignorant  of  this  arrangement,  did 
not  comprehend  the  state  of  things  until  they  were  in^ 
the  very  midst  of  them.  But  as  the  machine  had  beenj 
set  in  motion,  it  was  impossible  to  stop  it  and  to  retreat. 

"The  Swedish  cavalry  of  the  two  flanks  at  thej 
outset  overthrew  that  of  the  Russians,  and  even  went] 

*  Mes  reveries^  liv.  ii.,  chap.  12. 


REDOUBTS.  393 

too  far ;  but  tlie  infantry  of  tlie  centre  was  arrested 
by  these  redoubts.  The  Swedes  attacked  them,  and 
were  met  with  a  stout  resistance.  They  neverthe- 
less took  three  of  them,  but  w^ere  repulsed  by  the 
others  with  great  loss.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
Swedish  infantry  not  to  be  broken  by  attacking 
these  redoubts,  whilst  that  of  the  Kussians,  drawn 
up  in  order,  were  looking  on  at  a  distance  of  two 
hundred  paces. 

''  Charles  and  his  generals  saw  the  danger  they 
were  in,  and  the  inaction  of  the  Russians  gave  them 
some  hope  of  being  able  to  retire;  however,  order 
could  not  be  restored,  for  the  whole  line  was  broken, 
and  to  attack  was  to  lead  the  troops  to  slaughter.  To 
retire  was  the  only  course  to  be  pursued :  the  troops 
who  had  taken  some  of  the  redoubts,  as  well  as  those 
who  were  being  overwhelmed  by  the  others,  were 
therefore  Avithdrawn. 

^'  There  was  no  w^ay  to  form  them  under  the  fire 
which  proceeded  from  the  redoubts,  and  consequently 
they  retired  in  confusion  and  disorder.  At  this  junc- 
tui^e  the  czar  called  his  generals  and  asked  them  what 
it  was  proper  to  do.  One  of  the  youngest,  Allart, 
without  giving  the  others  time  to  express  their  opin- 
ions, addressed  his  royal  master  in  these  words  :  ^  If 
your  majesty  does  not  attach  the  Swedes  at  this  moment^ 
it  will  he  too  late^.  The  whole  line  was  immediately 
set  in  motion,  and  marched  in  good  order,  with  pikes 
erect,  between  the  intervals  of  the  redoubts,  which 
were  left  manned,  to  cover  a  retreat,  in  case  of  ne- 
cessity. 


394  MINOK    OPERATIONS. 

"  Hardly  had  the  Swedes  halted  to  form,  and  to 
restore  order,  when  they  saw  the  Eussians  on  their 
heels.  Their  disorder  and  confusion  became  general. 
Still,  they  did  not  fly  at  once ;  they  even  made  one 
more  valorous  effort,  and  turned  back  to  charge ;  but 
order,  the  soul  of  battles,  being  gone,  they  were  scat- 
tered without  resistance. 

"  The  Eussians,  who  were  not  accustomed  to  vic- 
tory, did  not  venture  to  pursue  them,  and  the  Swedes 
retired  in  disorder  as  far  as  the  Borysthenes,  where 
they  were  all  taken  prisoners.  Thus  it  is  that,  by 
skilful  arrangements,  we  can  propitiate  fortune." 


I 


CHAPTEE  TWELFTH. 

BARRICADES. 

1.  Coiistrnction. — Barricades  are  often  constructed 
in  the  streets  of  places  besieged  or  in  revolt,  for  the 
purpose  of  resisting  the  entrance  of  the  enemy  for  a 
longer  time  by  obliging  him  to  overcome  successively 
a  number  of  obstacles. 

Barricades  being  nothing  else  than  defensive 
works,  the  rules  for  their  construction  are  the  same 
as  those  prescribed  for  field  intrenchments ;  in  other 
words  they  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  located,  1st, 
at  elevated  points^  in  order  that  they  may  command 
the  portion  of  the  street  or  place  extending  before 
them ;  2d,  at  the  middle  of  hlochs^  rather  than  at 
their  extremities  against  the  two  houses  forming  an 
angle,  for  in  the  latter  position  they  are  more  easily 
turned. 

Barricades  may  be  composed  of  all  kinds  of  mate- 
rials, and  for  those  which  are  erected  in  haste  any- 
thing is  used  that  comes  to  hand.  The  best  are  con- 
structed either  of  alternate  layers  of  paving  stones 
and  earth,  or  of  wood  and  earth,  in  a  form  resembling 


396  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

the  sluice  in  dams  employed  in  hydraulic  works.  In 
all  cases,  it  is  well  to  make  the  slope  that  is  turned  to- 
ward the  enemy  as  steep  as  possible,  like  the  face  of 
a  wall,  in  order  to  make  it  difficult  to  scale  the  bar- 
ricade. 

It  need  not  be  said  that  the  higher  the  barricade, 
the  more  difficult  it  will  be  to  carry  by  assault ;  and 
that  if  j)rovided  in  front  with  a  ditch  and  pits,  it  will 
present  accessory  obstacles  to  be  surmounted  in  the 
first  place. 

On  the  inside  the  wall  of  the  barricade  should  be 
provided  with  steps,  upon  which  the  defenders  can 
mount  for  the  purpose  of  firing  on  the  enemy. 

2.  Defence. — In  defending  a  barricade  the  occu- 
pants fire  in  succession  upon  the  assailing  columns  as 
they  present  themselves.  A  small  mine-chamber  may 
also  be  prepared  in  advance,  opening  outward,  some 
ten  or  twelve  yards  in  front  of  the  barricade,  which 
may  be  sprung  by  a  train  from  the  inside  at  the  in- 
stant the  assailant  reaches  it. 

When  the  enemy  begins  to  scale  the  barricade, 
the  crest  is  defended  either  with  the  bayonet  and 
sword,  or  by  musketry. 

The  defence  of  a  barricade  requires  great  coolness 
and  calm  and  deliberate  courage,  not  to  be  too  readily 
daunted  by  numerous  assaults  upon  so  feeble  an  in- 
trench ment ;  and  to  make  these  assaults  fruitless, 
which  is  the  important  and  sole  object  in  view,  we 
can  only  advise  indefatigable  activity  and  incessant 
vigilance. 


I 


BAREICADES.  397 

If  the  defender  of  the  barricade  possesses  artillery, 
he  will  throw  grape-shot,  but  this  is  a  rare  case. 

When  one  barricade  becomes  untenable,  the  de- 
fenders abandon  it  and  retire  to  another,  at  the  same 
time  taking  care  to  obstruct  the  way  between  the  two 
barricades. 

3.  Attack. — Carrying  a  barricade  is  a  dangerous 
operation,  as  we  cannot  here  deploy  an  array  of  force, 
and  must  of  necessity,  on  account  of  the  narrowness 
of  the  street,  fight  upon  a  small  front,  which  gives  the 
chief  advantage  to  the  defenders. 

In  general,  this  obstacle  should  be  carried  by  ruse, 
by  surprise,  or  by  a  flanking  movement.  In  fact,  after 
a  careful  examination  of  the  locality,  by  a  reconnois- 
sance  or  bird's-eye  view  from  the  top  of  some  high 
building,  we  shall  seldom  fail  to  discover  some  pas- 
sage or  court  situated  near  the  barricade  by  which  it 
is  possible  to  gain  an  entrance  within  the  barricade, 
or  from  which  we  may  at  least  be  able  to  inspect  the 
space  occupied  by  the  defenders.  We  must  forthwith 
endeavor  by  all  means  to  secure  the  occupation  of 
such  a  passage  or  court. 

We  may  also  occupy  the  upper  stories  of  the 
neighboring  houses,  and  thence  dislodge  the  defend- 
ers by  a  plunging  fire  into  the  interior  of  the  bar- 
ricade. 

Finally,  we  may  resort  to  blowing  up  the  barricade 
by  running  a  mine  beneath  it,  or  at  least  to  throwing 
it  down  by  petards  or  barrels  of  powder  placed 
against  the  outer  face.     But  we  are  frequently  de- 


398  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

terred  from  employing  these  means  by  our  unwilling- 
ness to  destroy  tlie  houses  in  the  vicinity. 

On  account  of  the  small  breadth  of  the  street,  it 
will  rarely  be  possible  to  run  a  sap  to  carry  a  barri- 
cade :  besides,  we  should  in  this  operation  be  too 
much  exposed  to  the  plunging  fire  of  the  defence. 
The  only  way  would  be  to  advance  against  the  barri- 
cade behind  high  movable  mantlets,  furnished,  if  re- 
quired, with  a  banquette,  such  as  have  been  proposed 
for  this  purpose. 

These  means  failing,  we  must  come  to  a  direct  and 
open  attack,  notwithstanding  the  danger  it  involves. 
It  is  to  be  conducted  as  follows : 

If  we  have  cannon  or  howitzers,  we  first  endeavor 
to  batter  down  the  barricade  by  their  heavy  projec- 
tiles judiciously  directed.  Otherwise  we  dislodge  the 
defenders  by  rapid  and  well-aimed  musketry  fire. 

This  firing  is  continued  until  the  defence  shows 
signs  of  hesitation ;  then  a  column  of  assault  throws 
itself  at  full  speed  upon  the  barricade,  sappers  having 
previously  filled  up  the  ditch  and  pits.  This  column 
endeavors  to  escalade  the  barricade,  while  the  sappers 
proceed  to  open  it  in  any  part  that  has  been  sufiicient- 
ly  damaged  by  the  cannon. 

At  the  same  time,  the  sharpshooters  of  the  assail- 
ant, posted  in  the  neighboring  houses  which  command 
the  interior  of  the  barricade,  redouble  their  fire  to 
paralyse  the  defence  of  the  crest,  and  thus  to  promote 
the  success  of  the  assault. 

If  the  street  is  wide,  it  is  usual  to  employ  two 
columns  of  assault  instead  of  one ;  but  in  all  cases  the 


BAREICADES. 


399 


first  columns  should  be  supported  by  others  which  put 
themselves  in  motion  shortly  after  the  first. 

When,  after  a  number  of  assaults,  we  find  our- 
selves unable  to  obtain  possession  of  the  barricade, 
we  can  only  resort  to  the  extreme  measure  of  bom- 
barding it  and  reducing  it  to  ashes,  together  with  the 
adjacent  houses.  This  method  unfortunately  involves 
the  destruction  of  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  who 
are  not  among  the  defenders  of  the  barricade  ;  never- 
theless, we  should  not  hesitate  to  employ  it  rather 
than  to  suffer  the  destruction  of  large  numbers  of 
valuable  soldiers,  before  these  barriers  raised  by 
revolt  or  despair. 


CHAPTER  THIRTEENTH. 


FOEAGES. 


1.  Object. — A  forage  is  the  name  applied  to  the 
operation  in  which  troops  who  have  exhausted  the 
resources  of  their  bivouacs  or  cantonments,  go  to 
more  distant  parts  to  obtain  the  food  needed  for 
their  horses.  There  are  two  kinds  of  foraging — 
foraging  upon  the  inhabitants,  or  dry  foraging^  and 
foraging  in  the  fields,  or  green  foraging. 

Formerly,  and  even  in  the  last  century,  forages 
were  regarded  as  important  ojDcrations.  They  were 
preceded  by  reconnoissances,  and  undertaken  with 
every  precaution  ;  frequently  two  thirds  of  the  army 
were  employed  in  their  execution.  They  served  as 
Gourps  d'essai^  in  which  the  young  officer  could  test 
his  abilities  ;  and  Folard  advises  officers  "  never  to 
omit  a  single  opportunity  of  conducting  them,  as  they 
tend  greatly  to  cultivate  quickness  of  eye  and  acute- 
ness  of  judgment."  In  the  wars  of  the  Revolution 
and  of  the  Empire,  forages  became  of  secondary  im- 
portance, in  consequence  of  the  extreme  mobility  of 
the  armies,  which,  remaining  but  a  short  time  in  pres- 
ence of  each  other,  could  subsist  everywhere.     From 


FOEAGES.  401 

that  time  not  a  single  general  forage  was  ever  made  ; 
each  division  and  each  brigade  making  those  which 
their  wants  required. 

]N'evertheless,  foraging  is  still  indispensable,  and 
especially  for  light  cavalry.  General  Brack  says  :  "  1 
have  served  in  eight  campaigns  under  the  Empire,  and 
always  at  outposts,  and  in  the  whole  time  have  never 
seen  a  single  commissary,  nor  have  I  drawn  a  single 
ration  from  the  stores  of  the  army.  Was  there  then 
no  military  administration?  Never  was  the  chief 
military  administration  in  more  skilful  hands.  Why 
then  did  this  administration  not  have  its  agents  at  our 
outposts  of  light  cavalry  ?  Because  the  Emperor  had 
judged  that  it  was  impossible,  and  that  it  was  folly  to 
subject  a  troop  which  was  irregular  in  all  its  move- 
ments to  the  regularity  of  the  distributions  of  pro- 
visions." And  he  explains  how  this  system,  at  first 
practised  in  foraging  upon  the  enemy,  continued  to 
exist  when  the  French  were  afterward  forced  to  the 
defensive,  and  had  to  draw  upon  their  allies  and  their 
own  people."^ 

2.  i>i§tribiitioii. — As  soon  as  the  country  in  which 
we  are  to  sojourn  has  been  reconnoitred,  its  foraging 
resources  must  be  distributed  among  the  different 
corps  of  troops ;  that  is,  the  fields  must  be  appor- 
tioned for  green  foraging,  and  the  houses,  barns,  or 
hay-mows,  for  dry  foraging.  This  distribution  is  the 
more  necessary,  because  it  not  only  puts  an  end  to 
vexatious  rivalry  between  the  corps   and  to   other 

*  Atant-postes  de  ca/vaUrie  Ugere,  1831,  p.  143. 
26 


402  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

causes  of  disorder,  but  prevents  extravagant  waste  * 
and  thus  husbands  the  foraging  wealth  of  the  coun- 
try as  long  as  possible,  without  which  precaution  the 
cavalry  would  soon  be  deprived  of  food  for  their 
horses,  f 

To  effect  this  distribution  for  dry  foraging,  we 
commence  by  measuring  the  cubic  contents  of  the 
granaries,  stacks,  or  barns.  This  measure  is  converted 
into  weight,  by  the  rule  that  one  cubic  foot  of  straw 
weighs  about  eight  pounds ;  and  hence  the  number 
of  rations  of  straw  will  be  found  by  dividing  the 
whole  weight  by  the  weight  of  the  ration,  which 
varies  from  ten  to  twenty  pounds,  and  which  is 
usually  fixed  by  the  orders  of  the  day.  The  number 
of  rations  of  grain  will  be  reduced  from  the  total 
number  of  cubic  feet  of  grain  to  be  disposed  of,  by 
multiplying  that  number  by  3^,  which  is  about  the 
average  number  of  rations  in  a  cubic  foot. 

For  green  foraging,  on  the  other  hand,  we  first  as- 
certain from  the  inhabitants  the  yield  of  their  mea- 
dows, which  usually  varies  between  1,500  and  5,000 

*  General  Brack  says  with  reason :  "  In  peace  wanton  waste  is  a 
wrong ;  in  war  it  is  a  crime." 

"  The  use  of  cut  straw  by  the  German  cavahy,  and  the  order  and 
system  of  their  green  foraging,  have  often  facilitated  the  means  of  their 
subsistence."  {Approvisionnement  des  arinees  au  XIX^  siecle.,  par  le 
g6n6ral  Roguet,  p.  153.) 

t  In  support  of  the  distribution  recommended,  we  will  remind  the 
reader  that  when  Moncey  was  about  to  enter  Spain  in  1823  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Carcassone  and  Narbonne,  he  was  obliged  to  extend  his  canton- 
ments "  because  the  first  estimate  of  the  resources  of  the  communes  had 
been  made  in  an  inexact  manner."  (Marcillac,  Hist,  de  la  campagne  de 
Catalogue  en  1823,  Paris,  1824,  p.  G3.) 


FORAGES.  403 

pounds  per  acre;  and  then,  if  we  have  time,  also 
make  an  actual  experiment.  We  mow  a  portion  of  a 
meadow,  an  acre,  for  example ;  then,  having  measured 
the  area  of  all  the  meadows  in  our  possession,  we  mul- 
tiply the  number  of  acres  by  the  number  of  rations 
we  have  found  in  a  single  acre,  to  determine  the  whole 
number  of  rations  at  our  disposal.  We  should  ob- 
serve that  the  weight  of  the  green  ration  is  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  dry,  its  regulation  weight 
being  as  much  as  88  pounds,*  so  that  a  mounted  for- 
ager can  bring  in  but  a  small  number  of  green  rations. 
It  will  also  be  useful  to  remember  that  a  liberal  al- 
lowance should  be  made  in  the  distribution  of  green 
forage,  for  waste — about  one  thirdf — for  the  forage  is 
often  mowed  when  short,  and  much  of  it  is  then  lost, 
with  all  the  care  that  may  be  observed  in  the  opera- 
tion.J 

When  the  number  of  rations  of  the  locality  has 
been  determined,  the  assistant  intendant  and  staff  offi- 
cers to  whom  this  duty  is  assigned,  make  an  exact  dis- 
tribution of  the  granaries  or  the  meadows  among  the 
different  corps,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  their 

*  For  the  light  cavahy  horse. 

t  Some  authors  allow  as  much  as  one  half. 

I  The  following  recommendations  in  respect  to  green  forage  will  be 
found  useful  when  we  have  our  choice  of  the  food  to  be  given  to  the 
horse.  Green  forage  is  more  valuable  than  new  hay  ;  the  best  is  mown 
grass  that  is  not  too  young.  Next  comes  rye,  which  is  the  most  digest- 
ible of  all  green  forage,  but  is  not  so  nutritious  as  lucern  grass  and  clover. 
These  latter  should  be  cut  a  day  before  they  are  given  to  the  horses,  for 
when  fresh  they  contain  injurious  principles,  particularly  clover,  which, 
if  eaten  in  too  large  quantities,  will  kill  the  horses.  When  grasses  or 
grain  fail,  give  them  the  leaves  of  trees,  and  especially  leaves  of  elm. 


404  MmOR    OPERATIONS. 

horses,  and  in  such  a  manner  that  the  limits  of  the 
grounds  assigned  shall  present  no  possible  confusion. 

3.  Dry  Foraging. — Having  arrived  at  the  com- 
mune in  which  the  forage  is  to  be  made,  the  detach- 
ment which  has  been  sent  for  the  purpose  takes  pos- 
session of  its  outlets  and  surrounds  it  by  sentinels. 
The  chief  of  the  detachment  then  presents  to  the  com- 
munal authority  the  requisition  for  forage,  signed  by 
the  general-in-chief  or  at  least  by  a  general  officer  (ex- 
cept in  case  of  a  detached  corps).  If  this  authority 
complies,  willingly  or  unwillingly,  with  the  requisi- 
tion, he  is  required  to  transport  the  forage  to  the  spot 
where  the  foragers  are  in  waiting.  But  the  foragers 
are  not  allowed  to  carry  away  this  forage  on  their 
horses  until  the  amount  of  forage  delivered  has  been 
verified  :  it  will  be  better  if  we  have  the  privilege  of 
employing  the  wagons  of  the  country  for  the  trans- 
portation. 

But  if  the  communal  authority  refuses  to  comply 
with  the  requisition,  we  enter  the  village  by  force, 
and  we  assign  to  each  company  the  granaries,  farms,  or 
stacks  from  which  they  are  to  forage.  Outside  the 
village,  we  take  further  precautions,  and  place  addi- 
tional outposts,  in  order  not  to  be  surprised  by  the 
enemy  during  the  operation.  Inside  the  village,  we 
prevent  marauding  by  patrols.  "We  do  not  permit  all 
the  foragers  to  enter  the  houses  at  once,  as  this  would 
be  too  dangerous  in  case  of  surprise ;  they  are  allowed 
to  enter  only  by  squads,  and  in  succession.  If  we  do 
not  fear  the  arrival  of  the  enemy  during  the  operation, 


FOEAGES.  405 

we  may,  for  greater  convenience,  have  tlie  horses 
brought  near  to  the  houses;  otherwise  they  are  to 
be  left  outside  the  village,  of  course  under  escort.  In 
the  first  case,  we  send  off  the  foragers  in  small  bodies, 
as  fast  as  they  are  loaded ;  in  the  second,  they  do  not 
start  until  the  whole  detachment  is  collected  together. 
It  will  be  expedient  to  forage  in  but  one  village 
at  a  time,*  so  that  the  cavalry  may  not  be  too  much 
dispersed  in  positions  more  or  loss  obstructed,  and  al- 
ways dangerous. 

4.  Oreen  Foraging. — ^For  green  foraging,  the  for- 
agersf  are  each  furnished  with  two  forage  ropes  and  a 
bag.  They  retain  their  stoutest  head-gear  J  (the  hel- 
met or  shako)  and  their  sabre,  and  carry  sickles  or 
scythes,  according  to  circumstances.  Each  of  them 
should  make  two  bundles  or  trusses,  w^eighing  together 
from  200  to  300  pounds.§  He  ties  them  with  his  ropes, 
and  balances  them  upon  his  horse.  The  grain  is  put 
into  the  bag  and  carried  on  the  pommel  of  the  saddle. 

In  making  a  green  forage,  we  first  take  military 
possession  of  the  ground  and  place  a  reserve  on  the 
right  or  left.  Then  we  surround  ourselves  by  out- 
23osts,  so  as  to  be  apprized  in  season  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy. 

*  Instruction  de  Frederic  le  Grand  d  ses  generanx,  article  4. 

t  Often  called  corvee  horsemen,  in  contradistinction  to  the  horsemen 
of  the  escort. 

I  So  as  to  he  safer  from  sahre  hlows  coming  down  upon  them  while 
they  are  cutting  the  forage. 

§  As  much  as  550  pounds  was  once  allowed.  See  the  Eeveries  du 
marechal  de  Saxe,  liv.  i.,  chap.  3,  art.  6. 


406  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

In  order  that  the  horses  may  not  be  in  the  way 
during  the  operation,  they  are  left  outside  of  the  for- 
aging ground. 

When  all  these  dispositions  are  made,  the  operation 
is  commenced  and  prosecuted  with  diligence.  If  the 
enemy  appears  during  the  operation,  we  first  make  a 
defence  on  the  exterior,  and  the  reserve  goes  forward 
to  repel  him ;  but  the  foragers  should  not  quit  their 
work  until  the  last  extremity.  If  we  have  wagons  at 
our  disposal,  we  load  them  and  send  them  off  under  a 
small  escort,  while  the  reserve  obstructs  the  advance 
of  the  enemy.  We  may  thus  save  the  forage  contained 
in  these  wagons  at  least,  by  getting  it  to  some  secure 
place. 

Green  foraging,  being  executed  wholly  in  the  open 
field,  is  less  dangerous  than  dry  foraging,  in  which  it 
is  often  difficult  to  assemble  the  foragers  in  case  of 
alarm.  We  must  only  observe  not  to  embrace  too 
much  ground  in  the  operation,  but  should  rather  for- 
age twice  in  succession  on  a  smaller  scale. 

5.  Attack  of  a  Foraging  Party. — For  attacking  a 
party  engaged  in  green  foraging,  cavalry  will  be  sufii- 
cient ;  but  infantry  will  be  required  in  an  attack  upon 
those  engaged  in  a  dry  forage. 

In  the  attack  upon  a  forage,  as  in  a  surprise,  se- 
crecy is  the  great  element  of  success. 

We  show  ourselves  toward  the  end  of  the  opera- 
tion, and  endeavor  to  separate  the  foragers  from  the 
posts,  or  from  their  escorts,  according  as  they  are  at 
their  station,  or  on  the  march.    The  attack,  especially, 


rOKAGES. 


40T 


must  be  sudden  and  rapid ;  and  several  false  attacks 
should  be  made,  to  distract  tbe  attention  of  the  enemy. 

If  we  succeed  in  compelling  the  enemy  to  abandon 
the  forage  in  which  he  is  engaged,  we  have  completely 
accomplished  our  object,  and  therefore  we  should  not 
pursue  the  foragers* 

Failing  to  attain  so  complete  a  result,  we  at  least 
harass  the  foragers  during  the  operation,  both  going 
and  returning,  so  as  to  retard  them,  or  cause  them  to 
fail  in  their  enterprise. 

Euse,  well  employed,  may  become  an  excellent 
auxiliary  in  an  attack  upon  a  foraging  party 

*  Carrying  off  the  horses  of  the  cavalry,  whether  on  a  forage  or  in 
pasture,  hy  a  special  ruse,  was  formerly  called  donner  le  liaraux.  This 
ruse,"  descrihed  hy  Marshal  Saxe  {Reveries^  liv.  ii.,  chap.  7),  had  almost 
wholly  gone  out  of  use  hefore  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century. 


CHAPTER   FOURTEENTH. 


DEFILES. 


We  apply  the  term  defile  to  a  certain  extent  of 
country  or  of  ground  shut  in  between  lateral  obsta- 
cles, as  well  as  to  any  contraction  of  a  road  through 
which  we  can  pass  only  in  a  column  of  small  front,  or 
by  the  flank. 

Defiles  may  be  divided  into  two  classes : 

1st.  Those  whose  outlets  alone  can  be  seen  and  sd 
tacked  by  the  enemy,  and  whose  flanks  may  be  advai 
tageously  occupied  to  strengthen  their  defence. 

2d.  Those  which  give  scope  to  the  projectiles  oi 
the  enemy  throughout  their  whole  extent,  as  well 
at  their  outlets,  and  whose  flanks,  therefore,  can  nei- 
ther be  strengthened  nor  defended. 

Roads  through  narrow  valleys,  and  those  betweei 
mountains,  ditches,  woods,  and  passages  through  vil- 
lages which  cannot  be  turned,  are  defiles  of  the  first 
class.  Bridges,  narrow  necks  of  land,  dikes  through 
marshes,  are  examples  of  defiles  of  the  second  class.  A 
defile  which  can  be  turned  will  often  become  but  a 
fatal  trap,  in  spite  of  all  precautions.  Nevertheless, 
the  greater  niunber  of  defiles  may  be  easily  obstruct- 


DEFILES.  409 


ed;  they  afford  facilities  for  ambuscades;  they  pre- 
sent a  narrow  front  for  the  combat ;  and,  like  water 
courses,  exert  a  very  important  influence  in  military 
operations.  Those  of  the  first  class,  when  their  flanks 
have  been  strengthened,  present  positions  that  are 
almost  impregnable.  As  an  example,  we  may  cite 
Theimopylse,  of  classic  renown.  Formed  by  Mount 
CEta  and  the  sea,  they  close  the  entrance  of  Greece 
toward  Thessaly,  and  are  impregnable  when  the  sur- 
rounding heights  are  also  occupied.  But  for  treach- 
ery, the  Persians  would  have  been  baffled  by  this  for- 
midable position.  Defiles  of  the  second  class  are  fa- 
vorable for  defensive  operations,  and  are  forced  with 
difficulty,  as  was  illustrated  by  the  triple  combat  of 
Areola,  fought  by  Bonaparte  in  the  Italian  campaign  of 
1796,  against  the  Austrians,  commanded  by  Alvinzi. 

The  defence  and  attack  of  defiles  come  specially 
within  the  province  of  infantry  and  artillery.  Cav- 
alry should  participate  only  as  an  exception :  it  is  ex- 
cellent for  turning  them,  but  even  this  requires  that 
the  roads  by  which  it  may  be  ejffected  are  such  as 
they  can  traverse. 

1.     Occupation  and  defence  of  a  Defile. — The 

method  of  occupying  a  defile  and  the  distribution  of 
the  troops  in  it,  depend  upon  the  nature  and  conform- 
ation of  this  defile,  and  also  upon  the  object  we  pro- 
pose to  accomplish.  This  object  may  be,  either  to 
preserve  the  defile  for  our  own  use,  or  to  prevent  its 
passage  by  ihe  enemy. 

In  the  first  case,  Ave  occupy  all  the  points  in  front 


410  MINOR    OPERATIOlSrS. 

and  on  tlie  flanks  of  tlie  defile  whicli  are  suitable  for 
an  obstinate  defence,  and  establish  the  reserve  at  the 
rear  outlet  in  a  position  chosen  so  as  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  taking  possession  of  it  and  to  protect  the 
retreat  in  case  we  are  driven  back.  This  reserve 
should  cooperate  with  the  supporting  corps.  We 
should  especially  not  neglect  to  occupy  the  outlets  of 
the  various  roads  or  transverse  defiles  which  debouch 
upon  the  interior  of  the  main  defile.  Communication 
must  be  carefully  maintained  between  the  main  body 
and  the  different  posts  occupying  these  outlets  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  favorable  defensive  positions  situ- 
ated on  the  front  and  the  flanks  of  the  defile  on  the 
other,  in  order  that  these  posts  may  fall  back  or  be 
supported  in  season. 

In  the  second  case,  or  where  the  object  is  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  passing  the  defile,  we  should 
take  a  position  in  the  rear  and  at  the  point  most  fa- 
vorable for  assailing  the  enemy  on  the  front  or  flank  ^ 
at  the  moment  he  attempts  to  debouch.  This  rule  is 
more  particularly  applicable  to  the  defiles  whose  flanks 
are  inaccessible,  such  as  bridges  and  dikes.  We 
may,  however,  in  many  instances,  occupy  some  im-, 
portant  points  within  the  defile,  especially  the  inter- j 
sections  of  roads,  since  we  may  thus  arrest  the  enemy] 
at  various  points  successively. 

2.  Pas§age  of  a  Befiie — The  passage  of  a  defile,  in 
an  advance  movement,  when  it  is  not  occupied  by  the 
enemy  in  force,  presents  few  difiSculties.  We  first  re- 
connoitre the  defile,  its  approaches,  its  outlets,  and  the 


DEFILES.  411 

roads  and  paths  running  into  it ;  and  having  assured 
ourselves  that  it  contains  no  ambuscade  nor  intrench- 
ment,  we  occupy  it  as  above  stated.  When  possession 
has  been  taken,  the  advance-guard  passes  first  and 
clears  the  ground,  in  conjunction  with  some  skirmish- 
ers ;  then  the  several  bodies  of  troops  pass  successively, 
observing  all  the  usual  precautions,  that  is,  continu- 
ally throwing  out  scouts  and  never  trusting  to  a  de- 
lusive feeling  of  security.  These  troops,  upon  their 
exit  from  the  defile,  finding  the  front  freed  from  the 
presence  of  any  detachments  of  the  enemy  (which 
should  have  been  driven  ofi^  by  the  advance-guard 
and  the  skirmishers),  can  easily  take  position.  The 
passage  being  completed,  a  detachment  is  left  to 
occupy  and  defend  the  defile,  if  its  possession  is  re- 
quired for  the  safety  of  the  rear  of  the  army.  We  are 
thus  saved  the  trouble  of  subsequently  taking  it  when 
the  necessity  arises. 

The  passage  of  a  defile  in  a  retreat  is  a  more  deli- 
cate operation.  After  having  taken  military  posses- 
sion and  covered  its  flanks,  especially  by  detachments, 
the  main  body  of  the  army  is  left  in  advance,  facing 
the  enemy.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  accelerate  their 
speed  and  are  the  first  to  pass  the  defile,  because  they 
require  more  time  in  passing,  and  are  important  to  be 
preserved  ;  then  comes  the  infantry,  which  retires  slow- 
ly, leaving  the  rear-guard  before  the  front  of  the  defile 
in  the  place  of  the  main  body,  and  rallying,  as  they 
pass,  the  several  detachments  which  j)rotect  the  flanks. 

The  first  troop  which  debouches  forms  facing  the 
defile,  within  musket  range,  in  order  to  enfilade  it 


412  MINOR   OPEEATIONS. 

with  their  fire,  and  as  the  other  troops  debouch,  they 
successively  take  position  on  the  flanks. 

The  rear-guard  waits  until  the  army  is  entirely 
formed  before  it  retires.  It  unmasks  the  latter  slowly, 
and  proceeds  to  post  itself  upon  the  extremities  of  the 
line  of  battle.  The  retreat  from  the  defile  is  a  critical 
moment  for  the  rear-guard ;  for  it  has  to  pass  from  a 
narrow  field  of  battle,  where  it  could  resist  superior 
forces,  into  open  ground,  where  it  no  longer  enjoys  this 
advantage. 

When  there  are  lateral  avenues  falling  upon  the 
flanks  of  the  defile,  it  is  essential  that  their  outlets  be 
occupied  by  detachments,  for  the  purpose  of  protect- 
ing the  retreat  of  the  rear-guard — a  retreat  which  is 
sufficiently  perilous  in  itself,  and  should  not  be  ex- 
posed to  the  additional  danger  of  a  flank  attack. 

In  irregular  ground,  the  retreat  of  the  rear-guard] 
should  be  covered  by  a  chain  of  skirmishers,  but  in^ 
open  ground,  where  only  the  good  order  and  disci- 
pline of  the  troops  can  give  security  to  their  march,  it 
should  be  covered  by  some  companies ;  and  if  the  rear- 
guard should  find  itself  pressed  too  sharply  by  the 
enemy,  these  companies  must  make  a  half  turn  and 
charge  the  latter  with  the  bayonet. 

A  modern  military  writer*  compares  a  column  of 
troops  in  a  defile  to  a  serpent,  which  defends  all  the 
parts  of  its  long  body  by  its  head,  which  sees  best 
and  acts  best,  and  upon  which  the  whole  can  best  fold 
itself  back.     This  head  is  the  advance-guard  in  a  for- 

*  Voffwier  dHnfanterie  en  campagne^  par  le  g^n^ral  Eoguet,  1846, 
p.  111. 


DEFILES. 

ward  movement  through,  a  defile,  and  the  rear-guard 
in  a  retreat.  However,  in  both  cases,  this  serpent  col- 
umn should  have  eyes  not  only  in  the  head,  but  also 
in  the  tail,  and  often  on  both  sides,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent a  surprise  ;  hence,  besides  its  advanced  guard,  it 
should  thi'ow  out  skii^mishers  on  the  flanks. 

3.  Attack  of  a  l^efile. — In  this  attack  we  are,  a 
2yriori^  at  a  disadvantage,  on  account  of  the  small 
front  upon  which  we  are  compelled  to  fight. 

In  respect  to  the  method  of  attacking,  two  kinds 
of  defiles  are  to  be  distinguished ;  those  whose  flanks 
are  diflicult  of  access  or  well  defended  by  field  fortifi- 
cation, and  those  whose  flanks  are  not  covered  by  de- 
tachments of  troops. 

It  is  difficult  to  attack  those  of  the  first  kind,  nor 
should  we  attempt  to  take  them  unless  theii*  posses- 
sion is  of  essential  importance  to  the  success  of  the 
campaign.  The  available  means  of  attack  are,  first,  to 
drive  away  the  troops  who  guard  the  entrance  of  the 
defile,  and  then  to  protect  the  operation  of  passing. 
To  accomplish  this,  we  should  commence  by  stagger- 
ing the  enemy  with  an  overwhelming  fire,  and  as  soon 
as  we  perceive  hesitation  in  his  ranks,  the  infantry 
should  fall  upon  him  with  the  bayonet  in  close  col- 
umn. The  artillery  of  the  enemy  being  by  this  time 
dismounted,  at  least  in  part,  the  close  column  should 
advance  without  firing,  protected  on  the  front  by  an 
advance-guard  and  on  the  flanks  by  skirmishers,  who 
generally  succeed  in  insinuating  themselves  every- 
where.     As  fast  as  the  infantry  debouch  from  the  de- 


414  MINOR   OPERATIONS. 

file  they  should  deploy,  taking  care  to  rest  their  flanks 
upon  the  obstacle  formed  by  the  defile.  The  reserve 
should  remain  massed  at  the  entrance  of  the  defile,  to 
guard  against  a  counter  attack  and  reinforce  the  cen- 
tre and  flanks  when  necessary.  As  soon  as  we  have 
mastered  the  defile  and  the  obstacles  which  support 
it,  a  part  of  the  reserve  and  the  whole  of  the  cavalry 
will  pass  through  it  and  go  forward.  The  main  body 
of  the  artillery,  which  had  also  remained  in  the  rear, 
will  take  position  on  the  flanks  of  the  defile,  as  soon 
as  the  infantry  has  completed  its  passage  and  gained 
ground  in  front,  and  will  then  fire  briskly  upon  the 
retiring  enemy  as  long  as  he  is  within  range. 

When  the  ground  does  not  permit  a  direct  attack 
of  this  "kind,  we  must  have  recourse  to  ruse.  We 
should  harass  the  enemy  by  false  demonstrations,  es- 
pecially by  making  a  pretence  of  forcing  a  passage  in 
some  other  quarter ;  and  we  should  search  for  some 
road  or  path  comj3aratively  little  known,  which  the 
enemy  has  neglected  to  guard,  and  by  which  we  may 
be  able  to  turn  the  defile.  The  important  point  is  to 
succeed  by  these  means  in  pushing  some  comjDanies 
quite  to  the  extremity  of  the  defile,  as  these  companies, 
thus  advantageously  posted,  assist  the  march  of  the 
column,  support  its  flanks,  and  thereby  facilitate  the 
capture  of  the  defile. 

As  to  the  attack  of  defiles  whose  flanks  are  covered 
by  detachments,  the  following  is  the  usual  method  of 
proceeding : 

We  begin  by  attacking  these  detachments  briskly, 
with  the  sielect  detachments  which  flank  the  march  of 


» 


DEFILES.  415 

the  column  intended  to  force  the  defile.  These  select 
detachments  are  followed  by  reserves,  who  support 
them  when  necessary,  and  enable  them  to  rally  and 
make  head  against  the  enemy. 

If  these  attacks  are  repulsed,  they  are  nevertheless 
renewed  again  and  again,  until  the  detachments  which 
cover  the  flanks  of  the  defile  are  completely  driven 
from  all  the  points  which  they  have  occupied. 

Meanwhile  the  main  body,  stationed  in  front  of 
the  entrance  of  the  defile,  keeps  the  enemy  in  check 
by  making  demonstrations  of  attack,  and  throwing 
forward  skirmishers,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  reinforcing  the  posts  which  cover  their  flanks. 

"When  these  posts  have  been  driven  out,  we  en- 
deavor, by  still  pushing  forward,  to  take  the  enemy 
in  the  rear,  availing  ourselves  of  the  paths,  cuts,  and 
valleys  which  present  the  shortest  and  most  favorable 
route.  If  we  succeed,  in  this  way,  in  reaching  the 
openings  leading  into  the  defile  and  in  rear  of  the 
posts  of  the  enemy,  he  is  necessarily  forced  to  retire 
without  delay,  or  to  take  the  alternative  of  laying 
rlown  his  arms. 

4.  Historical  Examples. — I.  Omit  no  precaution 
when  near  a  defile, — In  the  campaign  in  Silesia,  about 
the  middle  of  December,  1745,  when  the  Prince  of 
Anhalt  arrived  before  the  city  of  Meissen,  his  cavalry 
sufi*ered  a  slight  check,  because,  being  fatigued,  they 
neglected  to  reconnoitre  the  approaches  of  the  places 
which  they  had  to  traverse.  They  had  to  defile,  man 
by  man,  through  a  deep  cut  in  the  road  before  entering 


416  MlNOn   OPEEATIONS. 

tliat  city.  This  occupied  quite  a  long  time,  during 
wMcli  two  Prussian  regiments  of  dragoons  dismount- 
ed to  wait  their  tui^n  to  warm  themselves.  But  a 
Saxon  detachment,  perceiving  their  situation,  stole 
into  a  neighboring  wood,  and  falling  unexpectedly 
upon  these  two  regiments,  killed  180  of  their  men  be- 
fore being  repulsed.  This  instance  aptly  illustrates 
the  importance  of  always  reconnoitring,  especially 
when  a  defile  is  to  be  passed.  "The  smallest  mis- 
takes in  war  are  punished,"  says  Frederic  in  relation 
to  this  subject,  "  for  the  enemy  never  pardons."  * 

II.  Cavalry  may^  as  an  exception^  force  a  defile. — 
The  attack  of  the  defile  of  Somo-Sierra,  in  Spain 
(Nov.  1808),  is  often  cited  as  proving  that  no  obstacle 
can  resist  the  imjyetuosity  of  good  cavalry. 

This  attack  was  made  by  the  third  squadron  of 
the  regiment  of  Polish  light  cavalry  of  the  Guard, 
which  regiment  was  commanded  by  Count,  afterward 
General  Krasinski. 

The  position  seemed  to  be  unassailable,  for  the 
contracted  road,  situated  between  rocks  whose  sides 
and  summits  were  covered  with  infantry,  formed  four 
bends  or  angles,  at  each  of  which  four  cannon  were 
stationed,  defending  the  passage  and  sweeping  every- 
thing which  appeared  on  the  road. 

Across  the  road  the  Spaniards  had  made  a  ditch, 
fortunately,  however,  not  very  broad.  The  fire  of  their 
infantry  and  artillery  not  only  prevented  the  French 
infantry  from  carrying  the  position,  but  even  from 

*  Example  taken  from  my  Eistoire  militaire  de  la  Prusse  amnt  1756, 
p.  338. 


I 


DEFILES.  417 

tilling  this  ditcli  witli  fascines.  It  was  proposed  to 
carry  tlie  defile  by  cavalry,  which,  from  its  rapidity, 
would  be  less  exposed  to  the  efi^ect  of  the  fire.  The 
thii^d  squadron  of  the  Polish  light  cavalry,  under  the 
command  of  Kozietulski,  rushed  forward  in  column  hy 
fours^  kept  on  in  spite  of  their  heavy  losses,  fell  upon 
the  cannoniers,  sabred  them  before  they  could  reload 
their  pieces,  and  were  so  impetuous  in  their  attack, 
that  the  Spanish  infantry  abandoned  their  positions  in 
terror  and  fled,  thus  in  a  moment  leaving  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle  without  defence,  and  opening  the 
route  to  Madrid  to  Napoleon  and  his  whole  army. 

If  the  squadron  had  stopped  during  the  charge,  it 
would  probably  have  been  lost,  for  the  Spanish  can- 
noniers would  have  had  time  to  reload,  and  having 
decimated  it  by  the  first  discharge,  would  doubtless 
have  annihilated  it  by  the  second.  The  charge  was 
executed  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning^  without  regard 
to  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  squadron  scarcely  per- 
ceived that  its  chief  (Kozietulski),  having  had  his 
horse  killed  under  him  at  the  commencement  of  the 
charge,  and  being  unable  to  follow  on  foot,  had  retired."^ 

III.  Employment  of  flanking  attacks, — Marshal 
Moncey  (July  24,  1808),  forced  the  supposed  impreg- 
nable defile  of  las  Cabreras  by  two  turning  attacks  on 
the  flanks,  executed  by  General  Harispe,f  the  intrepid 


*  Extracted  from  the  pamphlet  Les  Polonais  d  Somo-Sierra  en  1808 
(being  a  refutation  of  a  passage  in  the  ninth  volume  of  Thiers'  History 
of  the  Consulate  and  the  Empire),  bj  Colonel  Niegolevrski,  a  lieutenant 
of  the  squadron  which  forced  the  defile ;  Paris,  1854. 

t  Since  a  marshal  of  France. 
27 


418  MINOR   OPERATIOll^S. 

chief  of  the  Basque  chasseurs,  at  the  head  of  a  body 
of  good  marksmen  without  hnapsacke^  who  conquered 
the  position  rock  by  rock,  and  thus  descended  upon 
the  rear  of  the  defenders. 

In  Algeria,  at  the  beginning  of  its  conquest,  to 
pass  the  defile  of  Mouzaia  (November  21,  1830),  an 
attack  by  the  front  was  combined  with  a  flanking  at- 
tack upon  the  ridges  on  the  left. 

IV.  Passage  of  a  defile. — Before  the  battle  of  Cas- 
tiglione  (August  5,  1796),  Marmont,  wishing  to  de- 
ploy for  the  action  with  five  companies  of  artillery 
(nineteen  pieces),  found  himself  compelled  to  pass 
through  a  rather  wide  defile,  swept  by  the  enemy's 
fire.  He  threw  forward  his  column  (with  a  front  of 
two  pieces),  at  a  gallop^  placing  at  its  head  the  com- 
pany upon  which  he  counted  least.  This  head  was 
crushed,  but  the  rest  passed,  deployed,  and  quickly 
dismounted  half  the  pieces  of  heavy  calibre  posted  on 
Mount  Medola.* 

This  example,  which  again  illustrates  the  import- 
ance of  passing  defiles  as  rapidly  as  possible,  justifies 
the  saying  of  the  Archduke  Charles,f  that  "  every 
passage  of  a  defile  is  subject  to  difficulties  in  propor- 
tion to  the  space  to  be  passed  over  and  the  delay  to 
be  suffered." 

Y.  An  army  may  sometimes  he  drawn  up  in  order 
of  hattle  in  front  of  a  defile. — This  has  been  much  dis- 
puted, but  seems  at  the  present  day  to  be  more  fa- 
vorably considered.     The  Emperor  (Napoleon  III.), 

*  Memoires  de  Marmont,  1857,  t.  i.,  p.  209,  210. 

t  Campagne  de  1799,  traduction  fran^aise,  t.  ii.,  p.  123. 


DEFILES.  419 

in  his  great  work  *  remarks,  in  reference  to  a  position 
of  this  kind,  which  was  assumed  (so  to  speak)  by 
Gustavus  Adolphus  at  Leipsic  and  at  Lutzen,  that 
*'  its  sole  advantage  lies  in  compelling  the  soldiers  to 
conquer  or  to  die."  General  Jomini  goes  farther ;  he 
says :  "  It  is  still  a  question  to  be  resolved,  whether 
defiles  behind  a  beaten  anny  do  not  rather  favor  the 
retreat  than  render  it  difficult.-'  f 

5.  Defence  and  Attack  of  a  Bridge. — It  frequent- 
ly happens  in  war  that  we  wish  to  preserve  a  bridge  in 
order  to  make  use  of  it  subsequently ;  at  other  times 
we  wish  to  destroy  it,  but  our  troops  have  not  the  ne- 
cessary tools  or  powder  for  the  purpose,  especially  if  it 
is  of  stone.     In  both  cases  we  must  seek  to  defend  it. 

Suppose  then,  for  example,  an  officer  to  be  sent  upon 
such  a  mission  at  the  head  of  a  detachment  of  fifty  men. 
He  will  station  about  thirty  men  as  skirmishers  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  bridge,  along  the  bank  of  the 
stream,  in  the  places  which  have  been  shown  to  be 
favorable  by  a  previous  reconnoissance,  and  will  so 
dispose  them  that  their  fire  will  cross  in  front  of  the 
bridge  and  thus  keep  the  enemy  from  approaching  it. 
He  will  knock  down  its  parapets  to  facilitate  the  fire 
of  the  defence.  J     He  will  obstruct  the  bridge  at  both 

*  Etudes  8ur  le  passe  et  Vatenir  de  Vartillerie^  1846,  t.  i.,  in  4:to., 
p.  341. 

t  Traite  des  grandes  operations^  fourth  edition,  1851,  t.  i.,  p.  130. 
On  this  point  of  tactics,  the  reader  may  consult  the  Histoire  de  Welling- 
ton^ par  M.  Briahnont,  1857,  t,  ii.,  p.  412,  413. 

X  There  is  a  historical  fact  in  support  of  this  recommendation.  At 
the  attack  of  the  bridge  of  Goito  (April  8,  1848)  by  the  Piedmontese,  the 


420  MINOE   OPERATIOI^^S. 

extremities.  The  first  obstacle  cannot  be  directly  de- 
fended ;  it  will  consist  of  a  low  barrier,  or  an  abatis, 
or,  better  still,  of  a  simple  cut,  v/itli  tlie  object  of  re- 
tarding the  march  of  the  enemy,  and  bringing  him  to 
a  stand  at  the  entrance  of  the  bridge.  The  second 
obstacle  will  be  defended  with  the  greatest  energy  by 
the  remainder  of  the  detachment  If  the  number  of 
defenders  were  greater,  a  reserve  would  assist  in  this 
second  defence.  Finally,  one  or  two  posts  may  be  es- 
tablished to  oppose  any  flanking  manoeuvres.  Artil- 
lery would  here  be  an  excellent  auxiliary. 

A  chief  of  a  detachment,  charged  with  the  attack 
of  a  bridge,  will  first  make  a  minute  reconnoissance  of 
the  bridge,  to  ascertain  the  defensive  arrangements  of 
the  enemy.  He  will  then  distribute  his  skirmishers 
and  his  artillery  along  the  bank ;  the  latter  for  the  pur- 
pose of  silencing  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  or  of  distracting 
their  attention,  while  he  throws  himself  upon  the  bridge 
at  the  head  of  his  best  soldiers,  climbs  over  the  obsta- 
cles in  his  way,  and  strives  to  drive  off  the  defenders. 

We  should,  however,  always  endeavor  to  turn  a 
bridge  by  fording  or  swimming,  at  a  point  above  or 
below  it,  in  order  to  avoid  an  attack  by  the  front 
upon  a  position  in  which  the  enemy  has  fortified  him- 
self and  is  prepared  to  make  a  firm  stand. 


explosion  of  a  mine  rendered  the  bridge  impassable  ;  but  the  parapet  of 
the  bridge  remained  almost  uninjured,  and  the  sharpshooters  (hersaglieri), 
using  it  as  a  foot  bridge,  crossed  the  Mincio  and  pursued  the  Austrians, 
who  retired  by  the  road  to  Mantua. — As  an  analogous  instance,  it  may 
be  remembered  that,  in  1796,  the  French  crossed  the  Lavis  upon  the 
beams  of  a  bridge  from  which  the  planking  had  been  removed. 


DEFILES.  421 

As  an  example,  we  will  cite  the  attack  of  the 
bridge  of  Lodi  (May  11,  1796).  The  Austrians  had 
not  had  time  to  cut  away  the  bridge,  and  Beaulieii, 
instead  of  defending  it  solely  in  the  rear,  had  commit- 
ted the  error  of  leaving  some  battalions  in  front  of  it. 
The  French  reached  Lodi  at  '^ve  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing, after  a  march  of  ten  leagues,  and  immediately 
made  their  preparations.  The  columns  of  grenadiers 
charged  with  the  attack  were  sheltered  behind  the 
ancient  ramparts  of  the  city  from  the  grapeshot  of 
thirty  pieces  of  artillery  (drawn  up  concentrically 
upon  the  opposite  bank),  until  the  signal  for  the  at- 
tack was  given.  This  attack,  seconded  by  the  fire  of 
the  French  artillery,  was  made  with  such  impetuosity 
that  its  success  was  instantaneous  (notwithstanding 
the  175  yards'  length  of  the  bridge),  and  remained  a 
long  time  engraved  in  the  memory  of  the  Austrians. 
Tlie  retreat  of  the  latter  was  precipitated  by  the  ap- 
pearance on  their  right  flank  of  2,000  French  horse- 
men, who  had  crossed  the  Adda  above  Lodi  by  the 
ford  of  Montanaso. 

6.  Defence  and  Attack  of  a  I>ike.^ — As  COmbats  in 
marshes  can  seldom  take  place  except  on  dikes,  it 
will  be  useful  to  say  a  word  upon  their  defence  and 
attack. 

The  dikes  best  adapted  for  defence,  are  those 
which  can  be  defended  both  in  front  and  on  the 
flanks,  especially  when  the  troops  intrusted  with  the 
defence  of  the  flank  can  occupy  an  inaccessible  post. 
But  in  general  a  dike  can  only  be  defended  in  front. 


422  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

In  this  case,  when  its  length  does  not  exceed  musket 
range,  our  force  is  to  be  placed  in  rear  of  the  dike, 
and  is  to  be  divided  into  three  troops  of  about  equal 
numbers,  one  posted  (with  the  artillery,  if  we  have 
it)  at  the  terminus  of  the  dike,  to  receive  the  first 
attack  of  the  enemy,  the  second  about  thirty  yards  in 
rear,  to  fall  upon  the  enemy  when  he  debouches  from 
the  dike,  and  the  third  as  a  reserve,  still  farther  in  the 
rear.  But  if  the  length  of  the  dike  is  greater  than 
musket  range,  our  force  is  usually  to  be  placed  at  first 
in  advance  of  the  dike,  to  defend  it ;  then,  having  de- 
fended it  as  long  as  possible  in  this  position,  retire 
rapidly  over  the  dike  and  make  a  second  defence  from 
a  position  in  the  rear.  There  is,  however,  danger  in 
thus  placing  ourselves  in  advance  of  the  dike,  as 
this  position  the  enemy,  if  in  superior  force,  may  easil] 
surround  us,  and,  as  it  were,  corner  us.  Besides,  h< 
will  often  avail  himself  of  our  retreat  to  pass  the  dik< 
at  the  same  time  with  ourselves. 

The  attack  of  a  dike  by  the  front,  when  it  cai 
neither  be  turned  nor  attacked  by  the  flank,  consisi 
in  first  driving  back  the  defenders  to  the  rear  of  th( 
dike  by  an  overwhelming  and  well  sustained  fire,  an( 
especially  by  the  galling  fire  of  a  large  number  oi 
skilful  sharpshooters;  and  then,  at  the  moment  the 
defenders  show  signs  of  hesitation,  rushing  upon  th( 
dike  at  a  run  and  forcing  the  passage.     In  such  an 
attack  we  must  exhibit  great  vigor,  for  the  longer  we 
remain  on  the  dike  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  defend- 
ers, the  more  men  we  shall  lose,  and  the  greater  will 
be  the  probability  of  our  being  obliged  to  retreat — 


DEFILES.  423 

especially  if  tlie  defenders  possess  any  pieces  of  artil- 
lery loaded  with  grape,  which  enfilade  the  whole 
length  of  the  dike.  In  this  case,  the  assailant  will  be 
obliged  to  employ  artillery  to  silence  these  pieces; 
otherwise  he  will  fail  to  pass,  or  will  succeed  only  by 
losing  many  men. 


CHAPTER    FIFTEENTH. 

VILLAGES. 

1,  Occupation — ^Villages  should  be  occupied  only 
when  the  locality  is  favorable  for  defence  (for  if  it  is 
unfavorable,  their  occupation  by  the  enemy  will  pro- 
duce but  little  inconvenience),  and  when,  also,  this 
defence  is  connected  with  the  execution  of  the  general 
plan  of  operations.  This  rule  will  save  us  from  unne- 
cessarily drawing  away  troops  from  the  main  object  in 
view.  Villages  of  a  rounded  form,  in  which  the  houses 
are  pretty  close  together  and  have  streets  of  a  certain 
degree  of  regularity,  are  always  more  favorable  for 
defence,  other  things  being  equal,  than  those  of  an 
elongated  form,  or  those  composed  of  habitations  scat- 
tered here  and  there  without  connection  or  plan  :  for 
regular  and  short  streets  possess  the  advantage  of  be- 
ing good  strategic  routes,  in  Avhich  the  troops  and  the 
artillery  produce  most  effect. 

The  villages  the  occupation  of  which  may  be  of 
importance  to  an  army,  are :  1st,  those  which  form  a 
defile,  that  is,  those  which  are  the  key  of  a  defile,  or 
protect  a  defile ;  2d,  those  which  form  the  salient 
angle  of  a  position ;  3d,  those  which  cover  the  front 


I 


VILLAGES.  425 

or  flanks  of  a  line  of  battle,  and  would  consequently 
become  dangerous  if  the  enemy  were  to  take  posses- 
sion of  tliem ;  4tli,  those  wliicli  may  enable  us  to  stop 
a  pursuit  and  insure  a  retreat ;  that  is,  in  many  cases, 
those  which  are  in  defiles ;  5th,  those  which  come  into 
a  chain  of  posts,  as  it  is  necessary  that  everything 
which  occurs  in  that  chain  should  be  known ;  6th, 
and  finally,  those  which  are  within  a  short  distance 
of  the  army,  and  contain  magazines,  convoys,  and 
manufactures,  which  we  cannot  dispense  with,  and 
are,  therefore,  to  be  protected,  as  places  of  supply, 
with  as  much  care  as  our  lines  of  communication. 

A  glance  by  the  general-in-chief  at  the  general  and 
particular  position  of  a  village  may  have  given  suffi- 
cient ground  for  ordering  its  occujDation ;  but  to  effect 
this  occupation  in  a  suitable  manner,  we  must  first 
obtain  information  respecting  a  number  of  particulars 
which  may  be  classed  in  seven  categories :  1st,  as  to 
the  environs,  their  advantages  and  disadvantages  as  a 
battle-field,  and  the  kind  of  troops  that  can  be  em- 
ployed there  ;  2d,  whether  they  are  commanding  posi- 
tions or  othermse,  and  their  relative  advantages  in  this 
respect ;  3d,  the  distribution  and  construction  of  the 
houses,  which  may  be  of  wood,  clay  (torcliis),  brick, 
or  stone ;  4th,  as  to  the  church,  the  chateau,  the  court- 
liouse,  the  large  factories  and  other  considerable  edi- 
fices, which  may  serve  as  redoubts ;  5th,  as  to  the 
time  and  means  necessary  to  prepare  these  and  the 
whole  village  for  defence ;  6th,  as  to  the  number  and 
kind  of  troops  to  be  placed  there ;  7th,  as  to  the  re- 
sources of  all  kinds  which  the  place  may  offer  in  pro- 


426  MmOR    OPERATIOI^S. 

visions,  forage,  materials  for  accessory  defences,  and  for 
making  powder  and  balls. 

An  isolated  village,  whicli  would  not  be  protected 
by  escarpments  or  by  a  water  course,  or  by  a  disposi- 
tion of  troops  in  tlie  rear  and  on  tlie  flanks  of  the  vil- 
lage, in  a  word,  one  wliich  the  enemy  could  approach 
on  all  sides,  could  not  be  efficiently  defended,  and 
should  not  be  occupied.  Nor  should  any  one  be  occu- 
pied which  the  enemy  may  without  inconvenience 
neglect  and  pass  by,  for  om*  object  in  occupying  a  vil- 
lage is  to  arrest  the  enemy  and  obstruct  his  progress. 

2.  Defence. — The  first  thing  is  to  organize  the  de- 
fence. If  time  permits^  we  close  all  the  avenues  by 
ditches,  abafcis,  epaulements,  and  barricades  of  suffi- 
cient solidity  to  compel  the  enemy  to  breach  them ; 
we  make  loopholes  in  the  walls  and  banquettes 
hind  the  hedges,  in  order  to  obtain  a  fire  from  the' 
whole  perimeter ;  we  give  especial  care  to  the  organi- 
zation of  the  defence  of  the  church,  of  the  chateau,  and 
of  every  position  the  fire  from  which  may  arrest  the 
assailant,  and  most  especially  of  those  houses  which 
have  a  commanding  view  of  the  entrances  of  the 
streets ;  in  short,  we  make  use  of  all  the  resources  of 
field  fortification.  The  redoubt  is  to  be  selected  in  a 
strong  and  central  spot,  situated  in  the  part  where 
the  final  defence  is  made.  Although  the  artillery 
should  be  at  first  placed  at  the  most  vulnerable 
points,  and  where  it  may  produce  the  greatest  efiect 
(as,  for  example,  points  from  which  it  can  sweep  the 
open  spaces  and  enfilade  the  streets),  we  should  never- 


VILLAGES.  427 

theless  be  able  to  move  it  at  all  times,  and  carry  it 
to  the  points  most  threatened,  and  have  epaulements 
and  platforms  prepared  in  various  places,  to  receive 
it.  Firing  is  the  principal  agent  of  the  defence,  but 
especially  flank  and  oblique  firing,  at  short  ranges. 

A  small  body  of  cavalry  may  remain  in  the  inte- 
rior of  the  village,  but  the  greater  part  of  this  arm 
should  be  echeloned  in  rear  of  the  two  flanks,  to  pre- 
vent our  being  turned.  It  may  frequently  be  employed 
also  for  repelling  the  enemy  in  front. 

The  infantry  is  divided  into  three  portions.  The 
first  covers  the  village,  and  defends  the  approaches, 
because  we  must,  if  jDossible,  repulse  the  enemy  on 
the  exterior.  Behind  hedges,  loopholed  walls,  and 
palisades,  a  single  rank  of  soldiers  will  be  sufficient ; 
but  the  streets  and  other  wide  passages,  although 
they  may  have  been  closed,  when  there  was  time,  by 
abatis,  barricades,  epaulements,  or  ditches,  should  be 
occupied  by  companies  in  mass.  Detached  men  occupy 
those  houses  from  which  they  may  protect  the  exterior 
line  of  defence.  The  second  portion,  divided  into 
small  posts  communicating  with  each  other  and  easily 
rallied,  is  placed  behind  the  most  exposed  points,  and 
in  the  cross-roads  near  the  boundaries  of  the  village, 
these  posts  being  destined  to  support  and  relieve  the 
advanced  troops.  The  third  j)ortion  remains  concen- 
trated in  the  centre  of  the  village,  in  as  open  a  place 
as  possible,  equally  distant  from  all  the  points  of  at- 
tack. The  purpose  of  this  reserve  is  to  repulse  the 
enemy  at  any  point  at  which  he  presents  himself,  and 
to  receive  the  advanced  troops  and  cover  their  retreat 


428  MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

in  case  we  are  obliged  to  evacuate  the  village.    In  this 
formation  in  three  masses  we  find  reproduced  the  two 
lines  and  the  reserve  of  the  usual  order  of  battle.    As 
to  the  numerical  force  of  each  of  these  portions,  it 
must  depend  upon  the  configuration  of  the  village ; 
the  reserve  should  amount  to  about  one  fourth.     The 
principal  point  being  to  keep  up  a  promj^t  and  easy 
communication  between  the  centre  and  circumference, 
we  make  as  many  openings  in  the  walls  and  hedges  as 
may  be  necessary  for  that  purpose.     The  sorties,  if  a 
favorable  occasion  offers,  should  be  conducted  briskly, 
but  still  with  caution ;  strengthening  the  side  of  the 
village  by  which  the  troops  must  return,  and  enjoining 
upon  these  troops  to  confine  themselves  to  repulsing 
the  enemy,  and  not  to  abandon  themselves  to  an  ii 
prudent  pursuit.     The  resistance  should  be  displaye( 
at  first  in  the  defence  of  the  exterior,  and  afterwar( 
in  that  of  the  village  itself,  and  there  the  groun( 
must  be  defended  inch  by  inch.     If  the  enemy  gel 
in,  the  reserve  charges  upon  his  flank,  while  he 
arrested  by  the  barricades  and  the  filing  from  the^ 
houses.     If  we  are  forced  to  evacuate  certain  portions 
of  the  village  where  we  find  ourselves  too  seriousb 
threatened,  we  assume  a  new  line  of  defense  markec 
out  within  the  village,  we  attempt  counter  attacks 
and  fight  to  the  last  extremity,  always  taking  care 
however,  while  maintaining  ourselves  in  the  redoubi 
to  keep  open  a  line  of  retreat. 

3.  Attack. — "  Attacks  upon  villages  cost  too  many 
men,"  is  the  confession  of  Frederic  {Instruction^  art. 


I 


VILLAGES.  429 

23),  and,  in  fact,  villages  form  obstacles  wliicli  it  is 
proper  to  attack  only  when  other  means  are  not  avail- 
able for  accomplishing  the  end  in  view.  The  mere 
fact  that  the  localities  are  against  the  assailant,  makes 
it  necessary  that  he  should  possess  a  superiority  of 
force.  He  should,  especially,  have  a  great  number 
of  howitzers,  in  order  to  set  on  fire  and  destroy  the 
obstacles  which  are  thrown  in  his  way. 

It  is  considered  that,  in  general,  our  efforts  against 
villages  should  be  reduced  to  three  j)oints  :  a  genuine 
attack  and  two  false  attacks.  We  therefore  divide 
our  force  into  six  parts :  three  to  act  at  once ;  two  to 
protect  the  flanks  of  the  attacks,  supporting  and  rein- 
forcing them,  and  manoeuvring  at  small  distances  in 
the  rear;  and  the  sixth,  of  greater  force  than  the 
others,  to  act  as  a  reserve.  If  the  enemy  occupies 
some  positions  outside,  he  must  first  be  driven  from 
them  and  thrown  back  into  the  village.  In  this,  cav- 
alry will  be  useful.  The  batteries,  directed  upon  the 
village  at  the  outset,  form  the  most  advantageous  posi- 
tions possible,  and  having  produced  sufiicient  effect,  the 
first  three  parts  advance  in  columns,  accompanied  by 
a  detachment  of  sappers,  and  preceded  by  numerous 
skirmishers,  who  expel  the  defenders  from  the  circum- 
ference, and  silence  their  fire.  The  other  three  parts 
follow  the  movement  at  variable  distances.  We  take 
care  to  avail  ourselves  of  every  local  peculiarity,  how- 
ever trifling,  to  conceal  our  march,  to  put  the  enemy 
on  the  WTong  scent,  and  to  keep  ourselves  under  cover. 
We  must  be  neither  imprudent  nor  rash:  courage 
alone  is  required.     The  time  of  starting  of  the  three 


430  MINOE   OPEEATIOIs^S. 

columns,  and  the  velocity  of  their  march,  must  be  so 
regulated  that  they  may  come  upon  the  village  in 
succession  to  renew  the  alarm  of  the  defenders,  and  to 
commence  the  false  attacks,  whilst  they  are  engaged  in 
repelling  the  true  one.  These  columns  will  generally 
be  formed  by  sections,  and  will  consist  of  a  half  bat- 
talion at  most.  Having  arrived  within  range  of  the 
first  obstacles,  the  sappers  advance  with  their  imple- 
ments to  open  passages.  The  heads  of  the  columns, 
which  up  to  this  time  have  not  fired,  will  now  unite 
their  fire  with  that  of  the  skirmishers,  in  order  to  pro- 
tect the  work  of  the  sappers,  upon  which  the  success 
of  the  attack  mainly  depends. 

The  columns  penetrate  by  the  openings,  attack 
and  beat  down  the  masses  opposed  to  them,  pushing, 
them  with  vigor  both  in  the  streets  and  in  the  opei 
places.     The   skirmishers,  whose  circular  chain  hf 
naturally  closed  in  while  advancing,  leap  the  hedges 
scale  the  walls,  and  take  possession  of  some  house  oi 
eminence  from  which  they  can  fire  with  effect.    Being^ 
free  in  their  movements,  they  are  frequently  the  first: 
to  penetrate.     If  the  attack  is  repulsed,  we  renew  itj 
with  fresh  troops.     When  the  outer  precincts  have^ 
been  mastered,  the  sappers  open  the  secret  communi- 
cations of  the  defenders  or  make  new  ones,  tear  do^vni 
whatever  interferes  with   combining  the  attacks, 
which  favors  counter  attacks,  and  thereby  diminisl 
the  difficulties  which  the  permanent  obstacles  (namely,; 
the  houses)  present  to  the  assailant.     Then,  as  sooi 
as  we   have  gained  a  footing  in  the  interior  of  the 
village,  the  reserves  come  up  quickly,  either  to  aid 


VILLAGES.  431 

in  overtlu'owing  the  reserve  of  the  enemy,  or  to  secm*e 
the  occupation  of  the  village  or  of  the  conquered 
parties.  In  fact,  we  should  be  well  assured  of  the 
possession  of  one  portion  before  passing  to  the  con- 
quest of  another. 

The  cavalry  of  the  assailant  repulses  that  of  the 
defenders,  clears  the  field,  and  endeavors  to  flank  the 
village. 

4.  Sudden  Attack. — In  battles,  we  depart  more  or 
less  from  the  regular  attack  which  we  have  just  con- 
sidered :  we  give  quicker  blows,  we  act  by  surprise, 
we  carry  positions  by  assault,  and  we  make  but  one 
or  two  attacks.  These  are  then  two  flanking  attacks, 
which  are  executed  while  a  strong  reserve  remains  on 
the  front.  This  mode  is  especially  employed  in  Al- 
geria, where  the  villages  are  often  carried  by  the  in- 
fantry at  a  run,  without  artillery,  to  put  which  in 
battery  would  alone  leave  the  soldiers  too  long  ex- 
posed to  the  skilful  fire  of  the  Arabs.  It  compels  the 
enemy  to  abandon  his  position  without  giving  time 
for  any  real  engagement. 

5.  Historical  Examples. — It  is  easy  to  cite  battles 
in  which  villages  have  played  a  part. 

On  the  day  of  Nerwinden  (July  29,  1693),  the 
allies  had  their  army  drawn  up  from  the  Gehte  to  the 
brook  of  Landen,  between  the  villages  of  JSTerwinden 
and  Romdorf,  their  front  covered  by  intrencliments. 
Luxembourg  commenced  by  attacking  the  two  vil- 
lages, and  carried  the  first,  from  which,  however,  he 
was  soon  driven.     A  second  attack  was  followed  by 


432  MINOR   OPERATIOI^S. 

the  same  result,  because  wlien  they  had  got  into  Ner- 
winden,  the  French  officers  neglected  to  tear  down  the 
hedges  and  low  walls  with  which  the  streets  were  filled, 
so  that  our  columns  were  unable  to  communicate  with 
each  other,  and  their  action  was  disjointed.  Luxem- 
bourg did  not  allow  himself  to  be  discouraged:  he 
took  fresh  troops,  returned  a  third  time  to  the  attack 
of  Nerwinden,  and  this  time  remained  in  possession 
of  it.  The  enemy  had  stripped  his  left  to  defend 
Nerwinden,  in  consequence  of  which  the  attack  of  our 
right,  being  throughout  well  conducted,  was  successful, 
and  we  were  able  in  that  quarter  to  carry  the  intrench- 
ments  of  the  allies.  Upon  this,  Luxembourg  passed 
beyond  Nerwinden,  outflanked  the  enemy's  line,  threw 
it  into  confusion,  and  drove  a  large  part  back  upon 
the  Gehte. 

In  the  battle  of  Fontenoy  (May  11,  1745),  tl 
village  of  Fontenoy  was  three  times  attacked  by  thl 
English,  and  the  village  of  Antoin  twice  by  thl 
Dutch. 

At  Essling  (1809),  the  villages  of  Essling  and 
Aspern  were  each  taken  and  retaken  several  times. 

At  Leipsic  (1813),  the  village  of  Schoenfeld  was 
retaken  eight  times. 


APPENDIX 


KOTES  UPON  HYGIENE  IN  THE  FIELD. 


k 


It  is  difficult  for  one  who  is  not  a  physician  to 
\\Tite  upon  hygiene.  We  will  confine  ourselves  to  a 
few  simple  notes. 

Hygiene  is  the  science,  the  object  of  which  is  the 
preservation  of  health  and  the  prolongation  of  the 
average  duration  of  human  life. 

Now  that  the  foot  soldier  wears  a  cotton  shirt,  a 
flannel  waistband,  easy-fitting  garments,  light  head- 
gear, the  cravat  instead  of  the  stock,  trowsers  inserted 
in  the  gaiters,  and  cloth  trowsers  only,  a  cloak^^  over 
his  w^hole  dress  for  cold  w^eather,  and  often  an  overcoat 
with  a  folding-down  collar,  he  is  no  longer  dressed  in 
obedience  to  the  caprices  of  fashion,  but  more  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  rules  of  hygiene.  It  may  be,  how- 
ever, that  in  endeavoring  to  give  him  a  greater  degree 
of  lightness  and  to  fit  him  for  service  in  all  climates, 
we  have  had  too  much  reference  to  warm,  and  not 
enough  to  temperate  and  cold  ones.  But  we  shall  not 
enter  into  details  respecting  the  hygienic  preparations 

*  The  Zouaves  and  foot  chasseurs  have  a  dread-nought  with  a  hood. 
28 


434  APPENDIX. 

for  a  campaign,  either  for  tlie  foot  or  mounted  soldier ; 
our  present  purj)ose  being  merely  to  point  out  tlie 
precautions  necessary  for  the  troops  after  going  into 
tlie  field,  in  tlie  observance  of  which  every  officer,  in  a 
certain  measure,  should  cooperate. 

1.  Marclies. — We  must  limit  marches  to  the  human 
strength,  make  them  at  the  most  suitable  hours,'^  and 
avoid  passing  through  unhealthy  districts. 

We  must  especially  be  careful  to  husband  the 
strength  of  the  soldier  when  he  is  obliged  to  climb 
steep  ascents,  for  this  purpose  diminishing  the  weight 
of  his  baggage,f  moderating  his  gait,J  and  stopping 
from  time  to  time  to  allow  him  to  breathe. 

In  every  kind  of  march,  we  must  carefully  guard 
against  sudden  transitions,  which  are  always  perni- 
cious. §  Thus,  during  halts,  the  men  should  not  lay 
off  their  coats,  especially  if  perspiring,  and  they  should 
not  drink  until  after  a  moment  of  rest.  In  preference 
to  water  alone,  their  drink  should  consist  of  water 
mixed  with  a  little  brandy  or  coffee,  which  they  may 
carry  with  them.  We  should  add,  however,  what 
M.  Michel  Levy  says,  that  "  soldiers  on  a  march  who 

*  In  Slimmer,  we  should  avoid  the  heat  of  the  day. 

t  In  all  circumstances  the  men,  when  fatigued,  may  he  permitted  to 
put  their  knapsacks  on  the  wagons,  and  invalid  soldiers  should  ride  in 
them. 

\  The  step  should  in  general  he  such  that  the  left  will  not  he  obliged 
to  run. 

§  These  transitions  are  as  objectionable  in  military  hfe  generally  as  in 
a  simple  march.  We  send  our  southern  soldiers  in  preference  to  the 
colonies.  The  English  detail  for  the  Indies  those  regiments  which  have 
already  been  acclimated  at  Gibraltar,  Malta,  or  Corfu. 


I 


NOTES   UPON   HYGIEKE   IN   THE   FIELD.  435 

drink  cold  water  and  immediately  continue  their  jour- 
ney, do  not  suffer."  * 

In  a  warm  climate  a  marcli  is  fatiguing,  and  should 
be  abridged,  if  possible.  We  should  not  give  the  sol- 
dier much  to  carry,  and  should  allow  him  to  march 
with  the  route  step.  He  may,  for  example,  be  allowed 
to  unbutton  his  coat  and  loosen  his  cravat,  with  the 
proviso  that  he  shall  observe  a  stricter  bearing  if  the 
breeze  springs  up.  It  is  also  a  good  precaution  to 
cover  the  back  of  the  neck  with  a  white  handkerchief 
fastened  to  the  cap.  A  ration  of  wine  or  coffee  should 
be  added  to  the  ordinary  fare. 

If  the  march  is  in  a  cold  climate,  we  should  try  to 
accustom  the  soldier  to  it  by  degrees.  He  should  be 
well  clothed  and  abundantly  fed.  He  should  warm 
himself  rather  by  active  motion  than  by  a  fire.f  He 
should  avoid  alcoholic  drinks. 

In  the  summer,  at  the  end  of  a  march,  it  is  salutary 
to  wash  the  face  and  eyes  ;  and  at  all  seasons  the  feet 
should  be  washed  at  each  stopping-place  at  least.  A 
strict  attention  to  cleanliness  conduces  greatly  to  the 
soldier's  power  of  endurance. 

When  the  halting-place  is  reached,  the  sick  are  to 
be  visited,  and  those  threatened  with  any  serious  affec- 
tion sent  to  the  hospital. 

2.  Camps. — The  French  regulations  recommend 
that  the  site  of  a  camp  be  chosen  near  wood  and  wa- 
ter.    Water,  indeed,  is  necessary  for  the  preservation 

*  Traite  d^hygiene^  third  edition,  1857,  t.  ii.,  p.  31. 
t  In  extreme  cold,  if  a  fatigued  person  lies  down,  he  goes  to  sleep ; 
and  sleep,  in  this  case,  in  the  open  air,  is  death. 


436  APPENDIX. 

of  the  health  of  the  men  ;  a  running  stream  is  prefer- 
able, and  the  camp  may  be  pitched  near  its  banks. 
Woods  in  the  vicinity  are  desirable  for  furnishing  fuel 
for  cooking,  but,  as  the  soil  of  forests  is  moist,  we 
should  avoid  pitching  the  camp  within  them,  if  we 
would  avoid  miasmatic  influences. 

The  position  of  the  camp  should,  moreover,  be 
sufficiently  high  to  be  well  ventilated,  and  .gently 
sloping,  that  the  rain  may  flow  off;'^  under  these  con- 
ditions, a  dry  and  sandy  plain  will  be  suitable.f 

In  camp,  the  troop  is  lodged  in  huts  or  in  tents. 
If  the  rapidity  of  our  operations  does  not  prevent 
their  construction,  the  former  are  preferable  to  tents, 
which  are  too  close  in  summer  and  too  cold  in  winter.^ 
The  straw  used  for  beds  should  be  renewed  every  two 
weeks,  and  that  which  is  removed  should  be  hurned^ 
as  a  precaution  against  infection.  With  the  same  ob- 
ject, the  dung  should  be  carried  off  and  burned  evei 
day,  and  offal  of  all  kinds  buried  in  the  ground. 

The  soldiers  should  be  prohibited  from  going  ou| 
at  night  in  their  shirts  and  with  bare  feet,  as  this  prf 
tice  is  highly  injurious,  and  produces  dysentery. 

We  should  keep  a  camp  as  free  as  possible  from 
all  incumbrances ;  a  crowded  camp  is  always  fatal 
where  there  is  a  large  collection  of  men. 

Inactivity  is  also  attended  with  danger  to  the 
health  of  the  troops,  and  we  should  therefore  multiply 

*  Otherwise  the  camp  will  be  liable  to  be  inundated.  Ditches  or 
drains  should  be  made,  to  assist  in  carrying  off  the  water. 

t  An  eastern  (western,  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic)  exposure  will  be 
preferable. 


p 


NOTES    UPON   HYGIEKE   IN   THE   FIELD.  437 

detachments  as  mucli  as  possible,  and  employ  large 
numbers  of  tlie  men  in  extra  work. 

3.  Bivouacs. — "  A  bivouac,"  says  Jacquinot  de 
Presle,  "  althougli  unhealthy  in  a  rainy  time,  is  not 
generally  so  much  so  as  is  commonly  supposed.  The 
soldier  sleeps  with  his  feet  to  the  fire,  which  at  the 
same  time  dries  the  ground.  This  is  impossible  in  a 
tent,  where  the  cold  is  felt  severely,  and  the  men  col- 
lected in  so  small  a  space  soon  vitiate  the  air  they 
breathe."  * 

Although  this  remark  is,  on  the  whole,  correct,  yet 
the  bivouac  is  always  attended  by  more  discomfort 
than  the  camp ;  and  therefore  bivouacking  is  frequent- 
ly prescribed  only  to  the  troops  who  are  charged  with 
the  duty  of  watching  over  the  safety  of  the  army,  and 
a  double  ration  of  brandy  is  allowed  them.f 

The  location  of  a  bivouac  should  fulfil  the  same 
conditions  as  that  of  a  camj). 

If  fires  cannot  be  lighted,  on  account  of  the  prox- 
imity of  the  enemy,  the  condition  of  the  men  in  the 
Ijivouac  becomes  more  critical,  as  they  may  be  over- 
come by  the  cold.  In  this  case,  we  must  give  a  gen- 
eral order  making  it  the  duty  of  every  one  who  sees 
another  falling  asleep,  to  shake  him  until  he  is  thor- 
oughly aroused. 

The  portable  tent  (tente-ahri)  is  especially  suited 

*  Cours  cVart  ct  dliiatoire  militaire,  1829,  p.  321. 

t  In  general,  the  drawbacks  of  the  bivouac  are  compensated  in  a  great 
degree  by  good  food,  but  it  is  prudent  also  to  combine  attention  to  clean- 
liness as  in  marches,  and  activity  as  in  the  camp. 


438  APPENDIX. 

to  the  bivouac  *    The  officers  should  see  that  it  is 
properly  set  up. 

4.  Field  Hospitals. — ^These  temporary  establish- 
ments are  divided  into  field  hospitals  of  the  regiment, 
of  the  division,  and  of  head-quarters.  They  are  de- 
signed to  afford  the  first  relief  to  the  wounded  and 
sick,  and  to  serve  as  places  in  which  surgical  opera- 
tions may  be  performed  before  sending  the  men  either 
to  the  temporary  or  permanent  hospitals.  The  field 
hospitals  of  the  head-quarters,  however,  are  usually  of 
such  dimensions  that  the  soldier  may  be  taken  care 
of  in  them  for  a  longer  time. 

Field  hospitals  are  established  in  houses,  under  a 
tent,  or  even  in  the  open  air ;  but  in  all  cases  in  rear^ 
of  the  army,  sheltered  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  an( 
where  water  can  be  readily  obtained.     The  army  sur| 
geons  attend  to  those  placed  in  them.     Each  corps  is 
provided  with  litters  and  stretchers. 

Every  wounded  man,  deprived  of  consciousness  oi 
loss  of  blood,  or  with  a  deep  wound  in  the  breast 
abdomen,  will  be  sent  at  once  to  a  field  hospital,  and, 
if  possible,  to  the  special  field  hospital  which  the  a 
requires.     Others  may  be  temporarily  aided  on  t 
spot,  by  stopping  the  wound  from  which  the  bloo( 
flows  with  a  plug  of  lint,  bound  tightly  with  a  linei 
bandage. 

*  Captain  Zaccone  published,  in  1850,  a  small  pamphlet  on  the  tente- 
obrL  to  which  the  reader  will  do  well  to  refer. 


OOISTTElNrTS 


Preface  op  the  Translator, 
Preface  of  the  Editor,  .  . 


PAGE 

.     3 


PRELIMINARY   DEFINITIONS. 


"War,  offensive  and  defensive, 7 

Art  of  War 7 

Army 7 

Arm 7 

Infantry  arm 7 

Cavalry  arm 7 

Artillery  arm 7 

Engineer  arm 7 

Light  and  line  infantry 8 

Light,  line,  and  reserve  cavalry 8 

Field,  siege,  coast,  and  mountain  artillery..  8 

Sappers  and  miners S 

Unit  of  force,  or  tactical  unit 8 

Formation,  or  order 8 

Front,  rear,  and  flanks  of  formation 8 

Eauk,  me,  and  depth  of  troops 8 


Ployed  and  deployed  formations 8 

Manoeuvres 8 

Column 8 

Echelons 8 

Head  or  foot  of  column 8 

Distance  atid  interval  of  troops 8 

Checker-form 9 

Order,  or  combined  disposition  of  troops. .     9 

Tactics 9 

Strategy 9 

Logistics 9 

Base  of  operations 10 

Lino  of  defence 10 

Objectives,  or  objective  points 10 

Line  of  operations 10 

Lino  of  retreat 10 


PART  FIRST. 

niSTOEY   AND   TACTI03   OF   THE   SEPAEATE   AEMS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

HISTORY     OP     INFANTRY. 


Iktroduction 11 

1.  Ancients. 

Chivalry  and  war  chariots  most  used 13 

Infantry  more  solid  than  mobile 13 

Egyptian  infantry 13 

Jewish  infantry 13 

Persian  infantry 14 

Phalanx,  or  deep  formation 14 

2.   Greek  Phalanx. 

Character  and  formation 14 

Subdivisions 15 

Complete  phalanx 15 

Mode  of  action 15 

Hoplltes  and  their  arms 15 


Sarissa,  or  long  piko 16 

Psiletes,  or  light  troops 16 

Proportion  of  hoplites  to  psiletes 16 

Subdivisions  of  psiletes 16 

Mobile  formation  of  phalanx 16 

Peltastes 17 

Greek  education  chiefly  military 17 

Heroism  of  Spartan  mothers 17 

Excellence  of  Greek  infantry 17 

Immobility  of  phalanx  formation 17 

Alexander,  Xcnophon,  &c,  victorious  with 

phalanx IS 

3.   Roman  Iieg-ion. 

Characteristics 18 

Organization  more  mobile  than  phalanx..  18 


440 


COIS^TENTS. 


PAGE 

Maniple  formation 18 

Ilastati,  principes,  triarii,  and  veletes 18 

Strength  and  subdivisions  of  legion 19 

Turma  of  cavalry  added  to  legion 19 

Arms  of  legionaries , 20 

Veletes  the  skirmishers  of  the  legion 20 

Mode  of  action  of  the  classes  of  legionaries,  20 

Military  character  of  legionary 21 

Heavy  loads  and  long  marches  of  legionary,  21 

Intrenching  customary  with  legions 21 

Mobility  of  legion 22 

Adaptation  to  universal  conquest 22 

Eoman  government  suited  to  war.^ . . . 22 

Objections  to  formation  by  maniples 22 

Marius'  formation  by  cohorts 22 

Cohorts  comprise  but  one  class  of  troops. .  23 

Cohorts  armed  with  pilum 23 

Legion  divided  into  ten  cohorts 23 

Caesar's  cohort  formation 28 

Cohort  compared  with  maniple  formation,  23 
Deterioration  of  legion  under  the  Empire,  24 
Degeneration  of  soldiers  in  decline  of  Eome,  25 

4.  Barbarous  Nations. 

Barbarians  mostly  foot  soldiers 25 

German  infantry 25 

Frank  foot  soldiers  described 25 

Combat  of  Frank  soldiers 26 

Deep  formation  of  Frank  infantry 27 

Massing  infantry  disappeared  with  Charles 

Martel 23 

5.  Feudal  Infantry. 

Charlemagne's  army  half  cavalry 28 

bfobles  monopolized  profession  of  arms.. .  28 
Knights   wore    armor   and    rode    mailed 

chargers 28 

Infantry  powerless  against  gensdarmes 28 

Infantry  composed  of  servants  and  peasants,  28 

Menial  condition  of  feudal  infantry 28 

Arms  of  feudal  infantry 29 

Used  as  rampart  at  battle  of  Bouvines 29 

Slaughtered  at  battle  of  Crecy 29 

Condottieri  substituted 80 

6.  Communal  Infantry. 

Infantry  regenerated  in  12th  century 80 

Origin  of  communal  militia 81 

Communal  force  chiefly  infantry 81 

Arms  of  communal  infantry 81 

Marched  under  parochial  banner 31 

Served  within  or  not  far  from  commune. .  81 

Maintained  by  king  on  distant  service 32 

Position  in  battle 32 

Superior  to  feudal  infantry 82 

Nobles  not  relieved  from  military  service.  82 
Infantry  more  ready  to  pillage  than  fight.  82 
Grand  Master  of  the  Bowmen  instituted. .  82 

7.  Soldiers  of  Fortune. 

Names  of  vagabond  bands  in  12th  century,  88 
Depredations  committed  by  bands 33 


[  PAGE 

Du  Guesclin  drives  them  from  France 33 

Formation  in  battle  of  French  infantry. . .  83 

8.   English.  Archers. 

Archers  best  infantry  of  14th  century 34 

Arms  and  mode  of  fighting 84 

Hussite  infantry  under  Zisca 34 

Tabor,  or  barricade  of  wagons 34 

9.   Swiss  Infantry. 

Swiss  resuscitate  infantry  in  14th  century,  84 
Compact  formation  of  Swiss  infantry..  ..  34 

Arms  of  Swiss  infantry 34 

Culverins  used  by  Swiss  in  13S6 85 

Swiss  squares  at  Granson  and  Morat 35 

Echelon  formation  of  Swiss 35 

Discipline  and  courage  of  Swiss 85 

Swiss  infantry  extensively  used  in  Europe,  86 

10.  Spanish  Infantry. 

Character  of  Spanish  infantry 36 

Arms  of  Spanish  infantry 36 

Desperate  mode  of  fighting 36 

Arquebus  substituted  for  culverin 86 

Mousquet,  or  improved  arquebus 3T 

Spanish  infantry  terror  of  Europe 37 

Education  and  esprit  of  Spanish  soldier. ..  37 
Torcios  of  Charles  V 87 

11.  Frank  Archers. 

Charles  YII.  established  a  standing  army,  33 

Free  companies  of  cavalry 83 

Frank  archers  the  infontry  of  Charles  VII.,  8S 

Kecruiting  and  exercises  of  archers 38 

Mode  of  compensation  of  archers 38 

Arms  and  dress  of  archers 89 

Force  and  command  under  Louis  XI 89 

France  divided  into  military  departments,  89 

Causes  of  decline  of  Frank  archers 39 

Substitution  of  Swiss  and  other  troops. ...  40 

Lansquenets  adopted  Swiss  pike 40 

Pikemen  in  most  European  armies 40 

Foreign, substituted  for  French  infantry..  40 

Louis  XII.  dismounted  the  gentry 41 

Improved  infantry  victorious  in  Italy 41 

12.  Legions  of  Francis  I. 

French  superior  to  Swiss  at  Marignan., ..  41 

Machiavelli's  estimate  of  infantrj^ 41 

Francis  I.  created  a  national  infantry 41 

Organization  of  legions  of  Francis  1 42 

Command  and  force  of  legion 42 

Proportion  and  duties  of  arquebusiers....  43 

Privileges  of  legionaries 43 

Isolated  bands  substituted  for  legions....  43 

13.   French  Bands. 

French  band  corresponded  nearly  to  bat- 
talion    43 

Oflicers  of  band 43 

Anspessades,  or  first  class  infantry 44 

Arms  of  heavy  and  light  troops  of  bands..  44 


COIfTENTS. 


441 


PAGE 

Formation  and  mode  of  fighting  of  bands . .  44 

Formation  in  battailles 45 

Fire  arms  increased  during  religious  wars,  45 
Loss  of  pikes  felt  till  invention  of  bayonet,  45 

Bands  of  Piedmont  and  Picardy 46 

Bands  of  Cliampagne  and  Navarre 46 

Isolated  bands  suited  to  French  character,  46 

Necessity  of  combining  bands 46 

Regimental  organization  of  old  bands 47 

Character  and  name  of  bands 47 

Order  of  battle  of  regiments 47 

Arms  of  French  regiments 47 

Mounted  infantry  served  as  cavalry 47 

Arquebus  superseded  by  musket 48 

Henry  IV.  diminished  depth  of  infantry,  48 
French  battalion  about  1610 48 

14.  Swedish  Infantry. 

Gus.  Adolphus  gave  mobility  to  infantry,  49 

Formation  of  infantry  under  Gustavus 49 

Depth  diminished  and  fire-arms  increased,  50 

Improvement  in  arms  by  Gustavus 50 

Advantages  of  Gustavus'  innovations 50 

Mixed  formation  of  horse  and  foot 51 

15.   Infantry  of  Louis  XTV. 
and  XV. 

Flint-lock  musket  introduced  in  1652 51 

Turenne  adopted  six-rank  formation 51 

Lighter  arms  and  formation  advantageous,  51 
Formation  of  battalion  under  Louis  XIV.  52 

Company  square  in  1673 53 

Musket  and  bayonet  universally  adopted . .  53 

French  battalion  in  1703 54. 

Grenadiers  originated  under  Louis  XIV..  54  1 


PAGE 

Light  infantry  introduced  by  Fischer 54 

Chasseurs  introduced  by  Fischer  in  1743. .  55 

French  infantry  formed  in  four  ranks 55 

Cadenced  and  lock-step  introduced  by  Saxe,  55 
Formation  of  grenadier  company  (1757). . .  55 

16.   Prussian  Infantry. 

Excellence  of  Prussian  infantry 55 

Superiority  of  Prussian  gun 55 

Firing,tho  mode  of  battle  ol  Frederic  II. .  56 

Tactics  gi-eatly  improved  by  Frederic  II. .  56 

Formation  of  Prussian  battalion  (1752). . . .  56 

Formation  of  Prussian  company 67 

Firing  while  marching  to  the  charge 57 

Mobility  and  solidity  of  Prussian  soldiers,  68 

17.  Modem  Infantry. 

Three-rank  formation  adopted  in  France..  53 
Prussian  drill  introduced  in  French  army,  58 
Chasseur  and  elite  company  of  regiment. .  58 

Voltigcurs  substituted  for  elite  in  1S04 68 

Voltigeur  and  grenadier  company  to  each 

battalion 58 

Army  corps  of  select  troops  for  a  reserve,  59 

Infantry  organization  nearly  fixed 59 

Success  due  to  legs  as  much  as  to  arms. . .  59 

Two-rank  formation  of  some  armies 59 

Approval  of  two-rank  formation 60 

Percussion  substituted  for  flint-lock 60 

Kifled  arms  and  elongated  balls  adopted..  60 

18.  Remarks. 

Depth  of  infantry  constantly  diminished. .  60 

One-rank  formation  probable 61 

Success  cbiefly  due  to  good  infantry 61 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 

INFANTRY     FORMATION    AND    TACTICS. 


1.  General  Principles. 

Advantages  of  infimtry  over  other  arms ...  63 

Infantry  the  basis  of  an  army 63 

Qualifications  for  infantry  soldier 63 

Clothing  suitable  to  infantry 64 

Arms  requisite  for  Infantry 64 

Physical  and  moral  force,  how  increased..  64 

Load  and  march  of  infantry 05 

Infantry  outmarclies  cavalry 65 

Instruction,  from  individual  to  the  mass..  65 

Step  and  different  marching  paces 06 

Space  occupied  in  rank  and  file 66 

Two  and  three-rank  formation  compared.  66 
Infantry  and  cavalrynecessary  to  each  other,  67 

2.  Modes  of  Action  of  Infantry. 

By  firing,  or  with  sabro  and  bayonet *  63 

Sabre  a  poor  arm  for  infantry 68 

Bayonet  an  Inferior  weapon 68 

Bayonet  the  "  weapon  of  the  French  " 68 

Bayonet  only  good  for  a  demonstration. . .  63 


Bayonet  collision  of  rare  occurrence 68 

Bayonet  charge  produces  moral  effect 69 

Bayonet  mClce  at  siege  of  Genoa 69 

Marching  prepares,  firing  secures  victorj',  69 

Firing— simultaneous  and  at  will 69 

Firing  in  three  ranks  difficult 69 

Firing  by  battalions,  divisions,  and  ranks,  70 

Firing  by  command  impracticable  in  battle,  70 

Fire  by  file  best  for  combat 71 

Direct  and  oblique  firing 71 

Firing  improper  while  marching 71 

Bugeaud's  maxims  on  firing 71 

Saxe  condemned  excessive  firing 72 

3.  The  Battalion. 

Tactical  unit  of  infantry 72 

Composition  of,  in  France 72 

Conditions  necessary  in  its  constitution.. .  72 
Subdivisions   same   for   drill    and  disci- 
pline   73 

Subdivisions  symmetrical  and  equal 73 


442 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

4.  Manoeuvres. 

Tactics  consist  of  manoeuvres 73 

Eequisites  for  their  success  in  war 73 

Drills  indispensable  to  train  troops 73 

Manoeuvres  should  be  prompt  and  covered,  74 
Fixed  by  regulations " 74 

5.  Order  of  Battle. 

Positions  of  infantry  in  order  of  battle 74 

First  line  deployed,  second  ployed 75 

Evolution  of  lines  generally  separate 75 

6.  Marcliing  Pormations. 

Infantry  has  four  marching  formations 75 

Marching  in  line 75 

Marching  by  the  flank 76 

Marching  by  column 76 

Marching  in  square 77 

Historical  examples  of  marching  in  square,  77 

7.  Formations  of  Attack. 

Infantry  has  five  formations  of  attack 78 

Attack  in  line 78 

Advantages  and  defects  of  attack  in  line . .  78 

Attack  in  column 79 

Double-central  column  best  for  attack 79 

Columns  of  attack  by  platoons  and  sections,  80 

Depth  of  column  limited 80 

Column  should  steadily  move  to  attack. . .  80 

Advantages  of  attack  in  column 80 

French  successful  in  attack  by  columns. . .  81 
Infantry  mode  of  attacking  intrenchments,  82 

Exposure  of  columns  to  artillery  fire 82 

Mixed  formation  for  attack 82 

Historical  examples  of  attack  in  column . .  82 

Attack  as  skirmishers 83 

Skirmishers  en  grande  bande 83 

Skill  and  valor  required  in  skirmishers...  83 

Bayonet  useful  against  horsemen 84 

Attack  in  echelons 84 

Echelons  should  mutually  flank  each  other,  84 

Direct  and  oblique  echelons 84 

Echelon  cannot  exceed  sis  battalions 85 

Attack  in  squares 85 

Attack  in  squares  in  Egypt 85 

Square  by  battalion  best  for  oifensive 85 

Rectangular  formation  of  battalion 85 

8.  Pormations  of  Defence. 

Infantry  has  five  formations  for  defence. . .  86 

Defence  in  line 86 

Action  of  deployed  line  in  defence 86 


I  PAGE 

I  Formation  defending  intrenchments 86 

I  Genoa's  defence  aided  by  outside  reserves,  87 

Defence  in  column S7 

Column  good  only  against  cavalry 87 

Defence  in  square 87 

Regulation  square 87 

Russian  and  English   manceuvre  against 

cavalry 87 

Schramm's  square 88 

Square  half  full  formed  from  column 88 

Square  by  regiment  best  for  defensive 88 

Square  by  battalion  best  for  off'ensive 88 

Bugeaud's  square  of  a  battalion 89 

Weak  points  of  square 89 

Bayonet  better  than  fire  against  cavalry..  89 

Squares  echeloned  to  flank  each  other 89 

Artillery  formidable  against  square 89 

Cavalry  may  break  square 89 

Square  termed  formation  of  resistance ....  90 

Square  has  defects  of  a  redoubt 90 

Desaix'  square 90 

Wurtembera  square 90 

Defence  in  echelons 90 

Echelons  good  defence  in  retreat 90 

Defence  in  checker-form 91 

Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  checker- 
formation  91, 

9.  Liig-lat  Infantry. 

Light  troops  now  all  regularly  organized..  911 

Light  troops  have  special  tactics 913 

Chasseurs  a  pied  of  France 

Drill,  arms,  duty,  and  organization  of  chas- 
seurs  

Deployed  and  rallied  group  by  fours 92'.| 

Signals  by  whistle  as  well  as  bugle 98| 

Selection  and  instruction  of  chasseurs... 
Important  functions  of  light  infantry 941 

10.  Skirmishers. 

Fight  dispersed,  leaving  reserve  of  a  third,  94  j 

Qualifications  for  .skirmishers 9i\ 

Should  keep  moving,  or  lie  down  to  load,  94 

Chasseurs  furnish  best  skirinishers 94 

Line  infantry  sometimes  used    as    skir- 
mishers    94 

Skirmishers  of  march 95 

Skirmishers  of  battle 95 

Skirmishers  en  grande  hande 96 

Service  of  each  kind  of  skirmishers 96 

Historical  examples  of  use  of  skirmishers,  96 


CHAPTER  THIRD. 

HISTORY     OP      CATALRY, 


1.  Antiquity. 

Mounted  combatants  first  prevailed 97 

War  chariots  much  used  by  ancients 97 


Chariots  armed  with  scythes 97 

Chariots  carrying  military  machines 97 

Chariots  little  used  by  Greeks  and  Romans,  98 


COKTENTS. 


443 


PAGE   ! 

Eows  of  stakes  defence  against  chariots. .     9S  | 
Cavalry  existed  in  Cliina  2,0UU  years  B.  0.,    &S  ! 

Cyrus  introduced  cavalry  in  I'ersia 9S 

Greeks  early  used  cavalry 93 

Epaminondas  appreciated  value  of  cavalry,  98 
Cavalry  increased  after  Epaminondas. ...     98 

Thessalian  and  Etoliau  cavalry 99 

Proportion  of  cavalry  in  Grecian  armies,    99 

Koman  cavalry  mediocre 99 

Vicious  method  of  Roman  use  of  cavalry,  99 
Causes  of  inferiority  of  Koman  cavalry. . .  99 
Cavalry  of  Hannibal  superior  to  Roman . .  100 

Cavalry  of  Roman  citizens  or  knights 100 

Auxiliary  cavalry  of  allies  of  Rome 100 

Proportion  of  cavalry  to  Roman  legion..  100 

Arms  of  cavalry  of  Greece  and  Rome 100 

Ancient  cavalry  moved  slow 101 

Deep  formation  of  Greek  cavalry 101 

Thessalian  lozenge 101 

Cavalry  of  legion  divided  into  ten  turmce,  101 

Roman  turma,  or  squadron 102 

Position  of  cavalry  of  legion 102 

Depth  of  auxiliary  cavalry  less  than  Greek,  102 
Superiority  of  cavalry  of  Numidians,  &c.,  102 
Increase  of  cavalry  in  decline  of  Rome.. .  102 

Barbarians  had  little  cavalry 102 

Cavalry  much  increased  in  feudal  ages. . .  102 
Saddle  invented  in  reign  of  Constantine,  103 

Stirrups  invented  by  Franks 103 

Advantages  of  stirrups 103 

2.  Middle  Ag-es. 

Chivalry  c()ntributed  to  good  police 103 

Tactics  and  chivalry  antagonistic 104 

Service  of  knights  and  their  retinue 104 

Qualification  and  installation  of  knights  .  104 

Knighthood  conferred  before  battle 104 

Banneret  and  bachelor  knights 105 

Lance  and  coutillier 105 

Names  of  pieces  of  a  knight's  armor 106 

Offensive  arms  of  knights 107 


PAGE 

Villains  prohibited  use  of  lance 107 

Knights,  except  in  battle,  rode  a  courtaud,  107 

French  cavalry  charged  in  single  line 107 

Pages,  or  vai  lets,  in  second  line 107 

Cavalry  ignored  tactics  and  discipline. . . .  107 
Cavalry  fought  battles  and  laid  sieges. ...  107 

Cavalry  often  fought  dismounted 108 

Mode  of  fighting  of  knights  as  infantry . . .  103 
Causes  of  decline  of  chivalry 108 

3.  Modern  Times. 

FeudaljSupplanted  by  standing  armies. . .  109 
Charles  VII.  institutes  permanent  troops,  109 

Compagnies  d'ordonnance 109 

Horses  for  gensdarmes  aild  archers 109 

Gendarme  tax 109 

Nobles  prefer  being  captains  to  cavaliers,  110 

Companies  of  Charles  VII.  best 110 

Formation  too  thin  against  German  horse,  110 

Causes  of  German  deep  formation 110 

Fire-arms  adopted  by  cavalry 1 10 

Chevaux-legers  and  stradiots 110 

Cranequiniers  and  malandrins Ill 

Argoulets  and  carabins Ill 

Reitres,  or  pistoliers Ill 

Origin  of  dragoons HI 

Change  to  deep  formation Ill 

Mobility  of  cavalry  lessened 112 

Reduction  to  five  rank  formation '.  112 

Light  cavalry  formed  into  regiments 112 

Improvements  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.. .  112 

Mixture  of  infantry  with  cavalry  bad 113 

Company  in  order  of  battle  in  1750 118 

Changes  in  arms  and  armor 113 

Improvements  made  by  Marshal  Saxe. ..  113 

Improvements  made  by  Frederic  II 114 

Excellence  lies  in  the  charge,  not  firing. .  114 
Frederic's  formation  mostly  two  ranks..  114 

Improvements  made  by  Seydlitz 114 

Two-rank  formation  generally  adopted..  115 
Uniform  loose,  and   load  of  horse  dis- 
tributed    115 


CHAPTER  FOUETH. 

CAVALRY     FORMATION     AND     TACTIC! 


1.   TJse  of  Cavalry. 

Strength  of  cavalry  mostly  in  speed 116 

Pursuit  after  rout  main  use  of  cavalry.. .  116 
Offensive,  the  mode  of  combat  of  cavalry,  116 

Heavy,  light,  and  mixed  cavalry 117 

Carabiniers  and  cuirassiers 117 

Heavy  cavalry  for  decisive  charges 117 

Dragoons  include  all  mixed  cavalry 118 

Dragoons  rarely  fight  on  foot 118 

Service  of  dragoons 118 

Chasseurs  hussars,  and  lancers 119 

Duties  of  light  cavalry 119 

Irregular  cavalry  seldom  used 119 

Cossacks  charge  boldly  only  on  fugitives,  119 


2.  Armament. 

Uniform  and  arms  of  cavalry 120 

Fire-arms  useful  only  for  skirmishers,  &c.,  120 

3.  Numerical  Data. 

Cavalry  one-tenth  to  fifth  of  infantry. . . .  120 

Weight  carried  by  cavalry  horses 120 

Rate  of  travel  of  a  horse 121 

Rate  of  march  of  cavalry  column 121 

4.  Tactical  Unit. 

Squadron,  tactical  unit  of  cavalry., , 121 

Composition  of  French  squadron 121 

Squadron  in  order  of  battle 122 


444 


CO]S^TEjS^TS. 


PAGE 

Length  of  front  and  depth  of  squadron . . .  122 

Oldest  troops  in  front  and  on  right 122 

Effective  force  of  squadron 123 

Two-rank  formation  best  for  cavalry 123 

5.  Manoeuvres. 

Movement  by  fours 124 

Oblique  marches  by  fours  discontinued..  124 

Movement  by  platoons 124 

Trot  ordinary  gait  iu  manoeuvres 125 

6.  Mode  of  Action. 

Danger  to  horseman  less  than  to  footman,  125 
Instruction  to  man  and  horse  essential. . .  125 
Compactness  and  velocity  in  charge 12C 

7.  Charg-e. 

Charge  made  at  beginning  or  end  of  battle,  12G 

Charge  made  on  flanks  of  infantry 12G 

Mode  of  charging 126 

Charge  to  be  persevered  in  to  the  last 127 

Cavalry  should  not  fire  in  charging 127 

Few  killed  or  wounded  in  charge 128 

Charge  often  fails  from  small  cause 128 


PAGE 

Object  of  two  lines  in  charges 123 

Formation  for  the  charge 129 

Successful  charge  completed  by  pursuit..  129 

Pursuit,  how  conducted i29 

Position  of  officers  in  the  charge 129 

Charge  as  foragers  against  artillery 180 

Charge  as  foragers  against  Arabs 130 

8.  Formations. 

Order  in  line,  column,  echelons,  and  square,  130 

Cavalry  attacks  cavalry  in  line 1-30 

Attacks  infantry  in  echelons  or  column . .  130 

Advantages  of  attack  in  echelons 131 

Attack  in  column  against  square 131 

Cavalry  forms  square  for  defence 131 

Column  by  platoon  for  marching 182 

Cavalry  should  march  on  left  of  road  ...  182 
Checker-formation  little  used 132 

0.   Eclair eurs. 

Skirmishers  of  the  cavalry 182 

Duties,  and  how  selected 132 

Advantages  of  combination  with  infantry,  132 
One-fourth  of  troop  from  which  detailed,  132 


CHAPTER  FIFTH. 


HISTORY     OF     ARTILLERY. 


Balista,  onager,  and  catapulta 133 

Weight  of  projectiles,  and  how  far  thrown,  133 

Moved  with  armies  like  field  pieces 134 

Increased  use  among  ancients 134 

Destroyed  by  fire,  or  by  cutting  cords. . .  134 

Causes  of  decline  of  balistic  art 134 

Projectile  machines  during  Crusades 135 

Porriere  and  mangonneau 135 

Invention  of  gunpowder 135 

Cannon  introduced  in  14th  century 136 

Genoese  used  funnels  or  vases  in  1319 136 

Field  artillery  first  on  stationary  frames,  137 

Bombards 137 

Hugo  dimensions  of  bombards ...  - 137 

Bombards  superior  to  ancient  machiaeg,  137 

Bombards  supplanted  in  1376 137 

Artillery  derived  from  artillier 137 

Duties  of  masters  of  artillery 13S 

Cannoniers  instituted  about  1411 138 

Master-general  of  artillery  of  Charles  VII.,  138 

Distribution  of  artillery  in  armies 138 

Cannon  eff"ective  by  noise  chiefly 138 

Importance  for  defence 138 

Unsuitable  for  open  country 188 

Duties  of  chief  of  artillery  divided 138 

Louis  XL  maintained  much  artillery....  138 

Twelve  peers  of  France 139 

Single  chief  of  artillery  reestablished 139 

Charles  VIIPs  use  of  artillery  in  campaign,  139 
Lighter  artillery  adopted  by  Louis  XII..  139 
Two  chiefs  of  artillery  under  Louis  XII . .  139 


Artillery  Increased  and  systematized 14 

Examples  of  success  of  artillery  in  battle,  14 

Grand  master  and  captain-general 14 

Sully  held  it  as  an  office  of  the  crown.. 

First  inspector-general  of  artillery 

First  cannon  made  of  bars  and  hoops . . . 
Cast  iron,  copper,  and  bronze  adopted.. 

Materials  of  projectiles 

Swiss  and  German  infantry,  guard  of  pieces,  U 

Artillery  of  Henry  II.  and  I V 14 

Artillery  of  Germany  in  16th  century.. .  14 
Gus.  Adolphus'  improvements  in  artillery,  14| 

Introduction  of  12  and  24-poHndcrs 14 

Bombs  introduced  in  France 14S 

Light  pieces  only  carried  to  field 14 

Yauban  invented  ricochet  firing  (16SS). . .  142 

Breaches  made  by  cannon 143J 

Carcasses  invented  and  used  in  1672 143 

Fusiliers,  the  guard  of  artillery 142  i 

Name  of  fusilier  from  fusil 148 

French  artillery  corps  instituted 143 

Artillery  under  Louis  XIV 143 

Position  of  artillery  in  battle 143 

Valliere's  system  of  artillery 144 

Horse  artillery  introduced  by  FrederlcIL,  144 
Howitzers  used  in  field  by  Fredciic  II.. .  144 
Artillery  tnctics  improved  by  Frrderic  II.,  144 
Amount  of  artillery  large  under  Frederic,  144 
Gribeauval's  system  introduced  (1765) ...  144 

Great  improvements  by  Gribeauval 145 

Battery  established  as  unit  of  artillery.. .  145 


b 


CONTENTS. 


445 


PAGE 

Battalions  of  the  train  adopted  (ISOl). . . .  145 
Napoleon  used  large  masses  of  artillery, .  145 
Valee's  system,  adopted  from  English...  146 
Four  guns  and  two  howitzers  to  battery,  146 

Simplicity  of  Value's  system 146 

Cannonlers  ride  on  ammunition-chests..  147 


PAGE 

Mobility  of  artillery  of  new  system 147 

Modifications  in  Viil6e's  system  (1854). ..  147 

Napoleon-gun  introduced 147 

Light,  line,  and  reserve  artillery 147 

Advantages  of  these  three  divisions 147 

Train-corps  form  park-batteries 147 


CHAPTER  SIXTH. 

ARTILLERY     FORMATION     AND     TACTICS. 


I 


I 


1.  Purpose  of  Artillery. 

Destruction  of  troops  and  obstacles 148 

Facilitating  attack  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  148 

Artillery  should  act  in  large  masses 14S 

Object  of  field  and  siege  artillery 14S 

Mountain  artillery  carried  on  mules 149 

Artillery  movable  in  march  and  battle.. .  149 

Division  and  reserve  batteries 149 

Duties  of  French  artillery  corps  149 

Artillery  requires  support  of  other  arms,  149 

2.  Numerical  Data. 

Proportion  of  artillery  to  infantry 150 

Proportion  of  artillery  to  cavalry 151 

■Weight  considered  in  fixing  amount 151 

Supply  of  ammunition  carried 151 

Space  occupied  by  artillery  carriages 151 

3.  Tactical  Unit. 

Battery  the  tactical  unit 151 

Composition  of  field-battery 151 

Napoleon-guns  adopted  in  France 152 

Subdivisions  and  commands  of  battery. . .  152 

Composition  of  mountain  battery 152 

4.  Formations. 

Field  artillery  no  defensive  formation...  152 

Formation  in  column 153 

Formation  in  lino 154 

Formation  in  battery 155 

Advancing  and  retiring  by  half-battery..  156 


5.  Manoeuvres. 

Necessity  of  manoeuvres 156 

Artillery  should  manoeuvre  promptly . . . ,  156 

Manoeuvres  more  as  cavalry  than  infantry,  156 

Manoeuvres  mostly  at  a  trot 157 

Oblique  movements  and  wheeling 157 

Kight  or  left  oblique 157 

Artillery  disregards  inversions 153 

Formation  of  column  of  attack 153 

Formation  from  column  to  line 158 

Change  of  front  from  line 153 

Evolutions  of  batteries  on  same  principles,  159 

Guides  not  used  in  manoeuvres 159 

Wheeling  made  on  moving  pivot 159 

Countermarches  and  abouts 159 

6.  Positions. 

Battery  also  applied  to  artillery  in  position,  159 
Choice  of  positions  important  for  batteries,  159 

Commanding  open  ground  eligible  site. . .  160 

Soil  should  be  solid,  but  not  stony 160 

Commodious  and  safe  exits  necessary 160 

Concealed,  to  see  without  being  seen....  160 

Fixed  to  produce  greatest  damage 160 

Direct,  oblique,  and  reverse  batteries., ,.  160 

Enfilading  and  cross  batteries 161 

Division  batteries  fire  throughout  battle,  161 

Reserve  butteries  act  temporarily 161 

Former  in  front  and  on  flanks  of  lines. . .  161 

Latter  for  menaced  points  and  attacks. . .  161 

Caissons  placed  in  strong  and  safe  places,  161 


CHAPTER  SEVENTH. 

HISTORY     OF     ENGINEERS. 


Engineer  arm  not  of  ancient  origin 162 

Italian  engineers  employed  in  all  Europe,  162 
French  fortifications  repaired  by  Sully..  162 

Jngenieurs  ordiriaires  du  roi  (1602) 162 

Engineers  part  of  staff  till  1690 162 

Military  corps  serving  with  armies  in  the 

field  and  on  fortifications 163 

Louis  XIV.  largely  increased  engineers..  163 
Eminent  services  of  engineers  under  Vau- 

ban  in  siege  and  battle 163 

French  fortifications,  methods  of  attack, 

and  usages,  imitated  everywhere 163 

Vauban  made  marshal  for  his  services. ..  163 
Vauban  much  advanced  art  of  engineers,  163 


Immense  lines  of  field-works  constructed,  163 

Extent  made  them  weak  everywhere 163 

Engineers  united  with  artillery  in  1755..  163 

Separated  after  but  three  years'  trial 163 

Uniform  of  French  engineers 163 

Engineers  fixed  at  400  in  1762 163 

Styled,  in  1776,  Cor  pa  Royal  dv.  Genie..  164 

Duties  of  gardes  du  genie 1 64 

Revolution  caused emigrationof  engineers,  164 

Numbers  during  French  Revolution 164 

Employed  more  as  staff  officers  till  ISOO. .  164 
Engineers  too  few  in  1S13  to  defendFrance,  164 
Employed  in  sieges  in  Peninsular  "War. . .  164 
French  consulting  committee  of  engineers,  164 


446 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Cost  and  extent  of  fortifications  of  Paris,  164 
Engineers  fixed  at  460  by  Napoleon  III.,  165 
Sappers  created  in  1671, and  mi iicrs  in  1673,  165 
Vauban,  &c.,   commanded   sappers   and 
miners 165 


PAGE 

Convention  established  engineer  troops. .  165 
Number  and    organization    of  engineer 

troops  under  Napoleon 165 

Meagre    force    of  engineer  officers   and 

troops  in  United  States  army 166 


CHAPTER  EIGHTH. 

FUNCTIONS     OF     THE     ENGINEERS. 


Engineers  one  of  the  arms  of  service 167 

Duties  of  engineers 167 

Construction  and  repair  of  permanent  for- 
tifications   167 

Construction,  &c.  of  military  buildings..  167 
Construction  of  all  field  works  and  ovens,  167 
Making  and  destroying  military  roads.. .  168 
Construction  and  destruction  of  bridges 

Avith  fixed  supports 168 

"Works  for  attack  and  defence  of  places. .  168 

Military  reconnoissanco 168 

Works  executed  by  contract  in  peace 168 

Executed  by  military  workmen  in  war. .  168 
Engineer  troops  recruited  from  mechanics,  168 
Company  of  sappers  to  a  division,  in  war,  169 

Company  the  unit  of  engineer  force 169 

Wagon  to  each  company 169 


Arms  and  tools  carried  by  sappers 169 

Proportion  of  tools  to  a  company 169 

Miners  carry  special  mining  tools 169 

Miners  accompany  engineer  train 169 

Articles  carried  by  engineer  train 169 

Sappers  and  miners  drilled  as  infantry. . .  169 
Devotion  to  duty  of  sappers  and  miners,  170 
Floating  bridges,  transported  with  armies, 

built  by  artillery  in  France 170 

Pontonniers  belong  to  engineers  in  most 

armies 170 

Pontonniers  a  distinct  corps  in  Austria 

and  Russia 170 

Pontonniers  should  belong  to  engineers 

in  France 170 

Arms  and  equipment  of  French  engineer 

troops 170 


PART  SECOND. 

COMBINATION     OF    THE     AEMB. 


CHAPTER  FIRST. 


ORGANIZATION     OF     ACTIVE     ARMIES. 


1.  Principles  of  Organization. 
Brigades,  how  organized  and  commanded,  171 

Divisions,  how  organized 172 

Division,  fundamental  element  of  an  army,  172 

Advantages  of  division  formation 172 

Army  composed  of  several  divisions 172 

Relation  of  commanders  in  armies 172 

Permanent  and  temporary  fractions 173 

Organization  by  divisions  best  for  armies,  173 
Organization  by  army-corps  in  some  cases,  173 

Cases  where  army-corps  preferred 173 

Fractions  in  order  of  importance 174 

Army-corps  must  be  self-sustaining 174 

Army-corps  usually  composed  of  all  arms,  174 
Army-corps  of  cavalry  under  Napoleon. .  174 

Limits  of  cavalry  army-corps 174 

Composition  and  strength  of  army-corps,  174 

Order  of  battle  of  an  army-corps 175 

Order  of  battle  of  a  division 175 

Divisions  had  better  be  of  equal  force 176 

Purpose  and  proportion  of  reserves 176 

Reserves  f<»r  defence  as  well  as  for  offense,  177 

Reserve  composed  of  veteran  troops 177 

Embrace  heavy  cavalry  and  artillery 177 


Napoleon  used  an  army-corps  for  reserve,  177 
Imperial  guard  and  grenadiers  in  reserve,  17T] 
Withdrawal  of  select  troops  objectionable,  1771 
Withdrawal  should  be  only  temporary..  177J 

Solid  reserves  indispensable  in  field 177] 

Composition  of  brigades 178i 

Mixed  brigades  for  advanced-guards,  &c.,  178 
Appendages  of  an  army-parks,  trains,  &c.,  17 

Special  reserve  of  heavy  cavalry 1791 

Depots  of  an  army,  and  where  established,  178  j 

2.  Commands. 

Command  of  army  or  corps,how  regulated. 
Command  of  wings,  centre,  and  reserve, 

Command  of  divisions  and  brigades 

General  assigns  temporary  commanders. . 
General -in-chief  assisted  by  staff  officers. 

Chief  of  staff  and  sub-chiefs 

Duties  of  the  etat-major  (staff-corps) 

Administrative  services  for  an  army 

Duties  of  intendant  and  his  assistants 

Duties  of  chief  and  staff  of  engineers 

Duties  of  chief  and  staff  of  artillery 

Command  and  staff'  of  divisions,  &c 


CONTENTS. 


447 


PAGE 

A-ides-de-camp  and  orderly  ofliccrs 182 

Duties  of  commandant  of  headquarters..  1S2 

Duties  of  provost  marshal-general 183 

Duties  of  wagon-master  of  headquarters,  183 
Command,  &c.,  of  division  headquarters,  184 


3.  Standing  Armies. 

Organized  in  France  and  Austria  for  war,  184 
Organized  in  Prussia  for  peace  and  war . .  184 
Advantages  of  both  systems 184 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 


MARCHES. 


1.  Marches  of  Concentration. 

Performed  at  a  distance  from  enemy 186 

Mode  of  conducting  and  details 186 

Made  by  day  if  practicable 186 

Rate  of  travel  and  halts 187 

Uniformity  of  gait  essential  for  cavalry. .  187 

2.  Marches  of  Manoeuvre. 

Performed  in  presence  of  the  enemy 187 

Made  cautiously,  and  prepared  for  attack,  187 

Made  in  strong,  short  columns 187 

Position  of  dift'erent  arms  in  march 188 

Number  and  distance  ap;irt  of  columns. .  ISS 
Column  must  be  covered  by  light  troops,  183 

Duties  of  advance-guard  of  a  column 189 

Duties,  &c.,  of  commander  of  advance- 
guard 189 


Strength  of  advance-guard,  and  position . .  190 

Duties  of  rear-guard  of  a  column 190 

Qualifications  of  chief  of  rear-guard 190 

Duties  of  flankers  of  a  column 191 

General  advance  and  rear-guard  of  colv.mns,  19! 
Kuse  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  march. .  191 

Conveyance  of  messages 191 

March  of  manoeuvre  by  front,  flank,  or  rear,  192 

March  by  flank  in  single  long  column 192 

Precautions  to  be  taken  in  march  by  flank,  193 

Examples  of  flank  marches 193 

Marches  of  manceuvro  must  be  rapid. . . .  193 

Massena's  celebrated  march  at  Eivoli 193 

Defeat  of  Austriaus  in  1809  from  inactivit}^  194 
Eapidity  of  march  indispensable  in  pursuit,  194 
Retreat,  a  series  of  retrograde  marches. . .  194 
Precautions  to  be  taken  in  retreat 194 


CHAPTER  THIRD. 


BATTLES. 


1.  Primitive  Order  of  Battle. 

Three  lines  in  battle 196 

First  line  brings  on  the  action 196 

Second  line  supports  first 196 

First  line  is  deployed  in  order  of  battle. .  197 
Second  line  in  columns,  by  battalions ....  197 
Second  linedcployed  if  exposed  to  artillery,  197 

Reserve  in  column,  by  brigades 197 

Second  line  should  be  300  yards  from  first,  198 
Reserve  1,000  to  1,200  yards  in  its  rear. . .  19S 
Cavalry  should  be  on,  and  support  flanks,  199 
Exception  when  cavalry  may  be  at  centre,  199 

Artillery  in  front,  opposite  intervals 199 

Second  line  in  rear  of  flanks  and  intervals,  199 
Artillery  of  reserve  close  to  main  reserve,  199 
Parks,  Ac,  in  safe  place  in  rear  of  reserve,  199 

Entire  division  usually  in  same  line 200 

Primitive  order  of  battle  delineated 200 

Circumstances  modify  this  review  order,  201 

2.  Orders  of  Battle. 

Parallel  order  of  battle 201 

I'arallel.the  ancient  order  of  battle 202 

Modifications  of  parallel  order 202 

Oblique  order  of  battle 202 

Examples  of  oblique  order  of  battle 203 

Perpendicular,  a  case  of  oblique  order. .. .  203 


I  Concave  order  of  battle 

Examples  of  concave  order 

Convex  order  of  battle 

Convex,  a  bad  order,  except  in  few  cases, 
Turks'  transformation  of  convex  to  con- 
cave   

i  Practically,  orders  are  mere  approxima- 
tions  

,  Continuous  lines  preferable 

1  3.  Conduct  of  the  Battle. 

!  Object  and  necessity  of  battles 

\  Superiority  offeree  not  indispensable 

■  Victors  try  to  cut  enemy's  line 

;  Vanquished  try  to  preserve  its  line 

General  conforms  his  order  to  circum- 
stances  

I  Point  of  attack  determined  bystrategy,&c., 
i  Avoid  obstacles,  and  strike  at  weak  points, 

!  Genius  and  experience  decide  battles 

I  Long  circuits  to  be  avoided  in  flanking.. 
;  Attacks  on  many  points  objectionable. . . 

•  Examples  of  attacks 

'  Attacks  should  be  sudden  and  concealed, 

j  Provision  to  be  made  for  reverses 

i  Orders  completed  by  verbal  instructions, 
;  Discretionary  powers  to  subordinates. .. 


204 
204 


204 


205 
205 


205 
206 
206 
200 


203 


448 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE  I  PAGE 

Mode  of  conducting  an  offensive  battle...  210  j  Squares  to  be  used  in  defensive  battles..  214 

Conduct  of  pursuit  after  victory 212  |  Eet'stablisbing  an  uncovered  flank 214 

Kequisites  of  position  for  defensive  battle,  212  j  Assuming  offensive  from  defensive 214 

Precautions  for  vigorous  defence 213  \  Mode  of  conducting  a  retreat 215 

Mode  of  conducting  a  defensive  battle ...  213  i  History  of  battles  to  be  studied 216 


PART  THIRD. 


MINOR      OPERATIONS, 


CHAPTER   FIRST. 

OUTPOSTS. 


Introduction. 

Portion  of  army  must  guard  the  whole. .  217 

Functions  of  outposts 217 

Outposts  take  place  of  scouts  of  ancients,  218 

Outposts  the  eyes  of  an  army 

Composed  to  watch  most  active  enemy. 
Covering,  not  fighting,  corps  of  army. . . 

Safety  in  vigilance 

Surveillance  active,  not  too  regular 

Posted  to  watch  and  impede  enemy 

Outposts  extend  beyond  advance-guard. 

Transient  or  permanent,posted  alike 

Number  for  outposts,  and  how  supplied. 
Constituent  parts  of  outposts 


218 
218 
218 
219 
219 
219 
220 
220 
220 
220 


1.  Grand  Guards. 

Advanced  posts  of  camp  or  cantonment. .  221 
Number,  force,  position,  how  regulated..  221 

Infantry  and  cavalry  guard  combined 221 

Force  and  command  of  regimental  guard,  221 
Positions  to  be  occupied  by  grand  guards,  222 

Seldom  dispensed  with 222 

Posts  protected  by  temporary  defences..  222 
Intrenching,  like  ancients,  disapproved..  222 

Communications  to  be  secured 222 

Obstructions  made  toward  enemy 223 

Duties  of  grand  guards 223 

Precautions  to  be  taken  by  grand  guards,  223 
Conduct  of  grand  guard  when  attacked..  224 
Posted  2,500  yards  in  advance  of  army. . .  224 


2.  Small  Posts. 

Covering  force  of  grand  guard 224 

Positions,  force,  and  communications 225 

Instructions  and  duties  of  commanders..  225 

Precautions  at  small  posts 225 

Cossack-posts 220 

3.  Sentinels  and  Vedettes. 

Covering  force  of  small  posts 226 

Posted  500  yards  in  front  of  small  posts..  226 
Infantry  sentinels  and  cavalry  vedettes..  226 

Duties  of  sentinels  and  vedettes 227 

Precautions  by  sentinels  and  vedettes. ..  227 

4.  Distribution  of  the  Outposts. 

Distances  and  system  of  outposts 223 

Modified  by  nature  of  ground 228 

Distances  diminished  at  night 230 

5.   Posts  of  Support. 

Location,  object,  and  armament 230 

Form  fourth  line  of  outpost  defence 230 

6.  Patrols,  Lookouts,  Rounds. 

Outposts  must  be  under  surveillance 230 

Duties  and  object  of  round,  patrols,  &c...  281 

Arrangement  of  a  defensive  patrol 2-31 

Arrangement  of  an  offensive  patrol 232 

Patrols  should  not  remain  in  mass 233 

Precautions  to  be  observed  by  patrols...  234 


CHAPTER  SECOND. 

DETACHMENTS. 


1.  General  Observations. 

Object  and  duties  of  offensivcdetachmcnts,  235 
Made  up  of  fixed  fractions  of  regiments..  236 

Artillery  and  engineers  not  included 236 

Qualifications  and  duties  of  the  chiefs.. ..  236 

Feeble  on  the  march 238 

Advance  and  rear-guard  and  flankers.  ..  238 

Force  of  guards  and  flankers 238 

Precautions  to  be  taken  by  chief 239 

Should  always  be  ready  for  defence 239 


Should  not  be  stopped  by  a  river 240 

Have  a  right  to  shares  of  booty 240 

2.  Detachments  of  Infantry. 

Duties  and  precautions  to  be  taken 240 

Marching  formation  and  force 241 

3.  Detachments  of  Cavalry. 

Used  where  celerity  is  required 243 

Duty  of  their  advance-guards 243 


COITTENTS. 


449 


PAGE 

Dangers  of  defiles  to  bo  avoided 243 

Formation  and  march 244 

4.  Mixed  Detachments. 

Possess  more  stability  than  of  a  single  arm,  244 


PAGE 

Duties  for  which  most  suitable 244 

Order  of  march  In  diflerent  cases 244 

Dispositions  for  combat 245 

Marching  formation  on  level  ground 246 

Marching  formation  on  broken  ground. . .  247 


CHAPTER  THIRD. 


ARMED     RECONNOISS  ANCES. 


Introduction. 

Armed  reconnoissauce  defined 24S 

Basis  of  every  military  movement 248 

Diflieult  and  complicated 248 

Designed  to  see  and  collect  all  information,  249 

Five  kinds  of  reconnoissances 249 

Proposed  manner  of  treating  the  subject,  249 

1.  Daily  Reconnoissances. 

Object,  and  indications  for  guidance 250 

Kind  of  troops  varied  by  nature  of  country,  250 

Must  be  divested  of  regularity 250 

Aim,  information  and  not  combat 251 

Cases  where  combat  is  proper 251 

Has  advance,  rear-guard  and  flankers 251 

Flankers  not  far  from  main  body 251 

Precautions  to  avoid  ambuscades 251 

Precautions  when  halting 252 

Manner  of  observing  columns  on  march,  252 

2.  Special  Heconnoissances. 

Facilitating  march  of  columns 252 

Exploring  positions  to  be  occupied 252 

Ascertaining  enemy's  posts  and  defences,  253 
Estimating  enemy's  forces  at  all  points..  253 
Made  by  oflicers  according  to  speciality. .  253 
Instructions  to  whom  and  how  given. . . .  254 
Posts  not  to  be  attacked  without  authority,  254 

3.  Secret  Reconnoissances. 

Occupy  sometimes  several  days  and  nights,  254 
Secret  if  possible,  and  open  if  necessary,  255 
Intrusted  only  to  veteran  light  troops,. . .  255 
Requisites  in  the  chief  and  subordinates,  255 
Striking  example  ofVauban's  sang-froid,  257 
Chief  should  know  language  of  country. .  257 
Chief  should  have  telescope,  maps,  &c. ..  258 
Detachment  composed  of  light  cavalry..  258 
Composed  of  fifteen  to  forty  horsemen ...  258 

Moves  secretly  and  rapidly 259 

Accompanied  by  advance-guard  and  guide,  259 

Rallying  point  to  be  designated 259 

Messages  to  be  destroyed  to  avoid  capture,  259 

Formed  in  three  unequal  echelons 260 

Mode  of  conducting  reconnolssance 260 

When  discovered  to  be  renewed 260 

Chief  sometimes  advances  with  guide  only,  260 
Prisoners  to  be  made  if  other  means  fail . .  261 
Promptness  and  despatch  indispensable. .  261 
Retires  after  object  is  accomplished 261 

29 


4.  Offensive  Reconnoissances. 

Made  openly  by  force  of  anns 261 

Composed  of  artillery  and  light  cavalry. .  262 
Penetrates  to  point  where  all  can  be  seen,  262 

Supported  in  force  if  necessary 262 

Made  by  general  himself  on  eve  of  battle,  262 
Ordered  usually  by  general-in-chief 263 

5.  Report. 

Drawn  up  in  clear  and  positive  manner. ,  268 
Accompanied  by  sketch  of  ground,  &c. . .  263 
Better  to  be  too  explicit  than  too  concise,  263 
Indispensable  to  be  made  quickly  and  well,  264 

Made  verbally  often  to  avoid  delay 265 

"Written  or  oral,  must  be  clear  and  concif-e,  2C5 

6.  Historical  Examples. 

Pursuit  of  Duke  of  Savoy  from  Turin. . .  265 

Capture  of  Austrian  battalion  in  1805 266 

Lannes' false  march  after  Austerlitz 267 

Euse  of  Capt.  Curely  near  Eaab  in  1809,  267 

Defeat  of  Massena  at  Busaco  in  1810 268 

Capt.  Light's  exploit  near  Vic-de-Bigorre,  269 

7.  Reconnoissances  in  Africa. 

Difiiculty  and  danger 270 

Arab  limiers'  various  ruses 270 

8.   Maps. 

Indispensable  in  conducting  war 272 

Verification  of  correctness  necessary 272 

Mode  of  verifying  maps 273 

Cassini's  maps  deceived  Allies  in  1814.. .  273 

Foreign  maps  usually  defective 274 

Governmental  maps  to  be  trusted 274 

Road  and  station  maps 274 

9.  Guides. 

Give  information  not  on  maps 275 

Indispensable  to  success  of  armies 275 

Class  of  persons  from  whom  selected 276 

How  procured  and  treated 276 

Mode  of  ascertaining  their  intelligence. ..  277 
Must  obtain  knowledge  of  their  character,  277 

Selected  from  those  in  your  interest 273 

Punishment  and  rewards 278 

Interrogate  several,  and  not  rely  upon  one,  279 

Two  necessary  to  every  detachment 279 

Precautions  to  prevent  their  escape 280 

Must  be  prevented  falling  asleep 281 


I 


450 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

10.  Deserters. 
Disarmed  and  interrogated 281 

Not  to  be  trusted,  often  spies  in  disguise,  281 
Exaggerate  information  to  be  welcomed,  281 
Manner  of  interrogation  and  questions. . .  282 

11.  Inhabitants. 

Officials  and  other  persons  interrogated . .  2S2 

Questions  to  be  asked 282 

Questioned  separately  in  tlieir  language. .  283 

12.  Travellers. 

Questions  asked  of  comers  from  enemy..  233 

Interrogated  to  ascertain  whether  spies. .  284 

Testimony  to  be  rectified 284 

13.  Prisoners. 

Questions  to  be  put  same  as  to  deserters,  284 

Information  from  them  quite  reliable 285 

Capture  of  prisoners  to  obtain  information,  285 

14.  Spies. 

Definition  of  a  spy 286 

Spies  from  devotion  to  prince  or  countr)'-,  286 
Spies  procured  from  all  conditions  of  life,  287 
Examples  of  noted  spies 287 


PAGE 

Qualifications  for  spies,  and  where  found,  288 
Inhabitants  and  soldiers  of  enemy  spies. .  2S8 

Cruel  last  resort  to  obtain  spies 289 

Soldiers,  disguised  as  inhabitants,  used,.  289 
Spies  easily  got  among  a  divided  people,  290 
Diflicult  to  obtain  among  uprising  people,  290 

Verification  of  spies'  information 291 

Double  spies,  how  treated  and  made  use  of,  291 
Whimsical  ruse  of  Suwarrow  in  Poland,  291 

Spies  must  not  reside  in  camp 29i 

Spies  kept  apart  with  assumed  names..,  292 

Precautions  against  disguises  of  spies 292 

Sutlers  and  clerks  must  be  watched 293 

Spies'  reports  should  be  kept  secret 293 

Imprudent  speech  of  Alphonso  X 293 

Arrested  spies  searched  and  watched 293 

Examples  of  concealed  despatches 294 

15.  Indications. 

Divining  enemy's  intentions  gift  of  genius,  294 

Mythological  illustration  of  indications  .  294 

Historical  illustrations  of  indications....  294 

Skill  by  observation  and  comparison 295 

Interpreting,a  moral  part  of  war 295 

Principal  indications  enumerated 295 

True  from  false,  how  distinguished 297 


CHAPTER 

PASSAGE      0 

Introduction. 

Water-courses  formidable  obstacles  in  war,  298 

Various  modes  of  crossing  streams 298 

Improvised  passages  chiefly  considered..  298 

1.  Keconnoissance  of  a  River. 

Particulars  to  be  ascertained  enumerated,  299 
Various  points  to  be  exactly  explained..  299 

2.  Discovery,  Destruction,  and 
Hepair  of  Fords. 

Maximum  depth  of  fords  for  different  arms,  300 
Careful  search  should  be  made  for  fords. .  300 

Existence  of  fords,  how  indicated 300 

Below  mills  and  near  mouths  of  streams,  301 

Mode  of  reconnoitring  a  ford 301 

Mode  of  tracing  a  ford 301 

Ford  usually  found  in  double  bends 301 

Oblique  fords 802 

Essential  requisites  of  a  good  ford 302 

Fords  useful  to  us  must  be  protected 303 

Enemy's  fords  destroyed  or  obstructed. . .  303 

Modes  of  obstructing  fords 803 

Modes  of  breaking  up  or  destroying  fords,  304 
Modes  of  repairing  and  improving  fords,  304 

Fords  should  be  staked  out 306 

Fords  not  to  be  relied  upon  for  passage. ,  306 
Fords  of  mountain  torrents  not  reliable . .  806 
Disasters  by  changes  of  the  ford  of  Cinca,  806 


FOURTH. 

F      R  I  T  E  II  S  . 

3.  Fording"  a  River. 

Fords  suffice  for  detachments,  not  armies,  307 
Troops  when  heated  must  not  pass  a  ford,  307 
Stakes  or  guard-ropes  required  for  fords,  307 
Precautions  taken  in  fording  rapid  streams,  307 

Mode  of  fording  by  the  several  arms 303 

Precedence  of  arms  in  fording 808 

Fording  of  Granicus  and  Tagliamento. . .  309 
Historical   examples    of  importance   of 

fords 309 

English  won  Crecy  by  discovering  a  ford,  309 
Soult's  failure  to  ford  Tagus  saved  Wel- 
lington  ". 809 

4.  Swimming  a  River. 

Examples  of  swimming  with  despatches,  809 

Lille  saved,  in  1708 310 

Defence  of  Genoa  prolonged,  in  1800....  810 
Poniatowski,  not  a  swimmer,  drowned..  810 

Importance  of  swimming  to  soldiers 811 

French  soldiers  not  good  SAvimmers 311 

Passage  of  Linlh,  in  1799 811 

Choice  of  place  for  swimming  a  stream..  811 

Precautions  essential  for  infantry 812 

Passage  of  Loire  by  Ctsar 812 

Passage  of  Meuse  by  Prince  of  Orange.. .  812 
Precautions  to  be  observed  by  cavalry . .  812 

Horses  drowned  in  crossing  Oder 312 

Swimming  horses  behind  boats ' . .  •  •  813 


CONTENTS 


451 


PAGE 

Horseman  carrying  a  foot  soldier  behind,  813 

Passage  of  Douro,  in  15S0 313 

Passage  of  Rhine,  in  1639 313 

Arm  of  sea  crossed,  in  170S 313 

Mode  of  Tartar  cavalry  swimming  rivers,  313 
Celebrated  swimming  of  Rhine  by  Louis 
XIV 313 

5.  Passage  upon  Ice. 

1  Fastening  congelation  of  channel  of  river,  314 
Ice  not  trusted  if  it  does  not  lay  on  water,  314 
Thickness  of  ice  for  passage  of  all  arms. .  814 
Artificially  increasing  thickness  of  ice ... .  314 


PAGE 

Precautions  to  be  taken  in  crossing  ice,.  315 
Disorder  and  confusion  to  be  prevented . .  815 
Crossing  the  frozen  Frische-Haff,  in  1679,  315 
Dutch  fleet  captured  by  cavalry,  in  1795,  315 

6.  Improvised  Bridges. 

Construction  belong  mostly  to  artillery, .  815 

Foot-bridge  of  ladders 316 

Bridges  of  undressed  trees 816 

Bridge  of  wagons  for  shallow  streams. ,.  816 
Rope  bridges  on  narrovvmountain  torrents,  817 

Suspension  bridges  of  ropes 818 

Small  pile-bridges 318 


CHAPTER  FIFTH. 


CONVOYS. 


Introduction. 

Definition  and  object  of  a  convoy 319 

Convoys,muscles  of  army 319 

Organization  of  convoysdcmand  great  care,  319 
Outfit,&c.,both  adminisi  rative  and  tactical,  319 

Convoys  never  march  without  escort 319 

Force,  Ac,  determined  by  circumstances,  320 
Composed  of  infantry  and  a  little  cavalry,  320 

Ready  to  overcome  difficulties 320 

Some  artillery  and  sappers  attached 320 

Grade  of  commandant  of  convoy 320 

Artillery  officer  usually  convoys  ammu- 
nition    320 

Chief  has  detailed  written  instructions,,  .321 
Not  to  be  modified  by  any  one  on  the  route,  821 
Command  of  convoy  a  delicate  mission,,  821 

1.  Org-anization  of  tlie  Convoy. 

Chief  ccdlocts  and  examines  convoy 821 

Everything  necessary  must  be  provided. .  321 

Materiel  must  be  examined  in  detail 321 

Spare  wagons  and  parts  carried  along 322 

Large  convoys  divided  and  subdivided, . .  322 
Portion  of  escort  guards  each  subdivision,  322 
Wagons  of  most  value  at  heads  of  divisions,  322 

Hostile  prisoners  at  heads  of  convoys 323 

Beasts  of  burden  precede  convoy-wagons,  823 

Convoy  has  advance  and  rear-guard 323 

Chief  reserves  no  special  command 823 

Weight  carried  by  wagons  and  animals. ,  323 
Space  occupied  and  rateoftravelof  wagons,  324 
Forbidden  to  put  knapsacks  on  wagons..  324 

2.  March  of  the  Convoy. 

Examination  of  route  of  march  to  be  made,  324 

March  made  slow  at  uniform  rate 824 

Ad  vance-guai-d  precedes  convoy  sometime,  824 

Duties  of  advance-guard 825 

March  in  two  files,  and  drivers  watched,  825 
Wagons  kept  repaired,  or  thrown  out. . . .  325 

Escort  holds  all  dangerous  positions 826 

Vigilance  never  relaxed 326 


3.  Halts  and  Parks. 

Long  halts  made  only  in  strong  positions,  .S26 
Ilorseskept harnessed andwagons guarded,  32? 
Convoy  parked  at  night  and  on  halts. . .  327 
Wagons  occupy  exterior,  and  horses  and 

valuables  interior  of  park 327 

Park  resembles  barricade  or  intrenchment,  327 

Circular  park,  with  horses  in  interior 827 

Rectangular  park  used  in  Prussia S2S 

Park  formed  from  marching  column 329 

Archduke  Charles,  parks,  by  divisions 829 

Parks  far  from  towns,  woods,  «fec 330 

Defensive  accessories,  called  tabors 030 

4.  Defence  of  the  Convoy. 

Convoys  should  be  drilled  to  resist  attack,  831 
Measures  taken  on  approach  of  enemy. . .  831 

Skirmishers  keep  enemy  at  distance .331 

Convoy  eains  shelter  and  halts S3 1 

Enemy  dispersed,  and  march  resumed..  oS2 
Escort  recnforccd  to  resist  centra!  attack,  832 
Threatened  positions  to  be  occupied....  332 

Attack  in  rear  repelled  by  rear-guard 332 

Convoy  subdivided  in  dangerous  i»laces,  3.32 
Defence  failing  wagons  to  be  destroyed,  333 

Escort  does  not  pursue  enemy 833 

Prisoners  must  lie  down  during  attack. . .  883 
Prisoners  confined  in  defensible  houses, .  833 
Requisites  for  the  defence  of  a  convoy..  834. 

5.  Attack  of  a  Convoy. 

Advantage  in  attacks  with  assailant 834 

Attack  based  on  previous  information.. .  S84 
Corps  of  attack  divided  into  three  masses,  884 

First  engages  the  escort 884 

Second  falls  upon  the  wagons 8:34 

Third  remains  in  reserve 3.34 

Attack  made  on  centre  in  level  ground..  885 

Parks  attacked  in  rear  or  breached 335 

Attacks  generally  for  seizing  valuables..  385 
Often  limited  to  disorganizing  convoys..  835 


452 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

6.  Convoys  by  Water. 

Transport  bulky  and  heavy  supplies 836 

Distribution  of  escort  on  boats  and  shore,  336 

High  banks  to  be  occupied 337 

Convoy  halts  during  attack 337 

Convoy  proceeds  if  escort  is  victorious. . .  337 

Boats  sunk  If  escort  is  beaten 337 

Attack  of  convoy  of  boats  in  bend  of  river,  337 


I  PAGE 

Captured  convoy  best  be  removed  by  laud,  338 

7.  Historical  Examples. 

Corbie  relieved  by  entrance  of  convoy..  83y 
Success  of  convoy  introduced  into  Lille. .  339 
Attack  of  water  convoy  for  relief  of  Aire,  341 
Attack  of  land  convoy  for  relief  of  Olmutz,  342 
Kescue  of  a  convoy  of  Prussian  prisoners,  344 
Eccapture  of  convoy  in  Spain,  in  1811 344 


CHAPTER  SIXTH. 

PARTISANS. 


Definition  and  duties  of  partisans 346 

Act  not  at  a  venture,  nor  trust  to  chance,  346 
Operations  of,  part  of  plan  of  campaign  . .  346 
Dispensed  with  by  French  and  English. .  346 
Sometimes  termed  flankers  in  France. . .  346 

Modern  restriction  in  movements 347 

Composition  &c.,  vary  with  circumstances,  347 
Quality  more  than  quantity  necessary.. .  347 

Qualifications  needed  for  partisans 347 

Free  corps,  specially  raised,  good  material,  848 
Corps,rising  through  political  events,best,  343 
Essential  qualificationsof  partisan  chief. .  348 
Partisans  rely  mainly  on  expedients 349 


Inspire  respect  at  home  and  terror  abroad,  349 

Must  bid  adieu  to  idleness  and  rest 350 

March  concealed  anddiscipline  maintained,  8o0 
Discover  everything  and  be  stopped  by 

nothing 350 

Avoid  towns,  take  hostages,  resort  to  ruses,  850 

Dart  on  their  prey  like  vultures 351 

Success  being  doubtful,  should  retreat.. .  851 
Chief's  orders  given  to  next  in  command,  351 

Apportionment  of  prize  money 351 

Statement  of  requisitions  to  be  made.. ..  352 
Mansfeld,  and  other  celebrated  partisans,  353 
Historical  examples  of  partisan  operations,  353 


CHAPTER  SEVENTH. 

SURPRISES  AND  AMBUSCADES. 


Introduction. 

Surprises  aid  the  weak  against  the  strong,  356 

Essential  conditions  and  preparations 856 

Used  in  offensive  or  defensive  operations,  357 

1.  Surprises  by  Ambuscade. 

Derivation  of  the  term  ambuscade 357 

Purpose  of  an  ambuscade S5S 

Eequisites  in  composition  of  force 358 

Precautions  on  march  to  designated  place,  359 
Selection  of  position  for  an  ambuscade. . .  359 

Locations  for  concealing  troops 360 

Surprise  of  camp  or  cantonment 360 

Position  of  ambuscade  to  be  first  searched,  361 

Precautions  in  guarding  ambuscade 361 

Noise,  fire,  lights,  sleep,  &c.,  forbidden.. .  361 
Conduct  of  an  attack  from  an  ambuscade,  862 

Ruse  employed  in  retreats 362 

Counter-ambuscade  against  ambuscade..  363 

2.  Surprise  by  a  March. 

Calculated  for  the  proper  time  and  place,  3C3 


Break  of  day  best  time  for  surprise 363 

March  at  right  angles  to  enemy's  march,  368 
More    frequent    than   surprise    by   am- 
buscade   863 

Wrapping  horses'  hoofs  in  sheepskin 364 

Surprise  more  dishonorable  than  defeat. .  864 
Kleber's  precept  respecting  surprises 364 


3.  Historical  Examples. 

Should  emerge  from  ambuscade  in  a  body,  854 

Example  of  Labienus  in  44  B.  C 364 

Badge  or  rallying  signal  necessary 365 

Example    of  Villars'  reconnoissance   in 

1667 865 

Soldiers  in  ambush  should  not  sleep 865 

Example  of  night  ambuscade  in  Spain....  865 
Failed  at  Mayence  through  imprudent  cry,  866 
Capture  of  the  Vendean  chief,  Stofliet. . .  866 

Covering  obstacle  against  surprise 866 

Marmonfs  surprise  of  Eussian  outposts,  866 
Surprise  in  Algeria  nearly  frustrated 367 


CHAPTER  EIGHTH. 

HEIGHTS. 


1.  Reconnoissance. 

Heights  first  to  be  reconnoitred 868 

Essential  information  to  be  obtained 868 

Places  for  combat  to  be  indicated 869 


2.  Defence. 

Military  crest  between  slope  and  plateau,  369 

Position  of  defender  to  repel  attack 369 

First  line  near  military  crest 370 


COIfTENTS. 


453 


PAGE 

Assailant  fired  upon  before  rouching  crest,  371 

Second  line  placed  to  support  first 371 

Ueserve  to  watch  flanking  movements. . .  871 
Plateaux  to  be  successively  defended. . ..  871 

Flanking  fires  particularly  useful 371 

Cavalry  acts  chiefly  with  reserve 871 

Solid  and  experienced  infantry  necessarj-,  371 
Examples  of  Talavera  and  Pampeluna. . .  371 

3.  Attack. 
Should  seek  to  turn  position 872 


PAGE 

Attack  in  front  accompanied  by  false  ones,  372 

Main  attack  chiefly  by  light  troops 372 

Supported  by  small  and  mobile  colnmns,  372 
Attack  must  be  covered  by  skirmishers,  372 
Columns,  so  covered,  advance  step  by  step,  878 

4.  Attack  of  Height  by  Company 
of  Infantry. 

Bugeaud's  instructions  for  attack 373 

Company  divided  into  four  half-sections,  373 
Conduct  of  the  attack  described 374 


CHAPTER  NINTH. 


WOODS. 


I 


1.  Beconnoissance. 

Necessity  of  reconnoitring  woods 

Mode  of  conducting  reconnoissance 

Objects  to  be  noted  and  fully  reported. . 

2.  Defence. 

Assailant  to  be  arrested  at  verge  of  wood. 
Close  outlets  and  protect  projecting  points. 

Centre  of  action  to  be  selected 

Distribution  of  troops  for  defence  of  forest. 
Distributing  troops  for  defence  of  coppice. 


875 

375 


376 
377 
877 
377 

S7S  i 


3.  Attack. 

Preparations  for  attack  made  at  a  distance,  378 

Force  moves  rapidly  to  attack  woods 879 

Principal  attack  to  cut  line  of  retreat 379 

Vigorous  and  veteran  troops  required 879 

Distance  between  lines  and  reserve 379 

Mode  of  attack  of  different  kinds  of  woods,  379 
Eear-guard  to  cover  reserve  3S0 

4.  Example. 

Eichepanse's  success  at  IIohenlinden(1S00),3S0 


CHAPTER  TENTH. 


FARMS,     OR     HOUSES. 


Introduction. 
Importance  of  farm  or  house  for  defence,  382 
Hovel  even  hard  to  take  if  well  defended,  3S2 
Brick  walls  best,  not  being  easily  breached,  3S3 
Attack  or  defence  of  block-house 383 

1.  Defence. 

Engineers  prepare  defence SS3 

Strongest  structure  converted  into  citadel,  383 
Assailant  should  be  compelled  to  lay  siege,  8S3 

Points  of  attack  must  be  lit  up 383 

Enclosures  or  buildings  are  garrisoned...  333 
Loopholes  must  be  pierced  through  walls,  884 
Harricades  of  openings  to  be  well  defended,  384 
Flank  and  machicoulis  fires  upon  openings,  384 
Ladders  must  be  overthrown  imme- 
diately   884 

Climbers  must  bo  dislodged  from  roof. . .  384 
Vigorous  sorties  and  counter-attacks  made,  384 
Fires  kindled  byenemy  to  be  extinguished,  385 


Garrison  makes  final  defence  in  redoubt,  885 
Main  body  escapes  while  few  hold  redoubt,  885 

2.  Attack. 

Eeconnoissance  preliminary  to  attack. 


Cavalry  watches  supports  and  entrances.. 

Defenders'  night-fires  extinguished 

Exterior  and  weak  points  lit  up 

Breaches  to  be  made  and  roofs  burned. . . 
Ambuscaded  skirmishers  fire  on  openings, 
Columns  assault  breaches  and  openings. . 
Scaling-ladders,  sand-bags,  &c.,  provided, 

Skirmishers  cover  assaulting  columns 

Doors  to  be  forced  and  passages  explored. 
Sheltered  area  seized  for  place  of  arms. .. 
Communications  made  to  place  of  arms.. 

Second  enclosure  carried  like  first 

Skirmishers  secure  roof  and  staircases... . 
Sorties  captured,  or  followed  into  house. . 
Infiintry  troops  chiefly  employed  in  attack. 
Houses  fired  under  protection  of  cavalry, 


385 
3S5 

885 

385 
880 


386 
386 
886 
386 
886 
387 
887 
387 
387 


CHAPTER  ELEVENTH. 

R  K  D  0  U  B  T  S  . 

Introduction.  I  1.  Defence. 

Eedoubts  properly  belong  to  fortification,  388    Garrison,  a  reserve  and  active  part 388 

Defend  points  assailable  on  all  sides 888  I  Active  part,  of  two-thirds,  man  parapets,  888 

Protect  hillocks,  debouches  of  defiles,  &c.,  888  |  Two  men  to  every  yard  of  parapet 888 

Used  for  fortifying  front  of  line  of  battle..  888  '  Eeserve  (first  section)  to  protect  entrance,  388 


454 


contejs:ts. 


PAGE 

llt'serve(second  section)  for  assailed  points,  3S8 
Commandant  explains  duties  to  troops. . .  388 

Sentinels  guard  redoubt  till  attacked 389 

Artillery  fire  opens  at  400  yards 389 

Musketry  opens  at  150  yards 389 

Mode  of  repelling  assault 389 

Repulsed  enemy  fired  upon  in  retreat. . .  389 
Successful  enemy  to  be  attacked  by  re- 
serve   389 

2.  Attack. 
Force  divided  into  three  columns 339 


PAGE 

Sappers  destroy  accessory  defences 389 

Supports  march  in  rear  of  coluuins 389 

Two  columns  make  false  attacks 890 

Principal  point  of  attack,  bow  selected. .  890 

Systematic  mode  of  attack  of  redoubt 390 

Duties  of  assailants  when  within  redoubt,  890 
Precautious  taken  after  gaining  redoubt,  391 
Attack  of  small  force  made  as  foragers. . .  391 

3.  Example. 

Attack  on  redoubts  at  Pultawa 892 

Ketreat  of  Swedes  to  Borysthenes 394 


CHAPTER  TWELFTH. 


B  ARRI  CADES. 


1.  Construction. 


Barricades  often  constructed  in  streets...  395 
Rules  for  construction  same  as  field  works,  395 
Placed  at  elevations  and  middle  of  blocks,  395 

Constructed  of  all  kinds  of  materials 395 

Best  of  paving  stones  and  earth 395 

High  and  steep,  with  ditch  and  banquette,  396 

2.  Defence. 

Defenders  Are  in  succession  on  assailants,  396 
Prepared  mine  outside  fired  from  within,  396 

Defence,  if  necessary,  hand  to  hand 396 

Activity,  vigilance,  and  courage  required,  396 


Artillery,  if  any,  will  fire  grapeshot 397 

Retreat  how  made,  and  Avay  obstructed..  397 

3.  Attack. 

Dangerous  when  made  on  small  front 397 

Carried  by  ruse,  surprise,  or  turned 397 

Reconnoissance  made  for  rear  approach. .  .397 
Defenders  dislodged  by  fire  from  houses,  397 
Destroyed  sometimes  by  mine  or  petard,  397 

Streets  too  narrow  for  attack  by  sap 398 

Moving  martlets  have  been  suggested 898 

Open  attack  the  last  resort 398 

Mode  of  assault  by  open  force 893 

Assault  failing,  bombardment  made 399 


CHAPTER  THIRTEENTH. 

FORAGES. 


1.  Object. 

Forage,  the  obtaining  food  for  horses 400 

Dry  foraging,  and  green  foraging 400 

Forages  formerly  important  operations..  400 

Forages  unimportant  at  present  time 400 

Forages  indispensable  for  light  cavalry..  401 
Brack's  experience  in  eight  campaigns. . .  401 

2.  Bistribtition. 

Foraging  distributed  among  troops 401 

Necessity  of,  and  mode  of  distribution. . .  402 
Number  of  rations  of  forage,  how  settled,  402 

Unit  of  measure  determined  by  trial 403 

Distribution,  by  whom  made 403 

3.  Dry  Foraging". 

Place  of  foraging  surrounded  and  guarded,  404 
Supplied  on  requisition,  or  taken  by  force,  404 


Surprise  or  marauding,  how  prevented. . .  404 
Forages  made  in  but  one  village  at  a  time,  405 

4.   Green  Porag-ing-. 

Preparations  for  making  a  green  forage..  405 
Occupation  and  guarding  place  of  foraging,  405 

Horses  left  outside  of  foraging  ground 406 

Defence  and  escort  of  foraging  party 406 

Green  foraging  less  dangerous  than  dry..  406 

Must  not  embrace  too  much  ground 406 

5.  Attack  of  a  Forag-ing  Party. 

Cavalry  attacks  green, and  infantry  dry..  406 
Seci-ecy  great  element  of  success  in  attack,  406 
Foragers  cut  off  from  posts  and  escorts..  406 
Attack  sudden  and  rapid,  with  false  ones,  407 
Foragers  to  be  driven  off,  but  not  pursued,  407 
Forage,  if  not  broken  up,  to  be  harrassed,  407 
Ruse  excellent  auxiliary  in  attack 407 


CHAPTER   FOURTEENTH. 

DEFILES. 


Introduction. 

Defiles  defined  and  divided  into  two  classes,  408 


Roads  in  gorges,  ditches,  &c.— first  class,  408     Exert  important  influence  in  war 


Bridges,  necks,  dikes,  &c.— second  class..  408 
Easily  obstructed,  good  for  ambuscades,&c.  409 


CONTE?fTS. 


465 


PAGE 

First  class  almost  impregnable 409 

Example  of  defile  of  Tliermopylii; 409 

Second  class  forced  with  difficulty 409 

Example  of  dike  of  Areola 409 

Arms  used  iu  attack  and  defence 409 

1.  Occupation  and  Defence  of  a 
Defiie. 

Depends  upon  character,  jtc,  of  defile . . .  409 
Preserved,  or  use  by  enemy  prevented..  409 
Positions  to  be  occupied  for  defence 409 

2.  Passag-e  of  a  Defile. 

In  advance  not  difficult,  if  unoccupied. . .  410 

Mode  of  advancing  through  defile 410 

Passage  of  a  defile  in  retreat  more  difficult,  411 

Mode  of  passage  of  defile  in  retreat 411 

Precautions  to  be  observed  by  rear-guard,  412 
Troops  in  ia  defile  assimilated  to  a  serpeut,  412 

3.  Attack  of  a  Defile. 

Difficulty  of  attack  with  narrow  front .. .  413 
Difficult  to  attack  with  fianks  protected,  413 
Not  attacked  unless  essential  to  success. .  413 
Mode  of  conducting  the  attack  of  a  defile,  413 
Euse  tried  if  direst  attack  impracticable,  414 


PAGE 

I  Capturing  defile  by  false  demonstrations,  414 
I  Attacking  defiles  with  occupied  flanks. . .  414 

I  4.  Historical  Examples. 

j  Omit  no  precautions  when  near  a  defile,  415 

!  Passage  of  defile  near  Meissen,  in  1T45 . . .  415 

Cavalry  may,  as  an  exception,  force  a  defile,  416 

Passage  of  defile  of  Somo-Sierra,  in  1S03,  416 

Employment  of  flanking  attacks 417 

Harispe'sforciugdeflle  of  Cabreras,  in  180S,  417 

Passage  of  defile  in  Algeria,  in  ISoO 413 

Passage  of  a  defile  rapidly 418 

!  Passage  of  defile  on  Mount  Medola,  in  1796,  418 
}  Army  in  order  of  battle  before  a  defile. .  418 
!  Gus,  Adolphus  at  Leipsic  and  Leutzen..  419 

j  5.  Defence  and  Attack  of  a  Bridge. 

j  Mode  of  defending  a  bridge 419 

I  Mode  of  attacking  a  bridge 420 

Bridge  should  be  turned  by  fording,  &c. .  420 
!  Passage  of  bridge  of  Lodi,  in  1796 421 

;   6.  Defence  and  Attack  of  a  Dike. 

i  Dikes,  generally,  only  defended  in  front,  421 

I  Mode  of  defence  of  a  dike  in  front 422 

I  Mode  of  attack  of  a  dike  in  front 422 


CHAPTER  FIFTEENTH. 


TILLAGES. 


1.  Occupation. 

Villages  occupied  when  defensible 424 

Select  those  compactly  and  regularly  built,  424 

Occupied  if  important  to  the  army 424 

Information  to  be  obtained  before  occu- 
pation   425 

"Without  some  natural  defence  not  to  be 
occupied 425 

2.   Defence. 

Preparing  a  village  to  make  a  good  defence,  426 

Redoubt  to  be  in  central  position 426 

Artillery  posted  at  vulnerable  points 426 

Artillery  sweep  streets  and  open  places. .  426 
Flank  and  oblique  firing  most  effective. .  427 
Cavalry,  how  i>osted  for  the  best  defence,  427 

Infantry,  how  divided  and  posted 427 

Reserve  should  amount  to  about  one  fourth,  428 

Communications  to  bo  opened 428 

Sorties  conducted  briskly  and  with  caution,  428 
Enemy  to  be  repulsed,  but  not  pursued..  428 


Exterior  and  interior  defence 428 

Reserve  charges,  while  enemy  is  checked,428 
Counter-attacks  made  and  retreat  secured,  428 

3.  Attack. 

Attacks  on  villages  cost  too  many  men.,  428 
Superior  forces  and  howitzers  required..  429 
One  real  and  two  false  attacks  to  be  made,  429 
Division  of  force,  and  mode  of  attack.. .  429 
Duties  of  cavalry  in  assault  of  a  village. . .  431 

4.   Sudden  Attack. 

Made  by  surprise  or  vigorous  assault 431 

Adopted  in  Algeria  in  attack  of  villages..  431 

Tillages  carried  by  infantry  on  the  run. .  431 

5.  Historical  Examples. 

Attack  of  Xerwinden,  in  1693 431 

Attack  of  Fontenoy,  in  1745 432 

Attack  of  Essling  and  Aspern,  in  1809. . .  482 
Attack  of  Schcenfeld,  in  1813 432 


APPEl^DIX. 

UPON    nYGIENE    IX    THE    FIELD, 


Introduction. 

Difficult  for  soldier  to  write  on  hygiene . .  433 

Science  of  hygiene  defined 433 

Comfortable  clothing  contributes  to  health,  433 
Attention  paid  most  to  warm  climates. . .  433 


1.  Marches. 

Limited  to  strength,  hours,  and  districts,  434 
Care  observed  in  climbing  steep  ascents,  434 
Sudden  transitions  to  be  guarded  against,  434 
Indulgences  allowed  in  warm  climate ....  435 


456 


CONTENTS. 


PAor. 

Meu  well  clothed  and  fed  in  cold  climate,  435 
Warmed  by  exercise,  not  alcoholic  drinks,  435 
Strict  attention  to  be  paid  to  cleanliness,  435 
yick  seriously  threatened  sent  to  hospital,  435 

S.  Camps. 

Must  be  located  near  wood  and  water. . . .  4;35 
Pitched  near  banks  of  running  streams. .  430 

Wood  required  for  cooking  and  fuel 430 

Forests  moist  and  miasmatic 430 

High,  ventilated,  sloping,  and  drained. ..  430 
Huts  preferable  to  tents  except  on  march,  430 
Straw  bedding  renewed  and  old  burned. .  436 

Ofial  burned,  buried,  or  carried  off 436 

Night  exposure,  in  shirts  or  bare  feet,  bad,  436 
Incumbrances  to  be  removed  from  camps,  430 

Crowded  camps  liital  to  troops 430 

Troops  should  be  kept  active  and  at  work,  43G 


PAOB 

3.  Bivouacs. 

Generally  more  healthy  than  tents 487 

More  uncomfortable  than  camps 437 

Outposts  and  guards  generally  bivouac. . .  437 
Should  fulfil  same  conditions  as  camps. . .  437 
Troops  must  not  sleep  in  cold  without  fires,  4S1 
Shelter  tents  especially  suited  to  bivouacs,  437 

4.  Field  Hospitals. 

llegimental,  division,  and  of  headquarters,  488 
For  immediate  relief  of  sick  and  wounded,  438 

Those  of  headquarters  commodious 438 

Established  in  liouses,  tents,  or  open  air,  488 
Near  water,  and  removed  from  enemy..  43S 

Provided  with  litters,  stretchers,  &c 438 

Severely  wounded  sent  at  once  to  them,  438 
Slight  wounds  staunched  on  the  spot —  433 


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